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The last two decades have witnessed a ‘paradigm shift’ in conservation and natural resource 
management away from costly state-centred control towards approaches in which local 
people play a much more active role. The inefficiency of state control over woodland and 
water use, has partly led to the enactment of decentralisation policies to facilitate 
participation of local actors in resource management. Within the decentralisation discourse, 
there is a renewed debate on the role of institutions in community-based natural resource 
management (CBNRM). Using a case study of Romwe catchment, Chivi district in southern 
Zimbabwe, this thesis examines the role of local level institutions, both formal and informal 
within donor supported CBNRM initiatives. Emphasis in the study is on the analysis of 
informal institutions, a focus that is rare in conventional CBNRM studies. Informal 
institutions are defined as those institutions that are not legally recognised by the state. 
These include cultural norms, beliefs and social networks. The study explores how these 
institutions influence patterns of women’s and men’s access to woodlands and water 
resources. The study further examines the gendered aspects of decision-making processes in 
CBNRM.  
 
The study finds that at community level, there are a multiplicity of institutions and 
management structures with unclear mandates and jurisdictions. This may partly explain the 
state’s recentralisation of management authority at the Rural District Council (RDC) level 
rather than devolution to levels below the RDC. While there is often reference to formal 
and informal institutions in the CBNRM literature, the dichotomy between these institutions 
is overemphasised in theoretical debates. In practice, there are inter-linkages and overlaps. 
Relations between the various forms of institutional structures are influenced by a diversity 
of factors that include power dynamics. These power dynamics influence processes of 
negotiating resource access by various actors. In the process of negotiating resource access 
and use, conflicts may inevitably emerge as was found in Romwe. 
 
Although women have historically been sidelined in formal decision-making processes, this 
study finds that with the emergence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), women 
have become more actively involved. Women’s access to productive resources such as land 
and water has also been enhanced through garden projects. There is some indication of 
changes in the institutional framework at the local level, with women playing a much 
bigger role in formal decision-making processes.  
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CHAPTER ONE: SETTING THE RESEARCH 
AGENDA 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The last two decades have witnessed a ‘paradigm shift’ in conservation and 
natural resource management (NRM) away from costly state-centred 
control towards approaches in which local people play a much more active 
role in most post-colonial African countries (Murphree, 1991; Shackleton, 
et al., 2001). Colonial natural resource management policies had resulted 
in over-centralisation because they were designed in the context of 
conquest and subjugation (Mandondo, 2000a; Ribot, 1999). Much of the 
colonial legislation was inherited piecemeal and sometimes wholesale by 
most post-colonial governments, and amendments to the colonial 
legislation in Southern African countries have not democratised the various 
legal instruments (Mandondo, 2000a). However, state control over the use 
and management of natural resources such as woodlands has been largely 
ineffective because the state lacks the resources and capacity to enforce 
such controls. This has, since the early 1990s, partly led to the enactment 
of decentralisation policies to facilitate the participation of local 
communities in resource management. This development coincided with 
the general shift in the development paradigm from top-down to the 
adoption of bottom-up, participatory approaches, aimed at ensuring 
sustainable use and management of natural resources (Shackleton & 
Campbell, 2001; Ribot, 1999).  
 
The theme of sustainable natural resource use
1 has been on the 
international agenda since the first global environmental conference in 
1972 in Stockholm, Sweden. Since then, the predominant strategies of 
privatisation of the common pool resources, enforcement of state 
regulations and seeking technical solutions to environmental management 
problems have not prevented further depletion of local and national 
common pool resources (Steins, 1999). A bleak narrative of resource 
degradation characterised most countries in the south: soil erosion, 
declining biological diversity in terrestrial and aquatic resources and 
increasing desertification (Madzudzo, 2002). This gloomy picture was 
attributed to the state centred approach to common pool resource 
management and the exclusion of local communities in resource 
management. To ameliorate this state of the environment, there has been a 
shift from seeking technical solutions to natural resource management 
 
1 The concept of sustainability re-emerged in the late 1980s as a key one in the environment field and 
was defined as meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their needs (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). The 
call for sustainability not only puts focus on the design of the societal development philosophy 
itself, but also points at the interlinkages between the natural world and the socio-economic and 
cultural aspects (Stockholm Group for Studies on Natural Resource Management, 1988).   
   2
                                                          
problems to a focus on social and institutional issues in resource 
management (Steins, 1999; Sithole, 1999) and this has been spearheaded 
through donor funded community-based natural resource management 
(CBNRM) initiatives. CBNRM has been defined as “ideas, policies, 
practices and behaviours that seek to give those who live in rural 
environments greater involvement in managing the natural resources that 
exist in their areas in which they reside (be it permanently or temporarily) 
and/or greater access to benefits derived from those resources” (Hulme & 
Murphree, 2001). 
 
In the decentralisation of resource management discourse, there is a 
renewed debate on the role of institutions in common pool
2 natural 
resource management in the context of CBNRM. Common pool resources 
are defined as resources that generate finite quantities of resource units and 
one person’s use subtracts from the quantity of resource units available to 
others (Ostrom et al., 1994). Most common pool resources are sufficiently 
large that multiple actors can simultaneously use the resource system and 
efforts to exclude potential beneficiaries are costly (Ostrom, 1999). The 
literature on institutions in CBNRM argue that actors’ practices regarding 
resource use are shaped and made possible within a set institutional 
framework: institutions being regularised patterns of behaviour emerging 
from underlying structures or sets of rules in use (Leach et al., 1997; Berry, 
1989). An institutional analysis approach in CBNRM generates some 
understanding of what different actors do and why. Institutions specify the 
relationship among people regarding access to resources and therefore their 
effectiveness has implications for sustainable resource use. As the state 
shifts formal responsibility and rights over natural resources such as 
woodlands and water to local users’ institutional structures (as 
representatives of the communities), actors in these structures take over the 
responsibility of controlling access to natural resources in their locality 
(Meinzen-Dick & Zwarteveen, 2001). It therefore becomes important to 
examine who within these structures performs what tasks, who controls 
resource use, decision-making and related benefits.  
 
Within the literature on institutions, some debates have centred on the 
difference between institutions and organisations. According to North 
(1990:5), institutions are the rules of the game while organisations are 
taken to be the "players" or the groups of actors "bound together by some 
common purpose". Regarding the debates on differences between 
institutions and organisations, recent views suggest that definitions do not 
matter, but what matters is understanding their jurisdictions (Murphree, 
2000; Clarke, 1997; Folke et al., 1998); issues surrounding accountability 
(Ribot, 1999, 1998 & 1995; Peluso, 1992, Murombedzi, 1992; Matondi, 
 
2 The term common pool resources will be used because, as other studies have shown, the system in the 
Zimbabwean context, especially in relation to woodlands, lacks key characteristics of a true 
common property regime (Campbell et al., 2001; Goebel, 1998; Mandondo, 1997; Nemarundwe, 
2001).   3
                                                          
2001); the form and nature of institutional representation of different actors 
(Narayan, 2000; Mukamuri, 2000; Madzudzo, 2002; Sithole, 2001) and 
effectiveness (Narayan, 2000; Ribot, 1999). In relation to issues of 
representation, power
3 and its related dynamics becomes a key variable in 
determining whose interests are or are not catered for by the institutions 
given the diversity of actors involved in CBNRM. Institutions also 
encompass formal legally constructed and informal rules and regulations. 
At the local level, institutions are often informal, based on traditional 
norms and values (Folke & Colding, 2001). Some of the local level 
institutions may be more directly associated with resource management 
activities, while others may be more closely associated with cultural belief 
systems. Organisations, referred to in this thesis as institutional structures 
(following Pretty & Ward, 2001), can be seen as authority systems, which 
ensure that rules and access rights are adhered to. They are mechanisms 
people use to control their use of the environment and their behaviour 
towards each other (Bromley, 1991). It is often difficult to separate 
institutions from the structures that ensure that the institutions are adhered 
to, thus this study examines both where relevant. 
 
In this thesis, institutions are considered within the framework of power, 
process and participation in CBNRM (Goebel, 1998; Mandondo, 2001). 
This framework recognises that although actors (as individuals or groups) 
and institutional structures may wield power, the exercise of such power is 
usually mediated by a variety of factors including those grounded in the 
contexts in which power operates (Moore, 1996 & 1993). The wielding of 
power presupposes the exercise of yielding to it, of recognising the other as 
powerful (Villarreal, 1994), thus power is a relational concept. The 
mediation of power through a variety of factors is usually a reflection of 
the contestation and negotiation of interests between and among various 
actors in a given context (Moore, 1993; Scott, 1985). The institutional 
analysis approach adopted for this study also situates contemporary 
patterns of access, use and control over woodlands and water resources 
within a historical perspective as argued for by a number of scholars 
(Berry, 1989; Mandondo, 2000a; Moore, 1993; Moyo, 1995a). Detailed 
analyses of African agrarian and pastoral conflicts have stressed the 
embeddedness of struggles over resource use and control within historical 
patterns of access to critical natural resources (Matondi, 2001; Moore, 
1993; Richards, 1983). 
 
A central concern of this thesis is to examine the role of local level 
institutions, both codified (formal), and non-codified (informal i.e. a term 
often used to refer to traditional, indigenous ones) in CBNRM. In the case 
of Zimbabwe, the term formal or modern institutional structures refers to 
governance structures of the state that include the village development 
 
3 Following Foucault (1979), power is considered to be a strategy. Power is exercised rather than 
possessed (ibid: 26) and is constituted in social relationships, such as networks, alliances and 
conflicts.   4
committees (VIDCOs) and ward development committees (WADCOs) that 
are elected. It also refers to technical departments of the state that provide 
extension services on agriculture and natural resources such as Agritex, the 
Forestry Commission (FC) and Department of Natural Resources (DNR). 
Given the existence of a body of civil society organisations (NGOs and 
research institutes) in the study area, these also fall within this broad 
categorisation. These can either be locally or externally based. The term 
‘traditional’ refers to locally based institutions such as the sabuku, the 
headman, chief, traditional healer, the spirit mediums and community 
elders. These positions are inherited through lineage and kinship ties with 
leadership circulating among families. Sabuku is a position that was 
introduced during the colonial period, but the positions of chief and 
headman were in place during the pre-colonial period. The role of the 
sabuku was to collect tax and keep ‘books’ with village records. The term 
sabuku literally means the keeper of the book, i.e. records of taxes 
extracted from the African population by the colonial governments through 
these leaders. The use of the term ‘traditional’ is said to be problematic in 
the literature because it has been applied to practices and institutions that 
are not static but rather evolving and subject to modification by negotiation 
between various natural resource user groups and state institutions (Berry, 
1993; Havnevik and Hårsmar, 1999). For instance, the property rights 
regimes often labelled as ‘traditional’ constitute complex outcomes of 
cultural and environmental change, and thus should be understood as 
dynamic phenomena (Ranger, 1993). Most of the so-called traditional 
authorities were remoulded to extend colonial rule over the African 
population through a system of indirect rule.  
 
Emphasis in this study is placed on the informal institutions. There is a 
tendency in the institutional literature to recognise the importance of 
informal institutions, but nevertheless to concentrate on the analysis of 
formal organisations (e.g. King, 1994; Uphoff, 1986). The emphasis in 
these studies is often placed on committees and formal property rights as 
mechanisms for reducing transaction costs and institutionalising 
cooperative interactions. Such a focus is often prescriptive, with formalised 
institutional arrangements being considered more likely to be robust and 
enduring than informal ones (Cleaver, 1998). Contrary to these studies that 
place emphasis on formal institutions, this thesis investigates the role of 
both formal and informal institutions within CBNRM with the aim of 
contributing to the ongoing debates on institutional issues in common pool 
resource management and the role of institutions in facilitating sustainable 
use of natural resources. The concept of ‘informal’ institutions refers to 
those institutions that are not legally recognised by the state such as 
cultural norms, values, beliefs and social networks and/or kinship ties. 
These informal institutions are often upheld by mutual agreement (not 
written down), relations of power or authority and are enforced 
endogenously (Cousins, 1997). Leach et al., (1999) define formal 
institutions as rules that require third party enforcement and apply to law 
courts. Following Leach et al., (1999), the term formal institutions is used   5
to refer to state-related institutions such as those established by rural 
district councils (RDCs), with legal recognition and theoretically enforced 
by VIDCOs.  
 
A 1984 Prime Ministerial directive created the VIDCOs and WADCOs, 
purportedly to give a democratic orientation to the process of planning for 
local development. In principle, the system is based on the concept of 
popular representation (Makumbe, 1996). The VIDCO is the lowest unit of 
government administration, which is expected to identify the needs of the 
village and articulate them through the development of a village plan that is 
forwarded to the WADCO. The WADCO draws its membership from the 
chairpersons of the VIDCOs and it is presided over by an elected 
councillor. The elected councillor represents the ward at district level. A 
WADCO purportedly receives the plans of its constituent VIDCOs and 
consolidates them into a ward development plan. Councillors then forward 
these plans to the district council where they are submitted to the Rural 
District Development Committee (RDDC), the district’s supreme planning 
body that is tasked with consolidating the various ward plans into the 
district annual and five year plans. The RDDC is chaired by the District 
Administrator (DA) who is a government employee representing the 
Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development 
(MLGRUD). This committee includes heads of sectoral ministries, 
chairpersons of the Rural District Council (RDC)’s various subcommittees, 
and district heads of national security organs such as the police (Makumbe, 
1998). Membership of the RDDC is predominantly made up of bureaucrats 
and technocrats at the expense of ‘popular’ representatives of grassroots 
structures (Mandondo, 2000a: 11).  
 
The study further investigates the nature of informal institutions, how 
they relate to other local level natural resource management institutions 
(e.g. those established by non-governmental organisations), their influence 
on formal institutions, women’s and men’s access to woodland and water 
resources and whether this institutional set-up promotes or obstructs the 
sustainable use of these natural resources in Chivi district, southern 
Zimbabwe. The specific focus of the study is on woodland and water 
resources. These two natural resources were selected in order to determine 
whether the characteristics of the resource itself affects the management 
institution’s influence and/or determines who has access to and control 
over what resource and in which places. Murphree (1993) suggests that the 
nature of the resource has a bearing on its management. For instance, trees 
are fixed to a given land base and can be privatised or remain in the 
commons with no intrinsic difficulties, yet other resources like wild 
mammals are generally mobile or fugitive and less amenable to 
privatisation (ibid: 3). Fugitive natural resources are often difficult to claim 
ownership or have control over as compared to the more fixed resources 
such as woodlands.  
   6
                                                          
While institutional analysis in CBNRM has put emphasis on the formal 
institutional structures, there are other informal and often hidden 
institutions such as social networks that are important for appropriating 
resources (Matondi, 2001; Sithole, 2001 & 1999). Such social networks 
include, kinship ties, burial societies, funerals, women’s tea drinking 
gatherings, work parties and informal meetings e.g. at the well and other 
social gatherings such as beer drinking (ndari). It is important to 
understand informal institutions such as social networks functioning at 
village level as they impact on the formal institutions as well as the 
sustainable use of woodland and water resources. In this thesis, the term 
‘networks’ is used to refer to either kin or non-kin associations that people 
establish for particular purposes with others in their locality or in another 
place. This thesis documents the form and nature of some of these social 
networks within Romwe and how they relate to and/or influence
4 CBNRM 
and the sustainable use of woodlands and water. Particular attention is paid 
to how various cliques may use these hidden institutions to manipulate 
leaders or appropriate leadership positions. It is therefore pertinent not only 
to understand which institutional structures are considered more powerful 
but also which ones are more influential in determining access to 
woodlands and water.  
 
Gender differentiated impacts of such informal institutions are also 
explored. Because women and the poor are often excluded from 
involvement in formal community institutions, they tend to rely heavily on 
informal institutions that may offer them a hedge in fulfilling their 
household responsibilities (Berry, 1993; Narayan, 2000:6). The 
accountability of both formal and informal institutions, especially at the 
local level, has been questioned in recent literature (Ribot, 1999; 
Mandondo, 2001; Matondi, 2001).  
 
In the CBNRM discourse, local communities are generally held to be the 
appropriate institutions for local natural resource management (Murphree, 
1991). In theory, a minimum set of conditions is considered to underlie the 
existence of effective management of common pool resources use (Ostrom, 
1990). These conditions that are thought to enhance the success and 
sustainability of institutions for natural resource management include a 
clearly bounded user group, clearly defined resource boundaries, a system 
of graduated sanctions imposed on those who violate the rules, and public 
conflict resolution mechanisms (Ostrom, 1990). Communities involved 
presumably share common norms and are bound together by a common 
interest in achieving collective outcomes (McCay & Acheson, 1987; 
Berkes & Farvar, 1989). Smaller communities are held to be more 
organisationally cost effective since their members are expected to be in 
 
4 Sithole, forthcoming, quotes Schmidt (1992) who suggests that some distinction should be made 
between power and influence because emphasis has been on issues of power and not influence of 
various actors in CBNRM. Sithole argues that most marginalized groups such as women prefer 
influence to power. Influence is said to represent the strategies of those without formal power to 
limit the power of others and the way in which that power impinges upon their lives.      7
everyday social contact allowing for informal peer pressure to mitigate 
against high transaction costs. CBNRM initiatives often draw inspiration 
from the above images of a community. The design and implementation of 
CBNRM in Zimbabwe and other developing countries have been 
orchestrated within the resource management decentralisation discourse. 
 
1.1.1. Decentralised institutional arrangements for CBNRM 
CBNRM is situated within the theoretical framework seeking to empower 
local communities through decentralised entrustments regarding the use 
and management of natural resources in their locality (Mandondo, 2001; 
Murombedzi, 1994). Entrustment refers to the size and content of the 
package of powers, responsibilities and authority transferred from one level 
of social organisation to another (Ribot, 1999; Mandondo, 2000b). Since 
the 1970s, decentralisation in various forms has been recommended as a 
way to reduce problems that occur when a highly centralised public agency 
is used to manage natural resources in different localities (Ostrom et al., 
1993). The assumption that decentralisation is the answer to sustainability 
problems has been supported by case studies mainly being drawn from the 
context of infrastructural development (e.g. Cohen et al., 1981). It is 
argued that when local actors, who are the users of the natural resource, are 
involved in decision-making, they invest substantial resources such as time 
in ensuring sustainable utilisation of those resources (Cernea, 1985). The 
concept of decentralisation describes a process by which bundles of 
entrustments, including regulatory and decision-making powers, 
responsibility for planning and implementation and administrative 
capacity, are variously transferred to local groupings such as local 
governments and/or communities (Mandondo, 2000a; Agrawal & Gibson, 
1999). Decentralisation can occur in two forms, either through 
deconcentration or devolution. In deconcentration, the central government 
transfers some of the entrustments to lower levels but these remain 
responsible and accountable to central government (Ostrom, et al., 1993). 
The central government reserves the right to supervise, overturn or 
withdraw the entrustments. Ostrom et al., refer to this form of 
decentralisation (i.e. deconcentration) as ‘temporary devolution’ of 
authority within a bureaucracy to lower level officials, combined with 
enhanced opportunities for citizen participation (ibid: 164).  
 
In devolution, the entrustments are transferred more or less completely to 
the local authorities or users. In this case, there is distribution or 
redistribution of authority to make decisions and to take action by local 
governments or local users independently of the central administration of 
the state. Weber (1962) defines the state as a clearly defined set of 
institutions with official powers. But, it is not easy to draw neat lines 
between the state, civil society and civil society organisations. The state is 
an amorphous entity of elected politicians and non-elected civil servants 
and other actors with different interests and often conflicting preferences 
(Hasler, 1993). The central government may retain overall legal control but   8
                                                          
local governments are empowered to make decisions unlike in the context 
of deconcentration (Wunsch, 2001). Most CBNRM initiatives aim at 
devolution of entrustments to local communities. Devolution is sometimes 
referred to as democratic decentralisation within the CBNRM discourse 
(Ribot, 2003; Mapedza & Mandondo, 2001). In the Zimbabwean context 
the decentralisation process has both elements of deconcentration and 
devolution. For example, within the Communal Areas Management 
Programme for Indigenous Resources – CAMPFIRE
5 in which appropriate 
authority is decentralised to RDCs, the department of national parks retains 
certain levels of control and also the resource sharing scheme facilitated by 
the Forestry Commission (FC) – where local users can make certain 
decisions (e.g. on the use of non-timber products) independent of the FC, 
but cannot make other decisions such as the use of timber or game found in 
the forest reserve. This thesis therefore uses the term decentralisation 
because the CBNRM programmes in question are analysed regardless of 
the form of decentralisation.  
 
The literature on decentralisation in the context of CBNRM has 
concentrated on defining what should be decentralised, to whom (often 
groups treated as bounded entities), how and with what effect without 
systematically exploring the impact of decentralisation policies on 
institutional and power relations in the community at the beginning of the 
process (Murphree, 1991; Murombedzi, 1991; Mandondo, 2000a; 
Mamdani, 1996; Ribot 1999). From the literature that has focused on what 
is to be decentralised, elements presented in Table 1.1 can be discerned as 
being transferable by central government to lower levels.  The conferment 
of any of the rights presented in Table 1.1 on specific actors places an 
obligation on other actors to recognise such rights. In practice, people often 
use and assert claims to resources that they are neither entitled to nor own.  
 
5 CAMPFIRE is a community-based wildlife management programme that entails community 
participation in resources management. Economic benefits from wildife accrue to the community 
and are used for community development projects or are distributed amongst the households.   9
Table 1.1. What should be decentralised? 
 
What can be 
decentralised? 
Characteristics 
Access
6  Ability to derive benefits from the natural resources. 
Withdrawal  Rights and ability to obtain units of a resource.  
Management  Rights to regulate internal use patterns and to direct day-to-day 
stewardship. The right of management is a collective choice right 
authorising its holders to devise operational level withdrawal rights 
governing use of the resource.   
Exclusion  Rights to determine who has access. The right of exclusion is also a 
collective choice right authorising its holders to devise operational 
level rights of access. 
Alienation  Rights to sell or lease management of exclusion rights. Having 
alienated those rights means that the former rights holders can no 
longer exercise their authority in relation to the resource. 
  
Source: adapted from Ostrom & Schlager, 1996.   
 
Like property, which is a relational concept, ‘rights’ is also a relational 
concept. Thus rights are only secure to the extent to which others are 
willing to recognise them (Frost & Mandondo, 1999). In spite of its merits, 
the emphasis on ‘rights’ runs the risk of ignoring factors such as ability, 
capacity, resource endowments and decision-making autonomy, which are 
all critical components of an effective decentralisation process. Institutional 
dynamics and patterns of social interaction at the local level also make the 
decentralisation process a complex one. Similarly, access to natural 
resources at the community level is subject to multiple and competing 
interests and institutional arrangements. The formal and systematic transfer 
of entrustments may therefore at times have limited connection with the 
source of influence and power at community level. Thus it is not enough to 
define what is to be decentralised or the mere specification of entrustments 
(Ribot, 1999). In practice, decentralisation turns out to be a patchy and 
complex process, operating within arenas characterised by contestation and 
negotiation of interest between and within various levels of society 
(Moore, 1993; Mapedza & Mandondo, 2001). More powerful actors in a 
given context may manipulate the process of decentralisation to their own 
advantage.  
 
Power imbalances in a given community or among a diversity of actors 
may translate into inequalities of access to natural resources within the set 
institutional framework. It is only recently that CBNRM studies have 
begun to examine the heterogeneity of communities and how 
decentralisation of resource management has affected the different 
                                                           
6  Access to natural resources depends on an individual’s position and power within particular sets of 
social relationships. The concept of access is here defined following Ribot & Peluso (2001) as the 
‘ability to derive benefits from things’, in this case natural resources. This definition makes the 
concept of access broader than the classical notion of property defined as ‘the right to benefit from 
things’ by emphasising the ability rather than the right to benefits.   
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community groups, such as women (Shackleton & Campbell, 2001; 
Shackleton et al., 2001; Meinzen-Dick & Zwarteveen, 2001; Sithole, 2001; 
Nabane, 1997). These studies have shown that decentralisation of resource 
management to local communities, with multiple and often competing 
interests and actors, go beyond the mere targeting of appropriate 
‘communities'. Communities are highly differentiated along several axes 
that include gender (Mvududu 1995; Goebel 1998; Hunter, et al., 1990), 
wealth, educational levels, ethnicity and longevity of residence in a given 
locality (Dzingirai, 1998; Nhira, 1994). Decentralisation should therefore 
be representative of the diverse groups found in the community in order to 
cater for the multiple interests and aspirations (Ribot, 1999). While these 
studies highlight the importance of social differentiation within 
communities and challenge the notion of ‘community’ as a homogenous 
entity, they tend to portray the powerful actors as if they exist in a vacuum, 
yet the concept of power is relational. These studies overlook the fact that 
the ‘less powerful’ may devise a variety of strategies to ensure that their 
interests are catered for (Jackson, 1998; Scott, 1986 & 1985; Villarreal, 
1994). Such strategies are often informal and may therefore be viewed as 
trivial, yet they may influence CBNRM outcomes, sustainable resource use 
and the institutional framework governing access to natural resources. 
 
Decentralisation coincided with the mainstreaming of participatory 
approaches in development theory and practice, advocating that local 
resource users should play a much more active role in the protection and 
management of natural resources (Chambers, 1995 & 1993; Shackleton & 
Campbell, 2001). These reforms purportedly aim to increase resource user 
participation in natural resource management decisions and benefits 
through the transfer of management authority to local level organisations. 
Some development practitioners believe that community participation leads 
to sustainable natural resource use since the local users benefit from and 
are involved in decision-making processes regarding how resources should 
be allocated and managed. Community participation in resource 
management was attractive for CBNRM proponents because of its apparent 
democratising tendencies enabling local actors to take charge of the natural 
resources that they have day-to-day contact with. Community participation 
is believed to promise political, economic, conservation, sustainable use 
and development desires of a wide spectrum of actors. However, as regards 
the planning and implementation of the participatory process, there has 
often been limited concern for patterns of interaction and power relations 
that impact on (or are impacted upon by) the institutional framework 
governing access to woodlands and water. 
 
1.1.2. Community participation in CBNRM and institutional development 
The philosophy behind the participatory approaches to natural resource 
management is that these approaches may address inequalities by helping 
to retain and distribute the benefits of local management initiatives within 
the community and hence provide new opportunities for broader   11
community development (Ribot, 1999). Further, community participation 
in resource management may increase economic and managerial efficiency 
in three ways: 
 
1.  By allowing local people who bear the cost of natural resource 
management to make decisions, rather than leave decision-making 
in the hands of outsiders or unaccountable local people. 
2.  By reducing administrative and management transaction costs via 
the proximity of local participants. 
3.  By using local knowledge, values and aspirations in project design, 
planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation (Murphree, 
1991; Mohammed-Katerere, 2001).  
 
Notwithstanding the importance of people’s participation in CBNRM, it 
is argued here that participation is itself an outcome of the institutional 
framework within which it is embedded. It cannot be seen as something 
that can bring about the success of CBNRM if only certain actors are 
sufficiently involved in resource management. Participation itself is a 
socially embedded phenomenon and not something that can be elicited at 
will. The implication of this contention is that the participatory approach to 
natural resource management cannot bypass structural and institutional 
constraints arising from e.g. power relations and patterns of interaction in a 
given community (Admassie, 1995). Participatory natural resource 
management also needs to take cognisance of the unequal relations that 
exist between actors. This is important for understanding patterns of 
human-environment interaction and possible associated conflicts that may 
emerge in the process of interaction. These unequal relations need to be 
assessed in relation to the power that each actor commands and which 
actors influence the outcome of CBNRM. Furthermore, the central 
concepts of participatory resource management being applied to most 
donor-funded CBNRM initiatives in Africa did not originate from 
empirical and analytical investigation of realities of rural life and power 
relations in the different countries, but rather they emerged from theoretical 
constructs, mostly developed in the North. This may have important 
implications for the manner in which participatory processes are facilitated. 
 
In the context of CBNRM, there is a continuing danger of the 
participatory approaches being seen by some as a panacea for solving 
environmental problems. The concept of participation is problematic in that 
it is variously defined in different contexts. There is little agreement among 
writers who have theorised on the concept of participation regarding the 
nature and the range or the means and ends of the participation. 
Participation may take many forms, it occurs along a continuum from 
tokenism (nominal participation) to interactive participation. Besides the 
divergent views on participation, there are also differing perspectives on 
who is expected to participate, what exactly is to be achieved and how it 
should be brought about (Pretty, 1995). At its narrowest, participation in a 
group context is defined in terms of nominal membership and at its   12
broadest as being a dynamic interactive process in which the disadvantaged 
have a voice and influence in decision-making (Narayan, 1996). In terms 
of objectives, at its narrowest, participation is judged almost entirely by its 
potential efficiency effects and at its broadest by its ability to enhance 
equity, efficiency, empowerment and environmental sustainability (Uphoff, 
1991).  
 
Participation has been described through a range of levels, on one 
extreme as cooption (which is sometimes referred to as nominal 
participation) and on the other, collective action (Table 1.2). It is worth 
noting that there are a number of typologies of participation, e.g. Arnstein 
(1969) and Pretty et al., (1995). Agarwal’s (2001) typology was found 
more relevant for this study because the typologies developed by Arnstein 
(1969) and Pretty et al., (1995) refer to ‘partnership’ and in the context of 
donor-funded CBNRM initiatives, the concept of ‘partnership’ raises a 
number of questions regarding the nature of partnership. For example, one 
could question whether there is a level playing field between the locals 
(who are often resource poor) and external facilitators (who are endowed 
with both financial and material resources).  
 
 Table  1.2.  Typology of participation 
 
Form/Level of participation 
(presented in ascending order) 
Characteristics/Features 
Nominal participation  Membership in the group. 
Passive participation  Being informed of decisions ex post facto; or 
attending meetings, listening in on decision-
making without speaking up. 
Consultative participation  Being asked an opinion in specific matters 
without guarantee of influencing decisions. 
Activity-specific participation  Being asked to (or volunteering to) undertake 
specific tasks. 
Active participation  Expressing opinions whether or not solicited or 
taking initiatives of other sorts. 
Interactive participation 
(empowering) 
Having a voice and influence in the group’s 
decisions.  
 
  Source: Agarwal, 2001.  
 
Achieving effective participation would involve a shift from the lower 
(nominal participation) to the higher levels (interactive participation), with 
the levels being defined by the extent of people’s activeness. While it is 
noble to encourage community participation in CBNRM, there are limits as 
to what participation alone can achieve (even interactive participation) in 
terms of equity and efficiency, given existing socio-economic inequalities 
and power relations. Studies undertaken to test the degree of power shift 
and decision-making to the communities through CBNRM, for example, 
Goebel (1998), Meinzen-Dick & Zwarteveen (2001) and Nabane (1997)   13
show such shifts generally favour men and rarely women. A relevant 
question relates to what determines participation in CBNRM.  
 
Participation in the context of CBNRM is found mainly to depend on the 
following factors:  
 
a)  Rules of entry – the criteria for defining membership in the 
‘community’ and institutional structures. 
b)  Social norms that define, for instance, who should attend and speak 
up at meetings (i.e. the self-images of women and men in that 
group) and how women and men should behave in public. 
c) Social perceptions regarding for example, women and other 
disadvantaged groups’ ability to contribute to CBNRM activities. 
d)  Entrenched territorial claims. 
e)  Personal endowments and attributes, for example, wealth status, 
educational levels, age, ethnicity and marital status. 
f)  Household endowments and attributes, which define where women 
fall in the structural hierarchies of e.g. class or socio-economic 
well-being (Agarwal, 2001).    
 
The above factors may disadvantage women and the poor both separately 
and as groups. Women and the poor group’s ability to alter these 
conditions will depend on their bargaining power vis-à-vis the family, 
community and the state. For the donor-funded CBNRM facilitators to 
achieve community participation, there is need to take cognisance of these 
factors as they impact in various ways on project activities. If such factors 
are not considered, the concept of participatory resource management may 
reinforce top-down orientations since most initiatives are defined according 
to the terms and processes of external agents, usually the donors or their 
intermediaries who are often the local facilitators (Byron, 1997). Despite 
the policy commitment to CBNRM, there is accumulating evidence that 
many CBNRM programmes have led to a shift in the site of conflicts, from 
community-state to more local power struggles (Dzingirai, 1998; 
Madzudzo, 2002). Increasing local institutional conflicts and power 
struggles, for instance between traditional authorities and local government 
structures as well as other institutional structures established by CBNRM 
facilitators, are also emerging.  
 
To understand and appreciate the role of power in conditioning patterns 
of human-environment interaction, it is necessary to adopt an inclusive 
understanding of power. This implies encompassing material and non-
material considerations as well as the apparent fluidity of power itself in 
the analysis (Bryant & Bailey, 1997). This thesis uses an actor-oriented 
approach in order to assess the ways and forms that actors seek to exert 
control over the natural resource institutions in relation to other actors 
including how weaker actors resist their more powerful counterparts. Weak 
actors often find ways and means of challenging the more powerful ones 
(Scott, 1986 & 1985). Weaker actors may challenge stronger actors either   14
in overt or covert ways because it is rarely the case that one actor possesses 
overwhelming power over all other actors. As a result, in the relatively 
fluid circumstances that are associated with multiple power centres, weaker 
actors are often well placed to assert their interests vis-à-vis more powerful 
actors (Bryant & Bailey, 1997). Thus the ability for an actor to control or 
resist other actors is never permanent or fixed but always in a state of flux 
in CBNRM.  
 
1.1.3. CBNRM facilitation in the Zimbabwean context   
A key feature of CBNRM programmes in Zimbabwe is the assumption that 
institutions and institutional structures for resource management can be 
engineered (Luckert, 2000). The concept of institutional engineering has 
been used to refer to cases where external agencies enter a community and 
introduce new resource management structures, with little consideration for 
institutions already in place. In Zimbabwe, the newly introduced 
institutions are parallel to traditional as well as ruling party institutions 
(Makumbe, 1996). New structures often come in the form of catchment 
management committees, garden, boreholes, grazing, and dam committees. 
The structures often have the same membership regardless of their purpose. 
Such committees typically comprise seven members, the chairperson, vice 
chairperson, secretary, vice secretary, treasurer, and two committee 
members. The members are in theory, democratically elected into the 
office, but the external facilitators often wield advisory powers on the 
operations of these committees.  
 
The unequal relationship that exists between the external facilitators, 
with their advisory role and the structures established at the local level, 
may lead to subordination of democratic processes to bureaucratic control. 
The outcome may be that some local actors may not view these elected 
members as ‘community representatives’. This may further reinforce top-
down resource management orientations, contradicting the call for 
participatory and decentralised natural resource management. Furthermore, 
such structures are most often introduced into a complex organisational 
framework from which institutions for CBNRM have to be crafted. The 
new institutional structures are also established and juxtaposed in relation 
to a multitude of existing social, political and administrative structures that 
are variously aligned to state or customary forms of legitimacy. In 
establishing new structures, external facilitators have sought to mould 
seemingly local institutions, yet they often spearhead what in reality may 
be viewed as top-down conservation objectives and may therefore have 
negative implications for sustainable resource use and management at the 
local level. There is therefore need to examine the relationship of the newly 
created committees to other resource management structures in place prior 
to these interventions.  
 
The institutional engineering approach also assumes that resource users, 
management boundaries and institutional jurisdictions can be easily   15
defined or redefined. The approach assumes that ‘democratically’ 
established institutional structures cater for the interests and needs of their 
constituency, i.e. ‘the community’. The communities represented by these 
structures are believed to have distinct physical and resource use 
boundaries, a view that has been challenged in recent literature (Campbell 
et al., 2001; Guijt & Shah, 1998; James, 1999; Madzudzo, 2002; 
Mandondo, 1998). This study argues that the image often portrayed of 
“community institutions” in the context of CBNRM is incomplete because 
it overlooks the complex webs of interactions, informal institutions and 
contestations over resource control within the groups of the participating 
communities. Recent studies show that resource management structures 
and the institutional arrangements in place are characterised by 
heterogeneity, fluidity, and dynamic interactions at community level 
(Matondi, 2001; Sithole, 2001 & 1999; Steins, 1999). 
 
What emerges from literature on external social and political engineering 
of institutions (Murombedzi, 1992:46) and current experiences from the 
Romwe catchment, Zimbabwe, the research site for this thesis (Campbell et 
al., 2001) is that the process of institutional engineering may create further 
complexities in natural resource governance. Institutional engineering has 
in some cases been seen as contributing towards weakening of ‘traditional’ 
institutions, often key in natural resource management. For instance 
Fairhead & Leach (1996 & 1995) argue that local community institutions 
such as the traditional authority were once better capable of controlling 
environmental resources than they are today. This articulation attributes 
natural resource degradation to the breakdown of resource management 
institutions through the weakening of traditional institutions and the 
historical alienation of local resource control in favour of state structures. 
Natural resource users may either benefit or lose through the weakening of 
local level resource management institutions and the creation of multiple 
institutions in conditions of deteriorating natural resources through e.g. 
deforestation (Matondi, 2001). In other cases, poor households with limited 
access to land and natural resources have been further disadvantaged. The 
problem has sometimes been fuelled by ‘non-natural’ resource related 
struggles and the nature of power relations within the community 
(Matondi, 2001; Moore, 1996).  
 
In cases where external facilitators take cognisance of existing informal 
institutions at the local level, there have been calls for codification of these 
institutions, the assumption being that codification will make them more 
effective (Clarke, 1997; Mandondo 2000b; Matowanyika, 1991). Calls for 
codification tend to overlook the strengths of the non-codified management 
systems, which include flexibility in determining access to resources at a 
given time. Arguing against codification, Platteau (1995) uses evidence 
from land issues in Africa suggesting that formalising, for instance, land 
holdings through registration increases conflicts over land rights. Similar 
views are expressed by Havnevik (2000a & 1997) based on experiences 
from East Africa. Platteau (1995) argues that customary rights over   16
common pool natural resources and their inbuilt flexibility should be 
recognised in initiatives that aim to promote participatory resource 
management at the community level.    
 
The sustainability of the externally engineered institutions is also 
questionable. Institutional structures established to run CBNRM projects 
often disappear subsequent to the withdrawal of the facilitating agencies. 
The majority of external organisations often have funding contracts with a 
lifespan of three to five years. Furthermore, the existence of a number of 
actors at the local level often with both conflicting and complimentary 
needs and interests makes it necessary to promote collaboration. This 
collaboration should show responsiveness to emerging patterns of 
interaction and there should be clearly defined institutional mandates, 
jurisdictions and shared visions for CBNRM. This thesis argues that it is 
necessary to identify existing institutions and actors at the start of projects 
in order to be able to develop plans that may cater for the diversity of 
interests. Theoretically, institutions are relevant for resource management 
because they create order, reduce uncertainty and make individual action 
more predictable. This may however not always be the case on the ground 
as institutions take various forms, which may blur their role in natural 
resource management. The following section discusses the various 
institutional forms, referred to as the institutional taxonomy.    
 
1.1.4. Institutional Taxonomy 
There are different forms of institutions that regulate access to natural 
resources at the local level including the state, externally driven and 
indigenous or traditional institutions. Some institutions have an 
organisational form and these can be broadly divided into the state and 
civil society institutions (Narayan, 2000:9). State institutions are located at 
the national, regional and local levels. Civil society institutions include 
those facilitated by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
community-based organisations (CBOs). Other institutions found at the 
local level include social associations (networks) and kinship networks. 
Table 1.3 presents a typology of institutions that formed the basis for 
institutional classification during this study, without overlooking the 
fluidity of the boundaries across these categories. The analysis of this 
typology of institutions flows out of the Zimbabwean situation.  
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The institutional typology presents a diverse set of institutional structures 
but it is worth pointing out that these taxonomies are not exclusive of each 
other. There exist overlaps across categories, for instance local institutions 
can be either formal or informal. This makes understandable the confusion 
that can be discerned in the literature on institutions relating to definitions 
and classifications. Despite these overlaps, this typology can be useful in 
exploring the basic questions of organisational interactions and be further 
adapted to consider interactions at various levels such as the household, 
local, regional and national (Ostrom, 1990; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). In 
this study the household is defined following Barnes et al., (2002) as one 
or more persons who usually live and eat together, whether or not they are 
related by blood, marriage or adoption, and the individuals recognize each 
other as members of the same household. The household is here classified 
as one of the institutions because relations at the household level often 
influence what happens in resource governance institutions at the 
community level. The household is important, especially in the 
construction of gender identities that determine women’s and men’s 
different socio-economic options (Agarwal, 1994a; Goebel, 1998). 
 
Property rights and power relations play an important role in the extent to 
which people can successfully use institutions for accessing resources. An 
individual’s access to natural resources is influenced not only by his or her 
position in relation to institutions outside the household but the household 
plays a significant role in determining gender identity and gender 
differentiated access to natural resources. Despite the efforts that have been 
made to improve women’s position through processes of empowerment, 
women’s participation in formal decision-making structures remains highly 
constrained (Rocheleau & Edmunds, 1997; Moyo, 1995b; Agarwal, 1997b; 
Mosse, 1994; Cleaver & Elson, 1995, Leach, 1994). Recent literature has 
therefore advocated for the shift from emphasizing women’s position in 
relation to formal institutions to the investigation of the dynamics of 
women’s participation within the informal institutional framework 
(Cleaver, 1998; Jackson, 1998). This study hopes to contribute to the 
debates (in the growing body of literature on institutions) on the role of 
informal institutions that determine access to woodlands and water by 
various actors and ensure sustainable use of those resources. The 
understanding of institutional synergies and conflicts in CBNRM is also 
important as institutions affect women’s and men’s opportunities by 
establishing and maintaining their access to social, material and natural 
resources as well as sustainability of the natural resources used. 
 
While the literature on institutional issues in CBNRM has highlighted 
issues of social differentiation especially based on class, it is less explicit 
on the place of women in the institutional framework and how societal 
institutions influence women’s access to productive and reproductive 
resources (Goebel, 1998; Rocheleau, 1987). Within the institutional 
framework at the local level, elderly men often have the largest say about 
who has access to what natural resources. This has resulted in situations   19
where women have usufruct rights to resources and limited control over 
use of those resources. For instance Rocheleau & Edmunds (1997) note 
that throughout Africa, women are much less likely to hold formal title to 
land than men, yet they do most of the agricultural production. Significant 
differences between the perspectives of women and men with regards to 
environmental management are well documented (Agarwal, 1997a, & b, 
Jiggins, 1994; Jewitt, 2000; Narayan, 1997; Rocheleau, 1987 & 1991; 
Shiva, 1988). Women’s and men’s perspectives are conditioned by cultural 
and social factors and material conditions that eventually affect economic 
well-being. The differing perspectives of women and men need to be taken 
into account by policy makers, particularly in an era in which development 
policies are generally moving toward support of local demand and 
initiative. The priority problems of women and men, even in the same 
village, are often different because of their distinct roles and 
responsibilities. 
 
1.2 Objectives of the study 
The overall aim of the study is to examine the role of formal and informal 
institutions in CBNRM and how they influence access to and use of 
woodland and water resources by various actors and the management 
outcomes. The study also investigates the nature and patterns of interaction 
between formal, informal and the externally engineered community 
resource management institutional structures and the implications of these 
interactions for sustainable resource use in the context of CBNRM. The 
externally engineered institutions may either be formal or informal, 
depending on the context within which they are engineered. Research 
objectives and questions are presented below. 
 
Research Objectives and Questions: 
 
Key objective one: To identify the Romwe catchment natural resource 
landscape and boundaries, and how natural resources are used and 
managed by households in the context of CBNRM. 
x What are the woodlands and water resources found in Romwe 
catchment? 
x What are the uses of these resources? 
x What are the natural resource use boundaries in the study area in 
relation to village boundaries? 
x How are these natural resource use boundaries defined? 
x What are the forms of management? And how do they relate to 
particular natural resources? 
 
Key objective two: To examine existing formal and informal institutions 
that relate to woodlands and water use, their jurisdictions, conflicts among 
the various institutions and how this influences management of resources 
in the catchment.   20
x What are the local level woodland and water management 
institutions in place? 
x What are the institutional structures and their roles? 
x How are these institutions established in the context of CBNRM? 
x What are the strengths and weaknesses of the CBNRM institutional 
development process? 
x Is the jurisdiction of each institution in relation to other institutions 
clearly defined? 
x What are the areas of complementarity? 
x Are there areas of conflict? If so, are there any mechanisms in 
place for resolving conflicts? 
x Do these institutions influence sustainable use of woodlands and 
water resources? If so, how?  
 
Key objective three:  To investigate the role of women in relation to 
woodland and water institutions and decision-making processes at the local 
level.  
x What role do women play within the local level institutional 
framework for woodlands and water use and what impact does this 
have on sustainable use of these resources? 
x Who determines access to what natural resources? 
x How do women achieve power within the institutional framework 
in the community? 
 
The first objective of the study is to generate some understanding of the 
natural resource landscape in the study site. Understanding local 
woodlands and water resources management practices and strategies must 
not be based on biological or statutory definitions, but rather on the way 
local people define the complete resource system that they use and manage 
(Fortmann & Nhira, 1992; Leach & Mearns, 1996). The concept of 
landscape is therefore used in this thesis because the natural resource base 
is not described from a technical or biological angle, but from the 
perspective of the local resource users and managers. This concept of the 
landscape serves usefully to encompass the institutional and ecological 
dynamics with landscape history referring to the reflexive relationship 
between environmental and social history (Leach et al., 1999:239). In 
addition, because natural resource landscapes are socially and politically 
constructed, it is important to understand the power dynamics involved in 
the definition of landscapes and how they influence the management of 
resources. 
 
To fulfil the objectives, this study uses a case study approach that focuses 
on Romwe catchment in Chivi district, Southern Zimbabwe. A catchment 
is often defined as a physical space where natural resources, people and 
their livelihood systems are found within space. This study springs from a 
catchment as defined in hydrological terms as a basis for understanding 
how people within spaces of this nature conceive their relationship with the 
natural resources in their physical places. There are a number of reasons   21
why a case study approach was preferred. First, it provides scope to move 
from the general to the specific as it allows generating in-depth insights 
into the issues being examined. Second, CBNRM has been widely 
discussed in the last decade in Zimbabwe in relation to CAMPFIRE 
(Lawry, 1989; Murphree, 1991; Nhira, 1994; Dzingirai, 1998; 
Murombedzi, 1994; Nabane, 1997). Yet, outside the scope of empirical 
data generated through CAMPFIRE, there are few studies (Derman, 1999; 
Derman & Nhira, 1998; Lovell et al., 1999; Sithole, 1999) that investigate 
institutional processes in holistic resource management contexts. There has 
been a concerted effort to spread the CAMPFIRE philosophy to other 
natural resources such as minerals, forests and water. But the main 
challenge has been that CBNRM using the CAMPFIRE approach has 
focused on single resources without consideration of the complex resource 
set up within physical and social spaces. In contrast, this study focuses on 
two natural resources, woodlands and water resources. The study should 
contribute towards understanding of how the characteristics of a resource 
(e.g. the very heterogeneous woodlands versus more homogenous water) 
affect the form and nature of the management institution. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
The management of woodlands and water resources at the local level faces 
enormous challenges partly because of external engineering of political 
and/or administrative and formal institutions overlooking the traditional, 
informal and norm-based institutions already in place. The redefinition of 
village and/or resource use boundaries that often accompanies the 
formation of new administrative structures further complicates resource 
management at the local level. The state withdrawal from resource 
management at the local level, a level without adequate capacity building, 
which leaves behind a set-up where there are no clearly defined 
institutional mandates and jurisdictions has added complexity to the 
implementation of CBNRM initiatives at the local level. State withdrawal 
is often done under the guise of decentralization and participatory resource 
management, yet the state may be short of resources to continue policing 
resource use in the communal areas.  
 
While the state has in some way imposed the VIDCO and WADCO 
structures, other institutional engineering initiatives have been spearheaded 
by state based and civil society organisations. These include government 
extension departments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
research institutions like the Institute of Environmental Studies (IES) based 
at the University of Zimbabwe and the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology 
(CEH) - UK (the latter led development in the Romwe catchment in the 
early and mid 1990s). The state institutional structures do interact from 
time to time with traditional authorities in executing their functions derived 
from the statutory instruments. State structures that interact with traditional 
leaders have a tendency to view traditional authority as illiterate and   22
backward. This is not because of the legal standing of state structures but 
because of the belief that technical knowledge derived from formal 
education is superior to traditional knowledge. There is however, a 
tendency for traditional authorities to delegitimise themselves through, for 
instance, partisan politics, unfavourable adjudication over natural resource 
transgressions and unfair allocation of land, unlike state structures such as 
those linked to the ruling party ZANU PF, which of course, have never 
engaged in any of these. The introduction of external actors has also tended 
to add complexity to natural resource management at the local level. These 
external actors often come with preconceived ideas on what natural 
resources management “should be”, are pressured by time to meet targets 
and use the elite villagers as the point of entry into the community. This 
may further marginalize already marginalized groups such as women and 
the poor.   
 
In CBNRM literature and also other development projects that engineer 
institutions, there are still questions with regard to the social relevance and 
legitimacy of the engineered institutions. Throughout history in Zimbabwe, 
institutions have been established, often with minimal participation of elite 
villagers, politicians and the more powerful actors (Matondi, 2001, Sithole, 
2002 & 1999). Institutional engineering by external organisations 
sometimes is problematic because it may create uncertainty regarding to 
access to and control over natural resources such as woodlands and water. 
This uncertainty may be attributed to the proliferation of “new” institutions 
set-up by development facilitators with the view to increasing community 
participation through locally elected governance structures, which has 
often been done without considering boundaries of the natural resource 
being managed (Nemarundwe et al., 1998). Thus jurisdictions of the ‘new’ 
institutions may not match the natural resource use boundaries. The 
mismatch between organisational jurisdictions and the boundaries of the 
natural resources being managed may have negative outcomes for 
community members’ access to natural resources as well as on the state of 
the natural resource base (Campbell et al., 2001). In other cases, the 
opposite may be true, in which case institutional engineering may facilitate 
disadvantaged groups’ access to resources that they did not have access to 
prior to the external intervention. Using a case study of Romwe, this study 
therefore examined people’s perceptions of the roles and relevance of 
institutions that are externally engineered. 
 
A formidable task facing local institutions within CBNRM in Zimbabwe 
is to facilitate sustainable resource use in a context of waning natural 
resource capital within communal lands. Communal lands are the African 
smallholders’ farming areas, formerly called ‘reserves’ and ‘tribal trust 
lands’ during the colonial period. These were originally created through 
land alienation by the colonial regime using the Land Apportionment Act 
of 1930. In drier natural regions such as Masvingo province, within which 
the Romwe catchment falls, institutions face enormous challenges given 
the environmental pressures that obtain due to low rainfall, poor soils and   23
insufficient state support to agriculture. Most of the households have been 
repeatedly dependent on the state for food security due to droughts (e.g. in 
1992 and 1995) and also due to floods (e.g. in 1999/2000). As a result, 
people lack the means for their socio-economic reproduction, which then 
ties them to external agencies in command of material resources. In such a 
context there has been a tendency by community members to maintain 
links with external actors because they bring in resources in the form of 
projects and relief. This often undermines local institutional structures that 
do not have access to external resources or are not used by external actors 
as a conduit for distribution of such resources.  
 
1.4 Justification of the Study 
Studies of resource management institutions at the local level, have tended 
to put emphasis on investigating formal institutions for resource 
management overlooking the importance of informal institutions that affect 
women’s and men’s access to natural resources such as woodlands and 
water. Where women’s position regarding resource management 
institutions has been investigated, the emphasis has been on formal 
processes giving less attention to the importance of the informal processes 
and related interactions between and among different actors. There is a 
need to not only acknowledge the existence of informal institutions but to 
gain in-depth understanding of their importance and contribution to 
CBNRM and the sustainable use of woodland and water resources. In a 
similar fashion, institutional engineering in the CBNRM context has often 
been done without systematically considering its impact (both positive and 
negative) on existing institutions as well as on issues of access to natural 
resources by various actors in a given community.  
 
Where the presence of existing institutions has been acknowledged, 
external actors have often ignored them citing that if such institutions are 
strengthened, they may become too powerful and be obstacles to just and 
equitable development, which many believe the Aid process, ought to 
promote (Mandondo, 2000a). On the contrary, rural development literature 
has noted that the proliferation of new institutions in post independence 
Africa with a view to providing services to rural communities has more 
often negatively impacted on existing institutions and existing patterns of 
interactions (Berry, 1993). The study adds to the literature that examines 
the outcomes of the establishment of new institutional frameworks for 
CBNRM on community relationships, and existing institutions. External 
interventions may have both positive and negative effects. On one hand, 
external interventions may weaken local institutions and create a resource 
management institutional gap that may lead to resource degradation. On the 
other hand, external interventions may enhance the position of 
disadvantaged groups such as women and the poor by improving their 
access to resources that they historically had limited or no access to.    24
1.5 Outline of the Thesis  
Chapter One has set out the research agenda, while Chapter Two discusses 
the conceptual framework adopted for the study. The review and critique of 
global literature presented in Chapter Two reveals that there are a variety 
of models of common property resource management arising from or as 
reactions to Hardin’s 1968 tragedy of the commons thesis. Hardin’s 
tragedy of the commons thesis critiqued in Chapter Two is used as an entry 
point to the discussion of the CPRM theory (which has largely informed 
CBNRM). While a variety of models of common pool resource 
management institutions have been put forward, the basic critique made of 
these is that there is still insufficient recognition of the importance of 
diversity, power and institutional contexts that influence sustainable use of 
natural resources. Chapter Two further explores the relevance of both the 
actor-oriented and actor-network approaches in complementing the CPRM 
theory. The actor-oriented approach was adopted for investigating the place 
and role of actors (as groups or individuals) in interaction processes while 
the actor-network theory was adopted because it helps illuminate social 
dynamics determining common pool resource use and collective 
management of these resources. Following this, Chapter Three discusses 
the methodological approach adopted for the study, namely the qualitative 
approach, highlighting its strengths and the challenges faced during 
fieldwork. The second part of Chapter Three provides a detailed 
description of the study setting, the Romwe catchment in Chivi district, 
southern Zimbabwe. Chapter Four examines the woodlands and water use 
patterns in Romwe catchment and highlights the complexity of identifying 
resource use boundaries. The chapter also discusses the institutional 
framework for woodlands and water use in Romwe and highlights both the 
formal and informal institutions that relate to the use and management of 
woodlands and water in the study site. Chapter Five presents and discusses 
data on patterns of interaction among various institutional structures and 
conflicts over use and management of woodlands and water resources in 
Romwe. This chapter identifies and discusses the power bases of various 
actors, dwells on the nature of interactions and contests. The chapter 
further explores the role of community gossip and witchcraft beliefs and 
related accusations in these contests (as pointers to social tension and 
conflict), the relative influence of various actors and the resistance (in 
particular the hidden forms) exhibited in some of the interventions that 
arise from the different power bases. Within this context, historical 
narratives that reveal local people’s perceptions about their history and 
have relevance for the analysis of struggles to gain access to and control 
over natural resources are presented and analysed. This is followed by 
Chapter Six that explores the role of women in decision-making processes 
and institutional structures and the strategies the women use to gain access 
to woodlands and water. Finally Chapter Seven presents a synthesis of the 
findings and offers some reflections on the theoretical and methodological 
relevance of this study. Themes emerging from the study and areas for 
further research are also discussed in Chapter Seven.    25
CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING COMMON 
POOL RESOURCE INSTITUTIONS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets the foundation for exploring the nature of interaction of 
various actors in the management of common pool resources. Power 
relations and situated practices of different actors such as women and men, 
rich and poor and people from different ethnic backgrounds, located in 
specific contexts and mediated by sets of changing institutions, which may 
lead to different outcomes are analysed. Most analysts dealing with 
institutional issues in community-based natural resource management make 
reference to Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons thesis (1968), hence it 
becomes pertinent to commence the discussion from his viewpoint before 
exploring the alternatives presented by other scholars. The chapter 
elaborates the conceptual framework of the study of institutions in relation 
to the use and management of common pool resources. A focus on 
institutions leads into a discussion on the dynamics involved in collective 
management of common pool resources such as woodlands and water, how 
access rights and control over resources are strengthened or weakened. 
Such processes are often context bound, with history shaping the evolution 
of contestations around natural resources.  
 
2.2 Conceptual framework 
2.2.1.The commons problem in natural resource management  
Interest in the relationship between property and common pool resource 
management emerged in the 1950s through for instance, Gordon’s work on 
fisheries (1954). Hardin drew the attention of scholars and development 
practitioners to the issues of population and natural resource use through 
his paper entitled ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (Hardin, 1968). In this 
paper, Hardin warned against unrestrained freedom of resource use in a 
world of finite natural resources and he had two prescriptions, coercive 
regulation of resource use by the state and/or privatisation. The tragedy of 
the commons thesis was used to support arguments for the state to play a 
central role in the management of natural resources and the privatization of 
common property resources (ibid). Hardin used a metaphor of common 
pasture users who have privately owned animals. The argument in the 
thesis goes:  
 
‘Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each 
herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the 
commons. Ruin is the destination towards which all men rush, 
each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes 
in the freedom of the commons’. In vying with each other to   26
benefit individually from the commons, each one of the users 
keeps increasing the number of animals he brings into the 
common pasture even if he realizes that this in the long run 
will lead to the destruction of the common pasture through 
overgrazing and bring ruin to all. Each user concludes that 
abstinence on his part, if he chose it, would only incur private 
losses without significantly altering the long-term outcome, as 
others in any case will continue to bring additional animals 
into the common pasture. Each user therefore decides upon a 
course that is rational from his or her individual point of view 
but which leads to the irrational over-exploitation of the 
common pool resource and its ultimate and unavoidable 
destruction’ (Hardin 1968: 1244-45).  
 
From this metaphor, Hardin draws the conclusion that common 
ownership of pasture and private ownership of animals leads to a conflict 
between the group’s interest and that of the individual, and it is the group’s 
interest that is overridden. From this argument follows the conclusion that 
the only way out of such a paradox lies in privatization of common 
resources or instituting rules and regulations backed by external coercive 
sanctions (ibid: 1245-47).  
 
2.2.2 Reactions to the tragedy of the commons thesis 
Hardin’s thesis aroused strong criticism, one of which maintained that the 
characterization of common property as a system that necessarily leads to 
competitive over-exploitation and the unavoidable destruction of resources 
is based on unfounded assumptions and dubious conceptual grounds 
(McCay & Acheson, 1987; Acheson, 1989). The critiques present counter 
arguments to Hardin’s thesis, such as pointing to the fact that privatization, 
one of the solutions proposed by Hardin, has not solved the problem of 
overgrazing in countries such as the United States and Australia where the 
prevalence of private ownership is high (Admassie, 1995). Hardin’s thesis 
has also been criticised on the basis of logic emanating from the notion of 
rational choice, which is rooted in the philosophy of rationality employed 
in economics. The rationality principle is based on the notion that human 
actors attribute different utility to different actions and goods and is 
accompanied by the principle that actors choose actions that maximise their 
utility (Coleman, 1994). From a rational choice perspective, social 
interaction is essentially an economic transaction that is guided by the 
actors’ rational choices between alternative outcomes of their actions in 
terms of their costs and benefits (Coleman, 1994; Steins, 1999). Since each 
actor aims to maximise his own private values, cooperation towards 
collective objectives becomes problematic. The rational choice theory has 
been subject to criticism. First, it has been criticised for being a normative 
theory, since it assumes implicitly that rational choices are the correct 
choices (Etzioni, 1992). Second, many rational choice theorists tend to   27
                                                          
place human behaviour within a framework of calculated rationality
7 
rather than bounded rationality
8 and this does not do justice to the 
dynamics of people’s actions in a changing environment (Steins, 1999, 
Etzioni, 1992). Third, in the more traditional rational choice approaches, 
the rational individual is studied in isolation from his/her social and 
cultural context and society (Shepsle, 1989).  
 
Another prominent criticism on the tragedy of the common’s thesis is 
levelled at the very assumption on which its logic is grounded. Hardin’s 
failure to distinguish between ‘common property’ and ‘open access’ 
regimes is taken to task as a crucial conceptual imperfection. Four broad 
categories of management regimes are delineated in the literature on 
common pool resource management: state, private, common property and 
non-property or open access (Table 2.1). Woodland and water resources 
can be held under any one of the four property rights regimes and 
theoretically these property rights regimes should formally determine how 
the resources should be managed or who the managers are (Murphree, 
1993). However what is formal and what actually happens may be 
different. Therefore, the four property rights regimes may be seen as an 
analytic typology because in practice, natural resources are rarely managed 
solely within any one of these types. Property rights regimes often 
constitute a terrain of struggle, which is not surprising given that ‘property’ 
is not an object, but is rather a social relation that defines the property 
holder with respect to something of value (the benefit stream) against all 
others (Bromley, 1991). 
 
Because there are no social authorities that define and enforce the rights 
of individuals or groups to use open access resources, each resource user 
therefore ignores the consequences of his behaviour on others (Bromley, 
1992). The open access condition is therefore neither a property rights 
regime, nor is it a management regime since people use, opportunistically, 
the resources, but do not manage them. On the contrary, in a common 
property regime, an identifiable group controls use rights for the resource 
and there exist rules concerning who may use the resource, who is 
excluded from the resource and how the resource should be used (Berkes & 
Farvar, 1989). A common property regime therefore signifies exclusivity of 
rights for a bounded group, which it exercises over a well-delineated 
resource, to the exclusion of all outsiders, save for its invitees and therefore 
no single individual has exclusive rights to the use of the resource 
(Admassie, 1995). Group members have secure expectations that they can 
gain access to future use of the resource and there are functioning 
membership criteria. The bounded group has a social mechanism for 
regulating the use of the common pool resources and for sanctioning its 
 
7 The concept of calculated rationality assumes that individuals are capable of making rational choices 
without any restrictions 
8 The principle of bounded rationality refers to the idea that actors are incapable of conforming to a 
model of absolute rationality because they cannot apprehend all the possible choices (Steins, 1999).   28
regulations (Acheson, 1989; Bromley & Cernea, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; 
Runge, 1981). This view of common pool resource users as a bounded 
group having a social mechanism for regulating use of common pool 
resources is here referred to as the institution oriented approach and is 
discussed in the following section.  
 
Table 2.1. Types of property rights regimes in common pool resource use 
 
Property 
rights regime 
Characteristics/Features 
State property  The state has the right to determine use and access rules. Individuals 
have a duty to observe use and access rules that are determined by the 
state or its managing agency. 
Private 
property 
Individuals have the right to undertake socially acceptable uses and 
have the duty to refrain from socially unacceptable uses. The individual 
or corporate property owner has the right to control, lease, rent and 
transfer ownership rights. 
Common 
property 
A clearly defined group (owners) has the right to exclude non-members 
and the non-members have the duty to abide by the exclusion. 
Individual members of the management group have both the rights and 
duties with respect to use and maintenance of the resource owned. 
There is regulated utilization by, for example, some institutional 
framework to ensure that overexploitation of the resource does not 
occur and there is some enforcement mechanism for punishing deviant 
behaviour. The property rights are held by an identifiable group of 
interdependent users.    
Non-property 
or open access  
There is no specific  group of users or ‘owners’ and thus the benefit 
stream is available to anyone. Individuals have both privilege and no 
right or duty with respect to use and maintenance of the resource. The 
resource is therefore an open access resource. There is no social 
authority that defines and enforces the rights of the individuals or 
groups to use the resources.  
 
  Source: adapted from Cousins, 1992:16. 
 
In assessing the attributes of the property regimes found in the communal 
areas of Zimbabwe, it has been argued that the systems are not strictly 
common property resource systems but mixes of state, common property 
and private property (Campbell et al., 2001). For instance, communal lands 
are legally state lands under the Communal Lands Acts (1982), yet in 
practical terms, communities have traditional freehold tenure over 
residential and arable plots and usufructuary rights over the surrounding 
commons. These resource systems also have multiple rules (state, RDC and 
local) with multiple legitimation bases (e.g. legal and customary) and 
different enforcement structures and processes, often resulting in conflict 
(Mandondo, 2000a). Thus rather than being referred to as resources held as 
common property, they are referred to as ‘common pool’ resources as 
indicated in Chapter One.         
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2.2.3 Institutions-oriented approaches to common pool resource 
management 
From the wide range of literature that focuses on institutions, three 
approaches to institutional analysis can be discerned. First is the approach 
that focuses on moral codes, traditions and value systems and draws from 
the Durkheimian tradition. Moral theories view man as homo sociologicus 
whose actions are largely controlled by social norms (Scott, 1976). The 
moral economy approach puts more emphasis on the power of traditions, 
social rights, value systems and moral codes in generating and maintaining 
collective action in resource use and management. According to Scott 
(1976), collectivity arises from the ‘moral economy’ that drives 
communities to cope with risk and dependence on resources. Community 
actions and needs can manifest themselves in the form of religion, folklore 
and tradition (Guha, 1990; Shiva, 1987; Matowanyika, 1991). This 
approach, however, tends to romanticise the value of traditional institutions 
in managing common pool resources such as woodlands and water. It has 
been well documented that many institutions that are labelled as traditional 
were in fact altered by the colonial governments (Matondi, 2001; 
Mukamuri, 1995; Ribot, 1999). It is also important to note that all 
institutions change over time, so even institutions that are truly traditional 
are unlikely to be exactly as they were in earlier times. While these studies 
make this critique of traditional authority institutions, they do not make 
suggestions as to which institutions would be more appropriate in common 
pool resource management contexts, especially within CBNRM. These 
critics of the current form and nature of traditional institutions also 
overlook the dynamism of local environments, which have some impact on 
local institutions as they have to adapt to the changing environments. A 
question that is not considered by these critics is, if these institutions were 
‘real and true’ traditional institutions (i.e. without interference from the 
colonial regimes), would they have operated differently, and if so, how? 
This is an issue that is not analysed explicitly in the literature that critiques 
the current form and nature of traditional institutions.      
 
The second approach to institutional analysis is New Institutionalism, 
which is premised on rational choice theory and applies methods and 
postulates of economics to political and other non-market phenomena 
(Ostrom, 1990). The new institutionalism offers three insights: firstly a 
focus on the individual decision-maker, secondly an examination of 
institutional arrangements as they relate to property relations (i.e. the rights 
and obligations associated with property ownership) and thirdly, analysis 
of how institutional arrangements are affected by transaction costs. Mosse 
(1997) argues that despite the apparent differences between the moral 
economy perspective and the new institutionalism, the two approaches give 
similar images of collective action that are largely interventionist. The 
interventionist perspective sees development and social change as 
emanating primarily from centres of power in the form of intervention by 
state or other external agents or international interests (Long, 1992:19).   30
                                                          
Such perspectives have partly informed the institutional engineering 
approach in CBNRM initiatives. Arguing against interventionist 
perspectives, Long & van der Ploeg (1989:226) propose an actor-oriented 
approach that views intervention as a multiple reality made up of differing 
cultural perceptions and social interests and constituted by the on-going 
social and political struggles that take place between the social actors 
involved. Long & van der Ploeg (ibid) argue that one has to focus not on 
the models of intervention as such, but that more attention should be paid 
to intervention practices. This, they contend, allows one to take into 
account the emergent forms of interaction, procedures, practical strategies, 
cultural categories and the various stakeholders present in a specific 
context (ibid: 227). Theoretical paradigms of planned intervention that 
have to a large extent informed the process of institutional engineering 
prescribe how institutional development should be facilitated. Yet local 
communities have their own institutions that might clash with the 
externally facilitated institutions depending on the nature and jurisdictions 
of those newly established institutions and related structures and the power 
relations in which they are embedded.  
 
The third approach to institutional analysis focuses on individual 
strategies and argues that such strategies are mediated by institutions that 
are culturally and historically constructed within specific socio-ecological 
contexts (Long & Long, 1992; Mosse, 1997). This approach, which is here 
referred to as the actor
9-oriented approach to institutional analysis critiques 
the other two approaches as essentialist and divorcing the practices of the 
people from the contexts in which they act and define meanings. As such 
the actor-oriented approach is interpretative and centres on symbolism. 
Two of the three institutional analysis approaches are of relevance to this 
study, namely the new institutionalism and the actor-oriented approach. 
These are discussed in greater depth below. While the actor-oriented 
approach was found to be of relevance to the institutional analysis in 
CBNRM, its weakness is that it places too much emphasis on the actor, 
overlooking the fact that the actor does not implement his or her actions in 
a vacuum. Human action is shaped and regulated by the social order in 
which it is embedded. In light of this criticism, the actor-network theory, 
which stresses the importance of actor-networks in shaping the actions of 
various actors, was adopted to complement the actor-oriented approach to 
institutional analysis.     
 
New Institutionalism 
In new institutionalism, institutions or decision-making arrangements are 
considered to provide mechanisms whereby individuals can transcend 
social dilemmas and characteristics of social outcomes are not only 
explained by individual preferences and the optimisation of behaviour, but 
 
9 The term actor is here used to refer to an individual human being who is actively doing something 
and/or groups of actors who are capable of performing actions as a cohesive unit (Magadlela, 
2000). This concept is used to also draw attention to agency rather than the individual per se.    31
also on the basis of institutional preferences (Acheson, 1989; Bates, 1995; 
Ostrom, 1990). In new institutionalism, theorists believe that credible 
commitments, combined with mutual monitoring and the existence or 
establishment of certain institutions can motivate individuals to become 
more engaged in collective action towards the realisation of a shared goal 
(Ostrom, 1990). According to Ostrom (ibid), credible commitments can be 
made when individuals are presented with rules that meet a number of 
criteria or design principles that include clearly defined boundaries, 
congruence between allocation and access rules and local conditions, users 
being able to modify rules, monitoring by accountable individuals, and 
non-compliance being followed by graduated sanctions. The commitment 
is to follow the rules as long as most similarly situated individuals adopt 
the same commitment and the long-term net benefits are greater than the 
costs. The core argument made by new institutionalism is that institutions 
or decision-making arrangements provide the mechanism whereby 
individuals can transcend the tragedy of the commons.  
 
In contrast to the neo-classical economists who view the decision-maker 
as a perfectly rational individual who acts on calculated rationality, the 
new institutionalism assumes a situation of bounded rationality, and that 
coordination of economic activities involves more than transactions in 
markets in which price is the sole consideration. However, there may be 
deviants in society who go against rules and therefore challenge the notion 
of bounded rationality. The question that then arises relates to how such 
actors are dealt with. Institutions play a role in constraining and presenting 
opportunities to individuals and have a strong influence on the operation of 
the system (Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1992).  
 
New institutionalism has informed a large number of empirical studies on 
collective action in common pool resource management contexts (Bromley, 
1992; McCay & Acheson, 1987; Ostrom, 1990) and this body of literature 
has been referred to as common property theory (Steins, 1999). The 
common property resource (CPR) theory suggests that individuals will 
collectively manage common resources when the benefits from the 
institutional set-up (i.e. rules and means of enforcement) are limited to a 
small and stable community (Berkes, 1993; McCay & Acheson, 1987; 
Ostrom, 1990). Ostrom (1990) further postulates that spatial boundaries 
define the terms of exclusion and the terms are monitored and enforced by 
resource users or by selected individuals representing group interests in 
institutional structures that are established to monitor resource use. 
Common property theory has proved to be of great importance in that it has 
opened the minds of the natural scientists (who emphasise technical 
solutions to environmental problems) to appreciating the importance of 
human institutions, while encouraging social scientists to appreciate the 
ecological context and consequences of the institutions and behaviour that 
they study. A critical theme that can be identified in this literature focuses 
on the formulation of conditions or design principles underlying successful 
collective resource management (Ostrom, 1990).   32
The design principles for robust institutions  
The critical theme in the CPR literature, which focuses on the formulation 
of conditions or design principles underlying ‘successful’ collective 
resource management rejects the prescription of coercion (i.e. management 
by the state or a bureaucracy) or privatisation that is contained in Hardin’s 
thesis (Ostrom, 1990). While there is common usage of the term 
‘successful’ in collective resource management contexts, what is exactly 
meant by success is rarely made explicit. A question that comes to mind in 
relation to definition of common pool resource management initiatives as 
‘successful’ or ‘not successful’ is from whose perspective is this definition 
drawn i.e. resource management practitioners versus local communities and 
what criteria are used to define ‘success’? In the Zimbabwean context for 
instance, CAMPFIRE has been hailed as a success story of CBNRM and 
this has been based on the economic and other material benefits that 
communities participating in the programme realize. Because the success 
of CAMPFIRE has been attributed to the high economic value of wildlife 
resources, this has raised questions on the transferability of the model to 
low economic value products such as woodlands (Campbell et al., 1999). 
Ostrom (1990) is in favour of agreements by the users that can be enforced 
by many mechanisms, such as external agencies, members of the user 
community as monitors or users themselves as monitors (Ostrom, 
1990:18). Ostrom’s design principles approach has its underpinnings in the 
‘collective choice theory’ described above. In this line of thinking, Ostrom 
(ibid) offers some design principles for an effective common pool resource 
management regime that have some relevance for this study (Table 2.2). A 
design principle is ‘an element or condition that helps account for the 
success of these institutions in sustaining the common pool resource and 
gaining the compliance of generation after generation of appropriators to 
rules in use’ (Ostrom, 1990:90). Ostrom argues that robust, long term 
institutions are characterised by most of the design principles. Fragile 
institutions tend to be characterised by only some of these design 
principles. Failed institutions are characterised by very few of these 
principles.    33
Table 2.2. The Design Principles for CBNRM Institutions 
 
Design 
Principle 
Rules  Boundaries 
Design principle 
one 
Rules that clearly 
define who has rights 
to use a resource 
Boundaries of that resource ensure that 
appropriators can clearly identify legitimate 
resource users. 
Design principle 
two 
Congruence between 
the rules that assign 
benefits and costs 
Difficulties to judge rule compliance of 
those outside the boundaries as resources 
such as wildlife and water are transient. 
Design principle 
three 
Modifying the rules  The locale is not a closed unit as external 
authorities enforce broader agreements. 
Design principle 
four 
Monitoring of 
conformance to the 
rules 
Level of monitoring is significantly related 
to the extent of the resource in question as 
well as its form and structure. 
Design principle 
five 
Graduated sanctions  Ambiguous rules within catchment.  
Design principle 
six 
Conflict resolution 
mechanisms using 
clearly defined rules 
Third part mediation of conflicts beyond 
catchment. 
Design 
principle seven 
Recognition of rules 
by external 
authorities 
Boundaries must be recognised by outsiders 
including the state. 
Design principle 
eight 
Application of rules 
horizontally and 
vertically 
Multiple layers of nested enterprises 
(appropriation, provision, monitoring, 
enforcement, and conflict resolution) 
involving resource sharing. 
 
Source: Adapted from Ostrom, 1990. 
 
The CPRM theory and the design principles have influenced most 
institutional reform towards CBNRM. Empirical evidence suggests that 
design principles treat communities as homogenous entities, yet there is 
diversity in communities, between communities and their surrounding 
environments (Moore 1996; Campbell et al., 2001). This diversity is a 
result of the socio-economic characteristics of the users of the natural 
resources such as gender, ethnicity, wealth, education, age and the nature 
of the resources. Similarly, based on empirical evidence from comparative 
case studies, many scholars also argue that in many cases, only very small 
groups can organise themselves effectively in the manner suggested by the 
design principles because they presume that size is related to homogeneity 
(Olson, 1965; Murphree, 1991; Campbell et al., 2001; Mandondo, 1997). 
This argument overlooks the fact that communities and their environment 
are often heterogeneous regardless of their size (Balland & Platteau, 1996). 
In recent years, Ostrom’s design principles have been critiqued by 
development practitioners and researchers (Campbell et al., 2001; 
Mandondo, 1997; Steins, 1999) as being flawed in that they are based on, 
“simplistic assumption of single resource use, a static rationality model, the 
exclusive analysis of internal dynamics of the collective management 
system and the assumption that collective management outcomes are 
determined by predefined principles” (Steins et al., 2000: 2). A resource   34
system such as woodlands generally produces a multitude of products with 
different rules and norms for their abstraction, yet attempts have been made 
to apply design principles in such complex resource systems piecemeal 
(Murphree, 1991). Furthermore, even if collective management of a 
common pool resource revolves around one resource unit, for example, 
water in an irrigation system, this resource unit can be subject to 
conflicting multiple uses (irrigation, drinking, livestock watering, and 
domestic) for which different management institutions are in place. The 
design principles have largely neglected the role of contextual and external 
factors in shaping collective action at various institutional levels. Variables 
that link collective action to gender differentiation are not covered by the 
design principles. Thus there is a need to complement the design principles 
with other institutional analysis frameworks that consider key variables in 
community differentiation such as gender, age and wealth.  
 
The design principles have further been criticised as too limited for 
analysing dynamic resource management institutions (Steins, 1999). Other 
studies critique the design principles as romanticising indigenous 
knowledge systems, yet on the ground these systems have been extensively 
interfered with and often exist as a shadow of their original form (Balland 
& Platteau, 1996; Matondi, 2001; Ribot, 1999; 1995). This study found the 
design principles useful in the analysis of the internal institutional 
framework and thus they have been used to screen and analyse institutional 
performance in Romwe. Given the weaknesses of the new institutionalism 
and the design principles in addressing issues of social difference, and for 
failing to incorporate political and contextual factors into its analysis, 
giving more recognition to the ‘community’ thereby making it difficult to 
see the possible role of individual agents, the actor-oriented approach was 
adopted to complement the new institutionalism approach to institutional 
analysis. The actor-oriented approach has also been criticised for putting 
too much emphasis on the individuals as if they act in complete freedom. 
Thus to cater for this weakness in the actor-oriented approach, the actor-
network theory was also found useful for this study. Thus in combination, 
the actor-oriented and actor-network approaches complement the CPRM 
theory by offering the beginnings of an explanation of local institutional 
responses to development interventions, local struggles over resource 
access and control, security of tenure, decision-making, resource allocation 
and the impact of power differentials in the dynamic of conflict (Steins, 
1999).   
 
Actor-oriented approach 
The actor-oriented approach is relevant for this study because it places 
actors at the centre of the natural resource management discourse, with 
some recognition that there are a diversity of actors. This approach 
emphasises the meanings that different actors attach to local natural 
resource systems, thereby defining institutions as concepts, meanings and 
values that regulate actors’ behaviour (Mosse, 1997; Peters, 1984). It is   35
argued that institutions emanate from the strategic action of human agents 
in their ‘everyday interactions’ which enables them to cope with 
unforeseen and constantly changing circumstances (Long & Long, 1992). 
It is further argued that for an institutional system to be useful it has to 
characterise the social relations and categories of meaning and value in a 
particular value system (Mosse, 1997). The particular value system here 
refers to the socio-ecological context in which institutions are constituted 
as well as their being embedded in historically and culturally specific ways. 
Thus much of the focus of this approach is placed on the actors and the 
symbolic meanings they derive from a resource system. The derivatives 
thereby guide their access to resources. This in turn is an expression of 
social relations, status, honour and prestige of the individual actors 
(Mukamuri  et al, 2000). As far as this approach is concerned, the 
persistence of local institutions is not explained by rational calculations of 
individuals, but rather it is through structures of power that natural 
resources are managed and that institutions tend to produce relations of 
dominance and dependence, and provide the context for political strategy 
and competition (Mosse, 1997). A review of literature from Zimbabwe 
shows that the above scenario exemplifies the situation that obtains in 
many woodlands and water resources in Zimbabwe today. These natural 
resources are largely described as a physical medium on which conflicts 
are acted out. More often these conflict emerge among various groups such 
as sabukus versus VIDCOs, indigenous people against migrants, the rich 
and the less well off (Madzudzo, 2002; Mandondo, 1997; Matondi, 2001; 
Moore, 1993; Sithole, 1999). The various actors and their patterns of 
interaction therefore constantly shape institutions.  
 
The actor-oriented approach generally treats actors as ‘active participants 
who process information and strategise in their dealings with some local 
actors as well as interveners’ (Long, 1992:21). The approach stresses the 
dynamic interaction between social agents and institutions. The agents act 
and interact within the framework of these institutions but also shape and 
reshape them through these interactions. Human action and interaction is 
socially embedded and takes place within particular historical and 
contextual institutional arrangements and resource conditions and 
distribution. Actors structure their position in relation to one another, their 
opportunities as well as their constraints. There is therefore what Admassie 
(1995:13) refers to as bounded agency and bounded constructionism, 
bounded in the sense that institutions and material conditions matter in 
making up the given frames for action. Through synergies and struggles, 
actors engage in maintaining, reproducing and changing social rules and 
institutional arrangements. The actor-oriented approach provides a set of 
analytical tools useful for describing and analysing changes in patterns of 
social action and interaction, and institutional arrangements, where such 
changes are a function of human agents, the social and material conditions 
under which they act and interact and agency-structure dynamics 
(Admassie, 1995:13). The approach was also found useful in this study, not 
only because it is designed to address questions of social change and social   36
difference but because it provided specific concepts and analytical tools for 
the study of institutions, their production and reproduction, the role of 
human agency in these processes and the context dependency of social 
interactions as they shape access to natural resources. 
 
A major factor in institutional dynamics is human agency. Actors 
(individuals or groups) interact in ways that shape or are shaped by 
institutions and these processes often entail conflict and the exercise of 
power. Admassie (1995: 14) argues that human agency and social 
interaction processes are context dependent and institutional arrangements 
constitute a significant part of the context of social action and interaction. 
In addition, resource conditions and distribution make up part of this 
context, setting constraints but also providing opportunities. Key concepts 
in this approach of relevance to this study include the concepts of access, 
agency, power, and conflict as they relate to the institutional framework for 
resource use and management. These concepts will be elaborated below.     
 
Within the actor-oriented framework, actors may find themselves unable 
to pursue their own interests or agendas within the confines of existing 
institutions. In such cases, actors (as individuals or groups) may devise 
strategies to evade these rules, e.g. bending the rules to suit their interests 
and/or needs. It is worth noting that the power to bend or evade rules is not 
distributed equally across all actors. In any given situation, some actors 
have limited or no power to bend rules. In such cases actors may react to 
constraints in a radical manner or shift their action to other arenas of 
struggle  i.e. shifting from the arena of the overt to that of the covert 
(Admassie, 1995:17). This is what Scott (1995) refers to as the weapons of 
the weak or everyday forms of peasant resistance. In other cases, actors 
may switch between institutions in favour of the institution that supports 
their interests at a given time. Actors, who are involved in a given setting 
such as natural resource management, enter into a relationship constituting 
a spectrum of different types of interactions. The relationship often 
oscillates between power, struggle, conflict, and compromise over the 
making, changing and maintenance of institutions. The actor-oriented 
approach was useful as an analytical tool for this study in that it facilitated 
the following:  
 
i)  Identification of key individual actors and groups of actors 
participating in institutional processes relating to the natural 
resource landscape. 
ii)  Investigation of internal factors facilitating or constraining the 
decision-making capability and action of the various actors. 
iii)  Analysis of external factors facilitating or constraining the 
decision-making capability and action of actors (e.g. role of 
external CBNRM facilitators – NGOs, research institutes and 
the RDC).   37
iv)  Investigation of various actors’ access to and control over 
resources and power relations within the community as they 
relate to resource management institutions. 
v)  Analysis of various actors’ strategies to gain access to 
resources, synergies and conflicts between and among 
individuals or groups, as well as institutional synergies and 
conflicts. 
 
The actor-oriented approach has been criticised as focusing too much on 
actors without explicitly showing the relationships between and among 
various actors, which have implications for who has access to and control 
over what resource. No social actor acts in complete freedom as if existing 
in a vacuum because all purposeful human action is shaped and regulated 
by the social order in which it is embedded (Admassie, 1995). For instance, 
in the CBNRM context, actors find themselves playing out their roles 
within the institutional framework that forms the foundation of their action. 
The study therefore found the actor-network theory useful in moving us 
beyond the focus and emphasis on actors to the analysis of the relationship 
between the actors and the group within which actors undertake their 
actions.  
 
Actor-network theory   
The actor-network theory is one amongst a number of approaches that can 
be categorised as ‘social constructivism’. Social constructivism entered 
sociology through Berger and Luckman’s work entitled ‘The Social 
Construction of Reality’ (1968). From a social constructivist perspective, 
society, the object of sociological inquiry, is perceived as ‘part of a human 
world, made by men, inhabited by men and in turn making men in an 
ongoing historical process’ (Berger & Luckman, 1968:189). Thus human 
reality is conceived as socially constructed reality, rather than naturally 
given or merely taken for granted. In current literature, Berger & 
Luckman’s use of ‘men’ has been changed to ‘social actors’ (Steins, 1999). 
What distinguishes the actor-network theory from other social 
constructivist perspectives is that it studies the state of affairs in an action 
arena as the effect of interactions amongst social actors and non-human 
entities (Steins, 2002:413). Human beings are not considered as mere 
organisms but as social actors who have material properties and a history 
of social relations over which they may have some control, but on which 
they depend. At the core of the actor-network theory is the concern with 
how actors and organisations mobilise, juxtapose and hold together the bits 
and pieces out of which they are composed; how they are sometimes able 
to prevent those bits and pieces from following their own inclinations and 
making off and how they manage to turn a network from a heterogeneous 
set of bits and pieces, each with its own inclinations, into some identifiable 
entity (Law, 1992).  
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The actor-network theory considers natural resource management arenas 
to be ordered networks of heterogeneous materials that are constantly being 
shaped and reshaped as new human and non-human entities enter the arena. 
Within the actor-network theory, agency is a property that emerges through 
interactions of people and through relational networks. The social context 
therefore emerges as a site of struggle, a relational effect that recursively 
generates and reproduces itself (Law, 1992; Steins, 2002). Interaction is 
not only by local actors, but there are other external actors involved. 
Judgements and perceptions about sustainability are not only constructed 
by the local actors, but also by the external actors involved in resource 
management at the local level and other external actors who are not 
involved, but have opinions and may try to influence local management, 
for example, the Convention for International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES) and the Biodiversity Convention. Thus, while for local actors, 
certain patterns of resource use may be considered as sustainable, external 
actors might not necessarily share the same opinion.          
 
In relation to this study, the actor network theory is a useful way of 
thinking about how natural resource landscapes come to be wrapped up 
into complex social networks. The actor-network perspective cannot 
readily co-exist with the notion of space
10 as fixed and absolute in its 
coordinates (Murdoch, 1998). Space itself can be understood as a system of 
relations rather than a fixed entity. Natural resource spaces continually 
change shape and form within differing sets of relations and the 
malleability of space has been a recurrent theme in recent human 
geography analysis. Echoing actor-network theorists, Massey (1991:29) 
argues that local interactions are tied into networks of relations which are 
constructed on a far wider scale than what we happen to define for that 
moment as the resource space. Natural resource landscapes can thus be 
imagined as ‘articulated moments in networks of social relations and 
understandings’ (ibid: 28). Similarly relationalism disavows any fixed, 
absolute conception of landscapes. From an actor-network perspective 
natural resource landscapes are seen as emerging from processes and 
relations and concern here is with the topological textures, which arise as 
relations configure the landscapes.  
 
What the actor-network theory adds to the more commonplace 
understanding of relational landscapes and actor-dynamics is a concern 
with networks. While the term network is commonly used in the social 
sciences to describe technological relations, economic forms, political 
structures and social processes, the actor-network theory bundles all these 
network applications together for it concerns itself with the heterogeneity 
of networks (Murdoch, 1998:258). The actor network theory seeks to 
analyse how social and material processes become seamlessly entwined 
within complex sets of association. This leads on to an interest in network 
typologies, with the ways that landscapes emerge as socio-material 
 
10 Referred to as natural resource landscapes in this thesis.   39
relations that are arranged into orders and hierarchies. Networks are 
fundamental to the actor-network theory because it sees stable sets of 
relations or associations as the means by which the world is both built and 
stratified (Latour, 1986). Landscapes are seen as constructed within 
networks and the concept of time is also forged within these network 
configurations. Thus the actor-network theory explicitly links the relational 
view of landscapes to a relational view of time.  
 
The actor-network theory is highly critical of studies which are 
concerned with only social relations as it argues that such relations count 
for little unless they are held together by durable and resilient materials, 
which allow networks to both endure beyond the present and remain stable 
across space (Murdoch, 1998). It is the very heterogeneity of networks, 
which allows them to become in some sense structural; social order, power, 
scale and hierarchy are consolidated and preserved by material objects. 
Materials (e.g. woodland and water resources) solidify social relations and 
allow these relations to endure through space and time. Networks consist 
therefore of both subjects and objects.    
 
From an actor-network perspective, actors can only do things in 
association with others (Latour, 1986) and it is only by enlisting 
heterogeneous others in sets of stable relations i.e. relations that allow for 
the transmission of action and make things happen. Thus the conception of 
the term actor-network which Law (1997:3) claims is deliberately 
‘oxymoronic’ for it refers to a centred actor on the one hand and a 
decentred network on the other hand. Actor-networks are thus both 
‘individuals and collectives’. Although networks are forged for a variety of 
purposes, they are always a means of acting upon space and it is the sets of 
associations that define and constitute spatial qualities. Space, although 
partly physical, is therefore wholly relational.      
 
Two main types of networks can be discerned from the literature on the 
actor-network theory: standardised networks (referred to in the literature as 
spaces of prescription) and networks of variation and flux (referred to as 
spaces of negotiation). Firstly, standardised networks are those networks in 
which entities are effectively aligned and the network is stabilised. Despite 
the heterogeneous quality of any previous identities, these entities work in 
unison, thereby enabling the enrolling actor (the centre) to ‘speak’ for all. 
As the network settles into place, so the links and relations become 
standardised  e.g. heavy with norms and therefore relatively highly 
predictable. Examples of these in the Zimbabwean case would be burial 
societies that have increasingly become standardised due to the prevalence 
of HIV/AIDS. Some burial societies now have constitutions, yet they 
evolved based on loose arrangements. In the case of the standardised 
networks, spaces are strongly prescribed by a centre (which may be an 
individual or group as in the case of committees) as norms circulate, 
imposing fairly rigid and predictable forms of behaviour. In these 
standardised networks, the degree of individual autonomy depends on the   40
scope for negotiation and this will vary according to the kinds of actions 
and actors involved in the network. Secondly, networks of variation and 
flux are those networks in which the links between actors and 
intermediaries are provisional and divergent, where norms are hard to 
establish and standards are frequently compromised (Murdoch, 1998). In 
this case, the various components of the network continually renegotiate 
with one another, form variable and revisable coalitions and assume ever-
changing shapes. These networks are fluid, highly interactional and 
unstable. This study examines both standardised networks and networks of 
variation and flux. While these two broad categories are often treated 
separately in the literature, the separation is only useful for analytical 
purposes as in reality the boundaries between the two may be quite fluid. 
For instance, while standardised networks strongly configure actions in 
particular locales, even within them, there is some scope for negotiation as 
in the case of the networks of variation and flux. Sometimes these two 
types of networks co-exist or flow into one another.           
 
The actor-network theory stresses that it is the heterogeneity of actor-
networks, which allows them to remain durable in space and time. It is the 
seamless mixing of social, technical and natural objects within networks, 
which ensures that they frame social interactions, shape activities and 
direct movements. Focusing on the negotiation capabilities of humans, 
however, raises a number of questions, for instance, are all actors in 
heterogeneous networks able to negotiate in similar ways? Are all the 
actors able to conform or resist in the same way?  
 
A criticism that has been raised against the actor-network theory is that it 
seems to bring us close to Giddens notion of ‘duality and structure’ 
(Giddens, 1984). There are close parallels between enablement/constraint 
(Giddens, 1984) and standardisation/negotiation networks (Murdoch, 
1998). Giddens’ structuration theory refers to the enabling and constraining 
effects of structures, to the ways that structures are both a medium and 
outcome (1984). The main distinction between the work of Giddens (ibid) 
and the actor-network theorists lies not in the notion of duality, but in the 
notion of structure. Actor-network theorists argue that because Giddens 
neglects the heterogeneous composition of the social, he employs a weak 
conception of structure, thereby allowing a certain voluntarism to mar his 
conception of action. The actor-network theory on the other hand, ties 
structure (i.e. those stable arrangements which frame and shape action) into 
the deployment of durable materials and can thus account in intimate 
detail, for collective and individual action simultaneously.  
 
In reflections made by the author, it was found that the actor-network 
theory also places too much power on the role of networks in shaping 
patterns of interaction when it argues that ‘actors can only do things in 
association with others’ (Murdoch, 1998). This downplays the role of 
human agency that exists in social interactions. While actors may find 
themselves unable to pursue their interests within the confines of the social   41
                                                          
networks, they will attempt to use in-built ambivalence within the social 
system. There is always ambivalence between the idealised system and the 
one pursued in practice, which actors often exploit. One strategic resource 
is power. Yet power to influence the actor-network dynamics is unequally 
distributed. In any given situation, some actors have limited power to 
change or maintain the system, and these actors may react to the constraints 
either in more radical ways or in more subtle ways described by Scott 
(1985) as the ‘everyday forms of peasant resistance’ or the ‘weapons of the 
weak’. Secondly, the actor-network theory talks about ‘sets of stable 
relations’ but is not explicit by what is meant by ‘stable’ i.e. what criteria 
are used to determine whether a relationship is stable or not. Thus it is 
imperative to examine concepts that may help unravel the nature of 
relations among the different actors. These actors constitute various 
networks that emerge in the process of negotiating access to and control 
over woodlands and water resource.  
 
2.2.4. Key concepts in institutional analysis in CBNRM 
This section discusses key concepts in relation to institutional analysis 
within the CBNRM discourse. Key concepts considered relevant in the 
analysis of institutions as they shape and are shaped by processes of social 
interaction include access, agency, power, and conflict. The discussion 
centring on these concepts demonstrates how they have been historically 
derived, developed and applied to issues relating to CBNRM.     
 
Access to natural resources 
Access to natural resources such as woodlands and water occurs under 
conditions of both formal and informal regulation of property rights
11 in 
relation to tenure regimes that specify the conditions under which natural 
resources are used. Ribot (1998:310) defines access as the freedom or 
ability to obtain or make use of natural resources. While theoretically 
‘ability’ to obtain a resource may lie in the individual actor or given 
household, its articulation lies in wider community institutions and 
relations. It is worth highlighting that not all actors or resource users have 
the same abilities to obtain a particular resource. Ostrom (1992 & 1990) 
defines access as a right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy non-
subtractable benefits. According to Ostrom (ibid) and Bromley (1991:5), 
right implies an acknowledged claim that society (including the state) 
supports through law, custom and convention, yet ability is dependent 
upon one’s capacity to extract the benefits. Access evolves as well through 
social relations that include friendship, family, lineage and kinship ties 
(Matondi, 2001; Platteau, 1996). In exercising the right of access, resource 
users operate within an institutional framework that determines the nature, 
location, duration and intensity of their activities. Ostrom & Schlager 
(1996) argue that the distinction between the individual and collective 
 
11 ‘Property’ is defined as a social relation that defines the property holder and indirectly, those that are 
excluded as well with respect to a particular object or thing (Bromley, 1991:2) and a ‘right’ is seen 
as the capacity to call upon the collective to stand behind one’s claim to a benefit stream (ibid: 5).     42
                                                          
rights is crucial in that collective choice rights are powerful in relation to 
individual rights as they involve management
12, exclusion
13 and 
alienation
14. Access to natural resources such as woodlands and water 
evolves over time and is influenced by the character of the resource, 
availability and the type of uses (e.g. domestic versus commercial uses).  
 
One of the arguments for the need to pay attention to patterns of access to 
and control over natural resources is that secure tenure encourages 
investment in a resource, which leads to higher productivity and efficiency 
in its use (Meinzen-Dick et al., 1997:1304). If actors know that particular 
investments and increases in productivity will lead to loss of access to 
natural resources, their insecurity of tenure can be a barrier to sustainable 
resource use. Given that the woodland landscape is complex i.e. has 
multiple resource units governed by different institutional arrangements 
and has multiple resource users using the resource at different times, the 
understanding of which institutions govern what resource needs a careful 
analysis of contextual and tenure issues.  
 
The concept of tenure has been used to refer to conditions under which a 
resource is held, used and disposed of (Bruce, 1986). In the context of 
access to natural resources such as woodlands and water, the form of tenure 
regimes in place define the boundaries of the decision-making rights for 
the different resource users. Security of tenure is particularly important in 
situations where the management of the same natural resource system is 
shared by two or more categories of users, such as individuals, households, 
communities and a government regulatory agency, for instance the RDC. 
In such contexts, the type of tenure guides and regulates social action and 
interaction of the actors governed by the regime in the sphere to which it 
applies (Admassie, 1995). When a tenurial system fails to specify who 
does what, when, how and where, ambiguous situations arise, paving the 
way for conflict. In some cases such ambiguity exists within bounds and 
can be a basis of the system’s flexibility and not a matter of system failure 
(ibid: 23). Tenurial ambiguities may be exploited by better-placed actors 
such as individuals with political power who may use the situation to their 
advantage and increase their level of control over natural resources such as 
woodlands and water.  
 
In a communal area setting, access to natural resources is most often 
based on rights held by a male household head without recognition of how 
these rights are differentiated between individual actors based on gender, 
wealth, age or other intra-household characteristics. There has been 
 
12 Management is here defined as a process with both technical and social control functions 
(Abercrombie, 1988). 
13 The right to determine who will have access to a particular resource and how that may be 
transferred. Individuals or groups who hold rights of exclusion have the authority to define the 
criteria that actors must meet in order to access a given resource.   
14 Exercising a right of alienation means that an individual or group can sell or lease the right of 
management, exclusion or both.   43
considerable work that describes gender as an important determinant of 
how rights, responsibilities and resources tend to be allocated within 
households, communities or institutions (Poats, 1991; Moser, 1993; 
Thomas-Slayter & Rocheleau, 1995). Yet CBNRM is still being 
implemented with little or no consideration of gender issues. Focusing on 
gender does not imply that women and men are opposed to each other 
because there is often a great deal of complementarity of interests, roles 
and resource uses (Meinzen-Dick et al., 1997:1304). But these differences 
and complementarities are easy to overlook if a gender-blind conceptual 
and analytical framework is used. Gender analysis within CBNRM 
institutions can lead to a better understanding of complexity, and open our 
eyes to a broader range of shared, complementary and conflicting rights 
and uses (ibid).  
 
On agency  
Central to the debate about actors and the actor-oriented approach is the 
notion of human agency, which attributes to the individual actor the 
capacity to process social experience and to devise ways of coping with 
life, even under extreme forms of coercion (Long, 1992:22). Individual and 
collective actors carry out intentional and purposeful action, but their 
action is rarely played out as planned nor does it always lead to the 
intended outcomes (Admassie, 1995). Individual or group action is 
influenced and modified by each other’s action as well as by the 
institutional arrangements forming the context of their action. Likewise, 
individual or group action affects and influences existing institutional 
arrangements and actions are not totally determined by or predictable on 
the basis of contextual factors. For instance, local natural resource user 
groups such as livestock owners (for grazing) and social networks are 
active not only in influencing the farmers’ livelihoods but also in 
influencing farmers’ choices regarding what resources to use. The term 
‘social networks’ is used here to refer to either kinship or non-kinship 
associations that people establish for particular purposes with others in 
their locality or in another place.  
 
The networks examined in this study are those that can be treated as 
mutual benefit relationships among local woodland and water resource 
users. Networks do not necessarily represent equal relations; they can be 
unbalanced and sometimes more like client-patron relations. The strategic 
bargaining character of resource users’ networks gives them the attribute of 
‘group agency’ as they actively and consciously organise themselves into a 
body that interacts with other organs in the process of transforming their 
lives. The outcomes of institutional frameworks for natural resource 
management in specific contexts are to a large extent shaped by the 
manoeuvring of networks by various actors in the struggle to gain access to 
and control over natural resources. 
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By placing emphasis on agency in actor-oriented approaches, this means 
a person, for instance a woman, is treated as a social actor with a capacity 
for willed and voluntary action that is not simply determined by social 
structures. As has often been argued in the literature on gender and 
development, women have no formal or legal access to woodlands and 
water. Their rights to these resources are often attributed to male 
individuals only (Zwarteveen, 1995). The question that one could raise 
related to this view is, if women are so much disadvantaged, why do they 
appear to go along with a deal that appears to offer them so little (Jackson, 
1998)? This question highlights the need to consider how women 
experience woodland and water access and control as a particular part of 
the lived livelihoods and gender relations in the community. One approach 
to addressing this issue is suggested by Zwarteveen and Neupane (1996) 
based on their findings from a study carried out in Nepal. In their study, 
they describe a situation in which women find non-participation in formal 
water management groups offers advantages. For instance, they have 
greater freedom to break rules and ‘steal’ water and they find discourses of 
vulnerability, as female headed households, effective in securing water 
access. Similarly, a study by Roark (1984) in Burkina Faso also shows that 
although women were formally excluded from committees that were in 
control of water resources decision-making, in practice, decisions about 
digging new wells were made in informal meetings held by women prior to 
community meetings. Such findings suggest that Foucauldian notions of 
power as fragmented and dispersed are more useful in understanding 
relations between women and men than the dualistic opposition of 
powerful men versus weak women, a common view in much of the 
structuralist gender analysis (Jackson, 1998:317).  
 
The issue of visibility in relation to access to and control over natural 
resources within a given institutional framework is complex because, both 
women and men tend to devalue and make invisible women’s roles. It is 
desirable to make women’s roles in natural resource management more 
visible, and to make their rights to resources more formal, and less 
conditional on their relations with men. However, there is also need to 
recognise that invisibility and ambiguity may arouse less male resistance 
and yet provide subtle forms of influence and power for women (Jackson, 
1998). ‘Silences speak and invisibilities can be an excellent camouflage’ 
(ibid: 317). The focus on agency in institutional and gender analysis is 
therefore part of a larger redirection of thinking more seriously about 
women as actors and dynamising gender analytical concepts towards better 
understanding of why women do what they do in relation to access to 
natural resources and related management institutions.    45
The concept of power 
The concept of agency is indelibly tied to power. Weber defines power as 
the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a 
position to carry out his or her own will despite resistance, regardless of the 
basis on which this probability rests (Weber, 1957:152). While Weber’s 
definition sheds some light on what power is or does, the definition does 
not address how it is constituted. For one to understand social interactions 
in relation to institutions for natural resource management, one needs to 
examine how power can be conceptualised. Following Foucault (1979), 
power is here considered to be a strategy. Power is exercised rather than 
possessed (ibid: 26) and is constituted in social relationships, such as 
networks, alliances and conflicts. As Clegg (1989) notes, power is not a 
thing nor is it something that people have in a proprietorial sense. People 
possess power only in so far as they are relationally constituted as doing so 
(ibid: 207). Thus power is a relational concept, shaped by the different 
types of relationships that actors engage in and negotiate around each 
other. Power is viewed as a resource that can easily change hands or be 
influenced by different actors at the same time. No one particular actor has 
power at a particular time to the extent that others with whom he or she 
relates are lacking. In other words, in power relations, a powerful actor 
depends on other actors yielding power to the powerful actor (Villarreal, 
1992). Power can also be seen as related to issues of identity, especially in 
cases where a particular identity seemingly attributes to an individual a 
higher status and thus a more powerful position relative to other actors. 
This however does not mean that the ‘weaker actors’ are completely 
without power.  
 
More often village elites are perceived to be powerful in a given context. 
This however is an expression of their relations with other community 
members. Village elites may be individuals who own larger pieces of land, 
livestock, have broader networks and have better access to a diversity of 
income sources or can be those who hold leadership positions in the 
village. The term village elite does not only refer to actors who are 
physically resident in the village. Those living outside the village who are 
economically and politically influential in making local decisions are also 
included in this group of actors. Their social identity is not only 
constructed through their position in the kinship hierarchy, but also 
through social and economic achievement and networks that may be used 
in gaining access to key resources such as land, woodlands and water. With 
the introduction of formal education in colonial times, followed by 
modernisation and economic transformation, access to land and other 
natural resources can no longer be seen as the only important source of 
power. More often when wealth ranking is done in the communal areas 
context of Zimbabwe, traditional leaders, who often have bigger land 
holdings than most ordinary villagers, are ranked in the below average to 
poor categories. This reflects that land is not the only source of power, yet 
historically, land was the most important source of power. In addition to   46
access to land and other key natural resources such as woodlands and 
water, access to capital, labour and non-material goods such as 
information, knowledge and education is increasingly becoming more 
important in influencing power relations in a given community. 
 
In summary, power is not inherent to a position, a space or a person, it is 
not possessed by any other actors, and it is not a zero-sum process whereby 
its exercise by one of the actors leaves the others lacking. In this light, the 
concept of power is a useful analytical tool for understanding leadership 
and other struggles among community members. These may emerge 
between immigrants and groups endogenous to the areas, between 
livestock owners and the young couples who encroach into the grazing 
areas as a result of land shortage, between formal and informal institutions. 
Power relations can either emanate from application capacities or through 
discursive strategies that entail knowledge use or domination (Matose, 
2002). Understanding and unsettling processes of power and exclusion that 
disadvantage some groups of actors in relation to others (e.g. women and 
the poor), require that attention be paid to struggles over meaning as much 
as struggles over resources as Peters (1984) has demonstrated. Peters (ibid) 
arguments were substantiated by Carney and Watts (1991) drawing from a 
study in the Gambia. Woodlands and water are not only material assets; 
they are effective arguments and symbolic constructs, which are as 
significant to gendered natural resource rights as titles and tenure (Jackson, 
1998).  
 
Conflict analysis in CBNRM 
The interaction of various actors with diverse interests in a particular 
resource may result in conflict regardless of the institutional framework 
guiding the actions of various actors with regards to natural resource use. 
Rubin et al., define conflict as ‘perceived divergence of interest or a belief 
that the parties current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously’ 
(1994 quoted in Matondi, 2001). Matondi (ibid) notes that this definition is 
important in that it puts emphasis on the strategic choice and outcome of 
negotiations in the context of natural resource management. However the 
definition does not offer much insight into conflict between individual 
actors and institutions that should cater for their interests. A more relevant 
definition is that used by Grimble and Wellard (1997) who view conflicts 
as situations of competition and potential disagreements between and 
among actors and related resource management institutions. More often 
disagreements may be due to competition over scarce resources.   
 
Conflict is not always negative in natural resource management contexts 
as it can be an important feedback mechanism revealing how past efforts or 
projected future efforts affect the interests and behaviours of different 
participants (Ostrom, 1992). Institutional structures vary to the extent to 
which they use conflict creatively for gaining information about problems 
perceived by different actors. If conflict is suppressed, key information   47
                                                          
about the effects of past action is lost. From this proposition, conflict is 
often seen from a positive point of view in natural resource management 
contexts. On the contrary, if conflict is encouraged, valuable resources may 
be spent in potentially harmful disputes. Thus development of effective 
conflict resolution or management mechanisms is an important aspect of its 
capacity to achieve efficient and equitable performance of resource 
management institutions.   
 
Conflicts are expressed in a variety of ways such as confrontational, 
‘hidden transcripts’ or ‘the everyday forms of peasant resistance’ (Scott, 
1985 & 1990) and social tension that is played out in gossip and witchcraft 
accusations. Confrontational conflict is often violent (Matondi, 2001; 
Matose, 2002). Examples include encroachment of certain individuals into 
grazing areas, land occupations, for instance in the case of commercial land 
occupations and settlement in state forest reserves in Zimbabwe, and 
closing off people’s access to a resource such as woodland or water 
sources. Scott (1985) argues however that studying the ‘everyday forms of 
peasant resistance’ i.e. the subtle struggles waged by the less powerful is 
very revealing. The lack of confrontational approaches among the 
subordinate groups does not imply that they conform to the dominant 
discourses
15 and practices, as they have their own ‘everyday forms of 
resistance’, which become public in rare moments. Scott’s  (1985) field 
study in Southeast Asia particularly looks into how poor peasants may 
resist authority even under the most oppressive conditions. The various 
forms of resistance identified by Scott (ibid) include, passive compliance, 
subtle sabotage, evasion, pilfering, feet dragging and deception. These 
forms create a symbolic meaning of peasant resistance, challenging the 
assumption that the poor are victims of the prevailing ideology. The 
‘everyday forms of peasant resistance’ according to Scott (ibid) have both 
material and symbolic manifestations: they are part of a struggle over both 
resources and meanings (also in Peters, 1984). Scott (1985) further 
explains that there is often a ‘front-stage’ dominated by the elite or those 
perceived to be powerful, but ‘back-stage’ this control often falls away.  
 
Scott (1985) also contends that the ‘everyday forms of peasant 
resistance’ require little or no coordination or planning and make use of 
implicit understanding of informal networks. While Scott’s study provides 
useful insights of peasant forms of resistance, his analysis remains 
simplistic in that it portrays the rich and the poor or the powerful and the 
weak, in clear-cut categories that act according to pre-established sets of 
interests. It presents an evolutionist picture whereby the poor gradually 
develop power in an effort to destroy the system that oppresses them 
(Villarreal, 1994:28). Yet in real everyday life, there are flexible webs that 
configure power relations (Moore, 1993). These engender new forms of 
interaction and therefore have multiple faces. Scott has also been criticised 
 
15 Here discourses refer to an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is 
given to phenomena (Magadlela, 2000).   48
for failing to ask how gender might interact with class or other forms of 
social hierarchy in specific ways and to determine the forms that resistance 
might take if analysed through a gender lens (Agarwal, 1994a:83). 
Analysing ‘everyday forms of peasant resistance’ from a gender 
perspective, Simbolon’s (1998) study in North Sumatra, Indonesia, found 
that if women’s everyday forms of resistance did not succeed, they resorted 
to non-governmental agencies for assistance. In my study Scott’s concept 
of ‘everyday forms of peasant resistance’ provided a useful analytical 
framework for conceptualising the various forms of conflict and resistance, 
but a gender analysis framework was used to explore gender-related 
conflicts over access to woodlands and water resources.   
 
Witchcraft and related accusations have also been conceptualised as 
expressions of social tension or conflict in a given society. The belief in 
supernatural forces is still deeply rooted in many African societies 
regardless of education, religion and social class (Kohnert, 1996). The 
incidents of witchcraft accusations are said to be increasing due to social 
stress caused by resource scarcity and harsh macro-economic and political 
environments. Most often witchcraft accusations work to the disadvantage 
of the poor and deprived. However, under particular circumstances, they 
may become a means of the poor in the struggle to gain access to natural 
resources or a counter weight against oppression by the existing 
institutional framework (ibid: 1347). Development interventions, which 
constitute arenas for strategic groups in their struggle for power and control 
over project resources, are likely to further endanger a precarious balance 
of power, causing witchcraft accusations to flourish. Common to the belief 
in witchcraft is the perception that certain community members may harm 
their fellow women or men illicitly by recourse to supernatural means 
(Abrahams, 1985).  
 
Theories of witchcraft that have been implicitly or explicitly put forward 
fall into three main categories: 
 
a)  Historical or ethnological 
b) Psychological  and 
c)  Sociological – which may be divided into:  
(i)  those theories that emphasise normative aspects of 
social organisation and  
(ii)  those centring on tension and social change.  
 
The sociological theories on witchcraft are most relevant to this study. Of 
the two variants, that focusing on social norms is encountered more in 
literature but of more relevance to this thesis is the theory that centres on 
tension and social change within a given community. This theory treats 
witchcraft accusations as indices of social tension and as vehicles of social 
change. The relative frequency of accusations in various social 
relationships provides a set of social strain gauges for locating the tensions 
and role conflicts in a particular society. Abandoning a static functional   49
model, in favour of a more dynamic view of social trends and processes, 
this theory is undergoing modification. Greater attention is now being paid 
to the part accusations play in manipulating social situations and in 
involving the community as a whole in issues hitherto confined to those 
persons directly enmeshed in the conflict or quarrel from which the 
witchcraft accusation stems (Abrahams, 1985). These theories of witchcraft 
are important in that they raise the study of witchcraft from the level of 
travellers’ ‘entertaining tales’ and ‘straight’ ethnography to that of 
scientific analysis aimed at making generalisations about repetitive social 
situations and processes (ibid; Krige, 1947).        
 
Although much social science research has been done on CBNRM 
institutions, very little work has focused on the role of witchcraft and 
related accusations in influencing resource management institutions. 
Methodologically, it is quite complex to investigate issues surrounding 
witchcraft and related accusations. Thus rather than seeking more exact 
knowledge of witchcraft, the key question reflected upon in this thesis 
regarding witchcraft accusations as expression of social conflict relates to 
whether witchcraft accusations have any significance for CBNRM 
institutions and gendered access to woodlands and water resources at the 
local level. Events create a special anxiety when they are termed unnatural 
or are seen to run counter to the ordinary course of things. For example, if 
a woman becomes excessively powerful e.g. taking control over decision-
making processes, this may be considered unnatural in a patriarchal society 
where male dominance is prevalent. In such circumstances, community 
members begin to seek explanations and often witchcraft accusations come 
into play. As Krige (1947) found among the Lobedu of north-east 
Transvaal in South Africa, it suffices to ground an imputation of witchcraft 
when a man (woman) menaces you with the words udobona (you will see).   
 
At the manifest level, witchcraft stories have the value of the dramatic – 
an exciting story. As an analytical concept, witchcraft can be considered to 
be a force in social relations – something that can make or break a 
community. The witch does not exist in his/her own right; it is the 
judgement of society that creates him/her. Society creates this image of a 
witch and pins this image down to a particular individual. The question is, 
in a given society who is most likely to accuse whom and why? Possible 
answers given in the literature are: 
 
a)  Witches and their accusers are nearly always people closely 
intertwined together; belong to one neighbourhood, community or 
even one household (this is common in polygamous households). 
This principle is expressed in the witchcraft myth by the notion 
that witches cannot harm you from far away, but only if you are 
close by. 
b)  Witchcraft accusations nearly always grow out of some personal 
antipathy or hostile emotion. Frequencies of witchcraft accusations   50
may be interpreted as pointers to weak spots in the social structures 
(Mayer, 1954). 
c)  Those suspected of witchcraft in a given community do not 
constitute a random sample of the population generally. A large 
majority consists of certain groups of people such as the rich, the 
old and the powerful (Clyde, 1962).  
 
As Clyde (1962) observes, the effectiveness of leaders is sometimes 
increased by the fear that they are witches and that if they are disobeyed, 
they will use witchcraft against those who fail to follow them. While this 
sometimes doubtless has the consequence of perpetuating bad leadership 
(e.g. people fearing to remove community leaders from their positions even 
if they are not performing as expected), it has its good side too in that if a 
community lacks strong leadership, this may make it vulnerable when 
facing ‘outsiders’ (ibid). In many cases witchcraft accusations do more to 
promote fear and timidity than to relieve aggressive tendencies. The fear 
consequent upon witchcraft tends to restrict the life activities of some 
persons, to curtail their participation in certain arenas, while at the same 
time it may have negative implications for trust and the building of 
community networks, social capital and reciprocity.  
 
Within the context of conflict analysis, the intent of this study is to 
examine and provide insights into how the different types of conflict affect 
institutions for woodland and water resource use as well as sustainable use 
of these resources. Matondi (2001) identifies three levels at which conflicts 
occur, namely the micro, macro and meso levels and analyses conflict at 
these three levels. This study mainly focuses on institutional conflicts at the 
micro level and where relevant this is related to the other two levels. A 
variety of factors have been identified that can cause conflict within a 
community or among a variety of actors in the context of natural resource 
management. These include, historical factors e.g. the colonial land 
policies, resource scarcity due to population pressure, fuzzy resource use 
and user boundaries, and the nature of relations among actors regarding 
access to woodland and water resources. These are summarised in Table 
2.3.  
 
In any group sharing a common pool resource such as woodlands and 
water, conflicts are often inevitable as actors may have different views on 
authority, institutions, and interpretation of rules, trust and reciprocity. In 
general, managing communal landscapes is a complex process because 
within these landscapes, there are multiple resources, with multiple uses 
and users. The analysis of conflicts as they relate to institutional issues 
would be incomplete if conflict mediation mechanisms are overlooked. 
Thus conflict mediation or management mechanisms in place are analysed 
as well as institutional synergies from the community members’, and other 
relevant actors’, perspective.     51
 Table  2.3.  Factors that may contribute to institutional conflict 
 
Colonial 
policies 
Resource 
scarcity 
Institutional 
overlaps 
Fuzzy resource 
use boundaries 
Nature of 
relations 
between 
actors  
- Colonial 
land 
alienation
16 
- Insecure 
natural 
resource 
tenure  
-Population 
pressure in 
communal 
lands 
-
Resettlement 
leading to 
mixed ethnic 
groupings 
 
- Shortage of 
arable land 
(both in 
quantity and 
quality) 
- Shortage of 
settlement land  
- Low 
agricultural 
productivity 
-Limited 
livelihood 
sources e.g. 
following 
retrenchments 
partly 
attributed to 
ESAP
17. 
- Formal versus 
informal 
institutions 
- Modern versus 
traditional 
- Contested 
institutions 
- NGO and 
externally 
engineered versus 
other community 
institutions 
- Legal control 
vested in 
institutions that 
are upwardly and 
not downwardly 
accountable
18  
- Cross village 
resource sharing 
- Fuzzy 
definition of 
‘legitimate’ 
resource users 
- Multiple users 
of multiple 
resources in the 
same landscape 
 
- Lack of trust 
- Social tension 
(often 
expressed in 
witchcraft 
accusations) 
- Socio-
economic 
differentiation 
by gender age, 
and wealth 
- Skewed 
power relations 
- Differential 
access to 
natural 
resources 
 
2.3 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the conceptual framework that guides the study. 
The literature review began by discussing Hardin’s (1968) tragedy of the 
commons thesis that has been applied in the analysis of the ‘problem of 
commons’. Criticisms levelled against Hardin’s thesis were discussed 
leading to the analysis of the institutions-oriented approaches for analysing 
common pool resource management situations. Four broad categories of 
institutional analysis approaches were identified: the moral economy 
approach, new institutionalism and the actor-oriented and actor-network 
approaches. The latter three were found more relevant to this study and 
were therefore discussed in greater detail. The chapter went on to define 
and discuss key concepts that can be used as analytical tools in the analysis 
of common pool resource management institutions, the concepts of access, 
agency, power and conflict. The discussion on these key concepts centred 
on their utility within the context of actor-oriented and actor-network 
approaches in institutional analysis in CBNRM. The next chapter will 
discuss the methodological framework adopted for the study and the 
description of the study site, the Romwe Catchment in Chivi district, 
Southern Zimbabwe. 
                                                           
16 Land and related natural resources expropriation by colonial governments resulted in peasant 
farmers being overcrowded in areas of low agricultural potential. 
17 Economic Structural Adjustment Programme. 
18  See Matondi, 2001 & Ribot, 1999.  
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY AND 
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will describe the methodological framework adopted for the 
study as well as presenting the background and context of the study setting, 
the Romwe catchment in Chivi district, southern Zimbabwe. The study was 
located within a broader inter-institutional development project. The 
qualitative research methodology forms the basis of this study, although 
some quantitative research methods were also used. The majority of 
quantitative data presented in the thesis is drawn from a household survey 
that was done between late 1998 and 2000 in collaboration with the 
Institute of Environmental Studies (IES), CARE International and the 
Centre for Ecology and Hydrology (CEH). In the methodology section, a 
description is given of the research strategies adopted, methods of data 
collection and analysis, field procedures, experiences and the challenges 
faced during fieldwork. The second part of the chapter provides general 
background to the study site.  
 
3.2 Research methodology 
As discussed in Chapter One, the major question the study seeks to answer 
is what role formal and informal institutions play in determining patterns of 
access to and control over woodland and water resources by women and 
men. By answering this question, the study hopes to contribute to the 
debates on the role of local level institutions, in particular informal ones, in 
influencing and facilitating sustainable natural resource use in the context 
of CBNRM. The study attempts to broaden knowledge on the scope of 
actors, social interactions and informal processes with some relevance to 
the framework for the study of institutional dynamics in CBNRM. Before 
going into the details of the fieldwork process, the qualitative research 
approach is discussed. 
 
3.2.1 Qualitative research methodology 
Social research in a development project context (as in my case) on 
institutional dynamics and how they affect different actors is complex and 
therefore requires that one use methods that will bring out the dynamism of 
the numerous intricate processes of social interaction. Qualitative methods 
were suitable for my study as they aim at capturing the myriad perspectives 
of participants in the social world. Qualitative research is inherently multi-
method in focus (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Flick, 1998). The use of 
multiple methods, or triangulation, reflects an attempt to secure an in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon in question. Objective reality can never 
be captured, we can know something only through its representations 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2000:5). The multiple qualitative methods available to   54
the researcher include, case studies, situational analyses, network analysis, 
participant observation, dialogue, visual methods, group discussions and 
key informant interviews. The majority of these methods played a crucial 
role in the process of data collection in the study.  
 
3.2.2 Data requirements 
Given the diversity of actors that influence or are affected by institutions in 
CBNRM, the identification of various actors involved in shaping 
institutional processes becomes key to the institutional analysis process. 
Various actors, i.e. women, men, rich, poor, local and traditional 
authorities and individuals or groups’ relationship to institutions are often 
shaped by their experiences and other social relationships (both formal and 
informal) within local and external spheres. Their actions need to be 
interrogated in the context of their history, economic activities, ethnicity, 
age and gender so as to understand how action observed at a particular time 
at the local level is a product of and has some effect on the wider political, 
economic and social systems and institutional framework (Long, 1977). 
Thus, there is need to analyse historical processes and social relationships 
and how they impact on institutions for woodland and water use and 
management. Socio-economic differentiation data is required for the 
understanding of how institutions influence or are influenced by actors 
belonging to various socio-economic categories that can be defined along 
wealth, ethnic, age and gender lines. Five broad data sets can be discerned 
from the foregoing discussion:  
 
a)  development of an institutional map; 
b)  data on the nature and characteristics of the natural resource 
landscape; 
c)  identification of actors involved and related social networks; 
d) information on historical processes that shape or influence 
institutional dynamics; 
e)  data on socio-economic differentiation as it relates to institutions 
and issues of access to woodland and water resources; 
 
Identifying institutions and their membership is a major methodological 
challenge in a context where there are both formal (visible) and informal 
(often hidden) institutions. This study maps out institutions and related 
structures in the Romwe catchment in an effort to understand the 
significance of local and external institutions on defining patterns of 
resource access, use and management. Identifying major institutions in the 
area makes it possible to define a typology of institutions, the resources 
they are managing and how they have included or excluded others. Romwe 
residents to some extent have an interest in natural resources beyond their 
own catchment, for example, gold panning. Within the institutions, actors 
have different interests, beliefs and agendas. In mapping the institutions, 
attention is paid to who participates in the formation or maintenance of   55
which institutions, who are the members of which institutional structures 
and why?  
 
Other methodological issues relate to how boundaries have been defined 
within the context of a catchment through the CEH and IES catchment 
management projects. The biophysical boundaries of the Romwe 
catchment were defined by the CEH in 1991/92 and taken up by IES in 
1998 as a frame for their common property resources management project. 
The author participated in the Romwe catchment management project in 
her capacity as a Research Associate at IES. While the biophysical 
catchment was defined by CEH, this study attempts to define the social 
boundaries related to multiple and single resource use within the confines 
of the Romwe catchment. It is assumed that defining the precise 
biophysical boundaries of Romwe catchment as was done by CEH limits 
the understanding of how people in communal areas share natural 
resources within and across villages.  
 
Defining resource use boundaries was found to be a challenging task as it 
involved identifying the social and resource units, and multiple resource 
uses by various actors. These actors who are in themselves differentiated 
according to gender, ethnicity, age and wealth have different perceptions of 
the resources in question, how they be should be used and managed. A 
second challenge relates to how others are included or excluded in 
utilization of water and woodlands. Those excluded tend to mobilise both 
the local and outside institutions to gain access to such resources and in 
some instances through illegitimate means or through informal networks. 
 
3.2.3 Research strategy 
A case study approach was adopted in order to produce detailed analyses of 
various actors’ strategies in influencing or getting around both formal and 
informal institutional constraints and how this influences women’s and 
men’s access to woodlands and water. The idea of selecting critical cases is 
encouraged in the actor-oriented perspectives (Hammersley & Atkinson, 
1983; Long & Long, 1992; Steins, 1999) and the approach is an 
appropriate way of capturing context specific detail (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2000; Yin, 1994). The case study was central to my empirical investigation 
because it allowed me to be at the site where institutional interactions occur 
as well as observe actors in the context of processes at play and events 
taking place.  
 
Given that the data generated from case studies is largely qualitative in 
nature, the narrative approach is employed to present that data (Carr, 1986; 
Roe, 1995; Fortmann, 1995; Scott, 1985). Data from the case study does 
not always come in quantifiable form, although it can be quantified, for 
example, through content analysis. However, the objective of my study is 
to show processes of institutional interactions and relationships as they 
influence access to woodlands and water resources by women and men.   56
Where relevant, quantitative data was drawn from the household livelihood 
survey that was undertaken in 1998-2000 (Campbell, et al., 1998: 
Household Livelihood Survey Questionnaire for Romwe and Mutangi 
Catchments).  
 
3.2. 4 Identification of the study site 
The case study site was selected within the confines of a broader research 
project of IES on common property resources management. The project 
emerged from a perception that there were more studies on catchments that 
concentrated on biophysical and hydrological issues, with little emphasis 
on socio-economic issues. The broader question for the IES project was on 
whether the Integrated Resource Management approach is a means to 
eliminating rural poverty. Beginning in July 1998, IES, together with a 
non-governmental organisation, CARE International, RDC officials and 
community members have been exploring the role of an integrated 
approach to the management of micro-catchments in semi-arid areas of 
Zimbabwe in poverty alleviation.  
 
A question that often arises in relation to case studies is their 
representativeness. Rainfall received in Romwe catchment, located in hilly 
areas, ranges between 600-800 mm per annum while most other parts of 
Chivi district receive between 400-600 mm per annum. If other 
characteristics are considered, the Romwe catchment is not very different 
from the rest of Chivi communal lands. The Romwe catchment is typical of 
communal areas in Chivi district in many respects: it has a history of 
population movements, has a relatively high population density, infertile 
soils that are characterised by low agricultural productivity, high risk of 
droughts and crop failure, shortage of arable land, has had an influx of 
researchers and development organisations and has had a fair share of 
empty promises by the government on land resettlement. In this respect 
findings from the Romwe catchment may be applicable to other parts of the 
Chivi communal area as well as other communal areas in Zimbabwe that 
have similar characteristics.         
 
3.2.5 Research methods 
Multiple research methods and sources of evidence were used in order to 
capture the discourses and practices of the different actors. Triangulation 
was built into the data collection process so as to verify data collected. 
Specific research methods used include participatory rural appraisal 
exercises, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, historical 
narratives, case histories, participant observation, gender analysis, the actor 
linkage matrix and secondary data review. Participation in community 
gatherings such as funerals, weddings and church services was also 
important in the data gathering process. Residence in the study village was 
important in building rapport with community members and developing 
extensive social networks. Research methods used are presented in Table 
3.1, followed by a detailed description of each of the methods.   57
 
Table 3.1. Research methods, sources of data and unit of analysis 
 
Method Variables  Sources  Unit/level 
of analysis 
Resource and 
institutional 
mapping 
Woodland and water 
resources 
Grazing land 
Boundaries 
Tenure and access to 
resources 
Legitimacy 
Gender  
Participants at village 
PRA workshops 
Young men 
Village leaders 
RDC offices 
Village 
Household 
Transects Boundaries 
Conflict spots e.g. sacred 
areas 
Land holdings 
Village members  Village 
Household 
Pairwise 
ranking 
People’s priorities  PRA workshops  Village 
Wealth 
ranking 
Wealth indicators  PRA workshops 
Health workers 
Traditional leaders 
Village  
Household 
Historical 
trends 
Resource availability  PRA workshops 
Archival records 
RDC 
Aerial photos 
Traditional leaders 
Village 
 
Key 
informant 
interviews 
Tenure 
Access 
Conflicts and conflict 
mediation 
Gender 
Village 
RDC 
Provincial level 
NGOs 
Village  
Household 
Focus group 
discussions 
Tenure 
Conflict 
Gender 
Ordinary village 
women, men, youths 
Traditional leaders 
Village 
Household 
Historical 
narratives 
Tenure 
Settlement history 
Conflict 
Traditional leaders 
Community elders 
Village 
Case histories  Settlement history 
Resource availability 
Leadership 
Village i.e. traditional 
leaders 
Village 
Clan 
Participant 
observation 
Local practices 
Interactions 
Gossip 
Community gatherings 
e.g. funerals, churches, 
parties 
Village 
Household 
Individual 
Gender 
analysis  
Division of labour 
Tenure 
Access 
Leadership 
PRA workshops 
Community gatherings 
Households 
NGOs 
Village 
Household 
Actor linkage 
matrix 
Organisational interactions  Traditional leaders 
NGO and extension 
officers 
WADCOs & VIDCOs  
Village 
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Workshops and group interviews 
Participatory rural appraisal (PRA) workshops were facilitated to learn 
about the perspectives on natural resource use boundaries and institutional 
issues with relevance to the three study objectives. The PRA approach was 
found relevant because it emphasises recipient influence on problem 
definition and solution design and has gained popularity as a means of 
improving project performance (Chambers, 1993). In the PRA workshops, 
separate women’s and men’s groups worked on similar tasks designed to 
describe their patterns of access to and use of woodlands and water 
resources, and their perceptions of institutions regulating access to these 
natural resources. Women and men worked in separate groups so that 
women could freely express their opinions since, culturally, women tend 
not to speak in the presence of men. Plenary sessions often followed group 
work to ensure the sharing of information generated from different groups 
and also to get feedback on each group’s results from the larger 
community. Follow-up interviews were made after large community 
meetings to get a more in-depth understanding of issues raised at the 
meetings. 
 
In recent years, field experiences have suggested that PRA tools and 
techniques should be used with caution as they may not reveal power 
dynamics and other power relationships that influence common pool 
resource governance (Mosse, 1997; Goebel, 1998). These problems include 
production of a falsely homogenised view of village perspectives, static 
and misleading pictures of social practices and beliefs. Despite such 
weaknesses of the PRA methodology, this study found that PRA generates 
data that provide a picture on general trends and perceptions. Taking the 
weaknesses of PRA methods into consideration, this study therefore used 
other research methods such as key informant interviews and case histories 
to complement the PRA tools and techniques as well as triangulate 
information gathered through the PRA process. PRA tools and techniques 
employed include resource and institutional mapping, pairwise ranking of 
institutions with a focus on how local people perceive and value different 
institutions, transect walks, historical trends and wealth ranking.  
 
Resource mapping was used to generate data on woodlands and water 
resources available in the area. The maps generated are different from the 
‘official’ maps, since they reveal local people’s perceptions about 
resources available in their area. Resource areas and units used by different 
community members were identified in the process of mapping. Though 
the resource mapping exercise was useful in identifying different resource 
spaces and products, it was difficult to have clear boundaries shown on the 
maps as participants preferred to leave boundaries open. Further 
investigations through transect walks with key informants revealed that the 
issue of boundaries is contentious and therefore people prefer not to 
discuss it in public fora. Transects turned out to be useful in verifying 
resource use boundaries and areas of conflict over boundaries that had not   59
been clearly articulated during the mapping exercises as well as identifying 
problem areas. Issues relating to conflicts over certain areas such as sacred 
areas and grazing areas that had not come out during resource mapping 
exercises were raised during transect walks.  Tenure issues were discussed 
during the resource mapping exercises and this generated information on 
how access to these resources is determined by the various institutions 
found in the village. Data on access to natural resources and resource use 
boundaries was gathered cautiously because access to resources in the 
study site is mediated through kinship based and other social networks, 
relationships that it may be sensitive to discuss in public. Other studies 
carried out in different parts of the country have also made similar 
observations (Matondi, 2001; Sithole, 2000 & 1999). Wealth ranking was 
used to determine indicators of wealth as defined by community members. 
Wealth categories were derived from an exercise undertaken with key 
informants from the village. Because of the sensitive nature of the wealth 
ranking exercise, identification of criteria for defining the wealth categories 
was done in a larger community context, while the placing of individual 
households under each of the wealth groups was done by key informants 
(Annex 2). These wealth indicators give important social and economic 
information in themselves and were used for sampling purposes for the key 
informant interviews. 
 
During the PRA workshops, observation of interactions and flow of 
discussion gave pointers to the existence of allegiances between and among 
various actors, for example, which actors were allied to which individuals 
or institutions, which individuals tended to support each other, which 
people made attempts to suppress information and what types of 
information were being suppressed. Groans, grunts, and facial expressions 
are also quite revealing as they often manifest reactions to something that 
people do not agree with or otherwise. These reactions were taken note of 
during community meetings and discussions.  
 
As part of the PRA process, historical trends were used to gather 
information on changes in the natural resource base that have occurred 
over time. The underlying philosophy has been commonly referred to as 
indigenous technical knowledge (ITK), that communities are informed by 
past experiences and make decisions based on the interpretation of this 
experience and its relevance to the present. To identify changes in resource 
use patterns and resource availability from the local people’s perspective, 
historical trends were developed by the participants. Scoring was used to 
highlight resource availability for different time periods agreed upon by 
both women’s and men’s groups, but the scoring was done separately so as 
to capture any gender differences in perceptions. 
 
Key informant interviews 
The purposive sampling strategy was used for identifying key informants. 
Variables taken into consideration in the sampling of key informants are   60
gender, wealth, ethnicity, age, leadership position, and in-depth knowledge 
of the area. Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with key 
informants including older members of the community, people active in 
community institutions and those active in natural resource management in 
general. Because of the sensitive nature of information about natural 
resource use conflicts and village boundaries, this information was 
gathered through key informant interviews as it was deemed too sensitive 
to be discussed in a group setting. A tenure survey was also undertaken 
with key local leadership that includes the sabuku, VIDCO chairman, the 
former and current councillor and one headman (see Annex 1). The tenure 
surveys were used to explore and characterise the diversity of rules that 
make up property rights systems associated with different resources and 
resource areas identified during the mapping exercises (Kundhlande & 
Luckert, 1998). The tenure surveys were intended to give a finer analysis 
of the concept of property rights that transcend conventional notions of 
property rights broadly categorised into state, private, common property 
and open access regimes (Berkes & Farvar, 1989; Ostrom, 1990). Hence 
this study adopted a method used by Kundhlande and Luckert (1998), 
which describes property right systems in a much broader way than is the 
case in the CPR literature. In this approach, the characteristics that are 
hypothesised to have systematic effects on natural resource management 
include: comprehensiveness, exclusiveness, use designation, duration, 
allotment type, size, transferability, fees payment, operational 
requirements, operational control and security. These characteristics are 
described in Table 3.2. 
 
The standardised interview schedule presented in Annex 1 was designed 
and administered to key informants. Because the tenure survey sought to 
describe the village level context and resource use rules, village heads such 
as the headman, sabukus, and councillors were interviewed over several 
visits so as to avoid respondent fatigue as the survey took up to three hours 
of interview time per respondent.     61
Table 3.2. Characteristics of tenures influencing resource management 
 
Tenure characteristics  Description 
Comprehensiveness  Refers to the set of natural resources over which a 
household has control. Comprehensiveness may include 
management rights as well as harvesting rights.  
Exclusiveness  The ability of a property holder to prevent other parties 
from freely enjoying the benefits of a resource. Lack of 
exclusivity may erode incentives for investment in 
management since there is no guarantee of capturing the 
return.   
Use designation  Use designation limits the types of activities that tenure 
holders can carry out on a given type of tenure. E.g. 
cultivating in areas with indigenous woodlands may be 
prohibited to promote sustainability of the woodlands. 
Duration  In most cases, tenures specify the period over which 
property rights may be exercised. E.g. under private 
ownership, a perpetual duration is usually implied, yet 
leases of agricultural land can be for one or more cropping 
seasons. Curtailed time horizons may create incentives to 
push forward benefits and postpone costs.   
Allotment type  Refers to whether the tenure specifies an area over which a 
household possesses rights, or whether the tenure specifies 
volumes of natural resources that may be collected by the 
household at a given time.  
Size  The spatial or volume specification of the tenure.   
Transferability  The ability of a resource owner to sell, bequeath, or give an 
asset to others at mutually agreed upon terms. Asset or 
resource transfer can take the form of a sale or lease. For 
example agricultural land may sometimes be inherited or 
sold while woodland products may sometimes be sold.   
Fees payment  Fees may be payable by households harvesting products, 
e.g. persons wishing to collect and sell firewood may be 
required to purchase a permit. Fees may be paid in cash or 
kind.   
Operational requirements   Society may require that resource users adhere to certain 
regulations during the use of an asset, for resource 
management and in their harvesting practices. Such 
regulations may be designed to ensure that management and 
harvesting practices are consistent with the community’s 
management goals.  
Operational control   Mechanisms for enforcing the conditions for resource use. 
This may involve policing by appointees selected by 
villagers and a system of penalties against those who break 
the rules.   
Security (assurance)  The perception of a right holder concerning his/her ability 
to capture benefits generated by the resource in future and 
whether changes in tenure will occur that increase or 
decrease the derived benefits. 
 
 
Focus group discussions (FGDs) 
Facilitated FGDs generated data on institutional relationships and the role 
of women in institutional processes. FGDs were undertaken with small   62
groups of women in leadership positions, women active in natural resource 
management issues and projects, and members of institutional structures 
such as the sabukus, VIDCOs and the catchment management committee. 
Focus groups have been commended for allowing access to research 
participants who may find one-on-one, face-to-face interviews 
intimidating. By creating multiple lines of communication, the group 
interview offers participants a safe environment where they can share ideas 
(Madriz, 2000). The FGDs conducted were quite stimulating and the 
majority of the participants were actively involved. At the end of our 
discussions, people always made statements such as ‘When are you going 
to invite us again? We really enjoyed ourselves today; We learnt a lot from 
other group members that we didn’t know before’. Other studies conducted 
on focus groups show that group participants find the experience gratifying 
(Madriz, 2000). Focus group discussions also allowed for the observation 
of interactions amongst the participants and they exposed the researcher to 
the diverse views, preferences and priorities of different groups in the 
village. Divergent views noted during the discussions were used as foci for 
further investigations on process and relationships between and amongst 
various actors. While the focus group discussions have these advantages, 
they can also be arenas for contestation and may be biased by power 
relations in the group (Mosse, 1994; Goebel, 1998). If not facilitated 
carefully, views of powerful members of the group may be the dominant 
ones. To avoid this bias, individual interviews were also undertaken to 
complement data generated from group discussions. 
 
Historical narratives 
Historical narratives were generated from key informants, mainly the 
traditional leadership. Central to the analysis of narratives, apart from 
temporal unfolding of events, is the relation among the points of view on 
those events belonging to characters in the narrative, the narrator, and the 
audience to whom the narrative is delivered (Carr, 1986: 5). The narrator 
may oscillate between the ‘I that is We and the We that is I’ i.e. the idea of 
a social and collective subject of action, experience and history. Taking 
note of this is important in moving beyond individual subjectivity without 
leaving behind altogether the idea of subjectivity itself (ibid: 6). A story 
can be told by an individual or individuals on behalf of the We; indeed 
using the we as the subject not only of action and experience but also of 
narration itself. Such is the social function of leaders and spokespersons. 
The use of we is rhetoric that unites the group and expresses what it is 
about, where it came from and where it is going. The individual narrator 
may tell the story but it is presented as ‘our’ story. But such a narrative 
should be shared if it is to be constitutive of a group’s existence and 
activity. Other participants not have to tell the story, but they must believe 
it or accept it as the genuine account of what the group is and what it is 
doing. It is worth noting that there can be rival versions of the same story, 
but these different versions may also be the basis for factions so sharply 
divided that they threaten the unified existence of the community from   63
which they spring. Basically, the focus of a historical narrative is a story 
being told about the past. In analysing the historical narratives, there is 
need to examine the motive for constructing the narrative. The motive is 
sometimes to establish ‘moral authority’ and in other cases a narrative 
seeks to fulfil a cognitive motive. In some cases, a narrative can be used to 
put across a moral view of the world in the interests of power and 
manipulation.      
 
As Fortmann (1995) points out, narratives are crafted in an attempt to 
legitimise present claims (e.g. claims to leadership positions) in terms of 
the past recognition of their access right. The historical narratives 
presented in this thesis illustrate the role of ‘stories’ in institutional and 
property relations and resource claims. Institutions and institutional 
arrangements are constantly negotiated and renegotiated and narratives 
therefore constitute part of what Fortmann refers to as a “discursive 
strategy” that is a crucial component in the process of renegotiation. 
Historical narratives are an important oral manifestation of a local 
discourse seeking to define and claim local resources and assert 
institutional legitimacy (Peters, 1984). Thus, this study draws on local 
historical narratives in the attempt to understand and explain current local 
institutional frameworks for woodlands and water resources use and 
management.  
 
Case histories 
Case histories were used as a basis for understanding natural resource use 
and access struggles in the study area. Elderly people deemed 
knowledgeable of the area and the history of settlement were interviewed 
to generate case histories. The snowball method together with the 
experience of the IES full-time field research assistant, who lived in the 
study area for the four-year project period, participated in the identification 
of key informants. The snowball method involves identification of e.g. one 
respondent deemed knowledgeable on a particular topic. After discussions 
with him/her, he/she is asked to identify other potential respondents on the 
topic being discussed and the same is done with each of the later 
respondents. During this study, after three or four case histories, the same 
names would come up when a respondent was asked to identify other 
potential respondents. The study took into consideration observations that 
have been made about the challenges of using case histories. The challenge 
of using case histories as a research method is that recollection is selective 
and filtered. When recollecting the past, it is seldom that the past is 
reconstructed in accordance with present ideas. In most cases, important 
episodes or worst experiences are easily remembered. This approach was 
advantageous for my study because the struggles over property rights 
stories or narratives constitute a crucial component of the process of 
negotiations. Narratives are an important oral manifestation of local 
discourse that seeks to define claims on local resources (Roe, 1991; 
Fortmann 1995; Moore 1996). Claims by different actors over resource   64
                                                          
ownership often emphasise aspects of truth since rights in a resource are 
highly ambiguous and contextual.  
 
Participant observation 
The power relations of actors, which may have a direct or indirect impact 
on natural resource institutions, are embedded in contested and contrasting 
discourses
19. Institutional arrangements often symbolise contested terrains 
between and among various actors (as groups or individuals), communities 
versus state, settlers versus immigrants, women versus men and rich versus 
poor (Moore, 1996). Such contestations are often not expressed verbally by 
the actors or discussed publicly, but observations of interactions may yield 
important insights into how such relationships impact on resource 
management institutions and patterns of access to woodland and water by 
women and men. Participant observation was therefore found useful in this 
study. Given that some information was received through gossip and 
rumours spreading in the community, e.g. claims of certain strong personal 
relationships influencing decision-making processes and outcomes, the 
observations that were made in community meetings, at the dare,
20 
generated insights that were useful in determining whether the gossip or 
rumours had some basis on which they were founded. Observations of 
patterns of resource use and the role played by institutions (i.e. which 
institutions were adhered to or not) were also made.          
 
While participant observation is sometimes romanticised, it is worth 
noting that a stranger very rarely becomes fully part of the society he or 
she studies. The ‘social distance’ based on class, race, education, culture, 
language and power is never really closed (Cheater, 1986: 22). Cheater 
(ibid) notes that the romanticised idea of participant observation naively 
denies the differences that exist in all societies. This social differentiation 
makes total participation impossible, given the researcher’s ultimate 
objective of understanding that society comprehensively as a whole. 
Furthermore, participation in community activities by itself does not yield 
much usable information and thus, to elicit why people do what they do, it 
was necessary to ask questions in addition to observing the various 
activities. The asking of questions during participant observation was 
opportunistic and therefore informal and unstructured. Considering that 
there is often some disparity between what people say should be done and 
what they actually do, conceptualised as the difference between the ideal 
social structure and the empirical social organisation, the author recorded 
both what was said and what was done. In the majority of social gatherings 
attended, such as funerals and church gatherings, it was improper to take 
notes and thus documentation was done at the campsite immediately after 
the gatherings when information was still fresh in the mind. While the 
 
19 A discourse can be defined as an ‘ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which 
meaning is given to phenomena’. 
20 Attendance at the dare is open to the public and each person who attends is free to make his/her 
contribution, as the circumstances may allow (Gombe, 1995).   65
research campsite is located within the study area, the study would have 
benefited if the researcher had lived with a family, as it would have 
brought the researcher much closer to the reality of village life through 
participating in household activities, e.g. household chores.  
 
Gender analysis  
The gender analysis framework adopted for the study was meant to 
especially generate data on how institutions affect women’s and men’s 
patterns of access to woodlands and water. Gender analysis entailed 
understanding the nature and representation of both women and men in the 
institutional structures and the actual decision-making processes as these 
have implications for women’s and men’s access to and control over 
natural resources as well as the sustainable use of those resources. 
Resource management literature has highlighted the fact that women are 
frequently not represented or have token representation on the committees, 
which make decisions about natural resources (Nabane, 1997; Goebel, 
1998). Investigating gender issues in resource management institutions is 
an attempt to understand power relations and an effort to challenge the 
construction of rural institutional structures as representative structures. 
These power relations often influence resource management institutions 
either positively or negatively.  
 
Actor linkage matrix 
The actor linkage matrix (adapted from Biggs & Matsaert, 1998) was used 
to assess patterns of organisational interaction. This exercise was done with 
key informants mainly the sabukus and the VIDCO chairman. In using this 
method, the first step was to list major organisations down the page in rows 
and then the same organisations were listed across the page in columns. 
The cells in the matrix represent the frequency of interaction between the 
organisations. Analysis of patterns of organisational interactions was done 
using three scenarios: 
 
1.  The official picture - who is supposed to interact with whom? 
2.  Who is actually/currently interacting with whom? 
3.  What would be the ideal situation?  
 
Discussions were facilitated around the matrix regarding the nature of 
interaction. The discussions helped explain high or low level of interaction 
between the various organisations. Constraints on or factors hindering the 
ideal situation were discussed. While the actor linkage matrix generated 
useful insights on patterns of organisational interaction, it was a long 
process and needed patience from both the participants and the researcher. 
Focusing on the three scenarios could have resulted in the process taking a 
long time, but at the same time, the researcher felt if only one component 
was addressed, a full picture would not be generated from the exercise. The 
actor linkage matrix was also useful in that it was used to think and talk 
through alternative scenarios about possible organisational interactions in   66
CBNRM. Discussions were made regarding how the ideal situation could 
be achieved and some insights on policy-related reflections were drawn 
from the results of this exercise. While in practice it may not always be 
necessary to construct an actor linkage matrix to think through all 
institutional options for addressing CBNRM related problems, the matrix 
however helps ensure that implications of each option are thought through 
and that a wide range of options are kept open (Biggs & Matsaert, 
1998:12). The actor linkage matrix is also useful in identifying some 
institutional linkages that are strong, but might be weakened if the project 
is to contribute to changing the form and nature of interactions of the 
different institutional actors or vice versa. A challenge in using this matrix 
relates to its political sensitivity – because the matrix deals with 
relationships between various institutional actors, it may highlight weak or 
strong relationships, which are politically sensitive and might be unpopular 
for this reason. Because of the realisation of this challenge, the study used 
key informants rather than work with groups.          
 
Secondary sources of data 
Secondary data sources were reviewed, such as records at the rural district 
councils and other relevant organisations such as NGOs working in the 
area, for example, CARE International, and the CEH, South East Dry 
Areas Resource Management Project (SEDAP), Intermediate Technology 
Development (ITDG) and from government departments such as Agritex 
and the Forestry Commission.  
 
Information on the history of resource management institutions was 
collected from the National Archives, although this was not an easy 
process. Information on Romwe catchment history generated from the 
archives was very scanty although, based on what could be accessed, some 
thread was developed by linking it to some of the narratives by the elderly 
people interviewed in the village. Rural district council reports and 
documents were reviewed to gain some understanding on resource 
management perspectives at the RDC level. It is worth noting that a 
number of PhD dissertations have come out of Chivi district (e.g. 
Butterworth, 1997; Cavendish, 2000; Moriarty, 2000; Scoones, 1996) but 
none could be found at the district council or district administrator’s 
offices. When the researcher mentioned that she was carrying out research 
for a PhD programme, both the chief executive officer, the head of the 
RDC and the District Administrator (DA) expressed their hope that unlike 
previous researchers, results of the research would be made available to the 
RDC and the DA’s offices. 
 
The questionnaire survey 
Where relevant quantitative data was drawn from the household livelihood 
survey. The survey was conducted as a quarterly income, expenditure and 
activity survey over a fifteen-month period from late 1998 to early 2000. 
Focus of the household survey was on tracking how households use their   67
                                                          
available resources in the pursuit of livelihoods and the returns they receive 
from these activities. Because of the seasonal variability facing these 
villages, data was collected quarterly to capture the variations. There were 
several visits made to each household in the sample each quarter in order to 
gain sufficient observations regarding data that was likely to be accurately 
recalled within short time spans. Information collected during the survey 
that is relevant for this study includes:  
 
1)  Background information on the household (housing, land size, 
demography). 
2)  Agricultural production for the 1998/1999 growing season. 
3)  Remittances, wage employment, dryland crop production, 
livestock dynamics. 
4) Woodland  harvesting. 
5)  Water resource use. 
6)  Organisations involved and access to collective gardens. 
 
At least 20% of the social catchment
21 population was sampled for the 
household livelihood survey out of a population of 417. A stratified 
random sample was done in proportion to the total number of households 
in each village. 
 
3.2.6 Data analysis and interpretation 
The qualitative data generated by the study was analysed using a thematic 
approach. This thematic approach entailed coding of data from in-depth 
interviews, group interviews and focus group discussions and informal 
discussions according to emerging themes. It has been argued that themes 
are abstracts and often constructs that the researcher identifies before, 
during and after data collection. In this case, themes were developed based 
on both relevant literature reviewed for the study and from text recorded 
during interviews. During the process of identifying key emerging themes, 
the preliminary analysis involved looking for evidence on institutional 
conflicts, informal methods for social control, social conflict, ways by 
which people acquire and maintain achieved and ascribed status and 
information about how people solve different resource use and 
management problems. 
 
Preliminary results of the analysis were shared with local people at a 
community meeting held in September 2001. Romwe catchment residents, 
local officials such as the sabukus, headman and councillor, RDC officials, 
CARE International fieldworkers and other IES staff participated in the 
feedback workshop. This workshop contributed to the process of data 
analysis as participants reflected and commented on the result presented. 
Local peer review of research findings was an important component of the 
 
21 The social catchment includes seven neighbouring villages that are located outside the biophysical 
catchment, but use woodlands and water resources in the biophysical catchment in one way or 
another. This has implications for the institutions regulating access to these resources.    68
                                                          
analysis and write up on some of the findings of this study. This was done 
through presentations in national workshops as well as sending out drafts 
papers to colleagues for peer review. Research papers were also presented 
at international conferences that included a writing workshop held in 
Bogor, Indonesia in November 2001 and a regional conference held in 
Tanzania in October 2000, in addition to presentations at the Swedish 
University of Agricultural Sciences. 
 
3.2.7 Field procedures and processes   
Initial boundary setting was accomplished through periodic field visits to 
the study site from July 1998 to May 1999, using mapping, transects, key 
informant interviews and semi-structured interviews to generate 
information on the biophysical, social, natural resource use, administrative 
and institutional boundaries, from different actors’ perspectives. This 
information is presented in papers prepared for the Center for International 
Forestry Research (CIFOR) as part of project reporting and milestone 
requirements (Nemarundwe, 2001; Nemarundwe, forthcoming; 
Nemarundwe et al., 1998; Nemarundwe & Kozanayi, 2003; Campbell et 
al., 2001). During this exercise, which was done with assistance from an 
IES research assistant, the complexity of identifying resource use 
boundaries emerged.  
 
I resided in the village for an extended period with frequent two-week 
visits to the field between July 1998 and August 2002. In total, I spent 
approximately 18 months in the village during the four-year period. The 
research assistant based in the field on a full time basis for four years 
gathered additional information. During the research process, I developed 
extensive social relationships with individuals from wide ranging socio-
economic backgrounds.
22 Making friends with people from both rich and 
poor households, Ndebele and Shona speakers helped me interact with a 
variety of informants and the everyday interaction revealed complex webs 
of power relationships in the community, as well as helping explain why 
certain decisions are taken and adopted.  
 
While based in the community, I attended both formal and informal 
gatherings. During formal village meetings, I documented the process and 
deliberations during the meetings, e.g. who says what and whose ideas are 
adopted and recorded the nature of attendance by women and men. 
Informal gatherings included spending some time with groups of women 
watering vegetables at the garden projects, socialising at someone’s home 
as well as informal community gatherings where an invitation was not 
required such as at church services and funerals. This created opportunities 
for me to engage in informal discussions with community members. In 
both Ndebele and Shona cultures, if a family member dies, other 
households in the village have to contribute some money to assist the 
 
22 In November 2000, I was asked to pray at one respondent’s home because she was excited that I had 
paid her a visit yet other field workers in Romwe often visit certain “rich” households only.   69
                                                          
bereaved family in covering funeral and related expenses. I also had to 
make contributions, which were not much, from an outsider’s perspective, 
about Z$20.
23 I also made other non-monetary contributions such as 
transport to the business centre to buy funeral items such as food. Given 
the distance to the nearest clinic (approximately 15 km away), occasionally 
I provided transport to sick people to Ngundu clinic especially if it 
involved emergency cases. This brought me much closer to the community 
members and interaction with community members greatly improved over 
the period spent in the village. These interactions allowed for observations 
of interactions between women and men as well as providing information 
of relevance for this research topic.  
 
Participation in informal gatherings opened up access to information 
otherwise not talked about openly. For example, in previous interviews 
women had been asked about the use of medicinal plants in the area and 
people said they were Christians and therefore not using any medicinal 
plants. At one funeral I took a walk into the bush with the women, as there 
are generally no toilets in most households. During the process women 
were showing each other some plants that are used by pregnant women to 
relax the muscles of the birth canal and other plants that are used to 
enhance sexual pleasure. If it had not been for such an opportunity, the 
research would never have had access to such information.  
 
Flexibility was an important component of this research. There were 
times when we (myself and my research assistant) would plan to do 
interviews and the plans would be disrupted by a social visit to our 
campsite by some community members and we felt it would be impolite for 
us to excuse ourselves. For instance, one day we planned to do some 
interviews and just as we had left the camp we met three women who 
wanted to visit us. We had to go back and started chatting with them. First 
we thought they would leave early, since they had met us close to the gate, 
but they appeared very relaxed. About 30 minutes later a fourth woman 
joined us. Because we became a sizeable group, we were an hour later 
joined by one of the sabuku’s policemen, probably to spy on us. While this 
small gathering had not been planned for, nevertheless, it was a useful 
social event that generated insights relevant to the study. It was only 
possible to excuse ourselves without people being offended in cases where 
we had to attend formal meetings.   
 
3.2.8 The Challenges faced during fieldwork 
A methodological challenge that was faced relates to the investigation of 
witchcraft and related accusations. Although investigating issues 
surrounding witchcraft was not one of the original study objectives, its 
relevance to the study emerged during the fieldwork. The first challenge 
was that information on witchcraft is often not discussed in public – it is 
 
23 The official exchange rate of the US dollar to the Zimbabwean dollar was US$1 =Z$55 at the time 
of the study.   70
                                                          
one of those ‘open secrets’ in the community – everyone knows or talks 
about it privately but it is rarely talked about in public arenas. To address 
this problem, casual consultations were made with informants non-
systematically. Episodes of accusations and cases of people visiting 
traditional doctors were also documented. It was common that when 
someone became very ill, they would be taken to traditional healers outside 
the community, with the belief that a traditional healer not known to the 
accused could solve the problem at hand. In cases involving illnesses and 
subsequent death, it was common to hear people saying they had tried 
everything they could, including different traditional healers, clinics and 
hospitals but nothing had worked. Incidences where such comments were 
made were recorded. In one case, a village member even came to the 
research camp after a snake spit into his eyes and pleaded that my research 
assistant
24 give him some traditional medicine to cure his eye because he 
believed that ‘the snake that had spit into his eyes was not just a snake 
from God’. Listening to the gossip on witchcraft, each speaker would say 
‘people say or people think’ as if they themselves were not part of the 
process.      
 
Another challenge faced was being viewed as a ‘girl’ (musikana) by 
community members when I first went to the village in 1998 and this could 
have been because I did not fit their view of a ‘development woman’.
25 
While I had experienced similar challenges in the early years of my career 
as a researcher beginning in 1992, where I was often referred to as 
musikana wemurungu (the whitewoman/man’s girl, depending on the sex 
of my research colleagues, who coincidentally happened to be all white), I 
thought this time it would be different. I was coming into the village as 
team leader and also having my marital status changed from single to 
married woman. When I introduced myself as Mai (Mrs) Nemarundwe, 
first the community members did not believe it as they thought physically I 
looked too young to be married. Thus it took some effort for me to get the 
respect of a married woman. The status of being a married or single woman 
in both the Ndebele and Shona cultures has important implications as to 
who you can associate with and what kind of information people can or 
cannot give you. More importantly, your marital status as a woman may 
also influence the nature of interaction with men in general and male 
leaders, especially traditional village leaders. It also influences your 
possibility to attend meetings where cases are tried, such as the dare 
(traditional village court). For the benefit of understanding institutional 
 
24 My research assistant comes from a part of the country that is believed to have ‘strong’ traditional 
medicines. Once his clothes were stolen but were returned anonymously and people believed this 
happened because he comes from the part of the country where vanhu veko havasi vekutamba navo 
(people from that part of the country are not to be tampered with).  
25 Women working in development projects are locally referred to as madzimai ebudiriro (women 
working in development). These women are often conceptualised as physically big. Because at the 
time of the study, I did not fit the communities’ picture of mudzimai webudiriro I was therefore 
seen as musikana (girl). After developing rapport with the Romwe community, some women 
jokingly told me that I should eat a bit more so that I would look like a mudzimai webudiriro.    71
issues in woodland and water use and management I needed to attend such 
meetings if they took place during my time in the village. Thus my status 
as perceived by community members was quite important.  
 
A third challenge faced relates to IES having taken over a project from 
the CEH. The Centre for Ecology and Hydrology had been working in the 
area between 1991 and 1998. Key CEH researchers were mainly white who 
were seen in the village as representing dura reruzivo (the granary of 
knowledge). It took a long time for community members to believe that a 
young black woman could have “knowledge” that could benefit them. This 
in a way reveals villagers’ perceptions of what a researcher should be (in 
the Zimbabwean case often assumed to be white male of non-Zimbabwean 
origin). This point ties in with the challenge of raising expectations. While 
we explained that we were there to learn from the community members and 
not to teach them, they still expected us to ‘teach’ them something. In their 
own perceptions, we were also supposed to bring material resources and 
knowledge that would help develop their community. As one woman put it 
across to my Swedish supervisor, “If Nonto is just going to do her studies, 
and not return to us and share her findings so that we can use the 
knowledge in our projects, then we would not have benefited anything 
from her four years of stay with us in the village”.   
 
A fourth and final issue that will be discussed relating to challenges faced 
was the changing political context in Zimbabwe following the commercial 
farm occupations in February 2000 and the June 2000 parliamentary 
elections. The tension mounted toward the presidential elections held in 
March 2002 and this further constrained fieldwork, as villagers sometimes 
were afraid to interact with ‘outsiders’ as they could be viewed as 
supporting the political opposition. Fortunately by this time I had collected 
most of my data. The ruling party, ZANU PF, had unleashed violence 
against supporters of the opposition party and therefore people feared to be 
associated with outsiders especially from urban centres like Harare, where 
the University is based, because urban dwellers were believed to be 
supporters of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). 
Fieldwork activities were also constrained by fuel shortages during 2000 
and 2001.  
 
3.3 Description of the study site 
 
3.3.1 Background to Chivi district 
Topography, climate and agricultural potential 
This study was undertaken in Romwe catchment, Chivi district, southern 
Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is divided into four relief regions. These are, the 
Eastern Highlands, that comprise agro-ecological natural region I with very 
low temperatures, high rainfall and high topography that allows 
agricultural production of coffee, tea and horticultural produce. The second   72
relief region is the Highveld that falls into agro-ecological natural regions 
IIa, IIb and III suitable for crop and livestock production. This is followed 
by the Middleveld comprising agro-ecological natural regions III and IV 
suitable mainly for dryland farming and cattle ranching. The last is the 
Lowveld comprising natural region V suitable for cattle ranching and 
wildlife production. Chivi District falls in agro-ecological natural regions 
IV and V. The study site falls under the communal lands (formerly Tribal 
Trust Lands). Communal lands make up forty-nine percent of the country’s 
land area and approximately seventy-five percent of the communal lands 
are located within natural regions IV and V. These regions are 
characterised as being unsuitable for intensive agricultural production due 
to low and variable rainfall and poor soils. Romwe catchment, in a hilly 
area, receives rainfall of approximately 600-800 mm per annum and is 
characterised as being wetter and more suitable for farming compared to 
the rest of the district. Land use typical for communal areas in this region is 
rain fed agriculture and livestock grazing.  
 
Risk and uncertainty are endemic to dryland farming systems, as is the 
case in Chivi district, where rainfall is the key resource (Scoones et al., 
1996). Thus when the rain arrives, how much rain falls, how it is 
distributed between and within seasons and when the seasons end are 
critical to the level of production achieved (Campbell, et al., 2002). 
Research undertaken in Romwe has shown that too much rain can do as 
much damage as too little rain and when the rain arrives can be as 
important as how much falls (Moriarty & Lovell, 1998). Crop failure in the 
Romwe catchment, on the gneissic soils, is as likely to follow from water-
logging due to too much rain as from drought. Rainfall is not the only 
component of risk and uncertainty in agricultural production in Chivi. 
Others include, fluctuations in input and commodity prices, pest and 
disease outbreaks for humans (as in the case of HIV/AIDS), livestock and 
crops, and the condition of the country’s macro-economy. The latter 
determines amongst other things, levels of remittances and availability of 
off farm employment. For an area where off farm work and remittances are 
critical, a sudden decrease in remittances to a household can have as 
devastating effects as droughts or floods. Given these uncertainties, 
productive water points and reliance on woodlands is important for 
livelihood sustenance. This is one of the reasons why this study chose to 
place more emphasis on institutional arrangements for woodlands and 
water resources in the study site. In relation to water use, vegetables and 
other garden produce are important to people’s livelihoods.  
 
History of settlement in Chivi district 
The early part of the colonial period in Zimbabwe was characterised by 
apportionment of land along racial lines with colonial settlers being 
allocated the best land (currently termed commercial farming areas), 
forcing the bulk of the increasingly marginalized and impoverished black 
community into heavily populated communal areas. The relocations that   73
occurred during the early 1950s followed further land expropriation that 
took place after the Second World War. The government needed land to 
give to ex-servicemen who were returning from war and was also 
encouraging immigration which had slackened between 1920 and 1940, to 
boost the European population. The land allocated to the settlers was 
acquired by removing Africans from their areas that received high rainfall 
and resettling them in semi-arid areas such as Chivi district. It is estimated 
that in order to settle about 7 900 white immigrants who came to Rhodesia 
between 1946 and 1953, the government expelled about 110 000 Africans 
from the areas that had been designated European farming areas (Kriger, 
1992; Ranger, 1985). The Africans were resettled amidst discontent, which 
not only arose from the fact that their collective rights to land and other 
natural resources had been terminated, but also because of the manner in 
which they were relocated. Historical narratives from Tamwa village, one 
of the villages that fall under the Romwe catchment, show how people 
were badly treated during the relocations. The government often used 
mounted police to beat out people who refused to move out of the 
designated areas, their homes were burnt and people were often unilaterally 
transported to places that they had never known or wanted to live in 
(Dzingirai, 1998).  
 
The country’s colonial legacy of land and resource alienation laws taken 
together with other regulatory systems introduced to regulate the use of 
resources within areas in which peasants were relocated (e.g. the Native 
Husbandry Act of 1951 discussed below), resulted in what Murphree & 
Cumming (1990) refer to as ‘double expropriation’. Double expropriation 
is an idiom expressing the manner in which peasant communities were 
victims of a double loss through laws that stripped them of their pre-
colonial land entitlements together with the loss of control over natural 
resources in areas in which the peasants were relocated. Several Acts were 
enacted, which reinforced the double loss through variously removing 
control over resources in peasant areas from the local communities. 
Ironically, most of this colonial legislation was adopted piecemeal and 
sometimes wholesale by the post-colonial government.   
 
Following the relocations of the Africans, which led to overpopulation in 
the Tribal Trust Lands (now communal areas), the Native Husbandry Act 
(1951) was introduced with the aim of controlling allocation and use of 
land occupied by the native population to ensure efficient landuse by the 
Africans. Each African was to have no more than five head of cattle and 
eight acres of land. Unlike previously where traditional leaders allocated 
land, the Native Husbandry Act gave the District Commissioner (DC) the 
powers to allocate land, although traditional leaders largely remained de 
facto land allocators. As part of the destocking process, Africans were 
forced to sell their cattle, which supplied the much needed manure for the 
poor soils and also the government bought the cattle at very low prices and 
this intensified animosity towards the government among the peasants 
(Herbst, 1990). The inequitable distribution of land was a major factor   74
                                                          
behind Zimbabwe’s war of liberation and continues to be an important 
factor in Zimbabwean politics. This pattern of land distribution remains the 
same to this day. Though the recent (post-February 2000) fast track 
resettlement programme
26 and the general anarchy prevailing in the 
commercial farming areas has however led to some breakdown of the 
pattern (Campbell et al., 2002). Chivi communal land is thus a product of 
the colonial and post-colonial history.   
 
During the liberation war, the guerrilla movement had grand plans about 
land redistribution at independence (Lan, 1985). A common view 
expressed during the war of liberation was that land would be forcibly 
taken away from Europeans to be given back to the peasants, but this was 
not to be after the signing of the Lancaster Agreement (Moyo, 1995a). At 
independence in 1980, the government established a new Ministry of 
Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, which was tasked to deal 
with resettlement issues. The original plan of this Ministry was to resettle 
162,000 families by 1985. Ex-combatants and former refugees would be 
given first priority in the resettlement process because of their role during 
the war of liberation. The government was not successful in acquiring land 
for resettlement and by 1987, only 52,000 families had been resettled 
(Moyo, 1995a; Herbst, 1990). Two main reasons have been suggested as to 
why the government failed to resettle more people: a) the government had 
no money to purchase land that was being sold at current market rates 
(willing buyer willing seller) and donors were not forthcoming with 
funding the land redistribution programme, which they perceived as being 
racist (Moyo, 1995a: 9), the government lacked the requisite resources for 
a viable land resettlement policy, for instance there were not many 
competent administrators to run the programme. Thus with few people 
having been resettled by 1987, this did little to relieve population densities 
in the communal areas.  
 
Frustrated by the lack of support from the international community, the 
government enacted the Land Acquisition Act of 1992. According to the 
Act, the government could now acquire underutilised land from the white 
commercial farmers and each farmer was to own only one farm. In terms of 
the Act, any farmer wanting to sell land was to give first priority to the 
government and the government would determine the price of the land. 
Farms that were designated after the Land Acquisition Act (1992) were 
mostly taken over by the black elite, which comprised top government 
officials (Dzingirai, 1998). Thus land has not been forthcoming for the 
poor landless ordinary Zimbabweans leading to the farm occupations 
following the February 2000 referendum. Even in the post February 2000 
fast track resettlement programme, there has been negligible impact of 
resettlement on population densities in Chivi district as well as communal 
 
26 The fast track resettlement programme’s ‘intention is to speed up the process of land acquisition and 
resettlement and is seen as the quickest way of transferring land to those who have been 
disadvantaged for a long time’ (ZERO, 2001).   75
areas in other districts. This historical background shows that some of the 
issues emerging in this study are an outcome of the policy frameworks that 
have operated since the colonial period. Considering that the government 
has adopted piecemeal some of the colonial legislation that was crafted in 
the context of conquest and subjugation, it is not surprising that access to 
land and related natural resources has been at the centre of many conflicts 
around utilisation of these resources, even within CBNRM (Mandondo, 
2000a). 
 
The socio-political context 
Chivi communal area covers 3534 square kilometres (Campbell et al., 
2002). Its administrative centre is Chivi business centre, an old settlement 
established in the early part of the 20th Century. At the turn of the century, 
the estimated population of Chivi district was only around 15 000 (Scoones 
et al., 1996). By 1930, the population had grown to an estimated 28 500, in 
part due to population movements in the reserves. The southern parts of 
Chivi, such as the Romwe catchment were only settled during the 1950s, 
with the arrival of displaced people. Census figures in 1962, 1969 and 
1982 showed district populations of 57 220, 80 580 and 103 656 
respectively (Campbell et al., 2002). The 1992 census shows a total 
population for the district of 157 428, with a growth rate of 1.98% and a 
population density of 44.5 persons per square kilometre (CSO, 1992). 
Calculations done by Campbell et al., 2002 for the Romwe social 
catchment in 2000 show population densities of 86.1 persons per square 
kilometre. The high population density may have important implications 
for both formal and informal resource management institutions. Research 
in Chivi district has shown that there is much sharing of woodland and 
water resources across village boundaries (Nemarundwe, forthcoming; 
Nemarundwe et al., 1998; Nemarundwe & Kozanayi, 2003), thus the use 
of the concept of social catchment to encompass the broader community of 
users of resources in the biophysical catchment. While the biophysical 
catchment is about 4.6 km
2 in size and is home to thirty-two households, 
the social catchment covers 31.6 square kilometres and is home to 
approximately 417 households.  
 
3.3.2 The Romwe catchment 
 
Location  
The Romwe catchment is located south of Masvingo town, which is the 
capital city of Masvingo province, under which Chivi district falls (Map 
3.1). The turn-off to Romwe catchment is 86 km on the main road to South 
Africa and there is a 5 km gravel road to the catchment. Homesteads are 
spread along the base of the bounding hills that run west to east along the 
catchment. In 1995, there were 32 households within the biophysical 
catchment and an estimated 200 to 250 people (Mapaure et al., 1995).   
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Historically, ten villages had some informal natural resource sharing 
arrangements for resources such as water, grazing and forest products and 
these villages are shown in Table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3. Biophysical and social catchment villages using resources in 
Romwe area 
 
Traditional Villages  Traditional Units  Local Government 
Administrative Units 
Biophysical catchment 
(referred to as the Romwe 
area) 
Headmanship Chief  VIDCO  Ward 
Dobhani village  Puche  Madzivire  F
27 25
28 
Sihambe village  Chikanda  Nemauzhe  D  23 
Tamwa village  Chikanda  Nemauzhe  D  23 
Social catchment villages         
Chikanda   Chikanda  Nemauzhe  A  23 
Matenhese Chikanda  Nemauzhe  D  23 
Ndabaningi Chikanda  Nemauzhe  D  23 
Munikwa Joni  Nemauzhe  D  23 
Joni Joni  Nemauzhe  D  23 
Magomo Joni  Nemauzhe  E  23 
Puche Puche  Madzivire  B  25 
 
 
The three villages i.e. Sihambe, Dobhani and Tamwa that fall within the 
biophysical catchment are referred to as the biophysical catchment villages. 
The other seven neighbouring villages with historical resource sharing 
arrangements with the three biophysical catchment villages are referred to 
as the social catchment villages. Table 3.3 shows that the ten villages that 
use resources in the biophysical catchment area in Romwe fall under 
different traditional and administrative units, yet they have long-term 
relationships as regards natural resource sharing. 
 
Vegetation 
Vegetation resources are of great importance to rural communities in 
Zimbabwe’s communal lands. Rural populations are almost entirely 
dependent on wood as a source of fuel, and woodlands are important as 
sources of timber for construction, wood for making implements, fruits, 
medicines and as a habitat for both wildlife and cattle (Whitlow, 1988). A 
vegetation survey for Romwe catchment was done in 1995 focusing on 
species composition, structure, ecology and condition of the vegetation 
(Mapaure et al., 1995). Findings from the study show that the vegetation of 
the catchment area can be divided into three zones conforming to the 
geomorphological features of the area, namely hills, water courses and low 
lying areas consisting of cultivated land (Mapaure et al., 1995:3).  
                                                           
27   The 6-7 VIDCOs that constitute a ward are referred to by letters from A to F unlike in the case of 
traditional villages that are referred to by the name of the traditional leader.  
28  Numbers are used to refer to wards and the study villages fall under wards 23 and 25   78
                                                          
 
Vegetation on the hills predominantly consists of miombo woodlands 
dominated by Brachystegia glaucescens, as well as a mix of Julbernardia 
globiflora and Kirkia acuminata. The miombo woodlands are the main 
vegetation type in the catchment. In the hill areas, the woodland is 
generally intact and unlike many communal areas in Zimbabwe, shows 
relatively little impact of woodcutting and other causes of deforestation 
except the degraded areas on the lower slopes. The vegetation on the hills 
accounts for 55% of the catchment vegetation (ibid). Vegetation along the 
watercourses falls into three main categories, namely the Bauhinia galpinii 
dominated thickets, Acacia polyacantha dominated open woodlands and 
Acacia combretum mixed woodland thickets. Vegetation along the water 
courses accounts for approximately 7% of the catchment area. Much of the 
area in this zone has been cleared of trees for brushwood fencing and to 
make way for agricultural land. Vegetation in the low lying areas consist of 
remnant trees on cultivated and settled land and this accounts for 
approximately 38% of the vegetation cover in the area. Within the 
cultivated land, trees are often left standing for fruit and shade and some 
are usually left on termite mounds. Main tree species found in the 
cultivated and settled land consists of Azanza garckeana,  Ficus spp., 
Diospyros mespiliformis,  Piliostigma thonningii,  Sclerocarya birrea, 
Combretum adenogonium and Adansonia digitata. Overall, the vegetation 
of the area is still in relatively good condition despite a long history of 
settlement from the early 1950s. The woodland area appears large enough 
for most fuelwood needs to be met from dead wood. However, there is 
some cutting of live trees especially on the lower slopes of the hills, mainly 
for construction timber.    
 
The socio-cultural context 
There are two ethnic groups found in Romwe, namely the Shona
29 and the 
Ndebele. The pre-colonial history of the Shona and the Ndebele ethnic 
groups describes their relationship as having been based on war and 
conquest. The Ndebele emigrated from South Africa and arrived in present 
day Zimbabwe, with the powerful military organisation developed by the 
Zulu of the Shaka legacy and were able to conduct occasional raids deep 
into the Shona country, collecting women and cattle from defeated peoples 
(Bourdillon, 1987; Beach, 1973 & 1971). By the time the British arrived, 
there were indications that a number of the southern Shona chiefs were 
coming together in a concerted resistance to the Ndebele (Bourdillon, 
1987). The relationship between the Shona and the Ndebele during the pre-
colonial period is discussed in detail by Beach (1973), who points out that 
accounts of isolated Ndebele raids became exaggerated to the view that the 
Ndebele were continuously raiding their Shona neighbours. Nevertheless, 
 
29 As Bourdillon (1987:16-17) writes, the derivation of the word Shona is uncertain. It appears to have 
been first used by the Ndebele as a derogatory name for the people that they had defeated, 
particularly the Rozvi, now referred to as the Karanga and also the dialect spoken in Masvingo 
province, including the study site. The term Shona is used to refer to people who speak different 
dialects that include Karanga, Manyika, Zezuru, Korekore and others.   79
such historical information is of some relevance to the current study 
because the current relationship between Shona and Ndebele in the study 
site may be a result of such historical relationships and processes. The 
formation of current institutional arrangements, especially those that are 
considered traditional or indigenous may have been influenced by the 
historical processes occurring both during the pre-colonial, colonial and 
post colonial periods.    
 
From the local people’s perspective, CEH coined the name “Romwe 
catchment” in 1991 when defining the ‘community’ for their research and 
project-related activities. The name Romwe is derived from a sacred 
mountain located on the western side of the catchment. The mountain 
draws its sacredness from the traditional rituals carried out on the mountain 
by the Shona speaking people. Prior to this naming, the area was 
commonly known as KumaNdebele (meaning the area of the Ndebele 
speaking people). The Ndebele people were moved into this area during the 
early 1950s. The definition of the Romwe micro-catchment by CEH 
considered the biophysical characteristics, which were important for their 
research on hydrological issues in the catchment area.  
 
The boundary of the biophysical catchment corresponds with neither the 
traditional nor the modern village boundaries. The households in Romwe 
fall into three traditional villages, each presided over by a village head 
known as the sabuku. These are Dobhani in ward 25, and Sihambe and 
Tamwa both in ward 23 (Map 3.2). The former two are largely in the 
physical catchment while the latter is largely outside. Two of the villages 
are made up of the Ndebele ethnic group (Dobhani and Sihambe) and the 
third village, Tamwa, is Karanga, a sub-group of the Shona ethnic group. 
At the time of the household livelihood survey in 1999, Dobhani kraal had 
a total of 33 households, Sihambe 36 and Tamwa 58 households 
respectively. Only 32 of the total of 127 households in these villages fall 
within the actual biophysical catchment area while the rest of the 
households fall in the periphery. Sabukus Dobhani and Sihambe are 
brothers who were relocated from Shurugwi district in the Midlands area in 
1952. When they arrived in the area, there were few families and they built 
their homesteads close to each other on the northern side of Mawunga 
stream, which forms the central division of the biophysical catchment.  
 
During the late 1950s, the government engaged in a villagisation 
exercise, which separated the two brothers´ homesteads, with Dobhani 
shifted to the southern side of Mawunga stream. The two brothers now fell 
under two different Chieftainships, yet prior to the villagisation exercise, 
they were under one Chief. The third sabuku, who is covered by the 
catchment management project, Tamwa, was relocated from another part of 
the Midlands. Although 95% of Tamwa village households fall outside the 
biophysical area of the catchment, his village was included in the project 
because he is believed to be influential in decision-making in the area and 
is more respected by the neighbouring Shona speaking villages because he   80
is also of Shona origin. Historically, 10 villages, including the three 
catchment villages had some informal natural resource sharing 
arrangements for resources in the physical catchment, such as water, 
grazing and forest products. The other seven villages are, Ndabaningi, Joni, 
Munikwa, Chikanda, Puche, Matenhese and Magomo (Map 3.2). With the 
exception of Ndabaningi and Munikwa, which were relocated from 
Chiredzi district, to create space for the creation of Gonarezhou National 
Park, under Masvingo province, the rest of the villages are endogenous to 
the area.  
 
Classification of settlers in the Romwe catchment 
Differentiation is a key feature of the communal areas of Zimbabwe. 
Criteria for differentiation used include wealth, gender, age, ethnicity, 
historical factors and length of residence in an area and other forms of 
social construction of groups. Based on social differentiation, different 
categories of households or individuals within households often pursue 
different patterns of woodland and water resource use. While immigration 
has had an important impact in shaping the local history, classification of 
settlers appears to be an ongoing process. The settlers fall into four broad 
chronological categories as can be seen from Table 3.4.  
 
 Table  3.4.  Categorisation of settlers in Romwe 
 
Type of settler  Characteristics 
Pre 1950s settlers  Groups living around the confines of the Romwe area prior to 
1950. These include headman Chikanda and his people, Chief 
Nemauzhe and other social catchment villagers. 
1950s settlers  These are divided into two groups: 
MaNdebele - the Ndebele speaking people who came from 
Shurugwi district, namely those who fall under Sihambe and 
Dobhani villages. 
MaRhodesdale – Shona speaking people who came from the 
Rhodesdale area in Kwekwe district such as those who fall 
under Tamwa village. 
Pre 1980s (during the 
liberation war) 
settlers 
During the war of liberation, there was also some movement of 
people in the rural areas, some displaced by the war, others 
taking the advantage of the war to seek ‘greener pastures’.   
Post 1980 settlers 
(after independence 
in 1980)  
These are people who changed settlements under the spirit of 
mazvakezvake (each man for himself at independence). There 
was a general belief that no one (mostly referring to sabukus 
and chiefs) should deny someone a place to settle. 
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It is worth noting that while community members refer to these 
categories of settlers, these categories are not fixed but are rather very fluid 
and contextual and often emerge in relation to issues of access to different 
natural resources or when there is a particular issue at stake. Depending on 
the context and issue at stake, some people may be included or excluded. It 
is common to find community leaders such as the sabuku and VIDCO 
chairpersons having more than one list of households and each of the lists 
is used where deemed appropriate. Thus if an ‘outsider’ comes to the 
village and asks for a village register, normally the leader concerned would 
want to know why the person or agency wants the list. This information is 
useful to the community leader because it helps them decide which list to 
give out at a particular time.   
 
The distribution of arable land, in terms of size and number of holdings 
appears to be underlain by a strong historical influence. Compared to more 
recent immigrants, those clans who migrated into the area in the 1950s or 
have resided in the area for longer periods, tend to have either a greater 
number of fields or fields that are bigger in size. Within the after 1950 
settlers category, inequities in land holdings also exist and in this case the 
inequities are partly influenced by access to political power and influence. 
Within the three study villages defined as falling under the physical 
catchment, people are divided into a four-tier social hierarchy based on 
socio-political status, namely Voho (the ruling clan), Zvidza zvepo (those 
closely related to the ruling clan but not direct descendents), Vawuyi 
(newcomers) and Vechirudzi (aliens especially of Malawian origin). 
According to this social hierarchy, chiefs, headmen, and sabukus and their 
direct dependants constitute the Voho category, who theoretically should 
be included in all local meetings and decision-making processes. Zvidza 
zvepo comprises closely related kinsfolk of the ruling clans but are not their 
direct dependents, for instance, people whose mothers derive from the 
ruling lineages. Daughters from ruling lineages wield considerable 
influence when they get married and are normally referred to as Vatete (big 
Aunt). The Vatete, whose bride wealth is often used to obtain a wife for 
their brothers are more special and influential than the other women in the 
family who are normally referred to as Chipanda (those who have not 
generated bride wealth).  
 
People who settled into the area during the 1990s are referred to as 
Vawuyi (the newcomers). They generally have less privileged access or 
influence and less land because of their latecomer status. Aliens from other 
countries, especially those of Malawian origin wield the least influence and 
status and they are referred to as Vechirudzi, a term that has negative 
connotations. In practice, those perceived to be less privileged often have 
tools, referred to by Scott (1985) as weapons of the weak, with which they 
incorporate themselves into the positions of influence within the local 
social fabric. For instance one woman of Malawian origin was elected into 
the position of treasurer for one of the community projects because it is 
believed that those people belonging to the Vechirudzi class are more   83
trustworthy with money since they generally have fewer relatives or friends 
in the community who may want to borrow money from the project 
coffers. It is worth noting that this social classification is by no means 
static and inflexible. Rather, it is an examination of one of the bases of 
justifying resource claims and related contestations. This social 
classification is based on very abstract notions of differentiation that have a 
mix of cultural foundations and longevity of residence in the area.  
 
Livelihood sources  
A number of livelihood sources were identified through the household 
livelihood survey and these are presented in Table 3.5. Rainfed cultivation 
is the major source of livelihood in Romwe and this is done along the 
valley floors. Major crops grown include maize, groundnuts, finger millet, 
sorghum, sunflower, rice, round nuts and increasingly people are growing 
cotton. Livestock rearing is the second major source of livelihood and 
grazing occurs in the densely wooded miombo woodlands on the hills. 
Households have small garden plots either close to their homestead and fed 
by wells or located near to key water points such as the dam and stream 
that runs through the village. Starting from 1991, households also own 
plots in community gardens that utilise water from communal water 
sources such as the collector well as in the case of Chidiso garden. A 
second community garden was established in 1998, which utilises water 
from Barura dam, located outside the biophysical catchment. Remittances 
from people working in towns and the sugar estates contribute significantly 
towards livelihood sustenance (Campbell, et al., 2001).  
 
 Table  3.5.  Analysis of household livelihood source and activities 
 
Livelihood source  Activities 
Dryland agriculture  Production of maize, sorghum, millet, groundnuts, cotton and 
sunflower. 
Gardening  Production of tomatoes, beans, okra, green leafy vegetables 
that include rape, choumolia and cabbage.  
Livestock production  Rearing of cattle, donkeys, goats, pigs, and chicken. 
Woodland use  Wood and non-wood products including timber, firewood, 
thatch grass, small game, fruits, fibre and mushrooms.  
Home industry and 
wage labour 
Cash paying jobs including carving, brick moulding, fixing 
bicycles/implements, making household utensils from scrap 
metal. 
Remittances  Cash sent from family members not living within the village, 
e.g. working in urban centres or elsewhere outside the village.  
Domestic related  Maintenance of basic household health and nutrition including 
preparing meals, housekeeping and construction, attending 
community meetings, leisure and education. 
 
Source: Household Livelihood Survey, 1998-2000. 
 
Woodlands provide an abundance of wild products that include wild 
vegetables, fruits, mushrooms and honey as these supplement household 
dietary requirements. People also use leaf litter from the woodlands as   84
                                                          
manure in their crop fields and vegetable gardens. During times of food 
crisis such as 1991/1992 and the 2001/2002 droughts, other livelihood 
strategies are explored and these include migration to neighbouring areas to 
engage in gold panning and to South Africa to work on the commercial 
farms. It is often men who migrate to engage in these activities. The 
majority of those who move to South Africa in search of jobs are often 
considered illegal immigrants as they do not have work permits and 
therefore this is a risky enterprise. If caught by South African police they 
are often deported leaving behind the few belongings they would have 
acquired. If not caught, they are often underpaid because they do not have 
legal work permits and hence cannot bargain for better pay. In recent years, 
given the fluctuating value of the Zimbabwean dollar and the emergence of 
the parallel market, the little that people earn in South Africa makes a 
difference if converted to the Zimbabwean dollar at the parallel market 
rates.
30 
 
Access to markets  
The Romwe catchment is relatively well positioned in relation to markets 
by Chivi district standards. Garden produce is largely traded at Museva 
business centre and Ngundu growth point
31, located about 5 km and 14 km 
respectively from Romwe catchment. Women and children generally walk 
to the points of sale, carrying what they will try and sell on a particular 
day. There are occasional trips by bus to Masvingo to sell tomatoes and 
other vegetables that have a market there and these trips are often needed 
as well to purchase commodity items and farm inputs. For the major cash 
crops such as cotton and maize, farmers sell their crops at Ngundu Halt 
where there are depots or where traders come to buy. 
 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the qualitative methodology adopted for the 
study, and the various methods used for data collection in order to 
triangulate the information gathered. The methodological approach adopted 
for the study builds on the conceptual issues discussed in Chapter Two. In 
addition to data collected from the field, the chapter discusses the data 
collection process based on secondary sources such as archival records and 
documents kept at the RDC offices. The discussion on the historical 
narratives as a method for generating information on local perceptions of 
historical processes points to the importance of such narratives as tools for 
justifying individual or group claims over certain resources or leadership 
positions in a given context. The conclusion of the discussion on the 
importance of historical narratives is that they are part of deliberate 
discursive strategies of the various narrators to articulate and assert the 
 
30 The official exchange rate of the South African Rand to the Zimbabwean dollar is R1=Z$6 yet on 
the parallel market it is R1 = Z$30 as of May 2002. 
31 Growth points are centres that were initiated by the post-colonial government to spearhead 
development in rural areas through having such centres that could attract investors in the rural 
areas. These centres have access to electricity, telephones and sometimes banking facilities.   85
basis and legitimacy of their own claims to the woodland and water 
resources found in the area. Narratives are therefore used in this thesis as 
an analytical tool for understanding property relations and claims. The 
chapter also presented background information to the study site 
highlighting information relevant to the process of institutional analysis in 
the study area. This section outlined historical processes and policies that 
have influenced the institutional framework for natural resource 
management in the context of CBNRM. Historical data presented in the 
chapter is drawn from a combination of secondary sources and oral 
histories that were generated from key informants and archival data.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESOURCE MAPPING 
AND THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR RESOURCE ACCESS IN ROMWE 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides background for understanding the relations that 
develop amongst various actors regarding access to woodlands and water. 
Woodlands and water use in Chivi district are critical for livelihoods 
because of the unreliability of rainfed agriculture. The patterns of access 
and use are illuminated through the actor-oriented and actor-network 
approaches. Situating use patterns within community livelihoods enables a 
proper understanding of who uses what resources, when and how. 
Exploring the importance of resources for different users provides an 
opportunity to identify potential impediments or challenges to the existing 
institutional framework for resource access. This chapter critically analyses 
local level institutions and authority systems relating to woodlands and 
water resources from the perspectives of the various actors and user 
groups. Access to resources is complex, embedded in social and power 
relations and also highly dynamic due to the constant interplay between 
agency and structure. Power relations are manifest in the various actors’ 
quest for accessing natural resources for the sustenance of their livelihoods. 
These power relations may often lead to contestations and conflicts over 
resource access, use and/or over the way resources are managed.  
 
Blanket categorisations of property rights into state, private, common and 
open access conditions discussed in Chapter Two often mask the 
complexity that occurs within each of these broad categories. Given the 
widespread use of the term ‘common’ in describing property relations 
under communal area settings, this may be misleading in that it often 
portrays an image of communal area landscapes as those of uniformity. 
These classifications hide considerable complexity especially with regards 
to who can access and harvest what range of resources, across sub-
categories of communal area property relations. Access to natural resources 
such as woodlands and water takes place under conditions of both formal 
and informal regulation of property depending on the nature of tenure 
regimes that specify the conditions under which land is held and used 
(Matondi, 2001). The patterns of access evolve over time and tend to be 
determined by abundance, availability and the types of uses, e.g. domestic 
versus commercial purposes (Berry, 1993; North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990). It 
is therefore a complex process to clearly define the manner in which access 
is determined because resource management and related institutions often 
have inbuilt dynamism that enables them to respond to changing policies, 
and socio-economic and environmental conditions (Matondi, 2001; Sithole, 
1999).    88
Natural resource products such as those found in woodland areas have a 
diverse set of property regimes and are not necessarily accessible to every 
member of the user community. Access and user rights to such products 
tend to be embedded in household relations and sanctioned by community 
rules and regulations. The institutional framework guides and regulates 
social action and interaction of the actors that have rights to use these 
natural resources. While this is the case, individual actors create room for 
manoeuvre within the system so that they are able to meet their interest 
within the existing institutional framework. More often, access to natural 
resources shifts depending on the season or time of the year. For instance, 
during drought, rules of access may be more inclusive of actors who would 
normally be excluded from resource access or vice versa. Similarly, 
resource use boundaries across villages may be ignored during times of 
abundance to allow for resource sharing. Considering this flexibility in 
definition of resource user boundaries, it is argued that institutions exist to 
ensure sustainable use and management of natural resources in a given 
locality, although there may be some actors that transgress rules for a 
variety of reasons including holding a powerful position in the community 
and/or resource scarcity. It is therefore pertinent to understand how the 
institutional framework that governs access to woodlands and water also 
handles complexity and potential conflicts among the various resource 
users such as women, men, the rich, poor and people with different ethnic 
affiliations.  
 
4.2 Woodlands and water resource mapping in Romwe 
To understand the Romwe natural resource landscape, resource mapping 
exercises were undertaken, the results of which are presented in this 
section. Natural resources found within catchments have multiple uses and 
different management regimes that allow for access or denial of access. 
The use of resources also depends on one’s ability to extract the resource 
and in some cases the ability to pay fees or pay in kind for extraction. Yet 
in some instances, it is rather one’s talent that determines the ability to use 
the resources. Within the Romwe catchment there is multiple use of 
resource areas by different actors, who may compete over various uses of 
resources and employ various institutions to gain access to them. Access to 
the various resource areas is not open. There are restrictions regarding 
access to certain areas and/or certain natural resources both by the state and 
traditional leaders who use diverse cultural idioms to manage the resources 
(Mukamuri, 1995).  
 
4.2.1 Woodland resource mapping 
During the participatory rural appraisal workshops, the participants 
identified a number of woodlands resource areas and units. While five 
major resource areas were identified by separate groups of women and 
men, specific areas mentioned differed by group. Thus results from the two 
groups are presented in separate tables. Rules determining access to each of   89
the resource areas were also discussed by both groups as can be seen from 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Related rule enforcement structures are indicated in the 
tables. 
 
Table 4.1. Resource areas, products and rules identified by the women 
 
Resource 
Area 
Products/Uses  Rules governing access 
Mountain 
areas 
- grazing  
- honey 
- thatching grass 
- mushrooms 
- indigenous fruit 
- fibre 
- grinding stones  
- timber for 
construction 
- firewood 
- leaf litter  
- urimbo for 
snaring birds 
- for fruit, leaf litter, mushrooms, fibre, grinding 
stones, and urimbo there are no restrictions  
- thatching grass has to be cut when ripe but amount 
cut is not limited 
- to collect honey, ask for permission from sabuku if 
one plans to cut the tree 
- grazing during cropping season  
- collection of dead wood not restricted 
- get permission from sabuku for cutting poles and 
practice selective cutting 
- settlement restricted by sabuku 
- no starting of wildfires 
- Romwe mountain sacred and should be respected 
Vleis 
(mapani) 
- broom grass 
- thatching grass 
-vegetable 
gardens  
- wells 
- fruit 
- grazing  
- few fields 
 
- not allowed to cut thatch grass near other people’s 
fields or gardens without permission from owner 
- land for vegetable gardens is allocated by sabuku  
- free access to indigenous fruits except in gardens 
- grazing is open during dry season but cattle have to 
be guarded during cropping season 
- only Romwe residents use resources in these areas 
- wells are privately owned and access is determined 
by individual owners 
Riverine 
areas 
- water 
- fish 
- reeds for 
making baskets 
- gold  
- worms for use 
in fishing 
- river sand  
- no use of nets and sacks for fishing 
- no use of poison to catch fish 
- gold panning is illegal, but is done especially during 
drought years 
- no rules given for river sand 
- people are free to dig as many worms as they want 
Fields   - indigenous fruit 
- thatching grass 
- ground crickets 
- termites 
- locusts 
- crops 
- trespassing during cropping season is an offence 
- free access to anyone during dry season 
- fruit collection limited to owner during cropping 
season 
- for thatching grass and ground crickets, field owner 
controls access 
- locust collection free for other village members 
- sale of indigenous fruits prohibited by sabuku  
- no field extension without consulting sabuku 
- no work in the fields on chisi, every Wednesday. 
Homestead 
areas 
- exotic and 
indigenous fruits 
- livestock 
- shelter 
- indigenous trees 
for shade 
- parents restrict children from collecting fruits before 
they are ripe 
- neighbours are given fruits by homestead owner or 
they buy 
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The five resource areas identified by men include grazing land, 
homestead, and woodland areas, Romwe mountain, and other mountains. 
Products collected from the various resource areas and rules regulating 
access to these areas are presented in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2. Resource areas, products and rules identified by the men’s 
group 
 
Resource 
Area 
Products/Uses  Rules governing access 
Grazing land 
(in mountains, 
near fields, 
along contour 
ridges and 
waterways) 
- grazing livestock 
- collection of wild 
fruits 
- do not cause veld fires (a local DNR officer 
fines offenders Z$500
32 (US$9.00) while 
sabukus charge two goats instead of one as is 
the case with other offences. 
- communities neighbouring Romwe 
catchment have access to grazing areas 
Homestead 
areas 
- crop fields 
- indigenous fruits 
- exotic fruits 
- private wells 
- no harvesting of indigenous fruits from 
homestead trees without permission from 
owner. 
- no work in crop fields on chisi 
Woodland 
areas 
- indigenous fruits  
- wood for carving 
- timber for 
constructing  
- cotton loading 
ramps  
- poles for fencing 
and for construction 
- fuelwood 
- wood for firing  
bricks 
- medicinal plants (by 
herbalists). 
- no cutting of fruit trees 
- no sale of indigenous fruits 
- Afzelia quanzansis should not be cut for 
carving  
- offenders should be reported to FC or DNR 
- people from neighbouring villages not 
allowed to cut poles/timber 
- no sale of firewood and poles outside 
Romwe area 
- certain tree species should not be used for 
firewood 
- seek permission from sabuku to cut wet 
wood for firing bricks 
Romwe 
mountain 
- traditional rituals   
- source of medicinal 
plants for traditional 
healers 
- leaf litter from parts 
not considered sacred 
- indigenous fruits 
- no collection of firewood, timber for 
construction, poles  and thatching grass  
- mountain should not be climbed for no 
reason 
- elderly men who carry out rituals here 
should not engage in sex the night before  
- no use of soap in sacred pools on the hill 
Other 
mountains 
- fibre 
- grazing 
- timber for 
construction 
- fruits 
- mushroom 
- leaf litter 
- honey  
- firewood 
- no cutting of wet wood for fuel 
- no use of fire to fell trees or harvest honey 
- people from neighbouring villages are not 
allowed to collect large quantities of fire 
wood in one trip e.g. using scotchcarts 
- poles should be cut selectively 
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While the women grouped all mountains together, the men separated the 
Romwe mountain, which is considered sacred, from the other mountains. 
But the women discussed the Romwe as being distinct from the other 
mountains. Riverine areas were categorised under grazing land by men, 
while women did not identify grazing areas as a separate resource area. The 
men’s group placed fields under homestead areas, but women preferred to 
treat the two areas as separate resource areas. There were also differences 
relating to products mentioned that people collect from the various 
resource areas. For instance it is only the women’s group that recorded 
collection of thatching grass and also mentioned grinding stones and broom 
grass. Differences in perceptions of women and men may be related to the 
way in which they value particular resource areas or products collected 
from the various areas and the nature of the division of labour in the 
household. Three main factors affect the values different resource users 
attach to woodlands products. Firstly, there is the general availability of the 
resource, which may be a function of the management regime or level of 
usage of that particular resource. Secondly, the value attached to a resource 
may be related to accessibility, which is often influenced by the 
institutional framework governing access to these resources. Thirdly, this 
may be related to the transaction costs of collecting the resource in terms of 
labour, time and effort that an individual or household has to put into 
collecting a particular resource. The relative need of a particular resource 
by an individual or household may also influence the way they value a 
particular resource. The needs of a particular individual or household may 
reflect livelihood strategies of the household, and the manner in which 
basic needs such as food, shelter and health are satisfied. It is worth noting 
that other factors that may influence how an individual or household values 
woodland resources may be associated with cultural identity, history and 
the symbolic nature of the resource.   
 
It was noted that the majority of the woodland resource areas comprise 
fruit trees. The types of fruits differed from area to area, although some 
types could be found in more than one area. Indigenous fruits collected 
from the various resource areas are presented in Table 4.3. Some of the 
fruit trees in the homestead are predominantly exotic such as mango, 
guava, pawpaw, orange, banana, nartjies, lemon, mexican apple, peaches, 
grapes and avocado.  
 
Hills and mountain areas are reported to have a wider variety of 
woodland resources that people prefer to use as compared to the other 
resource areas. People from neighbouring villages (beyond the social 
catchment villages, e.g. Maringire – about 15-20 km away) often come to 
the Romwe area to collect woodland products such as fibre, mushrooms 
and honey. These ‘outsiders’ are not allowed to cut timber, poles or 
firewood from the area. Asked how residents of the catchment felt about 
people coming to their area from other villages to collect woodland 
resources, they indicated that this is a tradition and besides most of the 
‘outsiders’ often have relatives or friends residing in both the biophysical   92
and social catchment villages. Also the outsiders often make one-off 
collections and therefore local residents felt such collection might not have 
a negative impact on the resource base in a major way. 
 
 Table  4.3.  Important indigenous fruits found in the area 
 
Botanical name  Local name   Where found 
Azanza garckeana  Mutohwe  Mountains, vleis, river banks and fields 
Bauhinia thoningii  Musekesa  Mountain areas 
Lannea discolor  Mugan’acha  Mountain areas 
Ximenia caffra  Munhengeni  Mountains 
Berchemia discolor  Munyii  Mountains and in fields 
Strychnos spinosa  Mutamba  Fields and grazing areas 
Adansonia digitata  Muuyu  Grazing areas and mountains 
Cucumis anguria  Mugaka  Mountain areas  
Ximenia Americana  Mutsvanzvabere  Mountain areas 
Syzigium guineense  Mukute  Vleis and river banks 
Diospyros mespiliformis  Mushuma  Vleis, river banks and fields 
Ziziphus mucronata  Muchechete  Homesteads 
Sclerocarya birrea  Mupfura  Fields, vleis and mountains  
Fiscus spp.  Muonde  Fields 
Parinari curatelifolia  Muhacha  Fields (considered sacred species) 
Ziziphus mauritiania  Musawu  Homesteads 
 
 
Villagers from the Romwe area, especially men, also go to other villages 
for resources, such as gold panning during drought years as well as fishing. 
Thus there is resource sharing across villages. Problems may arise if 
‘outsiders’ break resource use rules. Then they are often taken to the 
headman or the chief because the sabuku’s dare (traditional village court) 
can only try people under his village. Beyond his ‘book’ (village) it is the 
responsibility of the headman. If the offender belongs to a village that falls 
outside the headman’s jurisdiction, then the Chief tries the case. Asked 
about when this last occurred, none of the participants could remember. It 
is something that rarely happens. This point highlights the need to take 
cognisance of the challenge that Cheater (1986:22) refers to as the 
‘perennial problem of trying to close the gap between what people say 
should be done and what they actually do’ which is conceptualised as the 
difference between the ideal management scenario and the actual 
management system in place.  For instance, if examples of cases that had 
been taken to the chief for adjudication had not been solicited, one would 
get the impression that this often happens, yet respondents were in actual 
fact articulating what should be done.    
 
The exclusiveness
33 of property rights generally varies between the 
resource areas. In household plots, resources tend to be domesticated exotic 
species and exclusivity is generally within the household. However, in 
communal woodland and riverine areas, resources are generally indigenous 
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species, that are for use by all village members. In sacred areas such as the 
Romwe mountain, the resources that can be accessed have traditionally 
been limited and in the past villagers feared any unapproved resource use. 
Fear of resource use in the sacred areas was rooted in the culture
34 of the 
indigenous people, the Shona, which has a strong belief in the spirits and 
the spirit world. The spirit world is believed to provide guardianship over 
the living, and thus should be revered. The basis of the sacredness of areas 
under ritual designations therefore arises from their role as homes of the 
spirits or places where offerings are made to the spirits. Sacredness has 
traditionally had ecological benefits for the environment as it resulted in 
the maintenance of biodiversity in those areas designated as sacred 
(Matowanyika, 1991). 
 
Grazing resources in woodlands and riverine areas could be taken to 
constitute open access resources, but villagers often put in place systems of 
controls designed to curtail open access and unrestricted use. In Romwe, 
many of the villages have grazing areas, which they can relatively clearly 
define, without numerous differences of opinion regarding boundary 
definition. In practice, grazing in the commons constitutes privatisation of 
such resources by livestock-owning households. This is because non-
livestock owners have less claim over and use of the grazing areas. In 
addition to the grazing areas, stover left in the fields in the post-harvest 
period also constitutes a common pool resource for all livestock owners. 
However, some households secure such resources as private property, 
either through fencing or through storage of the stover on elevated wooden 
platforms (matara) from which they can control the off take. 
 
The main woodland management problems include reduction of 
indigenous trees available in the woodlands, settlement and cultivation on 
fragile areas (such as stream bank cultivation), less respect for sacred areas 
as compared to the past (the exception being the sacred pool in Romwe), 
starting wildfires and general population pressure on the resources. 
Historical trends show that resource availability patterns have changed 
over the years, although relative to other communal areas in Chivi district, 
Romwe is viewed as having abundant woodland resources (Mapaure et al., 
1995). 
 
4.2.2. Historical trends in woodlands resource availability  
This section discusses changes in woodland resource availability in 
Romwe, from the local people’s perceptions. One of the conclusions from 
the baseline vegetation survey carried out by the CEH in 1995 is that ‘the 
vegetation of the Romwe catchment is still in relatively good condition 
despite the long history of settlement by people in the early 1950s’ 
(Mapaure  et al., 1995:12). Community members also indicate that 
 
34 In this study culture is treated not just as something embodied in values, beliefs or accepted 
practices, but as both an issue of representation and a process that goes beyond the reified and static 
traditions to include everyday social processes, practices and experiences.    94
woodland products are still relatively abundant. Although there have been 
changes in quantities of woodland resources available over the years, the 
only problems of scarcity reported during this study were land for 
cultivation and settlement for younger couples. Table 4.4 shows women’s 
and men’s perceptions of resource availability trends beginning in the 
1950s.  
 
Table 4.4. Perceptions of historical trends of woodland resource 
availability in Romwe  
 
  1950s & 1960s  1970s  1980s  1990s 
Product  Women Men  Women Men  Women Men  Women Men 
Firewood 25  20 17  16 5  10 3  4 
Grazing  area  30 30  14 10  4  7  2  3 
Timber for 
construction 
25 35  15 10  7  4  3  1 
Sacred areas 
(level of 
sacredness) 
20 47  15 1  9  1  6  1 
Sale of wood 
for carving 
6  5  10 5  15 20  19 20 
Tree species 
for carving 
28 45  16 2  4  2  2  1 
Crop fields 
availability 
30 40  10 7  8  2  2  1 
Gardens  2 2  9 3  12  10  31  35 
Wild  fruits  30 45  11 3  5  1  4  1 
Game    30 N/A  10 N/A  7  N/A  3  N/A 
      
Source: PRA workshop, January 1999. 
 
Four key time periods were defined by the participants and were used to 
discuss changes in the use and availability of different resources found in 
the catchment area. A total score of 50 was used for each product. Scores 
were distributed across the time periods agreed upon by the group. A 
higher score means higher availability except in the case of woodcarving 
where a higher score shows that the activity is more prevalent. The results 
presented in Table 4.4 reveal women’s and men’s perceptions regarding 
resource availability. From the group discussions, it became apparent that 
availability is not only measured in terms of the quantity of the resource 
but also in terms of the quality of the resource. Regarding quality of the 
resource, this relates to whether the preferred species is available or not, 
although there may be alternatives. Crop fields and gardens are included in 
the table because they are closely linked to availability of woodland 
resources and clearing land for fields may negatively affect availability of 
woodland products. 
 
From the local people’s perceptions, the 1950s and 1960s were 
characterised by abundance of natural resources when the people had just 
settled in the area. During the mid to late 1960s, the government initiated a   95
                                                          
villagisation programme, which resulted in centralisation that located 
villages in straight lines, leading to the demarcation of land into grazing, 
farming and residential areas. This process had some negative impact on 
the natural resources as people had to clear new land for settlement and 
crop fields. During this period, firewood could be collected pose-pose 
(everywhere) e.g. around homesteads, in crop fields. There was very little 
crossing of village boundaries because each village, including villages 
neighbouring Romwe, had abundant resources.  
 
Regarding grazing, during the 1950s/60s, the area that stretches from 
Mapande mountain to the present day Ngundu growth point was used as 
grazing land. Livestock also grazed in the vleis (mapani). There were no 
boundaries as far as grazing was concerned. Livestock were free to graze 
anywhere, except in crop fields during the cropping season. Certain areas 
were considered sacred. For instance, Siyawaraira mountain was 
considered sacred and no ‘silly talk’ was allowed while on the mountain as 
this could result in one getting lost on the mountain for a day or two. The 
Parinari curatellifolia ( muhacha) tree that is located at the present 
campsite for researchers (referred to as ‘Patrick’s house’
35) was considered 
sacred and the place where it is located used for traditional rainmaking 
ceremonies. This Parinari curatellifolia is no longer considered sacred and 
local people say this is because wakafumurwa nevarungu (it was undressed 
by the researchers) when they built their campsite where the tree is located. 
Informants claimed that during the 1950s/60s, these areas were very sacred 
and local spirits would mete out mysterious punishment to violators of the 
rules. The original Karanga inhabitants of the area strongly believed in the 
powers of the sacred areas but the immigrants of the 1950s, especially the 
Ndebele speaking ones, did not strongly believe in the supernatural powers 
of the sacred areas. Elderly men in group discussions accused the young 
generation of causing decay in the sacredness of the areas. The youth said 
that since the spirits were said to have traditionally protected the sacred 
areas, why were they not doing the same now. 
 
The 1970s period is classified as the ‘war period’. This period witnessed 
some minor downward trend in resource availability. This was related to 
lack of enforcement of government conservation laws while at the same 
time the traditional leaders on the ground were ignored and threatened by 
the liberation fighters because they were seen as an extension of the 
colonial government. During this period crop fields began to expand into 
grazing areas. Firewood and timber were still relatively abundant during 
this period. The 1980s saw natural resources, especially woodlands, being 
used indiscriminately because of the spirit of independence (madiro – do as 
you like). This period is referred to by the community as mazvakemazvake 
(each man for himself). During the 1980s, there were severe droughts, e.g. 
 
35 The campsite continues to be referred to as ‘panogara varungu (where the white men live), or 
kwaPatrick’ – a former CEH researcher from the UK, even four years after no white person has 
permanently resided there and the IES researchers of African origin resides at the site full time.    96
the 1982 drought, erratic rains and an increase in human population, partly 
due to returning refugees and people strategising to get land during the 
peak of the spirit of independence. This resulted in pressure on the 
woodland resources. Crop fields were further expanded into grazing areas 
to accommodate young couples and the fields came to take up substantial 
portions of the grazing areas. It was noted that scores in Table 4.4 show 
that areas originally designated for crop fields are becoming scarce and this 
explains the expansion of crop fields in areas originally designated for 
livestock grazing. There was also a shift from the traditional pole and 
dagga houses to brick houses and this resulted in wet wood being cut for 
firing bricks. Some fruit tree species began to be used for firewood. This is 
when the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and the RDC came up 
with rules prohibiting cutting of live trees.  
 
The 1990s was seen as the worst period in local history. In addition to 
increased pressure on the available woodland resources, many households 
also lost access to remittances that had traditionally been a major source of 
income for them. This was a result of companies closing down, often 
associated with the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) 
launched in 1990. Some retrenchees came back home and engaged in 
farming. This further reduced grazing land available in the area. While 
grazing areas were shrinking as a result of encroachment, the 1991/92 
droughts reduced the livestock numbers, thereby reducing pressure on 
grazing land. Firewood collection extended into the hills and some of the 
traditionally sacred tree species were being used for cooking. Preferred 
timber species are now scarce and farmers have switched to using less 
preferred species including eucalyptus trees. Given that access to timber is 
restricted for ‘outsiders’, people from villages outside the social catchment 
villages such as Museva and Maringire hire locals to cut timber for them 
since it is relatively available in Romwe as compared to other villages. 
While the men’s group indicated that ‘outsiders’ (people from outside the 
social catchment) only come to collect fibre, women differed from men on 
this point. From the women’s perspective, the so-called fibre collectors do 
not just collect fibre but also a host of other woodland products such as 
mushrooms, mopane worms and wild fruits. In the majority of cases, these 
‘outsiders’ to do not consult local leaders before they collect the products, 
but go to the mountains and collect whatever resources they want. It was 
claimed that it is often not easy to monitor resource use in the mountains, 
as these areas are secluded. It is easier near settled areas where there is 
always movement of people and it is therefore easy to spot any offenders.   
 
During the 1950s and 1960s, certain tree species were preferred for 
timber and firewood while some were regarded as sacred, as shown in 
Table 4.5. It is important to note that the tree species presented in Table 4.5 
do not constitute an exhaustive list of all tree species used in the area, but 
rather it is made up of tree species considered relatively more important 
than other tree species found in the catchment for use as firewood, timber 
and those considered sacred.    97
 Table  4.5:  Firewood, timber and sacred species 
 
Botanical name  Vernacular  Use/Comment 
Julbernardia 
globiflora 
Mutondo  Timber for construction 
Brachystegia 
glaucescens 
Muuzhe  Firewood, bark for fibre, fodder 
Dichrostachys 
cinera 
Mupangara  Firewood: produces good charcoal. Also used 
to test luck 
Pseudolachnostylis 
maprouneifolia 
Mushozhowa  Sacred - will cause family fights if used in for 
firewood 
Peltophorum 
africanum 
Muzeze  Sacred – used by traditional healers to cleanse 
evil spirits 
Euphorbia 
confinalis 
Chikondekonde  Sacred – not to be used for firewood 
 Chizhuzhu  Sacred – used as brushwood to cover graves 
 Chitarara  Sacred – causes fights in the home if used for 
firewood 
Lonchocarpus 
capassa 
Mupanda  Sacred- used during burial ceremonies 
Burkea africana  Mukarati  Sacred – not to be used for firewood 
Terminalia serecea  Mususu  Timber, firewood and leaves for cough 
medicine, yokes 
Dalbergia 
melanoxylon 
Murwiti  Timber for construction 
Colospemum 
mopane 
Mupani  Timber and firewood and hardwood for 
furniture 
Afzelia quanzensis  Mukamba  Carpentry, carvings (high value). Said to be 
the chief’s shade  
 
For tree species believed to be sacred, misfortunes were believed to 
follow people who failed to observe the traditional beliefs relating to these 
sacred tree species. Fruit trees could not be used for firewood because wild 
fruits constituted a big proportion of local diets especially during times of 
drought. Traditional leaders, in collaboration with religious/spiritual 
leaders formulated the rules that determined access to different resources. 
Timber for construction was collected in the valleys and lower parts of the 
mountains.  
 
4.2.3. Enforcement of rules for access to woodlands  
A wide array of rules and regulations governing access to woodlands were 
highlighted during group discussions and key informant interviews. 
Although rules and regulations can be of recent origin, rules outlined by 
villagers in Romwe appear to be rooted in the Shona culture, having been 
inherited from ancestors, for instance those rules relating to sacred areas. 
The Ndebeles therefore often ignore such rules. Rules narrated by people 
do not necessarily relate to the RDC by-laws. A few rules such as 
restrictions on cutting live trees are similar to those found in the by-laws, 
but it is not clear whether they have been received from the RDC, because 
in the villages, these were associated with either the traditional authorities 
or DNR. Contrary to Mandondo’s (2001) findings in Mutangi catchment,   98
where people clearly articulate RDC by-laws, in Romwe there was vague 
knowledge of the by-laws except in the case of the councillor and VIDCO 
chairman. Even other members of the VIDCO were not conversant with the 
RDC by-laws and subsequently there is limited enforcement. The VIDCO 
chairman suggested that there is no incentive to enforce the RDC by-laws 
because ‘we do not benefit anything from them’. From the VIDCO 
chairman’s perspective, councillors try to enforce them because they are 
paid monthly allowances by the RDC but other VIDCO members do not 
receive any remuneration. In addition, there was a general feeling that 
paying fines at the RDC is not fair because ‘the tree would have been cut 
from our area’. From the local people’s perspective, the fine should be paid 
locally to the sabuku. If an individual breaks some traditional rule, he/she 
is first given a warning if it is considered a minor offence. If the offence is 
repeated then the sabuku would usually make him/her pay a fine of a goat 
and this goat is consumed at the dare (village court). Thus local people 
tend to benefit in the case of justice meted out by the traditional leaders, 
unlike paying fines at the RDC.  
 
The rules that are enforced by traditional authorities and are usually 
adhered to include those for not starting bush fires and for not harvesting 
restricted tree species such as Afzelia quanzensis (mukamba). Cases were 
reported of individuals who had started bush fires and were fined a goat by 
the sabukus. Villagers confirmed they had ‘eaten the goats’ at the sabuku’s 
dare. One man was made to pay a fine of Z$500 (US$9.00 at the official 
exchange rate of US$1 = Z$55) by Chief Madzivire for starting a bush fire 
in 1997. More cases of people fined for cutting Afzelia quanzensis were 
reported during the study. For instance one woman said her son was caught 
cutting an Afzelia quanzensis tree near her homestead in July 2000 by the 
sabuku’s police. He was taken to the sabuku and was made to pay a fine of 
Z$50 (US$0.90). Another case reported was that of two brothers from 
Sihambe village who were found cutting an Afzelia quanzensis tree in 
Tamwa village by the sabuku’s police in November 2000. Because the case 
involved two villages, i.e. Tamwa and Sihambe, it was taken to headman 
Chikanda. The two brothers were earlier fined Z$500 (US$9.00) each. 
Their mother claimed that this was an unfair judgement partly because the 
court had been held in the absence of the boys’ father who worked in town. 
Rather than waiting for the father to return home and resume the case, the 
headman decided to reduce the fine from Z$500 to Z$50 (US$9.00 to 
US$0.90) each, subsequently their mother paid the fine. It is worth noting 
that there are discrepancies in the amounts reported as fines during the 
group discussions and the actual amounts that people pay. During group 
discussions, reference was made to fines of Z$500 (US$9.00) or a goat, but 
data on people who have actually been fined show that the majority were 
made to pay not more than Z$50 (US$0.90). Enforcement processes are 
also complex in that judgement is often made case by case, not according 
to some standard procedure, but rather based on norms that are applied in a 
flexible manner. 
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Another rule that is often flouted relates to restriction on establishment of 
homesteads in woodland and grazing areas. In practice, the establishment 
of homesteads in woodland areas does occur, regardless of the restrictions 
against such practice. Such restrictions are part of the national land 
allocation laws that are geared to controlling illegal settlements. The 
Communal Lands Act of 1982 vests the custodianship of land in the 
communal areas in the President, but it devolves the administration of such 
land to RDCs (prior to the enactment of the Traditional Leaders Act of 
1998). The RDCs in Zimbabwe are therefore de jure land authorities that 
oversee the allocation of land and establishment of new settlements in 
communal areas, a role that was played by chiefs during certain periods of 
the colonial era. Theoretically, a land allocation committee comprising 
local councillors, (mostly from the ruling ZANU PF party), war veterans of 
the liberation struggle and in some cases self-proclaimed war veterans, and 
officials from the RDC and Department of Agriculture, Technical and 
Extension Services (Agritex -the national agricultural extension agency) is 
vested with powers to evaluate and approve new settlements in Chivi 
district, but in practice, this committee is inactive. De facto, it is the 
sabukus who appear to have the most say in land allocation. Sales of land 
are prohibited but in practice, people often sell arable and residential units 
under the guise of charging only for improvements made on the land. 
Gardens in riverine areas can also be exchanged in the same manner.  
 
Locally, encroachment into grazing and woodland areas is blamed on the 
poor government resettlement programme. Consequently, offenders are 
often not tried because it is believed they are trying to make a living for 
themselves and their families. The fast track resettlement programme 
initiated in 2000, gave some farmers, especially the young generation some 
hope to ‘own’
36 (have access to) land. Currently in Romwe, the majority of 
the young men have been allocated some plots within their parents’ fields 
and some have encroached into the grazing areas or are leasing land on an 
annual basis from other farmers. Given the opportunity to ‘own’ land under 
the fast track resettlement programme, some Romwe farmers moved to the 
new areas (the commercial farms) with mixed results. Two of those who 
moved to Chinhoyi (about 500 km to the north west of Romwe) have 
managed to secure land and it is believed they got it because they are 
related to a government official. Their elder brother works as a central 
intelligence officer in Chinhoyi town, the district centre under which the 
two brothers got land. As one farmer summed it up, ‘it all depends on who 
you know and not what you know’. For those who tried their luck, without 
any links with government officials or other influential people, they were 
back in the village by June 2002, most with feelings of betrayal as can be 
 
36 Legally, in Zimbabwe, all land belongs to the head of state. Theoretically, in rural areas, the RDC, 
through the ward councillor, is mandated to allocate land. However, traditional leaders such as the 
sabuku, are the de facto land allocators. Once allocated a piece of land, be it for farming or 
settlement, farmers assume ‘ownership’ of that land. They can develop it, pass it on to their 
children or relatives and lease it out.    100
                                                          
seen in cases 4.1 and 4.2 of Mr. C. Lunga’s
37 and Mr Charewa’s 
experiences. These two cases illustrate what a number of other people in 
the catchment have experienced. Given the above scenario, local 
institutional arrangements may not be able to deal with cases of 
encroachment into woodland and grazing areas because the underlying 
problem of land shortage has not been dealt with. The cases also illustrate 
the point highlighted earlier that institutions for woodland and water 
management are not only meant for the management of these particular 
resources but also cater for various other community concerns such as 
securing arable land for the young generation. Encroachment is not 
restricted to grazing areas, but extends to other landscapes as well, for 
instance sacred areas.  
 
Two cases of farmers’ experience with the fast track resettlement 
programme 
 
Case 4.1:  Fast track resettlement: A window of 
opportunity for the landless or just a wild goose chase? 
 
Mr C. Lunga is one of the young farmers in Romwe who is 
landless because he and his wife do not ‘own’ land for 
cropping. Each cropping season, he leases land from other 
farmers within the catchment area or in the neighbouring 
social catchment villages. His parents also live in the 
catchment. Unlike him, they have land, but not enough to 
subdivide and allocate him a small piece, as in the case of 
other parents. In September 2000, Lunga was enticed by the 
government’s call for applications for land for resettlement 
and applied. The process of applying was very costly as he 
made several trips to Masvingo town (about 90 km away) to 
get application forms, complete the forms and he also paid for 
technical advice on developing the cash flow budgets needed 
in the forms from Agri-business departments of commercial 
banks. When he submitted the forms, he thought the process 
of approving the forms would be ‘fast tracked’ as that was the 
message they were receiving from government departments. 
This was not to be and in January 2001, he decided to join war 
veterans who were taking over some farms in Shurugwi 
district (coincidentally where his parents were relocated from 
in the early 1950s). The war veterans were allocating plots to 
interested individuals. He was allocated a piece of land on a 
commercial farm that had been ‘acquired’ by the government. 
Lunga started to look for a buyer for his old homestead in 
Romwe, but before he could find a buyer, he and other 
farmers who had been allocated plots at the Shurugwi farm 
 
37 Where people’s names are used in the cases, these are pseudonyms used to protect the privacy of the 
respondents.   101
were chased away by government officials ‘because they had 
not followed the right procedure’ in acquiring that land. 
Lunga came back and started renovating his houses that he 
had earlier deserted. Asked about his view on the fast track 
resettlement programme, he could only say ‘zveminda 
ndezvekungovharana chete, hapana nyaya apa!’ (Fast track 
resettlement is a joke; they are not serious about it.) From 
Lunga’s perspective, the farm was taken over by a 
government official. 
 
Case 4.2: Even war vets get trapped by their own trap      
 
Mr Charewa is one of the locals who claims to be a war 
veteran. He ‘owns’ about 6 hectares of arable land in Romwe. 
In May 2000, at the height of farm occupations, he went to 
occupy a ‘very fertile’ farm in Zvishavane district. The farm 
owner was asked to leave the farm by the war veterans. The 
whole of 2000, Charewa was at the farm where he claims that 
he had been made the ‘base commander’. When the cropping 
season came, he grew maize and cotton and he claims that he 
spent more than Z$7000 (US$127.00) to have the land 
cleared, tilled and to buy inputs. Meanwhile his entire family 
remained in Romwe where they continued cropping their 
Romwe field. Rumour was rife in Romwe that Charewa had 
married a second wife to assist him on the farm plot in 
Zvishavane. However, before the crops were ready, a political 
heavy weight cum-business man in the district literally chased 
them away because ‘that farm was part of his estate’. The 
businessman owns a farm adjacent to the farm Charewa and 
others had occupied. He claimed that he was leasing the farm 
to the former commercial farmer and if the land occupiers kept 
‘squatting’ on his farm, it was against the government’s black 
empowerment policy. His comment on the whole process after 
returning to Romwe was ‘Paya takatambwa, ndakarasa mari 
yangu yakawanda chaizvo. Ndezvenyika izvi, hapana 
zvekuita’ (We were cheated in Zvishavane I lost a lot of 
money on that farm. It is all politics, there is nothing I can do 
about it.)   
Source: Key informant interviews with returnees from the 
farms, June 2002. 
 
During the early stages of the research, villagers indicated that rules 
relating to sacred areas are still adhered to, in particular for Romwe 
mountain and that these areas are highly revered. Later follow-up key 
informant interviews revealed otherwise. There is now less respect for 
sacred areas as evidenced by the collection of products from areas 
traditionally regarded as sacred. Reasons given for loss of respect for 
sacred areas in recent years include the presence of fewer elderly people in   102
the community who are conversant with the rites and ceremonies that 
should be undertaken at sacred sites. Church members are also accused of 
contributing towards the loss of respect for the sacred hills as some of them 
go and hold night prayers in those hills considered as sacred. This is 
regarded as kufumura panoyera (undressing the sacred site). In other cases, 
the sacred areas have been redefined or renegotiated, shifting the original 
boundaries of the sacred spheres, as illustrated in case 4.3 on the 
encroachment into the Romwe mountain. Encroachment into sacred areas 
is also blamed on resource scarcity in the area.  
 
Case 4.3: Encroachment into sacred areas: The case of 
Romwe mountain 
 
The Romwe mountain was cited as one of the sacred areas in 
the catchment. Traditionally, rain making ceremonies and 
other rituals were done on this mountain under the guidance of 
cultural and traditional leaders who are the original inhabitants 
of the area. Prior to independence in 1980, the mountain was 
said to have been so sacred that spirits would mete out severe 
punishment to all offenders. Fruits, timber for construction 
and firewood could not be collected from the mountain then. 
Due to scarcity of certain resources in the area that can be 
found in Romwe mountain, farmers have started to encroach 
on the mountain area. It started with collection of fruit and 
firewood from the periphery of the surrounding hills, then 
onto the mountain itself. The villagers reclassified the smaller 
hill into a less sacred area and coined a new name for that hill 
– now referred to as ChanachaRomwe (literally meaning 
Romwe’s child). Thus ChanachaRomwe is not viewed as 
sacred anymore. As resources get depleted from 
ChanachaRomwe, villagers are beginning to encroach on the 
big Romwe mountain. The new view is that the only sacred 
area on the mountain is the pool where traditional ceremonies 
were performed. Fruit, timber for construction and firewood 
are being collected on Romwe mountain, a thing that was 
unheard of in the 1950s-1960s.  
 
When invading the sacred areas, there seems to be a certain 
pattern followed. In most cases, it is the young boys who take 
cattle for grazing in the sacred areas. The boys in the process, 
harvest fruits from the sacred areas. Next they collect fibre to 
make whips to drive cattle, and then pick up a log of dead 
wood at the end of the day to assist their parents with 
firewood. Women and girls follow, collecting head loads of 
dry wood. Finally, men will follow with the axe cutting poles 
for construction and wet wood to stockpile at home for use 
during the rainy season. Once men have joined in, the whole 
sacred area becomes what can be termed an open access   103
resource because the resource management regime appears to 
have broken down.  
 
The Romwe mountain case shows that there has been gradual 
undermining of the sacredness of Romwe mountain and this is attributed to 
resource scarcity and/or the distance that people have to walk to areas that 
are not sacred to collect products such as firewood. The traditional 
leadership who are the custodians of culture do not punish those who 
encroach into the sacred areas. This could be influenced by the presence of 
immigrant leaders who do not recognise these places as sacred. The 
Romwe mountain is located in an area that falls under sabuku Sihambe. 
When asked about the sacredness of the Romwe mountain and why there 
was encroachment onto the mountain, the sabuku had two explanations for 
this. First was that, in their former area of settlement in the Midlands 
province, they knew that the only sacred mountain was eNjelele (named 
the Matopos Hills during the colonial period) and it was not the case that 
every small hill was sacred. Thus when they moved into this area and were 
told by the headman and Chief that the Romwe mountain was sacred they 
did not understand why, but decided since they were ‘visitors’ in the area, 
they would respect these areas anyway. Second, when foreign-based 
researchers started working in the area, they would climb the mountain and 
do whatever they wanted with nothing happening to them. Yet they were 
told that if one engaged in an activity that violated the sacredness of the 
mountain such as cutting a tree, they would disappear. People started 
encroaching onto the mountain and when nothing happened to the first 
offenders, others followed suit.      
 
Although rules and rule-enforcement structures exist for woodland use 
and management, there appears to be mainly opportunistic enforcement of 
such rules. In cases where rules and regulations are enforced, this 
sometimes gets entangled in contestations arising from different standards 
of rulings made in the past and in differential treatment of different people 
e.g. differences in power, interests, values and inconsistencies in the 
enforcement of the rules. An example of inconsistency in rule enforcement 
is the case of the two brothers from Sihambe discussed earlier. The 
existence of a variety of bodies with overlapping and competing claims to 
authority  e.g.  sabukus versus VIDCOs, as will be shown later in the 
chapter, may also add complexity to the enforcement of the rules and 
regulations relating to woodland use and management. This may in the 
long run have negative implications for the sustainable use and 
management of the woodland resources.  
 
4.2.4 Water Resources Mapping  
Few studies exist that have focused on institutional arrangements for water 
management in the communal areas of Zimbabwe. Key studies by Sithole 
(2001 & 1999), focused on water sources found in wetland areas in 
communal areas. Another recent study by Matondi (2001) focused on institutional arrangements as they relate to irrigation schemes. My study 
focuses on all water sources found within a catchment, including wetlands 
and those sources used for garden irrigation. The study also investigates 
reciprocity between well owners and non-well owners. Two broad 
categories of water sources were identified during the resource mapping 
exercise; community owned and privately owned water sources. 
Community owned water sources include boreholes, dams (in particular 
Barura dam), streams, and deep wells. There are 36 privately owned wells 
in the biophysical catchment with various uses and users. Privately owned 
water sources are mainly in the form of deep wells. These have different 
institutional arrangements compared to community water sources. 
Institutional arrangements governing use of community water sources 
differ depending on the type of the source. Women, the main collectors of 
water, spend a lot of their time collecting water largely because of the 
volumes needed for domestic use, as can be seen from Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1. Contribution (%) of household members to domestic water 
collection 1999-2000 (Source: Sullivan et al., 2001
38) 
 
A variety of water sources are used to meet domestic water requirements. 
These include boreholes, riverbed wells, river, wells and the dam. Wells 
are used more frequently for domestic purposes during the wet season and 
boreholes are used more frequently during the dry season as some wells 
have low water levels during the dry season. Although a well may be 
privately owned, a number of households other than the well owner have 
                                                           
38 Drawing from results of the 1999-2000 Household Livelihood Survey carried out in Romwe. 
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access to the well. While wells are the major source of water for domestic 
purposes, other water sources provide a diversity of sources providing 
livelihood options and security. 
 
The diversity of household water sources increases household food 
security as members engage in a variety of activities including irrigated 
gardening. The success of irrigated gardening in semi-arid regions, as is the 
case in Romwe, largely depends on access to reliable water sources. The 
need for consistent water sources may explain why many households sink 
their own wells where feasible or maintain good relations with relatives or 
neighbours who own wells so that they can access water for vegetable 
production, especially during the dry season.   
 
Community owned water sources 
Different villages use community-owned water sources for various 
purposes and during different times of the year. Boundaries of water 
resource use, though known, shift depending on the type of the water 
source, the use of that particular source and the season. A variety of rules 
and regulations apply to the different community-owned water sources. 
Some rules are generic whilst others are specific to the type of water 
sources. Table 4.6 shows the water source, uses and the rules that apply to 
each of the sources. Overall, the rules and regulations that apply to 
community-owned water sources are not written down but they are known 
in the community. The following sections discuss each of the water sources 
presented in Table 4.6. 
 
Boreholes 
Whereas a borehole may be located in one village, that village allows 
neighbouring villages access to it. This is not a written contract, but an 
informal arrangement. In years with good rains (e.g. above about 650 mm 
per annum), rules relating to the use of boreholes apply equally to locals 
and outsiders (Table 4.6). These rules are enforced more vigilantly during 
times of water scarcity. Examples of rules that have been agreed upon by 
the community relate to general hygiene around the boreholes e.g. not to 
do laundry at the boreholes. In low rainfall years communities may 
institute rules that regulate the amount of water collected, frequency of 
collection, the uses to which the water is put and the number of villages 
that can use a particular borehole. The use of 200 litre drums for collecting 
water, for example, is strongly discouraged if there are signs that 
underground water reserves are running out. In addition, during times of 
water shortage farmers are not allowed to use borehole water for watering 
fruit or other trees being grown. In all cases these rules are not written 
down but community members seem to know them well and appear to 
follow them.  
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Table 4.6. Community water sources, uses and rules regulating access 
 
Water 
source 
Uses  Rules and regulations 
Boreholes Domestic 
purposes 
(drinking, 
cooking and 
laundry)  
Watering 
project garden 
 
Cleanliness should be maintained around the boreholes. 
The borehole pump should not be hit against the ground. 
No one is allowed to do laundry at the boreholes. 
Brick moulding is not allowed at the borehole.  
No use of drums to fetch water unless there is a funeral or 
big function. 
Every borehole user should contribute money for repairs. 
If children “play” with the pump, parents are fined Z$10 
(US$0.18). 
Barura 
dam 
Livestock 
watering 
 
 
 
 
Brick 
moulding 
 
 
Laundry 
 
 
 
 
Community 
garden project 
Livestock to use designated gates to control soil erosion. 
Every household that uses the dam should pay a yearly 
subscription fee of $5 (US$0.09). 
No cattle grazing around the dam to prevent soil erosion 
and dam siltation. 
 
No brick moulding at the dam site, individuals should 
fetch water and mould at some other location. 
No cutting of wet wood near the dam for firing bricks. 
 
Laundry should not be done near the dam, it should be 
done at least 30 m from the dam.  
Tamwa village is allowed to do laundry throughout the 
year while Dobhani uses the dam during the dry season. 
 
Privately owned vegetable gardens should be established 
far from the dam.  
No cultivation in the immediate surrounding of the dam. 
Deep 
wells 
(Type 1, 
closed) 
Laundry, 
cooking 
Laundry should be done at least 50 m from the well. 
No brick moulding.  
No gardening. 
The sabuku and his subjects set rules. No one has been 
fined so far as people observe the rules due to close 
kinship ties. 
Deep 
wells 
(Type 2: 
open) 
Brick 
moulding 
House 
construction 
No rules in place -chero vanochaya zvidhina zekutengesa 
ndipo pavanoenda- even people who mould bricks for 
sale use water from this well. Drinking water from the 
open well is discouraged as it may be contaminated. 
Mawunga 
stream 
Livestock 
watering 
Laundry 
Bathing 
Make bricks 
Irrigation 
Free access- no controls/rules. 
 
 
 
If there is a critical shortage of water in some villages, especially during 
the dry season, rules regarding who can have access to water are relaxed to 
accommodate unfortunate neighbours. Similarly if a neighbouring village’s 
borehole breaks down, access is given to them to collect water from a 
catchment borehole. As one old man put it, ‘if the borehole in Vhudzi 
village breaks down, how can we let them suffer? We allow them to fetch   107
                                                          
water from our borehole’. In the case of the boreholes in Romwe, 
management committees have been set up with the assistance of external 
support agencies such as the CEH of the United Kingdom, the Lutheran 
World Federation (LWF) and the District Development Fund (DDF). In 
theory, their mandate is to enforce the rules regulating access to these water 
sources, but in practice these committees were found ineffective. For 
instance, the Chidiso borehole committee failed to repair a borehole during 
a four-year period, yet only a bolt costing less than US$5.00 was needed. 
The committees are made up of five members, namely, the chairperson, 
vice chairperson, treasurer, secretary, and pump minders or borehole 
police. The composition of these committees was found to be gender 
balanced. While there are different committees for the different community 
owned water sources, some individuals are found in more than one 
committee. Sithole (1999) reports that to avoid leadership conflicts, 
villagers may elect the same people into different committees.  If the 
borehole committee tries a case and the offender refuses to comply with the 
ruling of the committee, the sabukus (who constitute the bulk of the 
Catchment Management Committee
39) are requested to intervene. This 
arrangement is meant to ensure that people respect the committees in place 
as they have the backing of the local leaders.  
 
Access to water sources is constantly negotiated and renegotiated 
depending on the nature of water use at a particular time. This point is 
illustrated by the case of Chidiso borehole. The Chidiso collector well 
(commonly referred to as a borehole by community members), was 
constructed in 1994. The borehole is located in Sihambe village. It has two 
hand pumps. Originally one was meant for household consumption while 
the other was meant for irrigating crops in the Chidiso vegetable garden. 
Unfortunately due to frequent breakdown of the hand pumps, only one of 
the hand pumps is usually working at any one time, and serves both of the 
purposes for which the well was designed (household consumption and 
irrigation). The three biophyisical catchment villages are the main users of 
this borehole. Two other villages, from the social catchment, Matenhese 
and Puche, normally collect water for domestic use from the Chidiso 
collector well if their boreholes are not functioning. The catchment villages 
use water from the collector well mainly for irrigation purposes in the 
community garden (Chidiso) and for domestic purposes such as cooking 
and washing. 
 
All users of a particular borehole are expected to pay a yearly 
contribution (e.g. Z$5 for Tamwa borehole). The money is in theory used 
for repairing the borehole if it breaks down. However it is difficult to 
mobilise all the users, as some people are less frequent users than others. 
For instance, at Chidiso borehole some farmers use water from the 
borehole specifically for domestic purposes while others use it for both 
 
39 This committee has the overall mandate to oversee use and management of all natural resources in 
the catchment area.   108
domestic and gardening purposes. The latter is a more important economic 
use than the former. Thus when it comes to paying yearly levies, 
community members who use the borehole for gardening usually pay the 
money as the borehole is more important to them than it is to the other 
group, which can look for alternative water sources. For domestic use only, 
people can rely on wells, most of which do not have enough water to 
sustain vegetable production at the village level. Women predominantly 
engage in vegetable production.  
 
Barura Dam 
Barura dam has a large sphere of influence in terms of the people who use 
it. The CARE-supported garden that is irrigated using water from the dam 
adds an extra dimension to the users and uses of the dam. The three 
catchment villages use the dam mainly for irrigating their crops in the 
community garden and for watering their livestock. Other villages, shown 
in Figure 4.2 use the dam, mainly in the dry season. Many committees 
influence the operation of the dam. The number of committees (dam, 
agronomy, conservation committees) related to the dam in one way or 
another indicates the different stakeholder groupings at the dam. The 
committees, in consultation with farmers, set rules that regulate the way 
farmers use the dam. It is worth noting that the jurisdictions of the 
committees tend to overlap. and this could potentially cause conflict 
amongst the various committees.  
 
As can be seen from Figure 4.2, the ten social catchment villages have 
access to Barura dam. While members of the social catchment villages can 
use the dam water for watering livestock and other domestic uses, they are 
not accorded the right to use the dam for purposes such as fishing or 
collecting large volumes of water. However, during droughts, use rights for 
specific purposes may be extended to other villages (outside the social 
catchment villages) for example, for watering livestock and for domestic 
use. The decision to accord access to the dam during droughts to villages 
that would normally not use the dam during a normal rainy season is often 
spearheaded by the sabukus after consultation with village elders and other 
community members. Often the sabuku of a village needing water makes a 
request to the concerned catchment village sabuku and then the request is 
discussed with the other two catchment villages’ sabukus, and then 
forwarded to the village elders. Following that, a community meeting is 
called to inform other community members about the request and a 
resolution is passed as to whether or not the village requesting access to the 
dam should be granted the permission to do so. Because water is 
considered  hupenyu (life), there has been no case of denying another 
village access to water during drought, although rules of use are enforced 
more stringently during drought periods.  
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109Closed deep wells 
There are closed deep wells that are used as community water sources. These 
are dug and protected with labour contribution from community members 
through the traditional work parties (nhimbe). Rules relating to access to these 
wells are set by the sabuku in consultation with his advisors. The rules include 
not doing laundry near the well and no brick moulding and gardening. In 
practice, there was no evidence that these rules are enforced, but the rules are 
adhered to. The study found that some rules are not enforced because of the 
transaction costs involved such as getting shouted at, time needed to track 
offenders and the fear of being bewitched. There are also close social ties in 
the catchment as the majority of the families are related in one way or another 
and thus there is fear that penalizing another person may work against the long 
established social capital. This was quite evident in conflict management 
situations discussed in Chapter Five. If a resident violates agreed upon rules, 
often he/she may just get cautioned by the sabuku and not made to pay any 
fine.   
 
Open wells 
The open wells found in the catchment are not protected and are used as an 
open access resource. Some of these wells are natural while others are wells 
that were abandoned when the owner moved to settle in another area outside 
Romwe. The wells are used mainly for brick moulding and house construction, 
but not for drinking purposes. People therefore have free access to these open 
wells. 
 
Mawunga stream 
During the dry season households water their livestock in the perennial 
Mawunga stream. Some mould bricks along the Mawunga stream as well. This 
stream is accessible to almost everyone in the adjacent villages. Use of the 
stream tends to be dictated or determined by the distance of the household to 
the stream. For example those who live near the stream can do gardening 
because they ‘own’ land near the stream while those who live far away can 
only use the stream for watering livestock. In addition, during the cropping 
season, farmers who live far from the stream find it difficult to water their 
livestock because the stream is surrounded by crop-fields, which are out of 
bounds to livestock. Key informants indicated that this has not been a source of 
conflict because during the cropping season in years with normal to high 
rainfall, there are water puddles all over the village. Thus not all livestock has 
to be watered at the Mawunga stream.  
 
110 
Privately owned water sources  
With regards to private water resources, these are predominantly wells dug by 
specific households close to their homes or in their fields and they are regarded 
as belonging to that household. Ownership ranges from zero to three wells per 
household. The wells are usually dug by individual households through 
mobilising their own labour, hired labour or assistance from neighbours. In 
some cases the wells are inherited, together with fields, from parents and 
grandparents. Most of the wells are located in crop fields and vegetable 
gardens while a few are located close to the houses. Household members dig or 
drill private wells for a variety of reasons but most of them said they do so for 
convenience. Ownership of a private well lessens the amount of time spent 
walking to fetch water. Exclusive use of a well by a single household is highly 
unlikely. Water is regarded as hupenyu (source of life). It is considered that ‘it 
is un-African to deny a relative or neighbour water, a God given resource’, 
thus access cannot be denied outright to other users. Wells are often open to 
use by other households following a basic set of norms. Wells are shared with 
relatives, neighbours, church colleagues and friends, such that eventually, 
everyone in the village has access to almost any well located within a 
reasonable distance from their homestead (Figure 4.3).  
 
The well owners attach certain conditions to the use of wells. For instance, 
permission has to be sought from the well owner before collecting water from 
a private well. Someone may be granted access to water for domestic purposes, 
such as for drinking, cooking and laundry, where larger amounts are needed, 
for example for beer brewing, permission has to be sought for that specific 
activity. In general wells in crop fields are more accessible to the whole 
village, unlike wells near homesteads, which are usually fenced off. 
 
When they are identifying a well from which to collect water (if given 
permission from the owner), an individual considers the following: distance to 
the well (i.e. nearness of the well to their own homestead); closeness of their 
relationship with the well owner (unotsvaga waunofarirana naye - you go to 
someone you are in good books with) and people whose well they have helped 
to construct. Some well owners may turn down a request by another 
community member to collect water from their wells if the well is located in a 
garden. In this case, permission may be withheld out of fear that the people 
coming to collect water may steal vegetables or leave the gate to the garden 
open allowing animals to invade the garden.  
 
 
111F
i
g
u
r
e
 
4
.
3
.
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
s
 
f
o
r
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
i
n
g
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
w
e
l
l
s
112  113
Restrictions may also apply if the well owner invested a significant 
amount of money in developing the well. Some well owners pointed out 
that if they had not spent a lot of money or had not hired someone to dig 
the well for them, they would willingly allow other villagers to have access 
to their well. Other cases of denial of access come into play if the person 
wanting to collect water from the well never assisted the well owner to dig 
the well or if the person is renowned for being unhygienic (uchapa). The 
social contract to collect water from another farmer’s well may be 
terminated if a person proves to be unhygienic, steals from the well 
owner’s garden or crop field, or collects water from the well for purposes 
other than those for which they originally sought permission.  
 
Individual well owners institute rules governing access to privately owned 
deep wells. These rules are similar to those governing access to community 
owned water sources, and are not written down. They are well articulated 
by community members because the well owners make sure the users and 
potential users know the rules. These rules are communicated informally to 
potential well users. The following rules were identified for private wells: 
 
1.  Use of drums (200 litres) for fetching water before getting 
permission is not allowed even if the individual wanting to fetch 
the water has been granted permission to collect water from the 
well for drinking. Permission to collect large volumes of water for 
different purposes has to be sought separately. 
2.  Washing clothes closer than 50 metres from a well is not allowed. 
Washing must be done down slope from the well. 
3.  Containers that have been used on a fire cannot be used for 
fetching water from a well. 
4.  Leaking tins cannot be used to draw water from a well. 
5.  Seventh Day Adventist Church members do not fetch water from 
their wells on Saturdays, nor do they allow others access them. 
 
Gates must be shut after fetching water, especially where there are 
gardens, or else vegetables may be lost to livestock.The well owners set 
most of the rules, but the local village health workers enforce some of the 
rules such as those relating to general hygiene. The village health workers 
make frequent visits to different wells to monitor cleanliness around wells 
and ensure the wells are properly protected. If conflicts on the use of a 
private well arise, the complainant can take the case to the local kraal head 
for arbitration. In most cases, however, conflicts are resolved amicably 
between the well owner and the community members. Usually the well 
owner first threatens to ban the offender from taking water from his or her 
well and then withdraws the permission to collect water if the person 
continues to be a problem. Bans against accessing water are generally 
resented in the community. For example, a well owner who prevented 
others from accessing his well found a dead dog in the well two days after 
he locked the gate to the well. The well owner later unlocked his gate.   114
People also believe that wells at which punitive rules are in force often dry 
up or collapse even if they have a strong lining made of cement. 
 
The foregoing discussion emphasizes what well owners ‘give’ to other 
community members and not what they themselves ‘get’ from the other 
community members. The process of water access is reciprocal, thus well 
owners also derive some benefits from people who use their wells. Benefits 
that can be realized by well owners include: 
 
a)  Access to arable land: as discussed earlier, there is general land 
shortage in Romwe, but land is comparatively abundant in the 
neighbouring social catchment villages such as in Matenhese 
village. However, people in Matenhese village do not have reliable 
water sources, even for domestic purposes as their borehole often 
breaks down, probably due to pressure. Residents from Romwe 
often lease land from farmers in Matenhese village. Whether one 
gets land or not in the neighbouring village depends a lot on the 
nature of the relationship between the concerned parties. Prices for 
leasing land vary from one person to another, for instance, if the 
farmers are close friends, user rights to the land can be given for 
free or for a very nominal fee. These arrangements are not fixed 
but are negotiated on an annual basis. Thus getting land from one 
person during one cropping season does not guarantee the person 
the same piece of land the next cropping season. Some well owners 
therefore allow villagers from Matenhese to access their wells in 
order to benefit through access to arable land. These are mutual 
arrangements. There is no guarantee that by according someone 
access to your well they would automatically lease land to you. 
Thus the reciprocity is based on trust. At the time of the study, the 
cost of leasing land ranged from Z$500 to Z$800 per acre per 
annum. 
 
b)  Access to draught power: some well owners do not own sources of 
draft power and therefore give access to their wells to fellow 
farmers who have draft power in anticipation that when the rainy 
season begins, they would be assisted with draught power at a 
‘reasonable’ price. Often the well owners do get assistance with 
draught power from neighbours, friends and relatives who use their 
well. 
 
c)  Access to labour: well owners may get assistance from those who 
are allowed to collect water in the form of help in the fields to 
weed, harvest and process farm produce. Although the well owners 
do not ask openly for such favours, based on cultural norms of 
reciprocity, the water collectors reciprocate the access they are 
given to a well in one way or another. For instance, in cases where 
an individual has been given permission to use a well for vegetable 
production, when the vegetables are ready, they give some to the   115
well owner, even if the well owner may have his/her own 
vegetable garden. 
 
d)  People who share the same water points have a higher chance of 
engaging in other projects together because they can easily 
mobilize each other. The flow of information is also fast among 
people who share the same water source. This is true especially as 
regards communally owned water sources such as dams. Cattle 
herders for example, come to know each other as they interact at 
the dam when watering livestock. During such interactions, there is 
sharing of information about cattle diseases, key dates on the cattle 
calendar e.g. when the next dipping date is going to be. Vegetable 
producers at community gardens, for instance at the Barura and 
Chidiso gardens, also interact at the gardens and share information 
on ideas for vegetable production. Other social issues are also 
discussed during such interactions and resolutions can even be 
made in such arenas prior to a formal community meeting to 
resolve a particular issue. Networks that emerge around issues of 
access to water are formed and nurtured over long periods of time 
through continuous interaction and are valuable for the analysis of 
local institutional arrangements for natural resource use.  
 
Natural springs (Zvitubu) 
Only two privately owned natural springs were identified. Given that 
springs are natural features, private ownership of springs is an example of 
privatisation of a potentially common pool resource. Individual claims are 
made over springs partly because they are localised and can be easily 
defended or based on claims of inheritance from forefathers. Water from 
natural springs is used for drinking, watering livestock, laundry, brick 
moulding and vegetable production for sale and home consumption. The 
owners of homesteads and fields located near the springs determine the 
kind of access to and use of the spring by other community members. 
There are no committees that monitor the way the springs are used. There 
are some rules, however, that have been inherited from generation to 
generation and enforced by sabukus and chiefs. The most common rules 
are: no bathing at the springs, no laundry, no soap should be used at the 
spring. Livestock should not drink from the same point of the spring as 
people because springs are normally left unfenced and would be trampled 
by livestock, thus spoiling the water and also making the spring dry up. 
Some rules are inherited cultural practices (yagara ingoritsika 
yamadziteteguru edu – traditional beliefs inherited from our forefathers). 
The DNR also encourages people to protect springs. Generally people 
observe the laid down rules, because they ensure the availability of clean 
water to people.   116
4.2.5 Historical trends in water resource availability 
From the local people’s perspective, historical trends for water resource 
availability in Romwe starting from the 1950s to the 1990s show a decline 
in abundance of water for rainfed agriculture and livestock watering (Table 
4.7). There has been an increase in the development of garden irrigation 
and the number of private wells. The increase in the number of privately 
owned wells may be explained by the decline in availability of natural 
springs and other open water sources that were used between the 1950s and 
1970s. Although there are differences in scores allocated by women and 
men, the trends portrayed are similar. 
 
During the 1950s, the area received high rainfall referred to as machakwi, 
jakuchichi, (very heavy rains). Perennial springs were quite common, both 
sacred and non-sacred. Use of metal utensils and those that had been used 
on the fire was a taboo, as this was believed to cause the sacred spring to 
dry up. No individuals flouted this rule, as mysterious things were believed 
to befall all people who breached the rule. Examples of sacred springs 
identified include Chimwandau spring in the Mapande mountain where use 
of metal utensils and bathing in the spring were prohibited and the sacred 
pool at the top of the Romwe mountain. The 1970s period received good 
rainfall except for 1972, which was reported to have been a year when the 
area received below average rainfall. During the 1980s, rains became more 
erratic and more farmers started digging individual wells as existing water 
sources became unreliable. The DDF also came in and drilled a borehole 
and established a committee that was tasked to maintain the borehole in 
good working order. 
  
 Table 4.7. Perceptions of historical trends of water resource availability 
in Romwe
40  
 
1950s & 1960s  1970s  1980s  1990s  Nature of the 
resource  Women  Men Women  Men Women  Men Women  Men 
Traditional 
drinking water 
sources 
20  20 20  20 6  5  4  5 
Livestock 
watering 
19  21 15  18 10  9  6  2 
Irrigating 
gardens 
1  0 10  5 15  15  24  30 
Crop 
production 
(rainfall) 
20  20 25  20 3  5  2  5 
No. of private 
wells 
5  3 10  8 15  15  20  24 
Source: Group discussion, December 2002. 
 
 
                                                           
40 A total of 50 scores were allocated for each resource and distributed across the different periods.    117
Rainfall is said to have become even more unreliable and unpredictable 
during the 1990s as was referred to as mvura yemakasi (rainfall is now like 
a card game). The metaphor of a card game was used to illustrate the level 
of unpredictability of rainfall and variability from one year to the next. 
These perceptions concur with the data gathered by Frost (2000/2001) for 
the last fifty years (Frost, database at IES). More private wells were dug 
and rules governing access were enforced more stringently. Vegetable 
growing as a livelihood option has accompanied this shift towards 
improving availability of water resources. In addition to growing 
vegetables for household consumption, surplus vegetables are sold to 
generate income. A number of NGOs such as CEH and CARE 
International came into the community to assist farmers with provision of 
water for irrigation through the collector well and dam rehabilitation 
respectively. Farmers have also received training in water and soil 
conservation as a drive towards ensuring sustainable use of natural 
resources in the catchment.    
 
4.2.6 Enforcement of water rules and regulations  
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) representatives vanajengetavhu 
(those who look after the soil), theoretically, enforce rules on the use of 
streams, a condition of use of land beside streams and wetlands in the 
Natural Resources Act (Chapter 26.) For instance, there is the 30 metre 
distance rule is meant to curb soil erosion along the riverbanks. According 
to this rule, farmers are not supposed to use the land within 30 metres of a 
stream. Once worked, the soil along the riverbanks may become loose and 
be easily eroded by the running water during the rainy season. The eroded 
soil often causes siltation in the river and the dams downstream. It was 
noted during the study that this DNR rule was ignored by most of the 
participants because the soils close to the riverbanks are very fertile and it 
is easy for them to water their gardens close to the water source.  
 
Land shortage in the area is also forcing people to ignore the 30 metre rule. 
This challenge for DNR also emanates from the fact that the department 
designs technical fixes for natural resource problems with little 
consideration of the local people involved in resource use. DNR polices 
natural resource regulations in rural areas of Zimbabwe and has the power 
to fine rule breakers. Despite backing by statutory instruments, of late, 
DNR rules and regulations have been ignored by communities, partly due 
to lack of efficient monitoring mechanisms by representatives and staff 
members of the department. For instance, there is often only one DNR 
officer per district and over the years government budgets have been 
dwindling, making it difficult for the officers to fulfil their enforcement 
role. As part of the shift towards more participatory approaches, there has 
been a gradual shift in the way DNR operates on the ground, from an 
enforcement role to a more community-based advisory role. This to some 
extent has been confusing the local communities who are used to DNR   118
being an enforcing agency. Similar findings on the changing role of DNR 
are reported by Keely and Scoones (2000).      
 
Unlike for woodland resources where discussion centred on enforcement 
of rules and regulations, in the case of water the term ‘enforcement’ may 
be misleading. ‘Compliance’ would be a more appropriate term to use in 
the case of institutions regulating access to water resources. The concept of 
compliance has as much to do with ‘public good will’ at the level of the 
individual, as it has to do with explicit social arrangements designed to 
ensure conformity to the rules (Mandondo, 2000b). The term 
‘enforcement’ appears to emphasize only explicit social arrangements for 
regulating behaviour. There could also be ‘voluntary compliance’ as was 
seen in Romwe regarding institutions for water use and management. The 
term ‘public good will’ can also be misleading as it suggests the notion of 
compliance as being perfectly voluntary. The wish to act in accordance 
with ‘public good will’ is often rooted in a background of sustained moral 
conditioning that involves systems of subtle (and often coercive) 
incentives, which are often coded into the local language and beliefs. For 
water resources in Romwe, much of the enforcement appears to be left to 
‘voluntary’ compliance to social norms, mores and other social 
arrangements that are agreed upon by the parties involved. Unlike the case 
of woodlands where several cases of rule violation were cited, cases of 
flouting of institutions regulating access to water resources were hard to 
come by. This raises an important question relating to why this is the case. 
Is it something to do with the characteristics of the resource or are there 
other factors at play? What implications does this have on the sustainable 
use of woodlands and water resources? 
 
Considering that water resources are more discreet, with resource user 
boundaries more clearly defined as compared to woodlands, this could 
explain why institutions for water management appear to be more effective. 
Both communal and private water sources are clearly defined and claims to 
a particular water source are recognised by other users. In the case of 
woodlands, there are competing resource claims, which could be a result of 
the fuzziness of resource use boundaries and also having diverse woodland 
products with different users located in a particular landscape unit. For 
example, the Barura mountain has resources that include fibre, timber, 
mushrooms, fruits, medicine and leaf litter, all with a different set of users, 
whose use jurisdictions are not clearly defined. On the contrary, while a 
particular water source may have many users and different types of uses, 
there is clear definition of who should use what water source and for what 
purposes. Also, because most water sources are considerably smaller than 
woodlands geographically, water sources are therefore more easily 
monitored. For instance there is no big river that passes through the village 
that could have competitive upstream or downstream users. Thus users in 
both the social and biophysical catchments seem to understand and respect 
their rights of access to the water resources. Water resources are therefore   119
more likely to be used and managed in a sustainable manner as compared 
to woodlands.  
 
In Romwe, private water source institutional arrangements are products 
of social networks of actors created through the family, extended family, 
kinship ties and other social networks. This is illustrated in Figure 4.3, 
which shows how various members of the community gain access to 
privately owned water sources. Thus interpersonal relationships are 
important in determining the degree of compliance with existing rules and 
regulations governing access to water resources. Networks surrounding 
water use appear to be much stronger than for woodlands. These are based 
on criteria including kinship ties and sharing of totems. In some cases, 
there may be no blood relations but good neighbourliness is important in 
the development of these networks. Such networks are not apparent for 
woodland management.  
 
Furthermore, there is individual and group investment in the 
establishment of the majority of water sources, e.g. digging private wells, 
participation in dam rehabilitation and maintenance of communal water 
sources, which could be influencing use, and management of water 
resources. For woodlands there is less investment and the woodland 
products are considered as God given and therefore are managed in open-
access-like manner. The concept of open-access-like is borrowed from 
Mandondo et al., (2001), referring to a situation where a resource is not 
managed as common property, yet the management regime cannot be fully 
described as open access. The management regime in this case has 
elements of both common property and open access regimes. These 
findings challenge one assumption that CPR management may be classified 
into four property regimes, namely common property, private property, 
state property and open access. CPR typologies categorising management 
regimes into these four broad categories remain a central feature of the 
CPR literature that has largely informed CBNRM (Berkes & Farvar, 1989; 
Bromley, 1991). In strict technical terms, open access denotes lack of a 
management regime, yet the woodlands in Romwe have some management 
regime, though not effective. It therefore makes it difficult to describe 
access to the woodlands as being open access. In more recent publications, 
CPR advocates have shied away from the use of the term ‘common 
property’ and rather refer to common pool resources (Arnold, 1998). This 
however, does not take away the fact that the property right conditions of 
any resource managed communally, are of critical importance in that they 
influence the kind of collective management that will be applied to a 
resource.   
 
The multiple uses of a water source also involve a balance between 
allocating water for domestic and other uses. In most cases, priority is 
given to water for domestic use, over irrigation or gardening activities. A 
good example is the Chidiso borehole, where originally two pumps were 
allocated for domestic and irrigation purposes but due to frequent   120
breakdowns the irrigation pump is often used for domestic purposes. This 
balance also allows for flexibility. People do not rigidly stick to the 
original uses of a particular water source. Findings of the analysis of water 
institutions contradict the literature on collective resource use, which 
assume that economic incentives drive self-interested behaviour in CPRM 
(Ostrom, 1990). This study found that management of water as a common 
pool resource is facilitated more by the nature of interpersonal relationships 
rather than being driven by economic incentives. These social relations 
provide social bonds that are key for the attainment of collective outcomes 
for resource management and sustainable use of those resources.  
 
4.3 Defining resource use boundaries  
In seeking to describe patterns of access to woodlands and water resources 
at the village level, some insights may be drawn from observing how local 
people think about and describe their resource areas. An attempt to map out 
village and resource use boundaries revealed that traditional villages (under 
the headship of the sabuku) and administration boundaries do not match 
up. Resource use boundaries also do not match with administration and 
other village boundaries. Even traditional village boundaries that have a 
longer history of existence are not a hundred percent clear. Similar to 
village boundaries, resource use boundaries are fluid and often influenced 
by changing resource status.  
 
Results on the identification of resource user groups for woodlands and 
water are presented separately as there are differences, while the discussion 
draws on findings from both resources. Resource use mapping revealed 
that woodland resource use boundaries do not coincide with any of the 
administrative, political, and traditional or project defined boundaries. The 
boundaries were found to vary depending on the type of natural resources 
in question. Figure 4.4 on the use of resources found on Mapande 
mountain is used to illustrate this point. As can be seen from Figure 4.4, 
the woodland resources from Mapande mountain area, the mountain south 
of Dobhani village, have different communities or groups of users for 
different resources such as grazing, firewood, timber, fibre and 
mushrooms. 
 Figure 4.4. Villages that use woodland resources from Mapande mountain. 
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Resource use boundaries vary depending on the resource in question. The 
boundaries are negotiated between and among the various actors, both on 
an individual basis and/or on a village or group level basis. Conflicts may 
emerge during the negotiation process. Another complicating factor is that 
the use of resources from that same area or the same product changes over 
the year and during different seasons. The fluidity of the resource use 
boundaries may have negative implications for sustainable resource use, 
especially if there are no clearly defined institutional jurisdictions 
regarding management of the woodlands. The shifting of resource use 
boundaries does not apply to woodland products only, it also applies to 
various resource areas and/or units. For instance, for each of the different 
mountain areas in the catchment area, there is a different constellation of 
villages for different resources. The shifting of resource use boundaries 
was found to be more common for woodlands than for water resources. 
While water users may change depending on the type of use, season or 
during a particular year, the definition of users of various sources of water 
appears to be relatively fixed or much clearer than for woodlands.  
 
While there is general fuzziness on the geographical extent of each 
village, boundaries are also not fixed. They are often defined and redefined 
depending on the issue at stake. For instance, boundaries may shrink if the 
issue at stake relates to access to resources considered key to livelihood 
sustenance, yet they can expand during a drought year in relation to 
external food aid. That the sabukus have different lists of households for 
different purposes illustrates, as was described earlier, the fuzziness of the 
‘village’ concept. For instance, the household lists (which were much 
longer) that the research team was given in 1998 during the first visit to the 
village were different from lists given out by the sabukus during later 
stages of the research. Asked to explain the differences, the sabukus 
indicated that the longer list, that often includes young men above the age 
of eighteen but not yet married and residing with their parents is often used 
when material benefits are expected from a project. The household lists 
that the research team used in later sampling purposes are the shorter ones 
comprising household heads who have their own separate homestead 
and/or young men who are married but may still be residing in their 
parents’ homestead due to the shortage of land for settlement in Romwe.  
 
Shifting of boundaries is sometimes in response to perceived imbalance 
between available natural resources and human population. In some cases, 
villagers, rather than claiming an area that originally did not belong to their 
village, settled in neighbouring villages perceived to be under populated, 
without relinquishing their allegiance to their former village leaders. An 
attempt to identify village geographical boundaries was found to be even 
more complex as membership in the villages is fluid and amorphous as 
illustrated in case 4.4. The amorphous nature of community membership 
generally translates into shared ownership and shared use. For instance, 
some people may reside in one village, and consider themselves under the 
jurisdiction of a leader of another village, whilst their crop fields are   123
located in yet a third village. These cases involve strategic choices by the 
individuals involved regarding who they should align with or whom to 
support in a conflict over resources such as land.  
 
Case 4.4: Cases illustrating the fluid and amorphous nature of membership of 
villages within Romwe area 
 
x Mr I. Zirehwa physically resides in Matenhese village. He 
‘owns’ two fields, one is located in Sihambe village while the 
other is in Matenhese village. Yet he considers himself to be 
under the jurisdiction of sabuku Dobhani and for purposes of 
village records his name is under Dobhani village. Mr. Zirehwa 
can use his position to benefit from the three different villages 
depending on which position suits him most at a particular 
time. 
 
x Mr Lukasi is registered and resides in Tamwa village. His 
fields, vegetable garden and perennial well are located in 
Sihambe village. He leases part of his vegetable garden to a 
member of the Zvidza zvopo kinship group from Sihambe 
village.  
 
x Mr M. Dube resides in Tamwa village but his fields are 
located in Sihambe village. Mr Dube inherited his field from 
his father. Originally their household was also located under 
Sihambe village but during the villagisation exercise in the 
1960s their new homestead geographically fell under Tamwa 
village. 
 
x  Mr. I Tawona is registered under Sihambe village, has his 
crop field in Sihambe but his homestead is located in Dobhani 
village. He claims his allegiance is to sabuku Sihambe even 
though he resides in Dobhani village because his fields, that 
are a major source of livelihood for his family are located in 
Sihambe. 
Source: Key informant interviews, September 2001. 
 
The above cases of farmers residing in one village, with fields in a 
different village and paying allegiance to a leader of yet another village 
illustrate that individuals have multiple membership. Thus they are able to 
play multiple roles by drawing at will on different sources of legitimacy. 
These multiple roles may inflate the status of an individual.  
 
Although clear resource use boundaries are often considered a pre-
requisite for successful CPR, results presented in this section show that in 
practice, it is not easy to define these boundaries. The question is, in what 
context can CPR be possible given this fuzziness? This fuzziness of village 
and resource use boundaries challenges the notion of clearly defined   124
boundaries said to be desirable if collective resource management 
arrangements and related institutions are to be effective (Murphree, 1991). 
 
4.4 Institutional framework for woodlands and water use in 
Romwe  
The institutional policy framework has changed dramatically in Zimbabwe 
during the last two decades, moving from state centred approaches towards 
decentralisation and participatory resource management. There are many 
studies on the institutional framework governing natural resources in 
Zimbabwe including work done by Helmsing (1991), Makumbe (1996), 
Moyo (1995a), Scoones & Wilson (1989), Cousins (1989), Fortmann & 
Nhira (1992), Scoones & Matose (1993), Mandondo (2000a), Sithole 
(1999), Mukamuri (1995), the Land Tenure Commission of 1994, 
Murombedzi (1991), Murphree (1991) and Wekwete (1990). Themes 
running across these studies include: the nature of the tenure system in the 
communal areas as it relates to resource management, the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of existing authority structures.  
 
Since this thesis focuses on woodlands and water, only the legislative 
framework relevant to these resources is revisited. The principal legislative 
provisions governing woodlands in the communal areas are the Forest Act 
(1982), the Communal Lands Forest Produce Act (1987) and the Rural 
District Councils Act (1988), while the Water Act (1998) governs water 
resources. The Forest Act (1982) governs the establishment and protection 
of state forests while the Communal Lands Forestry Produce Act (1987) 
prohibits the commercialisation of forest products in all communal areas. 
The Rural District Councils Act (1988) vests district councils with powers 
to act as the local planning and development authorities and enact legally 
binding landuse and conservation by-laws that apply to areas under their 
jurisdiction. The Water Act (1998) allows for water abstraction using 
permits and is also the basis upon which catchment councils are 
established. It has been observed that these pieces of legislation focus on 
regulation and policing and therefore do not promote local proprietorship 
of resources (Nhira, 1994). Recent developments in the water sector have 
attempted to foster the concept of community participation, but as in the 
case of woodlands, forestry and wildlife sectors, a number of challenges 
have emerged. Some of the challenges relate to the identification of 
resource use boundaries, establishing conflict management and/or 
resolution mechanisms.  
 
Four major areas of concern can be discerned from the literature on the 
policy and legal framework for NRM in Zimbabwe that are relevant to the 
sociological understanding of institutions in CBNRM:  
 
(i)  Land alienation and land use provisions (this relates to 
alienation from other natural resources found on the land such   125
                                                          
as woodlands and water) that alienated pre-colonial resource 
management institutions. 
(ii)  Government policies and extension approaches that were 
predominantly top-down. 
(iii)  Tenure, administration and legislative interventions that 
alienated pre-colonial tenure systems in favour of the colonial 
policies and legal framework. 
(iv)  The changing resource use and management strategies adopted 
by communal dwellers in their various capacities as individuals 
and/or groups in response to changing socio-economic and 
political conditions. 
 
The literature on the institutional framework for resource management in 
Zimbabwe also highlights issues relating to the existence of a multiplicity 
of, parallel and often ineffectual institutions (Mandondo, 2000b; Matondi, 
2001; Mukamuri et al., 2000). A number of other studies discuss issues of 
contestation and legitimacy for some of the institutions (Moore, 1996 & 
1993; Mukamuri, 1995; Sithole, 1999). There is no general agreement in 
this literature regarding which institutions are effective in natural resource 
management, as their influence and effectiveness appear to be contextual. 
The process of institutional engineering in CBNRM by NGOs and 
community-based organisations (CBOs) has added another dimension to 
the institutional framework for natural resource management at the local 
level by adding another set of institutions often regardless of other 
institutions that are already in place.  
 
Another key feature in the post-independence policy framework for 
natural resource management in Zimbabwe relates to the decentralisation 
of local governance following the Prime Minister’s directive in 1984. The 
major objective of the decentralisation process was to ‘involve local 
communities, both horizontally and vertically in the process of planning 
and effecting their own development.’ (The Herald, February 28, 1984 
cited in Murombedzi, 1994). The Prime Minister’s directive outlined a new 
local government hierarchy from the central government to the village 
level. The directive provided for the appointment and duties of Provincial 
Governors, the composition and functions of provincial councils, the 
provincial development committees (PDCs), district councils and district 
development committees (DDCs), WADCOs and VIDCOs. The VIDCO 
was conceived as the primary organ for development at the local level and 
was to comprise 100 households. A ward consists of six or seven 
VIDCOs
41, representing 600-700 households at the time of establishment. 
The actual sizes of both the VIDCOs and WADCOs rarely correspond to 
the theoretical demographic imperatives of 100 households for the VIDCO 
and 600-700 for the WADCO. Since the delineation of these VIDCOs and 
WADCOs in 1984 up to the present, there has been population increase in 
the communal areas, due to either natural increases or immigration, which 
 
41  The term VIDCO is used to denote both the village in spatial terms and the committee.    126
was not considered in the original VIDCO/WADCO delineation. It is 
worth noting that the VIDCOs and WADCOs were created without taking 
cognisance of existing traditional authority structures and villages such as a 
sabuku’s village (bhuku  - kraal), headman’s ward (dunhu) and Chief’s 
district (nyika).
42) This created a situation, in which VIDCO villages differ 
from the sabuku villages that were created during the colonial period, often 
based on lineage and kinship ties. The VIDCO/WADCO and traditional 
systems of leadership rely on different systems of legitimation, which 
makes conflict between them inevitable (Murombedzi, 1994). This 
institutional framework at the local level has important implications for 
CBNRM institutions and sustainable resource use. 
 
Although resource management initiatives that involve decentralisation 
of management authority to local levels are increasingly finding significant 
legislative support in the post independence institutional framework for 
natural resource management, their implementation is not without 
problems. Natural resource management power has remained centralised in 
the state or its bureaucracies as the little power shifted towards local 
communities gets re-centralised at the RDC level and no legislation as yet 
gives legal mandate and fiscal autonomy to structures below the RDC level 
(Mapedza & Mandondo, 2001).  
 
The various institutional structures found in the Romwe catchment are 
presented in Figure 4.5. In addition, there are also several external agencies 
such as NGOs and research institutes that have facilitated the establishment 
of resource management institutions. Project related committees such as 
garden, dam, grazing, catchment management committees have been 
established by the NGOs to oversee the management of different projects 
that are facilitated by these NGOs. Except for the catchment management 
committee that comprises the three sabukus in Romwe catchment, all the 
other committees have a standard structure made up of seven members, 
comprising a chairperson, vice chairperson, secretary, vice secretary, 
treasurer, and two committee members. Unlike the case of VIDCOs and 
WADCOs, the NGO facilitated committees have received training in 
leadership, book keeping and training for transformation.  
 
 
                                                           
42 Historically, land and people were the property of a Chief, whose district (nyika) was divided into 
wards (matunhu), which were governed by headmen and under these were villages (mabhuku) 
headed by a kraalhead (sabuku). In most cases these villages were conceived to be people or 
households belonging to the same clan or lineage grouping.   
 
Figure 4.5. Institutional framework for woodland and water management 
in Romwe 
 
Following the recommendations of the Land Tenure Commission (1994), 
and the subsequent enactment of the Traditional Leaders´ Act of 1998, 
there are experiments with local government reforms through a system of 
village and ward assemblies. This may further confuse the VIDCO-
WADCO and traditional authority systems already in place. The village 
and ward assemblies are to be constituted through a mix of nominee 
leaders and elected representatives. Membership of the village assembly is 
open to all adults in the village and presided over by hereditary traditional 
leaders, whose nominations and appointments are approved by chiefs and 
the Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development 
(MLGRUD). A ward council comprises village heads of its constituent 
village assemblies, a councillor of the ward and a cohort of headmen 
nominated by chiefs and endorsed by the relevant minister. The ward 
assembly is headed by a headman, elected by members of the assembly 
from among themselves. Village assemblies elect VIDCOs, supervise and 
approve development plans from VIDCOs, whilst ward assemblies oversee 
all the roles and activities of their constituent VIDCOs. With the headman 
heading the ward assembly, this elevates a system of nominee lineage 
leaders over elected representatives. Furthermore, the village head to 
headman to chief to minister line of approving hereditary nominees 
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potentially creates a system of patronage in spite of the appointment of 
such leaders in accordance with culture (Mapedza and Mandondo, 2001). 
This framework of ward assemblies may result in what Mamdani has 
referred to as ‘decentralised despotism’, in which case oppressive powers 
are transferred to lower tiers of governance with the objective of 
controlling people, rather than motivating them to develop their own 
management systems. Local structures become the eyes and ears of the 
central state and this may result in their loss of legitimacy from the local 
communities. These structures may be seen as representing state interest 
and not local interest as they become upwardly accountable and not 
downwardly accountable. The introduction of village assemblies and ward 
councils in the face of existing VIDCO-WADCO and traditional leadership 
systems could be a recipe for further conflict between these systems. The 
likelihood of conflict is further aggravated when external CBNRM 
facilitators seek to enlist local support for woodlands and water 
conservation through the creation of new committees (e.g. catchment 
management, grazing, dam, and garden committees). These various 
structures often have overlapping, ever-changing membership and patterns 
of networking.  
 
The Chivi RDC, being the legal overseer of natural resources within the 
district enjoys legal support from several legal instruments presented in 
Table 4.8. The state policies governing access to and control over 
woodlands do not enable sustainable use and management of the resources 
at the local level. For instance, the Communal Lands Forest Produce Act 
(1987) restricts commercialisation of woodland products by local people, 
yet outsiders are allowed to exploit the resources for commercial purposes 
through obtaining permits from the RDC and state agencies such as the 
Forestry Commission, by passing village resource management structures. 
Such restrictions constrain the range of income sources available to local 
communities, who have otherwise become highly integrated into the 
broader national economy. The Act also confers control of hardwood 
timber occurring in communal areas to the RDCs, which exploit these 
resources through a system of concessions, with fees accruing to the RDC 
and not to local communities from which resources are extracted. The 
national legislation is therefore not empowering to local communities in 
the decentralisation process. Enabling legislation could stimulate effective 
local resource management providing incentives for management through 
clearly defined mandates and jurisdictions for local management structures 
within the decentralisation framework. Decision-making surrounding 
resource use should lie with local communities rather than Acts that give 
powers to state bodies such as the RDC and the forestry department. The 
Environmental Management Bill seeks to rationalise the country’s 
fragmented environmental laws by integrating them to ensure that they are 
consistent with each other. While the first draft of the Environmental 
Management Bill gave hope of decentralisation of resource management 
beyond the RDC, i.e. to local communities, the second version of the bill 
appears to focus on the RDC as the lowest legal entity of local governance.   129
 
Table 4.8: Legislation guiding decentralised resource management 
 
Legal 
instrument 
Rationale Effect/Impact   
The Rural 
District 
Councils Act of 
1988 
Merging of the rural and 
district councils, which were 
separate authorities during 
the colonial government. 
Reinforced the powers that a variety 
of other laws vested in the RDCs. 
The Communal 
Lands Act of 
1982 
Defines the RDCs as land 
authorities with powers to 
allocate land under their 
jurisdiction in conjunction 
with district administrators. 
Conflicts between councillors and 
traditional leadership over land 
allocation. Legally the RDC allocate 
land, but in practice sabukus 
allocates the land.  
Parks and 
Wildlife Act of 
1975 (amended 
in 1982) 
Designates RDCs as 
‘appropriate authorities’ over 
wildlife resources in their 
areas of jurisdiction. 
Re-centralises wildlife management 
authority at the RDC level rather 
than devolution to local 
communities. 
Natural 
Resources Act 
of 1941 (being 
amended 
through the 
Environmental 
Management 
Bill 
Designated local government 
authorities as the authorities 
for the conservation of 
resources within their 
districts and the 
Environmental Management 
Bill seeks to grant them 
appropriate authority status 
over a broad range of natural 
resources.  
Restrictions on dambo/wetland 
cultivation impacted negatively on 
women who were the main users of 
the dambo areas, growing 
vegetables for both household 
consumption and for sale, when 
there was surplus. 
The Communal 
Areas Forest 
Produce Act of 
1982 (amended 
in 1987) 
Vests RDCs with the power 
to grant licenses for timber 
concessions in communal 
areas. 
Restricts use of woodland resources 
to own use by local people, while 
allowing outsiders to exploit 
resources for commercial purposes. 
 
 
The Rural District Councils Act of 1988 also vested powers in councils 
e.g. to raise revenues through taxes, levies and tariffs from their areas, act 
as local planning and development authorities, and to enact legally binding 
landuse planning/conservation by-laws that apply to areas under their 
jurisdiction (Mandondo, 2001). The process of formulation and 
enforcement of these by-laws has been critiqued by Mandondo (2001) and 
Kundhlande (2000). In his review, Mandondo (2001) points out that the 
process of by-law formulation is not ‘participatory’ and as communities are 
not involved in this process there is poor enforcement of the by-laws on the 
ground. Furthermore the review of the by-laws carried out for this study 
revealed that there is no specific reference to water in the by-laws. The lack 
of specific reference to the use of water resources in the RDC by-laws is 
intriguing given that water is an important source of livelihood in semi-arid 
regions such as Chivi district.  
 
  Community members in Romwe were asked for their views on the RDC 
by-laws and whether there is adherence to the by-laws. There was in   130
general poor knowledge of the existence of the RDC by-laws in Romwe 
and the majority of the key respondents in group discussions had only a 
vague idea of the by-laws. At the community level, emphasis was on local 
level rules associated with traditional management systems and not 
necessarily with the RDC by-laws. The findings of this study differ from 
Mandondo’s (ibid) from Mutangi catchment, a site also located in Chivi 
district, where he found that there is high level of knowledge of the RDC 
by-laws even though they are not adhered to. Yet in Romwe, when people 
were asked to describe the by-laws, it was only the councillor, VIDCO 
chairman and a few people holding leadership positions who were able to 
articulate the RDC by-laws. The proximity of Mutangi village to Chivi 
town centre where the RDC offices are located, may explain the higher 
level of knowledge people have of the RDC by-laws (i.e. the village is 
more accessible to RDC officers as it is located about 20 km away yet 
Romwe is located about 60 km away). While this may be the case, 
portrayal of ignorance of the by-laws in Romwe could also be a tactic used 
to ignore or reject the rules.  
 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has shown the nature and patterns of woodland and water 
resource access. Given the diversity of values attached to woodlands and 
water by different resource users, this means that there may be different 
practices employed to gain access to different resources. Differences of 
values attached to different resources may provide the basis for conflicts 
amongst the various resources users, as individuals or groups. Resource 
management institutions often mediate such conflicts. Resources valued for 
livelihood sustenance by different users may become sources of conflict if 
the institutional arrangements governing access become untenable. In other 
cases, various resource users, especially disadvantaged groups such as 
women and the poor, may devise strategies for ensuring their continued 
access to the resource.  
 
Differentiation between common pool and privately owned resources 
was more distinct for water resources than for woodlands. Access of 
different users to various water sources, both communal and private, may 
shift during different times of the year but generally rules are consistently 
enforced. While access to woodlands is not defined in specific relational 
terms such as kinship ties, for water resources, access, especially to 
privately owned water sources, is defined based on kinship and other social 
ties as illustrated in Figure 4.3. Both implicit and explicit institutional 
arrangements govern communal and private water sources in Romwe. In 
the majority of cases, the rules and regulations are generally not written 
down, but community members appear to know them well. In most cases 
these institutional arrangements are defined only in a very general way, 
giving conditional access based on appropriate use. The importance of this 
non-specificity is that it allows for flexibility in resolving particular cases 
(Berry, 1993; Cleaver, 2000). Some authors have argued that it is important   131
to codify rules and regulations for resource use, for instance, through 
community organisations (Clarke, 1997; Mandondo, 2000b; Matowanyika, 
1991). Codification should, however, only be done when community needs 
and priorities justify switches to more managerially costly and intensive 
management systems. It should be demand driven rather than be 
prescriptive or supply led.  
 
Calls for codification overlook the fact that the existing system allows for 
flexibility in determining who has access to woodlands and water resources 
at a given time. The codified rules that do exist, e.g. the RDC by-laws and 
DNR rules and regulations, do not seem to work. Arguing against 
codification, Platteau (1995), using evidence from Africa on land issues, 
suggests that formalising land holdings, through registration, increases 
conflicts over land rights. This is more so for groups, who customarily had 
informal access to natural resources such as land, and in this case, water. In 
Platteau’s view, customary rights over common pool resources in local 
communities and the value of flexibility in these arrangements should be 
recognised. In this respect, external agents should limit themselves largely 
to facilitating and coordinating the informal management systems 
operating at the local level. In some cases, these arrangements may no 
longer be appropriate.  In such cases, there is a role for external agents to 
be more proactive.   
 
There is reciprocal access to woodland and water resources with 
neighbouring villages, as seen in the case of Barura dam and woodland 
products. This overrides the traditional and administrative boundaries in 
favour of flexible social boundaries. This in a way challenges one of 
Ostrom’s design principles (1990), which suggests that resource use 
boundaries should be clearly defined. This fuzziness of resource use 
boundaries also challenges recommendations for exclusion management, as 
espoused in the Land Tenure Commission report (1994) and the new 
Traditional Leaders Act of 1998. The legal framework for woodland 
management has been decentralised from central government, but re-
centralised at the RDC level and does not provide incentives for 
sustainable use and management of woodlands at the local level. Although 
some Acts have explicitly sought to move control over resources closer to 
the direct resource users, i.e. the local communities, for example, the Parks 
and Wildlife Act (1982), much control remains at the RDC level. 
Considering the bureaucratic nature of the RDC, local communities are not 
effectively represented in council decision-making processes (Mandondo, 
2000b). In principle, planning local development is bottom-up starting 
from the VIDCOs to WADCOs and then to the RDC, but in practice, most 
planning and approval, along with the implementation of such plans, is 
carried out at RDC level, and not at the community level. This top-down 
framework is reinforced by the fact that no legislation as yet gives effective 
legal authority or fiscal autonomy to units that are below the RDC level.  
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At community level, there exist diverse stakeholders, often with those 
ostensibly on the fringes of formal systems of power and authority 
significantly inserting themselves into local social and political processes. 
Encroachment to gain access to resources and ignoring the RDC by-laws 
are examples of such instruments used by local actors to assert their 
resource claims – what Scott (1986) refers to as the everyday forms of 
peasant resistance. Focusing only on legal instruments that guide resource 
management may be misleading as the analysis portrays the natural 
resource arena as exclusively pitting the state against local actors. Resource 
management is an arena in which heterogeneous local interests are argued 
out simultaneously together with the overbearing interests of local 
alliances. Given this complex resource management scenario, the key 
question that arises is: What institution or institutions are appropriate for 
CBNRM and could ensure sustainable use of woodland and water 
resources as well as equitable distribution of these resources to different 
user groups? An attempt is made to answer this question in chapters five 
and six, which show that maybe the issue for policy makers is not a 
question of either this or that institution, but rather that there is need to 
focus of ways of facilitating collaborative resources management processes 
that would ensure views and interests of different actors are considered.    133
CHAPTER FIVE: PATTERNS OF 
INTERACTION AND CONFLICTS OVER 
RESOURCE USE AND CONTROL 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter Four described the Romwe natural resource landscape and further 
examined the institutional framework that regulates access to woodland 
and water resources. The Romwe natural resource landscape provides a 
setting for social action but is also a product of such action. Processes of 
interaction may result in situations of conflict among the various actors, but 
there also exist areas of cooperation. From an actor-oriented perspective, 
natural resource use conflicts are an outcome of the interaction of different 
actors pursuing often quite distinctive aims and interests (Long & Long, 
1992). The actor-oriented approach has been found useful in other contexts 
in analysing how patterns of interaction may result in conflict situations. 
Examples include studies by Bassett (1988) and Toure (1988) exploring 
conflict between pastoralists, farmers and the state in the Ivory Coast and 
Senegal. Peluso (1992) and Bryant (1997) use the approach to examine 
how forest politics in India, Indonesia and Burma have been conditioned 
by the struggle of different actors with the state as well as struggles 
between the state departments. The actor-oriented approach therefore 
relates an understanding of actors to the political-ecological processes 
(Bryant & Bailey (1997), and was found relevant in this study in the 
analysis of conflicts related to woodland and water resource use. The 
chapter further analyses historical narratives as they relate to resource and 
leadership claims by different resource users. 
 
The research findings show that whilst networking, negotiations and 
dialogue are a pervasive feature of social interactions, the incidences of 
conflict over access, especially to woodlands and grazing areas, have been 
on the increase in recent years. As various actors negotiate and network to 
secure their access to natural resources, conflicts are inevitable and 
therefore often viewed as part and parcel of the negotiation process. By 
analysing the role and interaction of various actors such as women and 
men, this study highlights the importance of micro-politics in CBNRM. 
The concept of micro-politics is used after Moore (1993), referring to the 
politics of resource access and control at the local level There are two 
major issues central to the understanding of micro-politics in the context of 
CBNRM, namely, an appreciation that politics is about interaction relating 
to natural resource use and access and secondly, recognition that even 
weak actors possess some power to act in the pursuit of their interests. The 
‘power of the weak´ highlights the need for a full appreciation of the role 
of agency in human affairs (Bryant & Bailey, 1997).  
   134
5.2. Organisational interactions in Romwe 
Much literature on CBNRM in Zimbabwe highlights the multiplicity of 
organisations involved in natural resource management at the local level 
(Hasler, 1993; King, 1994; Madzudzo, 2002; Matondi, 2001; Sithole, 
1999). These studies place emphasis on conflicts between and among the 
various organisations and individuals, and focus less on areas of 
cooperation. The complex and shifting alliances within and among these 
resource management structures are both complimentary and conflicting 
and therefore need to be examined from both perspectives. Recognition of 
the multiplicity of resource management organisations at the local level 
raises questions about which organisation or combination of organisations 
resource management authority should be decentralised to, who decides 
and how might such decision be implemented. This chapter explores the 
interactions of different organisations involved in woodlands and water 
management in Romwe and highlights the constant flux, as power shifts 
among the various organisations. Perceptions of community members 
regarding the roles and responsibilities of the various organisations were 
also sought. There is a complex maze of organisations at community level 
as can be seen from Table 5.1. These organisations can be classified into 
five broad categories: traditional, local governance, technical government 
departments, NGO facilitated structures and interest groups. Many are 
based on social and kinship ties. Roles and responsibilities of each of the 
organisations involved in woodlands and water resources management in 
Romwe, drawing from the local actors’ perspective, are outlined.  
 
The majority of the local level organisations such as the catchment 
management, dam, agronomy, conservation, garden, and micro-credit 
scheme committees were established by NGOs. While these committees do 
not necessarily have legal backing, they draw the allegiance of people due 
to the material and financial support they receive from the NGOs. These 
NGOs are dependent on donor-supported projects with a timeframe, often 
ranging between three to five years. Once the donors withdraw support, 
most NGOs withdraw and these structures often lose their vibrancy. 
Community members often act in calculated rationality, for instance, when 
the Barura garden was established in 1998, most members from Chidiso 
garden moved to Barura garden, hoping that material and financial support 
would be higher there. Some former committee members in Chidiso garden 
hold positions in Barura garden committee and only two members of the 
Chidiso garden committee were active at the time of the study. The 
Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union (ZFU) supports smallholder farmers. Because 
membership is through payment of annual fees, the less privileged cannot 
afford to join and thus it is seen as an elitist organisation in the study site. 
With the exception of madzoro (traditional cattle herding arrangements), 
all interest groups were found to be very active. Madzoro are now defunct 
partly because richer households prefer to use hired labour rather than 
group herding arrangements.    135
Table 5.1: Village level organisations involved in CBNRM in Romwe 
 
Category Structure  Constitution  Status Mandates/comments 
Sabuku  Inherited and 
chief confirms  
Active Allocate  land 
Enforce resource use rules 
Resolve village disputes 
Headman Lineage 
nominee, chief 
confirms 
Active  Resolve cross village disputes 
Allocate land 
Chief Lineage 
nominee, and 
State confirms 
Active  Custodians of the land 
Spiritual guidance 
Traditional 
authorities 
(informal)  
Traditional 
healers 
Spiritual 
censure 
Active Diviners   
Cure ailments 
VIDCOs Elected  Inactive, 
except 
chairman 
Spearhead development 
Legal mandate for land 
allocation 
WADCOs Elected    Councillor 
active 
Spearhead development 
Link community to RDC 
Modern, 
statutory 
administrative 
(formal)  
RDC Elected  and 
statutory 
Not active at 
village  
Legal local authority in the 
district. 
Agritex  Statutory   Active  Pegging of fields 
Extension services  
Advise on disease control 
DNR Statutory  Formerly 
active 
Restrict stream bank 
cultivation 
Prevent tree cutting 
FC  Statutory  Inactive  Enforce forest use rules 
Technical 
government 
departments  
DDF  Statutory  Inactive  Provision of infrastructure 
Catchment 
mgt 
Nominated   Dormant   Manage use of resources in 
the catchment area 
Chidiso 
garden 
Elected Two  people 
active 
Management of garden 
Resolve internal conflicts 
Barura 
garden  
Elected  Active  Management of garden 
Seek potential markets 
Dam 
committee 
Elected  Active  Management of dam water 
and control use of dam 
Borehole 
committees 
Elected Inactive  Borehole  maintenance 
Collect annual user fees 
Agronomy  Elected  Inactive  Tree planting for catchment 
conservation 
Grazing  Elected  Inactive  Monitor grazing areas use 
Micro-credit  Elected  Active  Manage village credit scheme 
NGO and 
researcher 
facilitated 
committees 
Tree 
enthusiasts 
Voluntary and 
ad hoc 
Active  Indigenous tree planting 
Action research on trees 
ZFU  Joining fee   Active  Improve access to inputs  
Church  Voluntary  Active  Spiritual and moral support 
Burial 
societies 
Voluntary, 
subscriptions 
Active  Moral &material support 
during bereavement 
Madzoro   Voluntary  Inactive  Labour pooling for livestock 
herding 
Interest groups 
Cotton 
growers 
Voluntary  Active  Sharing knowledge on cotton  
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Traditional authorities were said to be the more active by community 
members as compared to modern structures. As one villager put it, ‘we get 
most of our information from the sabukus, the other leaders are just doing 
their formal job’ (zvizhinji tinozvinzwa kubva kumasabuku,  vamwe ava 
kungoitawo basa ravo). The Forestry Commission (FC) is not active in the 
Romwe area, although it was noted that it is active elsewhere in the district. 
This is partly explained by the fact that there is only one forestry extension 
officer covering the whole district. The mandate of the FC is to promote 
sustainable use of forest resources and enforce rules regarding use of forest 
products. NGO facilitated structures tend to interact more with the 
traditional structures. In cases where NGO facilitated structures such as 
garden committees cannot resolve conflicts, they refer cases to the sabuku. 
In other cases where local actors are not happy with decisions taken by the 
sabuku regarding projects, they sometimes seek the intervention of NGO 
officers to resolve such differences.  
 
While there is a maze of organisations at the local level, there is no 
formal definition of which organisation should be doing what. There is 
often poor communication among the various organisations sometimes 
leading to competition, duplication of roles and services. Existing 
legislation to a large extent fosters competition rather than a spirit of 
cooperation and collaboration between resource management 
organisations. For instance, DNR insists on maintaining the 30 metre rule, 
restricting cultivation along the stream bank, yet Agritex officers more 
present on the ground, sympathise with local people and allow vegetable 
irrigation along the stream banks. There is thus need for harmonisation of 
legal instruments relating to resource management at the local level.  
 
Rather than being independent entities, local level structures are often 
made up of the same individuals, operating in different capacities in the 
different structures. Thus while there may be conflicts in the objectives and 
interests of different organisations, this may be neutralised by having the 
same individuals sitting in the various committee structures. Figure 5.1 
serves to illustrate the multiple leadership positions that one individual may 
hold. Similar findings are reported by Sithole (1999) in a case where 
villagers decided to elect traditional leaders into VIDCO and WADCO 
positions following the Prime Minister’s declaration on decentralisation of 
the local governance system in 1984.  
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Figure 5.1. Multiple leadership in institutional structures 
 
 
It is important to analyse the characteristics of those individuals who 
hold positions in different leadership structures, as this would generate 
some understanding on a number of factors that influence power dynamics 
in the community. In the case of Vakuru, he is a respected sabuku in the 
area and is of Shona speaking origin. Because the other two Romwe area 
sabukus are of Ndebele origin, Vakuru is accorded more respect by the 
headman, the Chief and other Shona speaking sabukus as compared to his 
Ndebele speaking counterparts. During the wealth ranking exercises, 
Vakuru was ranked in the well off category because he has a sizeable herd 
of cattle, owns agricultural implements such as an ox-drawn plough and 
cultivator, he also has comparatively big fields, all of which he ploughs 
during good rainy seasons. Yet the other two sabukus for the catchment 
villages were ranked in the poor categories. In the majority of cases where 
individuals hold multiple leadership positions, other criteria for their 
selection besides their wealth status include their level of education, being 
eloquent and well connected politically, like the former councillor.  
 
The former councillor, who was also a teacher, for example, held both 
the councillor and VIDCO chairperson position, a situation that is very 
unusual. Kinship ties may also influence who holds what positions. For 
instance the former councillor, appointed one of his wives to be the village 
community worker (VCW), yet other community members should elect a 
person into this position. Because the councillor was well connected 
politically and influential in decision-making processes, his decision to 
appoint one of his three wives as the VCW was not challenged. At the time 
of the study, another of the former councillor’s wives also held multiple   138
positions that included being the chairperson of the Barura garden project, 
secretary for the village micro-credit scheme and representing the 
community at training workshops such as the Training for Transformation 
course, food processing, crop husbandry and look and learn visits to other 
projects sites that were organised by CARE International and IES. One of 
the sisters of the former councillor also held multiple positions that 
included being the vice chairperson of Chidiso garden (where she was said 
to be very influential), a member of committee for the Barura garden 
project and member of the cotton growers’ committee. Having almost the 
same members hold positions in different committees raises questions 
regarding the quality of these leaders’ input in the committees. This may 
help explain why some committees are inactive as shown in Table 5.1.   
 
While there may be differences in the mandates and objectives of the 
various organisations, Murphree (1994) argues that this does not 
necessarily imply incompatibility and can create a productive synergy 
among different institutional actors. Similarly, Murombedzi (1992) argues 
that the success of CAMPFIRE can be attributed to bringing together 
various interest groups and actors and thereby having instituted multi-party 
wildlife management involving local communities. However, despite the 
institutional collaboration between local authorities, government 
departments and NGOs involved in the implementation of the programme, 
Murombedzi (ibid) observes competition for resource control between 
local communities and their local authorities and that the RDCs do not 
necessarily represent the interests of the local communities. Rather, they 
function as extensions of central government, accountable to the centre 
rather than to the community. In Romwe there has also been re-
centralisation of resource management authority at the RDC level through 
various legal Acts that include the RDCs Act of 1988 rather than devolving 
management authority to lower levels. For instance, in Chivi district, 
resource use by-laws that have legal recognition were developed by the 
RDC without the involvement of the local communities (Mandondo, 2001). 
As a result, local actors tend to ignore the by-laws and in some cases claim 
that they do not know about these by-laws.  
 
The current set up is confusing as organisational interaction is on an ad 
hoc basis. There is also some strategic switch by external agents between 
parallel institutional structures. The external agents may interact with one 
structure at one level and at another level switch to a different structure. 
For instance, at village level, Agritex officers interact more actively with 
the sabukus, yet at ward level they interact more with councillors and not 
the headman. NGO officers are said to be selective in their interaction with 
local level organisations that they interact with, probably depending on 
which organisation they feel is more supportive of their goals. For instance, 
while CARE International, CEH and IES have a bias towards traditional 
authority structures, the South East Dry Areas Project (SEDAP), a project 
introduced in 2000, works closer with the VIDCO. The challenge villagers 
face is that all projects being implemented in the area come through the   139
RDC, yet on the ground the external facilitators appear to choose at their 
own discretion which local level organisation to work with. Since projects 
come through the RDC, the local authority, villagers claim that it is 
difficult for them to reject the projects if their local authority has given a 
project the go ahead as who are they to say no to the projects. The strategic 
switch of external facilitators among local level organisations may 
contribute towards fuelling conflicts between and among various 
organisations and actors involved in woodlands and water use and 
management at the local level.  
 
5.3. Foundations of resource and leadership claims: local 
historical narratives 
Berry (1997) finds that historical narratives may be used to lay claim to 
land and/or other natural resources. Similar views have been expressed by 
Fortmann (1995) and Peters (1992 & 1984). The production of history may 
therefore be a social process whose value depends on the social dynamics 
of production. Historical narratives often serve not only to establish a 
person’s claim to property and power, but also to constitute or reaffirm 
relationships with other people whose actions or recollections may help in 
the defence or exercise of such claims (Berry, 1997: 1237). Historical 
narratives tend to proliferate over time rather than converge toward a 
single, dominant version. Berry (1997) argues that in communities where 
property rights and institutions are defined through a process of 
negotiation, people are more likely to gain reasonably secure access to 
resources by participating in the negotiations, and the accompanying 
proliferation of historical precedents, than by settling on a single story 
which secures some people’s rights at the expense of others. This argument 
was found to be relevant for Romwe as key informants gave different 
historical narratives regarding the process of settlement in the area, 
depending on their social position in the community. Narratives have the 
power to frame and create understanding to establish, maintain and validate 
current actions to empower the narrator.  
 
‘Official’ history and local narratives provide general consistency on the 
dates of relocation from the Midlands in the 1950s province during the 
land expropriation period. At the local level, however, there are different 
narratives relating to the actual process of relocation, who came into the 
area first and how. These narratives were the foundation for conflicts over 
woodlands and water use, institutional conflicts and strategies used to 
access natural resources by various actors in the catchment. The local 
historical narratives vary according to the narrator and/or the clan that the 
narrator belongs to. From key informant interviews, four different 
historical narratives emerge that relate to four dominant kinship groupings 
found in the study site; the Mhlanga family (Ndebele without traditional 
leadership position in the area), the Sihambe clan (Ndebele, one of the   140
                                                          
traditional leaders comes from this clan
43), the Dobhani (also Ndebele, one 
of the three catchment traditional leaders comes from this clan) and the 
Tamwa (Shona, the traditional leader, perceived to be the most powerful of 
the three kraal heads in the catchment comes from this clan). The narratives 
of these four dominant groups are presented below.  
 
5.3.1 The Mhlanga Narrative 
My father Mbeleki Mhlanga  was born in Plumtree. Then he moved to 
Bulawayo and later to Shurugwi through his job. He used to work with 
wagons pulled by oxen and these transported agricultural produce for a 
company called Fox and Bucklos Transporters. I was born in 1927 in 
Shurugwi (then Selukwe) under Chief Mabhazule. When I was born my 
parents lived in the rural areas, which were converted to commercial farms 
in 1930. However, no farmer took up the land immediately, thus we 
continued to stay there. Farming started in 1944 on these farms but we 
remained and worked on the farm. When the area where our parents (we 
were very young then) resided was designated as a commercial farm, the 
new farmer at first was very kind to us. He allowed us to remain on the 
farm and gave us small plots where we grew maize. Every member of the 
family worked on this white man’s farm. The elderly people worked in the 
fields while children were made to look after sheep and cattle. Because our 
individual plots were very small, the farmer would give us some maize 
after harvesting his crop to supplement our food. My father Mbeleki 
Mhlanga was a foreman at the farm. All these people you see here like 
sabukus Sihambe and Dobhani were under him since he was the foreman. 
In 1951, when the farmer started growing tobacco rather than maize, it 
became difficult for us to get food. Some people decided to leave the farm 
to go to other places such as Tugwi (closer to Masvingo town). We asked 
the farmer what we should do and he advised us to go and ask for land 
from the District Commissioner (DC)’s office. My father and Sihambe 
(who was not sabuku then) went to the DC’s office. They were told that 
there was no more land around the Shurugwi area and advised them to 
consult the DC for Chivi district as he had heard that there was land 
available there.  
 
Mbeleki, Sihambe, Dobhani and one Mr Malamba left for Chivi district 
in search of land. Mbeleki Mhlanga is said to have been Sihambe and 
Dobhani’s brother-in-law because he had married their sister – the mother 
of the seven Mhlanga children, six of whom were still residing in the 
catchment at the beginning of this study.
44 Mr Malamba was not a blood 
relative of these three but they came along with him because they had all 
been residents and workers on the farm. When the four men got to the DC 
in Chivi they were advised that land was available under Chief 
 
43 Sabuku Sihambe is estimated to be in his eighties, and no longer active in his position. One of the 
Mhlangas has taken over the duties of the sabuku but people in the area claim he is self-appointed. 
44 Two of these, one being the former councillor died in May 2000 while his younger brother died in 
August 2001.    141
                                                          
Nemauzhe’s area but they had to go there first and confirm it before their 
papers could be processed. The four went to Chief Nemauzhe and they 
were shown the area to the north of Mawunga stream that runs across the 
biophysical catchment and now forms the boundary between Sihambe and 
Dobhani villages. They liked the area and went back to inform the DC. 
Because Mbeleki Mhlanga was foreman at the commercial farm, they 
decided he should be registered as their sabuku, but when the DC asked for 
his national registration identity card, he noticed that under the section for 
tribe it was recorded as Ndebele.
45 Although Sihambe and Dobhani were 
also of Ndebele origin, they had received their identity cards after they 
moved to the Midlands area, thus their tribe had been registered as Shona. 
The then Chivi DC said it would complicate matters if Mbeleki was made 
sabuku with ethnicity recorded as Ndebele in a predominantly Shona 
speaking area. Thus it was advisable that one of those whose identity cards 
was registered as Shona become the sabuku. Because Sihambe was the 
older of the two brothers, they decided that he be registered as the sabuku.  
 
After moving into the area in 1952, they realised that the land on the 
northern side of Mawunga stream was not enough for all the families and 
approached Chief Nemauzhe again for permission to utilise the land on the 
southern side of Mawunga stream. Chief Nemauzhe advised that the stream 
formed the boundary between his nyika (land) and that of Chief Madzivire; 
therefore they had to ask the permission from Chief Madzivire. The two 
brothers, Sihambe and Dobhani approached Chief Madzivire and they were 
granted the right to use the land. The two brothers decided that since 
Dobhani was the younger of the two, he should move to the new area 
across Mawunga stream with his family and become the sabuku for this 
new settlement. This explains the present settlement where Sihambe 
families are settled on the northern side of the stream and the Dobhani area 
is across the stream. Although they are brothers, they report to different 
Chiefs because of the nature of their settlement. When we arrived in this 
area, we were told that intaba iRomwe ayikhwelwa, ikhwelwa ngabanikazi 
bendawo kuphela abanjengenkosi uNemauzhe (that Romwe mountain is 
sacred and we should not climb it except for the ‘owners of the land’, such 
as Chief Nemauzhe). Where we grew up no area was said to be sacred 
except the Matopos where we were told there was ‘God’ and people would 
go there to worship him. Thus we did not understand what they meant 
about a local area being sacred. They would say if you go up the hill you 
will get lost, but one can get lost even walking along the road.  
 
We moved to this area in a decent manner as compared to people in 
Tamwa village. After identifying where we wanted to settle, we were 
offered transport by the Shurugwi DC. But those people under Tamwa and 
 
45 Archival records reviewed show that when a person was appointed sabuku or headman during the 
colonial period their details e.g. tribe, totem, language spoken, and genealogy were recorded at the 
DC’s office (National Archives File S2929/8/2 – Report on Makovere Headmanship and 
Community Chief Nemavuzhe – Chibi Tribal Trust Land and District).      142
Vudzi (one of the social catchment villages), they were moved in a rough 
manner. They were packed in lorries and driven to this place from 
Rhodesdale, this was not the case with Sihambe, Dobhani and us (the 
Mhlangas). Because we chose the land we wanted, we have good arable 
land in the valley unlike Tamwa and Vudzi who were just dumped in the 
area. 
Source: Interview with Jani Mhlanga – who has usurped his uncle’s 
position of sabuku, November 2000 and supplemented by information 
generated from an informal discussion with Joel Mhlanga, February 2001 
and interview with Mr Monday Malamba, February 2001. 
 
5.3.2 The Sihambe Narrative 
The farm where we lived and worked was called Washblock and was 
owned by Shabani Mines. Residents on the farm were a mix of Ndebele 
and Shona and our Chief was Ngungu Dlodlo. People started being moved 
from the farm in 1948 and we moved in 1952 and came here (Romwe). 
Before the whites came we always had izinduna (headmen) who were 
under inkosi (Chiefs), but when the whites came they introduced osobhuku 
(sabukus) to whom we had to pay head and hut taxes. The whites wanted to 
know where we lived and it was easier to do so through the sabukus – thus 
the  sabukus were like our home addresses. The District Commissioner 
(DC) helped us to move from Shurugwi and settle here. When the people 
who were asked to look for land for us to settle came here, they first went 
to headman Chikanda to seek permission. Chikanda took them to Chief 
Nemauzhe because Chikanda could not allow new people into the area 
without the Chief’s knowledge. The land seekers had brought with them a 
letter from the DC. After being granted the rights to settle, we went back 
and brought our belongings. The DC provided us with transport. When we 
came here, this area was not settled – we don’t know whether any people 
had lived here before. The whole area was heavily forested and it took 
heavy labour input to clear the fields. During our first days here our 
standard of living went down because we had no experience with the area. 
The knowledge we had about cropping and livestock management in 
Shurugwi was not directly applicable here. We had to learn the new 
environment. Life started getting better around 1960. Then around 1962 
the white men came and said we should destump our field and dig contour 
ridges. We did not like it because it was hard labour. Those who failed to 
construct the contours ridges were arrested and made to pay fines, but I 
cannot remember how much they were made to pay. Our villages were also 
reorganised during that time into linear settlements. When we look back we 
appreciate having constructed the contours because they curbed soil 
erosion.  
 
When we first settled here, cattle from my area could graze in the 
neighbouring villages and theirs would come to my area too. We were not 
allowed by the DC to graze cattle along the Mawunga stream, they would 
go there for watering only. Nowadays we have demarcated village   143
boundaries but cattle can still cross over to other villages because they do 
not know about boundaries. Even firewood we collect anywhere and 
neighbouring villages come here because the hilly areas still have a 
diversity of tree species and wood products are abundant.      
Source: Interview with sabuku Sihambe (age - in his late 80s), July 1998 
and November 2000. 
 
5.3.3 The Dobhani Narrative 
We came here in 1952 from Shurugwi area. Our homes were originally 
located between Gweru and Shurugwi near the Bulawayo railroad on the 
Matebeleland side. We originally belonged to the Ndebele tribe. We were 
settled on Washingbrook farm in Shurugwi and at first there was an 
agreement with the farm owner that people would work on his farm for 
three months a year to raise money needed to pay taxes. But when the 
farmer started growing tobacco, he needed more labour and wanted us to 
work more than the three months and we were not willing to do so. Thus 
we were asked to look for alternative land to settle. Our fathers worked 
together at the farm with Mbeleki Mhlanga. Although Mbeleki was a 
foreman, he was just a worker like anyone else. My father was the elder 
brother of the sitting sabuku Sihambe. Later Mbeleki married the sister of 
sabuku Sihambe.  
 
After the owner of Washingbrook farm asked us to leave, we came here. 
Chief Madzivire gave us this area (referring to the area that forms Dobhani 
and Sihambe villages) after we came through the District Commissioner 
(DC- mudzviti). At first we were settled to the north of Mawunga stream 
and the DC appointed my father to be the sabuku. When my father moved 
to the southern side of Mawunga stream, Sihambe became the sabuku for 
the households located on the northern side of Mawunga stream. I was 
appointed by my father to inherit his position in the late 1960s when he 
said he was too old to rule. Beginning in 1961 we were forced to dig 
contours by the agricultural extension workers. Since we came here, there 
have been some changes in terms of resource availability. Significant 
changes have been influenced by population growth. We were few when 
we arrived but now there is a shortage of arable and grazing land. Now we 
have a shortage of grazing land because people are settling randomly in our 
original grazing areas. It has become difficult to control them because they 
say we are now independent – thus implying they are free to do what they 
want. There is cross-village use of woodland and water resources. It has 
always been the case since we settled here, but then it was not a problem. 
When we moved into this area, the Chief told us about the traditional rules 
that applied to natural resources, such as respecting sacred areas and 
rainmaking ceremonies and we followed them. Sacred areas were spared 
even when the whites pegged our homes and fields during the early 1960s. 
People under Tamwa were ‘deported’ from Rhodesdale in the Midlands 
province after the area was taken over by the government for distribution to 
soldiers who had fought during the Second World War on the side of   144
                                                          
Britain. ‘VanaTamwa vakatamiswa zvakaipa mhani – mombe dzakazosara 
dzotevera neRMS’ (People under Tamwa were relocated in a huff – their 
cattle had to follow after they had already been dumped in this area).   
Source: Interview with sabuku Dobhani (in his mid 70s), July 1998 and 
informal discussion with same informant in November 2000. 
 
5.3.4 The Tamwa Narrative 
Originally, we lived in Rhodesdale, which falls under Kwekwe district in 
the Midlands area. Then we heard that our area was now a farm. Some of 
our relatives were relocated to Gokwe, but myself and Vudzi were moved 
to this area (Romwe). We could not do anything because we were told it 
was an order from the government. Takazokandwa kuno nemota 
dzeHurumende kwataigara kwatorwa kuita mapurazi emasoja aHitler (We 
were driven in government trucks and dumped into this area when our land 
was turned into commercial farms for the soldiers that had fought during 
the war with Hitler). Our livestock came after we had already been moved 
into this area. My father had 45 head of cattle, and some of them got lost 
during the relocation process. We had good land for agricultural production 
in Kwekwe, the soils were fertile and rainfall was very reliable. Fortunately 
when we got here, people who were already settled here like Chikanda 
received us well and also told us about zviyera zvaivako (the sacred areas 
that were found in the area). We respected zviyera zvavo sevaenzi vawuya 
munzvimbo yevaridzi (their sacred areas since we were the newcomers in 
the area, we had to follow their beliefs) and that people should not work in 
the fields on Wednesday (chisi.
46)  Chisi is a day that is traditionally 
revered and viewed as a day for resting and therefore people are not 
supposed to work in the fields. We also found Sihambe and Dobhani 
people here but we all became one since we had all been resettled in the 
area. They (Sihambe and Dobhani) told us that they had also been moved 
from an area that was turned into a farm like us but they say they were not 
forced to come here. It is difficult to say whether their story is true or not 
asi isu takadzingwa (but as for us we were forcibly relocated). Now we 
have lived here for many years and we are used to the area.   
Source: Sabuku Tamwa in his mid 70s interview, July 1998 and informal 
discussion in November 2000.  
 
5.3.5 Observations from the narratives 
All the four narratives concur on a number of issues such as having found 
already established leadership structures in the area, i.e. the headman 
Chikanda and the Chiefs Nemauzhe and Madzivire. While they had their 
own sabukus and villages created through the District Commissioner, at the 
time they respected the existing leadership structures. The narratives also 
concur on the fact that they were informed about existing institutional 
 
46 Sithole (1999) finds that in Eastern Zimbabwe historically, this day was dedicated to the King or 
Chief and people would contribute labour on fields where grain for communal granaries was 
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arrangements such as sacred areas in Romwe, but the Ndebele seem to 
have failed to appreciate these, given that they came from a cultural context 
that recognised mainly one area, the Matopos, as sacred. It is only the 
Mhlanga narrative that highlights how the new sabukus got their positions 
when they moved into the area. As will be seen later in the chapter, one of 
the Mhlanga brothers has appointed himself heir to the Sihambe sabuku 
position because the current sabuku is too old to be actively involved in 
village activities. The narrator may have told his story in a way that 
justifies his action of taking over the sabuku position. In other community 
projects, members of the Mhlanga family have also been found to be 
dominating in decision-making and leadership positions as illustrated 
above through the case of the former councillor and his wives and sister 
holding multiple leadership positions. Sithole (2002) also describes the 
dominance of members of the Mhlanga kinship group in the village micro-
credit scheme. In the micro-credit scheme, members of this family hold key 
positions in the committee, have taken bigger amounts of loans and the 
majority of them have defaulted on repayments (ibid). These narratives are 
important for understanding social interaction and current patterns of 
institutional interaction in the community, and struggles over property 
rights relating to woodlands and water. The creation of narratives is part of 
the process of negotiating and renegotiating arrangements for resource use, 
property rights and they play an important role in the social, institutional 
and cultural transformation process. It is worth noting that all narratives 
appear to deliberately use the term “we” as a way of portraying that it is 
not just the individual narrator’s perceptions that are described, but an 
experience shared by the group (see Carr, 1986). It is therefore important to 
take note of the narrator’s oscillation between the ‘I’ and the ‘we’ in 
narrating the story. The following section discusses conflicts that were 
identified in Romwe. 
 
5.4 Conflicts over woodlands and water access and control  
Corell (1996:21) defines conflict as a social situation in which a minimum 
of two parties strive at the same moment to acquire the same set of scarce 
resources. While this definition is of some relevance to this study, it 
emphasises situations of resource scarcity as fuelling conflicts, yet there 
could be other situations where conflicts are not related to scarcity, for 
example conflicts over leadership positions. Leach et al., (1999) note that 
resource availability and access are often interconnected and conflicts over 
access often intensify when the resources in question become scarce in 
absolute terms. This definition also highlights the issue of scarcity; 
although unlike Corell (1996) Leach et al., (1999) make reference to 
‘absolute scarcity’ as a key factor in the emergence of conflicts. This line 
of argument is common in the CBNRM literature. While this study shows 
that conflicts often emerge as a result of resource scarcity, it is also shown 
that resource scarcity is not always the only source as there are other 
patterns of social interaction that may lead to conflict situations. Historical 
claims to resource access and control are also a source of conflicts in   146
Romwe. Common themes that run across most definitions of conflict in the 
literature on CBNRM and were relevant for this study contain the 
following elements:  
 
x Perceived divergence of interests between different beliefs and 
values. 
x Different interests, goals and ambitions between and among 
various actors. 
x Incentives that force the actors involved to both compete and 
cooperate. 
x Negotiation and tradeoffs between goals, interests and aspirations 
of the various actors. 
x Strategic behaviour that is often expressed as power practices. 
 
In any form of social interaction, conflicts are constantly present but to 
differing degrees. In the context of CBNRM, community participation is 
often seen as a means to decrease the risk of resource use conflicts or a way 
of enabling constructive management of existing conflicts. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, conflicts over resource access and control are expressed in 
various forms and these vary in space, time and level. The intensity of 
conflicts depends on the nature of the resource in question, the relationship 
of the parties involved and the history of natural resource access. The 
emerging conflicts in CBNRM are about what Moore (1993) and Sithole 
(2001) call ‘micro-politics’ of resource access and management. In 
addition, they claim that conflicts relate to various actors strategising to 
gain control over key natural resources such as woodlands and water and 
conflicts can therefore not be restricted to issues surrounding resource 
scarcity as often emphasised in the CBNRM literature. Conflicts over 
access to and control over woodlands and water resources are also about 
survival, leadership, institutions and the politics of livelihood today and for 
the future of households. Conflicts emanating from encroachment into 
woodlands and consequently grazing areas heighten people’s insecurity 
over access to natural resources and therefore raise concerns about the 
sustainability of the natural resource base. Some contestations have 
historical underpinnings and are influenced by factors such as length of 
residence in a given community or area and these are taken up in this 
chapter. The discussion on resource conflicts begins with the presentation 
and analysis of the foundations of resource and leadership claims that have 
a bearing on who can have access to and control over what resource. An 
overview of conflicts identified in the study site is then presented followed 
by a discussion of each of the areas of conflict and analyses of conflict 
mediation strategies.  
 
A variety of conflicts relating to resource use, access and control were 
identified during this study. These conflicts occur both at household and 
community level, with some occurring between and across villages. An 
overview of conflicts identified during the study is presented in Table 5.2. 
Areas of conflict identified include, organisational conflicts, land conflicts   147
related to encroachment into grazing areas and other common pool 
woodland areas, commercialisation of woodlands products, boundary 
disputes, villagers’ and leaders’ conflicts, squabbles over water, spiritual 
issues and those between ‘outsiders’ (e.g. external project facilitators) and 
‘insiders’ (community members).  
 
Table 5.2. Overview of conflicts over woodlands and water  
 
Nature of 
conflict 
Causes   Major characteristics  Most affected 
Organisational 
conflict 
- Overlapping legal 
instruments (e.g. RDCs 
Act and Traditional 
Leaders’ Act) 
- Sectorial legislation 
(e.g. Natural Resources 
Act, Forest Produce Act, 
Parks and Wildlife Act) 
- Poor relations between VIDCOs 
and sabukus. 
- Lack of clear institutional 
jurisdictions 
- Poor rule enforcement 
- Inconsistent judgement of rule 
breakers 
- Local leaders lack of motivation  
-Traditional 
leaders 
- VIDCOs  
 
 
 
 
Land and grazing 
area conflicts 
- Population pressure 
-Low agricultural 
productivity 
- Colonial land policies 
- Poor implementation 
of resettlement 
programmes 
- Unemployment 
- Expropriation of individual 
arable land for community 
projects without ‘fair’ 
compensation 
- Self allocation of land i.e. 
encroachment into common pool 
resource areas e.g. grazing areas 
- Squabbles over land inheritance. 
- Landless, 
e.g. young 
men 
- Landowners 
for land taken 
for projects  
- Livestock 
owners 
Sale of woodland 
products 
- Unemployment 
- Limited livelihood 
options 
 
- Sale of firewood 
- Use of common pool areas that 
are normally not used to collect 
e.g. firewood for sale 
- Young men  
- Women 
Boundary 
disputes 
- Fuzziness of 
boundaries 
- Land shortage 
 
 
- Residence in one village with 
fields in a different village 
- Encroachment of settlement in 
other villages 
- Lack of specific village 
boundaries 
- Men 
- Traditional 
leaders 
 
Villagers versus 
Leaders 
- ‘Unfair’ adjudication  
- Perceived favouritism 
- Interaction with 
‘outsiders’ 
- Inefficiency of 
leadership  
- Questioning legitimacy of a 
leader 
- Witchcraft accusations 
- Villagers seeking external 
intervention or mediation 
- Leasing of garden plots 
- Vandalism or theft of 
equipment. 
- Traditional 
leaders 
- VIDCOs 
-Project 
committees 
 
Water related 
conflicts  
- Unreliable water 
supply at Barura dam 
- Competing water uses  
- Closing off water supply 
- Witchcraft accusations 
 
- Women  
- Livestock 
owners  
Conflict over 
spiritual matters 
- Different traditional 
belief and value systems  
- Christianity  
- Encroachment into sacred areas  
- Witchcraft accusations 
- Breaching of e.g. chisi. 
All 
community 
members 
Between 
‘outsiders’ and 
‘insiders’ 
- Perceived favouritism 
of certain actors  
- Job allocation 
- Vandalism or theft of equipment 
- Feet dragging 
- False compliance 
- Researchers 
-Village 
leadership 
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5.4.1 Organisational conflicts     
Main organisational conflicts emanate from overlapping legal instruments 
and sectorial application of resource use rules and regulations. Conflicts 
that emerge also relate to the interpretation of the law, how it should be 
applied, enforcement mechanisms and its relevance in a context in which 
resource scarcity is increasing. Legally the RDCs have the authority over 
natural resources in the district based on the RDCs Act of 1988. VIDCOs 
and WADCOs are the extension of the RDC’s legal authority at the local 
community level. Although the traditional system was weakened during the 
war of liberation and subsequently in the early 1980s, post independence 
period, it has endured through all these trials and tribulations. As part of 
their roles to manage social relations in the community, traditional 
authorities were historically mandated to look after the land and instil 
stewardship over natural resources. For this task, they were believed to 
receive assistance from the spirits of the land (vadzimu) who would mete 
out justice when the majority of the people desecrated the land 
(Matowanyika, 1991). Whereas the official authority for land allocation 
and natural resource governance lay in the RDC up until 1998, when the 
TLA was enacted, the traditional authorities were the de facto land 
allocators and resource managers on the ground. 
 
The Land Tenure Commission (LTC) of 1994 marked the build up to the 
enactment of the Traditional Leaders Act (TLA, 1998. The LTC 
recommended that ‘traditional’ villages under village heads were the 
legitimate and appropriate units for local natural resource management in 
communal areas. In line with the recommendations of the LTC, the 
Traditional Leaders Act (1998) recognises the ‘traditional’ village as the 
lowest unit of social organisation, in contrast to the VIDCOs. The TLA 
provides for the granting of registration titles to village assemblies that are 
based on adult village suffrage and presided over by a village head 
appointed by the chief. A registered village is to consist of a clearly 
mapped spatial unit with well-defined boundaries. The policy espousing 
clearly defined villages is aimed at ensuring that costs and benefits directly 
accrue to clearly defined members who can then be tasked with the 
management of natural resources in their locality. The practicability of 
implementing the LTC recommendations in line with the TLA (1998) may 
face challenges, as the place and role of the VIDCOs and WADCOs are not 
clearly defined in relation to the traditional authorities that are being 
accorded legal recognition.  
 
The lack of clear jurisdictions for VIDCOs and sabukus has to a large 
extent created a resource management vacuum at community level which 
villagers tend to take advantage of by oscillating between these 
organisations in times of crisis – depending on which one is seen as the 
more favourable to their individual needs and actions. These recent legal 
reforms may further conflate the VIDCO-WADCO in relation to the 
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and headmen are charged with the enforcement of all environmental 
planning and conservation by-laws on behalf of the chief, the RDC and the 
state. Traditional authorities are therefore empowered to enforce rules that 
exact fines that end up with the RDC. This provides a typical case of 
higher level authorities decentralising the costs of natural resource 
management but retaining control of benefits. As shown in Chapter Four, 
current enforcement of by-laws at community level is weak partly because 
communities feel the fines should be paid to the traditional authorities for 
their direct benefit. In addition, the VIDCOs and WADCOs were and are 
still undertaking some of the roles that have been legally allocated to the 
traditional authorities, and it is not clear how these two structures would 
co-exist within the new organisational framework.  
 
Different judgements passed by the formal and informal resource 
management structures for the same case as well were said to result in 
conflict between resource management organisations. This can be seen in 
Case 5.1. In this case, the traditional authority system judged in favour of 
the defendants while the formal/modern system (i.e. the RDC) favoured the 
accused. Such conflicting adjudication also creates loopholes in the natural 
resource management systems in place.  
 
5.4.2 Conflicts over access to land and grazing areas     
Grazing lands are held in common by all villagers and in some cases they 
are shared with neighbouring villages. Theoretically, the user community 
utilises the grazing lands according to agreed rules. The rules define 
membership, i.e. who can and who cannot graze in the pastures; the times 
and seasons members can use the grazing lands; and specify the nature of 
penalty or fine that various infringements incur. Poor enforcement of rules 
regulating access to grazing areas has occurred due to increased land 
shortage that has led to intensified competition and conflicts over access to 
these resources. Conflicts over access to land (where woodlands are found) 
and grazing areas reflect a constant struggle over control of resource use 
spaces. Resource use landscapes and spaces are arenas where competing 
private and collective interests are expressed and played out, reflecting the 
hierarchy between different actors on the ‘front-stage’ as well as the ‘back-
stage’. The concept of ‘front-stage’ and ‘back-stage’ is borrowed from 
Goffman, cited in Villarreal (1992). ‘Front-stage’ represents the public 
process and patterns of interaction whereas the ‘back-stage’ represents the 
more private or subtle processes that may not be seen at face value and also 
may not just be taken for granted. Common pool resource landscapes 
provide ground for mobilisation and self-empowerment while remaining 
open to struggles for resource access and control. This may unite or 
fragment, create, reconfigure and transform social interactions of the 
various actors. This process shows the physical as well as symbolic shifting 
of boundaries that shrink or expand depending on the issue at stake. For 
instance, at one time the catchment villages include only three villages, 
Sihambe, Dobhani and Tamwa, yet in other contexts, the catchment   150
villages include all ten villages that use resources in the biophysical 
catchment area. A variety of factors contribute towards the emergence of 
conflicts over land and grazing areas and land inheritance emerged as one 
of these factors. Land inheritance conflicts and those related to 
encroachment into grazing and other common pool woodland resource 
areas are on the increase. The land shortage in the area has also fuelled 
conflicts through the expropriation of individual (private) arable plots for 
community projects such as gardens without ‘fair’ compensation.      
 
Conflicts over land inheritance 
Under customary law, which is operational in the majority of the 
communal lands in Zimbabwe, men inherit land along the patriarchal 
lineage. Although legally all lands under communal lands belong to the 
state (under the Communal Lands Act of 1982), on the ground individual 
landholdings are often registered under the head of the household, often 
male. Conflicts over land inheritance may arise in cases where a couple 
gets married and decides to settle in the woman’s home area as can be seen 
in Case 5.1.    
 
Case 5.1: Inter-household conflict over arable land: The case 
of Mafeha  
 
Mafeha met his wife in the Chiredzi sugar estates during the 
1970s and after getting married they moved to Romwe in the 
1980s, his wife’s home area. Mafeha was born in Nkayi 
district in Matebeleland North. In Romwe they settled in 
Tamwa village and they were given a field that belonged to 
his wife’s clan. Mafeha being the household head, their 
landholding was registered in his name. They later divorced 
and his wife moved to her sister’s homestead, still in the 
Romwe area. Mafeha continued to reside in their homestead, 
ploughing the field and producing vegetables from his garden 
that has a very productive perennial well. In 1999 his ex-wife 
fell ill and she died in 2000. After her death, her relatives 
demanded that Mafeha give back ‘their’ field. The ex-wife’s 
family reported the case to the sabuku who supported their 
claim. Realising that he was going to lose the field, Mafeha 
leased it to an ‘outsider’ - one of the researchers - hoping that 
his ex-wife’s relatives would be embarrassed to demand the 
return of the field from an ‘outsider’. Mafeha also leased part 
of his garden to a member of one of the powerful families in 
the village. The ‘outsider’ was later told by the sabuku that the 
following cropping season he should not use the field. The 
following year when his ex-wife’s relatives backed by the 
sabuku’s ruling insisted he should give back the field, Mafeha 
went and reported his case at the district administrator and 
RDC offices. Subsequently the council officials told his ex-  151
wife’s relatives that they did not have the right to take the 
field away from him because ‘murume ndiye samusha - the 
man is the owner of the homestead’. With the backing of the 
RDC officials, Mafeha won ‘his’ field. 
 
The Mafeha case raises a number of institutional questions relating to 
conflict resolution and issues of access to land in the study area. The 
multiplicity of institutions related to natural resource access and 
management provides local people with room to choose to recognise a 
particular authority when it suits them most. For instance, when the sabuku 
made a judgement that Mafeha felt was not ‘fair’, he instead sought 
external adjudication from the RDC and thus took advantage of the poor 
relations between the traditional and the RDC (modern) authority systems. 
Villagers juggle across the various authority structures depending on the 
circumstances. The Mafeha case also illustrates the complexity of land 
inheritance. Conflicts over inheritance issues may heighten in contexts of 
resource scarcity. Given that land is traditionally inherited through the 
male lineage and that women have relatively weaker rights to land, this 
could partly explain why Mafeha was able to retain the fields. The 
advantage of having land owned and inherited through the male lineage 
system is that it reduces the loss of land to people considered as aliens, 
such as sons-in-law.     
 
Conflicts over privatisation of common pool woodland and grazing 
areas 
Population pressure in Romwe has also seen individuals privatising 
common pool resources such as grazing and woodland areas. Case 5.2 
illustrates this. There are many other similar cases where young men 
enclose areas for either settlement or crop production due to land shortage.  
 
Case 5.2: Privatising common pool resources: Farai’ s case 
 
My father settled in this area in 1963 when land was abundant. 
When I got married, my father gave me part of his crop fields. 
This is what happens here for most families because there is 
limited scope for opening up new land. Currently there are 
few households that own more than 3 acres of land because of 
population growth and land redistribution. Because of this, 
there is increasing temptation especially for the youth to 
encroach into areas originally reserved for purposes other than 
crop production. While one may want to uphold traditional 
values, one finds oneself caught up between economic 
demands and the need for social conformity. As hopes of a 
better life continue to dwindle, the tendency is that economic 
demands are given more weight. Encroachment into common 
pool resource areas is bound to increase if no alternative 
solutions to the land shortage are found.    152
 
In 1993, I felt I could not live on such poor soil and decided to 
go and work on the farms in South Africa. Because I did not 
have a work permit I was deported in 1995. When I came 
back I asked the sabuku to allocate me a better piece of land 
but he could not get good land for me. Thus I decided to fence 
off a small piece of land in the grazing area for my garden. I 
dug a well in the garden to ensure I had a reliable source of 
water throughout the year in order to produce vegetables. 
Other villagers complained that I had fenced off a route that 
was used by many people to meet my own needs. A village 
tribunal was called which the sabuku and the VIDCO 
chairman attended and they resolved that I should keep the 
garden because I was doing it for the survival of my family. 
When we were young, life was easy because there were fewer 
people, soils were much more fertile and there was no 
pressure to seek alternative sources of livelihood.       
Source: Adapted from Nemarundwe et al., 1998. 
 
Both the traditional and modern authorities find themselves having to 
deal with cases of encroachment in an environment of growing resource 
scarcity. Being forced to balance people’s need for survival and good 
environmental management, community leaders are forced to prioritise the 
survival of people over environmental management goals. Local resource 
management authorities are increasingly being criticised for nepotism and 
corruption through letting people settle randomly or annex common pool 
resource areas as seen in the above case as well as in Case 5.3 below. 
 
Case 5.3: Mbuya Simba’s field expansion 
 
Mbuya Simba is the wife of one of the sabuku’s brothers. 
Because she is in a polygamous union and the eldest wife, her 
husband allocated her separate fields that she calls her ‘own’ 
fields. The younger wife uses their husband’s field. Mbuya 
Simba subdivided one of her fields between her two sons 
when they got married. As a result her land holding became 
smaller. In October 2001, she decided to expand her field up 
the hill located near her field and in doing so, encroached into 
the grazing area. Both the sabukus and Agritex do not allow 
farming on steep slopes due to soil erosion problems. Asked 
how she got land, her response was, ‘… land is not a problem 
here. You just talk to the sabuku. I told him my land was not 
enough for me and he asked me if I had any suggestions as to 
what could be done. I told him that I wanted to expand my 
fields towards the hill and he said I should go ahead. If asked 
by other community members, he would pretend that he is not 
aware of it’. During the interview, when asked how she 
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can be “talked” to; you should not suffer in silence. Even 
yourself (referring to the researcher), if you want a field, you 
should go and talk to the sabuku’. A month after she had 
extended her field, no one had questioned or challenged her 
actions.   
Source: Interview with Mbuya Simba, September 2001. 
 
Such cases appear to challenge both the traditional and modern 
authorities and sometimes weaken their position in terms of adjudicating 
village cases related to natural resource use.  They are therefore viewed as 
having nepotistic tendencies. The sabukus are also accused of accepting 
gifts from people who later ask for favours from them (the sabukus).  
 
Conflicts over land for community projects  
Conflicts have also been reported relating to conversion of private 
landholdings for community projects such as the Chidiso and the Barura 
gardens. In both cases, the original landowners protested against their land 
being taken for the garden projects arguing they would not be fairly 
compensated. By ‘fair’ compensation, reference was made to the quality of 
the land in terms of agricultural productivity as well as the size of the land. 
The two cases were resolved differently. In the case of Chidiso the land 
taken up by the garden was a field belonging to a widow. At first she 
resisted and claims are that one of the garden committee members 
threatened her for thwarting development efforts in the community for her 
individual benefit suggesting that if she continued to refuse she ‘would see’ 
(see Table 5.5). In the study site, such threats are greatly feared, as it is 
believed the person will harm their opponent with mystical powers 
associated with witchcraft. After experiencing some mysterious ‘pulling of 
her eyeball’ the widow gave up her fields, as she feared losing her 
eyesight. She was later given another piece of land, which was located 
relatively far from her homestead as compared to her former field.  
 
The conflict resolution in Barura garden was different. In Barura, the 
man who owned the field where the garden is located also resisted even 
after several meetings. The NGO officers and sabuku could not convince 
him to give it up. Then the NGO approached the district administrator 
(DA) to intervene. The DA and the RDC chief executive officer (CEO) 
came to the village. A meeting was called and the case was concluded with 
the decision that he should give up the field. The district officers used the 
existing legal instruments, which designate the RDC as the legally 
recognised land authority in the district to support their adjudication giving 
the field owner no choice but to move to another location. He was 
promised a plot in the garden as part of the compensation package. This 
case highlights the fluid nature of decision-making processes involving 
both internal and external actors depending on the issue at stake. In cases 
of stalemate in the community, external intervention is often sought. In this   154
case final decisions were made referring to existing legal instruments that 
give the RDC authority to allocate land in communal areas. 
 
5.4.3 Commercialisation of woodland products 
A contentious issue in the community is the commercialisation of 
woodlands products, especially by young men. This has increased in recent 
years due to the prevailing economic conditions e.g. loss of formal 
employment and remittances resulting in limited livelihood options in rural 
areas. Several cases were reported of people involved in the woodland 
products commercialisation such as the case of Peter, which illustrates 
firewood sale. Peter is a former employee in the CEH and IES research 
projects. He was employed as a groundwater monitor but when the 
research emphasis shifted to socio-economics, he was laid off. In early 
October 2001, Peter sought permission from the sabuku to sell firewood. 
After considering Peter’s case, the sabuku granted him permission to do so. 
Peter began selling firewood to Museva business centre, Ngundu growth 
point, researchers based in the village and to other villagers in the Romwe 
area at an average price of Z$300 per scotchcart load. The price is 
negotiable and depends on the relationship between the two parties 
involved. Often for outsiders such as researchers, the price is much higher 
than for other community members. In mid November 2001, two members 
of the village approached the sabuku and complained about Peter’s 
enterprise. These two asked the sabuku to ban Peter from selling firewood. 
The sabuku responded by banning Peter from selling firewood. At the end 
of November, Peter went to Museva business centre and bought the sabuku 
some sugar and tealeaves. After the sabuku accepted the gifts, Peter 
renegotiated permission to sell firewood. The sabuku granted permission 
on condition that he would only sell the firewood locally. In December, the 
two members who had earlier complained to the sabuku threatened to 
denounce him publicly if he did not stop Peter from selling firewood. The 
sabuku then asked Peter to stop the sale of firewood completely. In January 
2002, after the sabuku had banned him from selling firewood, Peter 
indicated when interviewed that he had decided to stop temporarily and 
would start again once ‘the dust has settled down’. 
 
With commercialisation of woodland products, local leaders are finding 
it difficult to ban people from engaging in ‘survival strategies’ that involve 
commercialisation of woodland products. Braedt and Standa-Gunda (2000) 
report similar findings referring to production and sale of woodcarvings 
along the Masvingo-Beitbridge road in Chivi district. Village leaders find 
themselves accepting gifts such as sugar and tea from individuals in the 
community for getting permission to, for instance, generate income 
through the sale of woodlands products. Traditional leaders are prone to 
accepting such gifts partly because they also want to ‘survive’. During the 
wealth ranking exercise (see Annex 2), some of the traditional leaders were 
classified in the poor category. Accepting bribes could hence be seen as a 
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raised complaints relating to the sale of woodland products outside the 
village, a resolution was made that they be sold locally only. The reason 
was that the activity should not be completely banned, as it is one of the 
important livelihood sources in the village. Despite this resolution, two 
months later, some young men had resumed the sale of firewood as 
illustrated by the case of Zimuto.  
 
Zimuto is unemployed and the son of one of the sabuku’s brothers. He 
embarked on selling firewood from Romwe to a businessman at Ngundu 
growth point who owns a butchery. The businessman comes once or twice 
a month to collect firewood from Zimuto using his five tonne truck. One 
man complained to the sabuku and his response was, “you can also do it as 
long as other people do not see it. What do you think I can do when he is 
doing it for survival? If he was spending the money on beer, I would ban 
him, but he is buying food for his family”. Asked about their views on this 
case, some villagers indicated that this sabuku is known for being very 
strict but appeared to be lenient with Zimuto probably because he is a 
relative of his. If it had been an ‘ordinary’ person in the village who had 
broken the rule, he or she would have been made to pay a fine. A young 
man whose parents settled in the area during the 1970s asked the 
researcher, ‘Have you not heard that blood is thicker than water? It is us 
aliens (Vawuyi) who suffer while those of the ruling family (Vowushe) are 
at liberty to collect anything they want from the forest’. 
 
5.4.4 Boundary disputes  
As discussed in Chapter Four, village and resource use boundaries are very 
porous and often shift depending on the issue or product at stake. Because 
village boundaries are socially constructed by the various actors, they are 
fluid and conflicts over boundary definitions are frequent. While people 
have only a general idea as to the location of village boundaries, cases of 
disputed exact locations of boundaries were common. Instances of 
households who have fields or wells in neighbouring villages were noted, 
demonstrating as well resource sharing across villages. Examples of 
contestations over boundaries are presented in Table 5.3. 
 
Contestations over boundaries involve both leaders and villagers 
claiming and reclaiming resource use areas especially common pool 
woodland areas. Village boundaries are shifting and contested, thus 
villagers often do not want to discuss village boundaries in public fora as 
this may raise tempers. The contestation of village boundaries is not a new 
phenomenon. Bourdillon (1987) documents that historically, natural 
features such as hills and rivers well known to the inhabitants usually 
defined boundaries of chiefdoms, but precise agreement over these 
boundaries was not always shared with inhabitants of neighbouring 
chiefdoms. Despite the diverging views on the village boundaries, there 
appear to be ‘give and take’ arrangements regarding resource sharing 
across the villages.    156
 Table  5.3.  Village boundary contestations  
 
Case Explanation/Description 
Dobhani 
village versus 
Pedzisayi 
village 
The boundary between these two villages, Mapande mountain, is 
contested. Informants from Dobhani claim that the whole of Mapande 
mountain, which is located between the two villages, lies in their village. 
Those from Pedzisayi village argue that the crest of the mountain is the 
‘legitimate’ boundary. As shown in Chapter Four, Mapande mountain is 
an important source of a diversity of woodland products. 
Tamwa 
village versus 
Magomo 
village 
Sabuku Magomo has used in-migrants as a tool for annexing part of 
Tamwa’s area. Magomo did this by tacitly approving illegal settlements, 
thus in turn securing the allegiance of the settlers.  
Ndabaningi 
village versus 
all other 
social and 
biophysical 
catchment 
villages 
The low status of sabuku Ndabaningi
47 makes his village more 
vulnerable to expropriation by neighbouring villages that are headed by 
leaders who consider themselves ‘original’ settlers. For instance, a 
farmer in Tamwa village fenced off some land in the adjacent 
Ndabaningi village, thus effectively privatising it. Headman Chikanda 
has also approved and supported the settlement of one of his relatives in 
Ndabaningi area and the new settler in turn encouraged the subsequent 
settlement in Ndabaningi village by his own relative. They both owe 
allegiance to headman Chikanda and not sabuku Ndabaningi.    
 
5.4.5 Conflicts between villagers and leaders   
The leadership and villagers conflicts in Romwe were found in NGO 
facilitated projects, if constitutions were not abided by and also in relation 
to inheritance of traditional leadership positions. Responses to such 
conflicts reflect what Scott (1985) calls the weapons of the weak or 
everyday forms of peasant resistance. These include passive compliance, 
strategic lesser involvement in a particular project, witchcraft accusations 
and theft of project equipment. Other conflicts between leaders and 
villagers relate to the legitimacy of certain traditional leaders in the 
community based on historical claims to a particular position. 
 
Conflicts between project leadership and members 
In the analysis of conflicts between leaders and villagers, patterns of 
interaction at Chidiso garden project are used to illustrate such conflicts as 
well as contestations of traditional leadership positions based on historical 
reasons. The conflicts at Chidiso emanate predominantly from 
dissatisfaction with the project leadership that was elected into power after 
the construction of the Chidiso collector well in 1991. The project was 
named Chidisochamwari, which means ‘God’s will’ and the reason given 
by community members for such a name is that the project was offered to 
them when no one, not even the sabukus or the councillor had made any 
application to get such a project. From the researcher’s analysis emphasis 
on the name and its history, which is always repeated at the garden and 
                                                           
47    Ndabaningi is not very highly respected because when the sitting sabuku died, he and another 
relative fought over who should take over the position until Chief Nemauzhe intervened and 
because they could not reach an agreement, the village was divided into two and Ndabaningi 
became sabuku for one of the two new villages.     157
other related community project meetings, is to ensure that powerful actors 
in the community do not monopolise the project or claim more credit for its 
initiation. The project has gone through different processes of 
development. In the early 1990s, the project was highly productive (Lovell, 
et al., 1999). The late 1990s saw production in the garden going down due 
to an array of factors. These factors are discussed below. Table 5.4 traces 
key events, as defined by community members, in the history of the project 
since its inception, some of which triggered or were a response to 
dissatisfaction with project leadership. 
 
Conflicts between Chidiso leaders and project members have increased 
over the years and the committee is accused of not abiding by the project 
constitution. Meetings called by project members to discuss problems are 
ignored by the committee, while meetings called by the committee have an 
agenda set by the committee and in most cases the meetings start 2-3 hours 
later than the scheduled time. Because of fear of being seen as challenging 
the committee given previous illnesses faced by those who openly 
challenged the committee, members sit and wait until the meetings start. 
Often members just endorse the decision of the committee because of the 
fear noted above. The committee is said to be generally inactive. For 
instance one of the hand pumps at the collector well went without grease 
for three years despite minor costs of such accessories (about US$0.50 per 
month). The second hand pump at the collector well broke down in 1997 
and had not been repaired by June 2002, yet only a bolt costing less than 
US$5 was required. One community member commented that, ‘what is 
needed to fix the pump is just a simple bolt, even if we contribute a cent 
per person, the money would be more than enough to buy the bolt’. 
Ironically, members pay an annual levy of approximately US$1 per 
member, and this money is meant for maintenance costs but it is never 
accounted for. Members still pay the annual levy to retain their claim to the 
plot – otherwise they would forfeit it. In response to the behaviour of the 
committee and fear challenging the committee openly partly due to 
witchcraft beliefs, a number of non-confrontational strategies have been 
adopted by project members and these include, leasing of plots to non-
members referred to as ‘lodgers’ (tenants), pilfering, and false compliance.   158
 Table  5.4.  Key events in the history of Chidiso garden project 
 
Date   Key event(s)  Conflict situations  Impact/Comments 
1990/ 
1991 
- CEH constructs 
Chidiso collector well 
- Garden begins with 
a total of 50 members 
from the 3 
biophysical 
catchment villages  
- Z$50 Joining fee 
- Committee elected 
- Disagreement over the location 
of the garden as the identified site 
is one widow’s field. The widow 
first refuses to give up her field. 
One of the powerful members of 
the committee threatens that she 
should give up the field, 
otherwise ‘she will see’ and 
fearing for her life she gave up the 
field.  
Some members 
disgruntled that they 
could not join the 
project, as they did not 
have the joining fee 
required at the time  
1991  August 1991, official 
opening of the garden 
by the British High 
Commissioner 
- Petty disagreements e.g. over 
what crops should be grown and 
watering times resolved by the 
Agritex officer  
- Project running smoothly 
- Timely payment of the 
Z$5 per member annual 
levies  
- Transparent accounts 
- Income generation 
1994  Resignation of one 
committee member 
Two committee members clash 
over the way the project is being 
run. One of them falls ill,  resigns.  
Witchcraft accusations 
against some leaders. 
1995   Resignation of 
project secretary 
- Clash between vice chairperson 
and secretary over record keeping.  
- Secretary falls ill & resigns. 
- Sister-in-law to the vice 
chairperson is appointed new 
secretary 
Illness of the secretary 
instils fear in project 
members. 
1997/ 
1998 
- One of the collector 
well hand pumps 
breaks down 
- Garden tank cracks 
-Agritex withdraws 
due to budgetary 
constraints 
- Problems with marketing of 
produce and leadership blamed 
for forcing every member to grow 
the same crops 
- Watering taking time since tank 
is not in use – people have to walk 
500 m to the well  
- Increased workload 
- Lack of advice on 
cropping, marketing and 
pest control after 
withdrawal of Agritex  
1999   - Establishment of 
Barura Dam 
- IES fulltime in 
Romwe 
- Disgruntled 
members join Barura 
garden  
- Passive resistance as more than 
half of the members move to 
Barura garden leasing their plots  
- Project members suggest that 
committee be changed but 
committee refuses 
- No transparency in use of annual 
levies 
Production levels reach 
the lowest in the history 
of the project  
2000 Training  for 
transformation and 
leadership courses 
run by IES 
- Reduction in conflicts after 
training for transformation  
- More cries from members for the 
need to change comm. ittee 
Production increased as 
a result of facilitation 
2001  Expansion of garden 
by IES to 
accommodate new 
members 
- At first resistance by committee 
to have new members, preferring 
to give old members more plots  
- New entrants vocal at meetings 
-A few weeks later extension wire 
stolen and thieves not identified  
No action from both 
project and other 
community leaders on 
theft of wire 
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The major form of passive resistance to the project leadership in the case 
of Chidiso is the leasing of plots to tenants. These tenants do not have 
power to vote or influence decision-making regarding operations of the 
garden. Thus, the committee runs the project the way they want. The 
official registered number of members at Chidiso before the garden 
extension in 2001 was 50. The garden was divided into four working 
groups, namely A, B, C and D and each has a membership of 12 or 13 
members. This was done for management purposes and also to instil some 
spirit of competition among the four groups so that production can be 
maintained at higher levels. As of November 2000, more than half of the 
people actively involved in production in Chidiso garden were tenants (see 
Table 5.6.). The arrangement of tenants is an agreement between the two 
people involved. Some tenants pay a fee to the plot holder while others do 
not pay a fee but pay in kind, for example giving some of the produce to 
the plot holder. Table 5.5 illustrates the level of tenancy in Chidiso based 
on an assessment of one of the four working groups found in the garden. 
 
Table 5.5. The level of tenancy in Chidiso garden 
 
Bed 
Number 
Status 
of user 
Comment/observation 
1  Lodger  Bed belonged to Tom who moved to some resettlement area in 
Midlands province in 1997. He gave the plot to his nephew’s wife 
but she is leasing the plot to another community member. 
2  Owner  Has used his plot since 1991. 
3  Owner  A widow – has used her plot since 1991 and never leased it out. 
4  Lodger  Owner joined Barura garden in 1999 and is leasing the plot to her 
daughter-in-law. 
5  Lodger  Owner moved to Barura garden. Her daughter, a divorcee, is using 
the plot but it is still registered under the original owner. 
6  Lodger  Owner moved to Harare to join her husband and is leasing plot 
because she did not want to give it up – for future security. 
7  Lodger  Owner moved to Barura in 1999 and is leasing the plot to her 
neighbour. 
8  Lodger  Between 1996 and 1998 the owner leased it to her neighbour but 
she took the plot back because the tenant was not paying 
according to their agreement and sometimes they would fight over 
the payment. She used the plot for a while and leased it again to a 
different person at the beginning of 2000.  
9  Lodger  Owner’s husband was ill at the time of the survey and she did not 
have time to work in the garden, as she had to look after her 
husband. Thus she was leasing her plot.   
10  Owner  She still uses her plot but she has a more vibrant garden near her 
husband’s private well.  
11  Owner   She still uses her plot but spends more time at her other plot in 
Barura garden. 
12  Owner  Has never had any tenant since 1991. 
13  Owner  Has never had any tenant, but has another plot in Barura. 
  54 % 
tenants 
46% 
owners  
Those who hold plots in Barura garden or have other private 
gardens spend more time in the other gardens and less time in 
Chidiso. Even some of the committee members have moved to 
Barura garden.    160
 
 
As a result of the social tension in Chidiso garden between the project 
members and leadership, witchcraft accusations have emerged as an 
explanation given by members as to why there is fear of dissolving the old 
committee and electing a new one. Examples are given by project members 
to substantiate fear of being bewitched if one challenges the leadership. 
The two examples of committee members who resigned and the 
experiences of the original owner of the land where the garden is located 
appear to reinforce witchcraft beliefs and accusations surrounding 
leadership issues in the project. It is claimed that the secretary of the 
committee who resigned had suggested that to keep the project vibrant, the 
committee should be changed every two years. It is understood that one of 
the longstanding committee members indicated to him that ‘wavakuda 
kuwona manje, tichaona kuti unosvika kupi – now you are becoming too 
big for your boots, we want to see how far you will go’ and a few days 
later the secretary fell ill and he immediately resigned.  
 
When interviewed, the former secretary indicated that he had resigned 
following the argument with one of the committee members. He indicated 
that after he fell ill, he thought it was best to resign, fearing that he could 
have been bewitched. Following the Training for Transformation and 
Leadership course organised by IES in July 2000, participants of that 
workshop felt they had gained confidence from the course and they would 
call for elections for a new committee at the Chidiso garden project. Claims 
are that when one of the powerful members of the committee heard this, 
she announced that ‘this committee is not going to change, we want to see 
those people who think they are clever, especially the one who will initiate 
the process’ and after she made that statement, no one ever talked about 
wanting to change the committee. Such statements are often taken to mean 
unspecified action would be taken against those who dared raise the issue 
or challenge the leadership. This illustrates the embeddedness of natural 
resource management institutions and related structures within the cultural 
and belief system of a given society. Leaders may take advantage of the 
traditional belief system to cement their positions. As discussed in Chapter 
Two, traditional beliefs such as witchcraft and related accusations may 
perpetuate bad leadership to the detriment of the project. Besides witchcraft 
accusations, the two powerful members of the committee who are feared 
belong to the Voushe (the ruling clan) and Zvidza zvopo (the powerful 
ones). This also makes it difficult to challenge them publicly.     
 
Other forms of passive resistance by project members that were observed 
occur through pilfering of project equipment. For instance some project 
equipment just disappeared without explanation and also wire from the 
Chidiso garden extension was stolen, with the leadership not reacting to 
such actions. False compliance was also a common strategy as members 
would just attend meetings called by the committee and endorse whatever 
the committee would suggest without any protest even if they did not fully   161
agree with the decision or were unhappy with the decision. Project 
members would then raise complaints after the meeting. For instance 
during the extension of the Chidiso garden, a time was set as to when 
people would meet to put up the fence. The majority of the members 
arrived on time except two key members of the committee. After waiting 
for an hour, those present decided they should go ahead and start digging 
holes for the poles since the new boundary had been discussed and agreed 
upon in a previous meeting even though it had not been physically marked. 
After putting up the poles, the two members of the committee arrived and 
said they had put the poles in the wrong place they should remove all of 
them and start afresh. The poles were removed and new holes dug. It was 
only afterwards that some of the members complained to the researcher 
about the whole incident as one man put it, ‘we worked so hard yesterday 
and only when we were about to finish, those two came and said remove 
all those poles and start afresh. Zvinogwadza mhani- unoshaya kuti vaivepi 
pataiita basa rose – its really painful and you wonder where those two had 
been when we were doing all that work’. A few weeks later the wire on 
that extension part was stolen, yet since its establishment in 1991, no theft 
had been experienced at the garden. 
 
Asked as to why sometimes conflicts emerged between leaders and 
community members, reasons given include:  
 
1.  Community members sometimes just comply or agree with certain 
decisions taken by leaders without seriously reflecting on them 
(ndivanamutendazvose), thus when problems arise, instead of 
working together to solve them, people start pointing fingers. 
2.  In cases where leaders are elected, community members just rush 
to vote for leaders without reflecting on the leadership qualities of 
the person they are electing. 
3.  Pressure of time from external project facilitators. Often external 
project facilitators come for a meeting, having given the 
community no agenda in advance and then at the end of the 
meeting they say elect a committee for this or that project. 
4.  Some project or community leaders are not clear of their roles – 
thus they may under-perform. 
5.  Having the same people in different leadership positions. These 
people end up being too powerful and sometimes no longer listen 
to other community members during deliberations on important 
community issues.  
6.  Chikama  – Nepotism by leaders, e.g. in resource allocation 
sometimes they favour their relatives. 
 
While conflicts were generally viewed as being negative, the villagers 
said sometimes conflicts have positive impact on leaders as it challenges 
them to think and reflect on the reasons for the emergence of these 
conflicts and therefore may change their leadership style. This ensures that 
leaders do not become the ‘we know it all’ type of leaders and this may   162
improve communication between leaders and other community members. 
Bourdillon (1987) notes that traditionally, leaders such as the chiefs and 
headmen’s power lay in their ability to listen to the members of their 
community’s views. Given this historical background, it is not surprising 
that people would resist leadership that makes independent decisions 
without considering the community members’ view. As Bourdillon notes 
(ibid: 142) according to traditional ideals, a chief could not force people to 
do what they did not want to do; he was a leader rather than a ruler, relying 
for his position on influence rather than force. This was also the case in 
judging cases in the traditional court where ideally the chief was a 
chairman rather than a judge and through allowing the court elders and 
other people to speak their minds before giving his own summing up, 
which depended largely on expressed public opinion. 
 
Questioning the legitimacy of traditional leadership 
Conflicts between leaders and villagers were also noted relating to the 
questioning of the legitimacy of leaders, in particular traditional leaders. 
Often contestations surrounded inheritance of the sabuku position. In both 
the Shona and the Ndebele inheritance systems, the eldest son usually 
inherits his father’s position. In cases where the leader has more than one 
wife, a son from the first wife theoretically inherits the position. Bourdillon 
records that it is not uncommon for leadership in the traditional authority 
system to be inherited by what are considered junior lineages. Sometimes 
there can be disputes about seniority and in most cases after the death of a 
leader there are usually a number of claimants to succeed him. It appears 
that succession to traditional authority leadership has always given rise to 
some debate and historically, many chiefdoms had traditions of feuds 
between branches of the ruling family with rivals including brothers 
murdering each other over the position (Bourdillon, 1987:107). Such 
leadership wrangles were identified in the study site and often had some 
effect of weakening decisions made by a particular leader whose position 
was contested. Two cases are discussed here to illustrate these leadership 
contestations, one involving the position of sabuku Dobhani and the other 
involving the Sihambe position. Sabuku Dobhani’s position is being 
challenged by his brother who claims he was the rightful son to inherit the 
position because his mother was older than the current sabuku’s mother in 
terms of polygamous union. The relationship between the two is illustrated 
in Figure 5.2.                                                                                                                                                                                                          
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The first sabuku Dobhani
Son Majike 
(Claimant to 
sabuku position) 
Second wife
No sons 
First wife 
Sons 
Son Davi 
(Current sabuku) 
Third wife  Fourth wife 
Figure 5.2. Contested Dobhani village headship 
 
The contestant to sabuku Dobhani claims that since his mother was the 
second wife and the current sabuku’s mother was third wife he should have 
been the one to inherit the position. Key informants indicated that the late 
sabuku announced before his death the heir to the position. Asked why he 
was challenging a decision made by his father when he was alive but had 
not challenged it when it was made, the incumbent indicated that at the 
time the announcement was made he was too confused because he did not 
understand why his father had made that decision, although according to 
tradition, he was the ‘legitimate’ heir. Views from other community 
members were that the contestant to the sabuku position in Dobhani 
village, had alcohol problems and therefore his father felt he would not be 
a good leader. There is often fear to go against the will of the dead as it is 
believed their spirit will torment you and for this reason the contestant 
conceded that his brother should inherit the position. During this study 
some key informants claimed that most encroachment into the grazing 
areas was happening in Dobhani village and this was associated with this 
conflict between the two brothers over the leadership position as the 
current sabuku does not want to take decisions that would be controversial 
and might therefore raise more questions about his legitimacy.  
 
The second leadership contestation involves sabuku Sihambe’s position. 
The sitting sabuku is now very old and therefore inactive. A nephew of the 
sitting sabuku who is also a member of one of the Zvidza zvopo families is 
currently the self-appointed acting sabuku. Considering that the current 
sabuku has sons who are supposed to inherit the position, other villagers 
are questioning the current acting sabuku. In August 2001, the acting 
sabuku presided over a case of four boys from the same village who had 
cut down an Afzelia quanzensis tree and fined them Z$50 each, the usual 
fine for offences relating to illegal tree felling in the area, but their parents   164
did not pay and officially they said they were still trying to raise the 
money. Yet in informal circles they were saying they would not pay the 
money because, ‘who is he to make other people pay fines?’ Talking to one 
of the boys parents, she said, ‘we are not going to pay the fine because this 
acting sabuku gave himself this position. No one appointed him’. Usually 
if an offender is made to pay a fine and does not do so within a stipulated 
time of approximately two weeks, they are charged again for contempt. In 
this case the acting sabuku called another dare which was poorly attended 
and said the four boys should pay Z$100 each after the stipulated period 
had expired, but still their parents did not pay. The acting sabuku later 
threatened to take them to the headman, but people knew he could not do 
that because he was self-appointed and the headman would question him 
on who gave him the power and authority to call for a dare in the first 
instance.  
 
The sitting sabuku Sihambe’s sons were all in formal employment, which 
could be one reason why the sabuku’s nephew appointed himself acting 
sabuku. Key informants claim that one of the current sabuku’s sons 
indicated in 2000 that he was planning to resign from his formal 
employment so as to take over his father’s position and shortly after that he 
fell ill and died in February 2001. This raised a lot of suspicion in the 
community and the remaining brothers are now afraid to take over the 
acting sabuku position, as it is believed the brother who died may have 
been bewitched in connection with the position. Witchcraft accusations 
often occur when a person dies regardless of the fact that he/she has been 
ill for a long time. According to the village health worker in Romwe, 
witchcraft beliefs have been found to hinder progress on HIV/AIDS 
awareness campaigns as people attribute death to witchcraft and not to 
HIV/AIDS. There is a saying commonly used by the people that chiripo 
chariuraya, zizi harifi nemhepo (something must have caused the death, an 
owl does not die from wind). Normally witchcraft accusations spread in the 
form of gossip. But witchcraft is strongly believed in by those involved, 
thus influencing the patterns of social interaction among the various actors. 
The study found that there are intricate networks which are used for 
gossiping and one has to know who to talk to first about something they 
have heard, and who to tell last and what stories can be shared with who. 
This is more often the case where witchcraft accusations are involved as 
this is considered sensitive information and also one can be legally charged 
for making such accusations on the basis of the Witchcraft Suppression 
Act.  
 
While witchcraft is theoretically considered as non-existent in some 
observable physical form but rather a component of the belief system, in 
recent years there has been an increase in the number of witchcraft 
confessions in Zimbabwe (The Chronicle, 21 August 2002:4 -5). A case 
worth noting is that of a man in the same province where this study was 
undertaken who went to a police station indicating that he wanted to 
surrender his ‘tools’ as he was tired of being a witch and the police   165
dismissed him as being in an unstable mental state (Police Outpost, January 
1999). The man decided to demonstrate to the police his ability to control 
lightning and a bolt of lightning struck a tree and the tree immediately 
withered and the police pleaded with him to take his ‘tools’ back to his 
home. This raises some questions on the effect of witchcraft beliefs on 
community relations. For instance, if an individual is believed to be a 
witch, how does this belief influence their position in the community 
regarding decision-making processes?  
 
Witchcraft accusations and related gossip shape the way people relate to 
each in the community, the way individual and communally owned 
resources are used and managed as well as the nature of leadership in the 
community. In the case of the Sihambe village headship, a person viewed 
as not being the ‘legitimate’ leader, a nephew of the current village head 
took over the position, yet the village head has his sons who are supposed 
to inherit the position, but now they cannot challenge him because of their 
fear of witchcraft. In the meanwhile, the relatives of the nephew believe he 
has the right to be acting village head because when their parents first 
settled in the area in 1952, the father of the acting sabuku was supposed to 
be the legitimate village head because he had been the foreman at the farm 
when they were relocated (see the Mhlanga historical narrative in Chapter 
Four). It would be interesting to establish what will take place after the old 
sabuku dies, since his position is already being contested while he is still 
alive. Usually, contestations occur when the leader has died and not when 
they are still alive (Bourdillon, 1987). The general lack of clarity on 
inheritance criteria for traditional authority positions may contribute to 
contestation over the inheritance of the position. Unlike for VIDCOs where 
a leader is elected traditional authority positions are still inherited with no 
clearly defined criteria for inheritance.  
 
5.4.6. Water related conflicts    
Much historical and political analysis of natural resource access in 
Zimbabwe has tended to focus on resources such as land, forests and 
wildlife, neglecting a crucial resource, water. A few sociological studies on 
water issues have been undertaken following the enactment of the Water 
Act (1998) such as those by Matondi (2001) and Sithole (2001 & 1999). 
Other studies on water use and management have been undertaken by 
Cleaver (2000; 1998 & 1994). These studies show how access to water has 
been critical in shaping interactions of water users and emerging conflicts 
over access to water. Attempts to access and control water resources have 
been observed to be an integral part of the struggles for political power 
amongst various actors in the community. As outlined in Chapter Four, 
much access to water resources in Romwe is based on informal 
relationships and networks. Unlike the case of woodlands, conflicts over 
water resources in Romwe appear to be very minimal and more often these 
are expressed in the form of passive resistance. The example discussed in 
Chapter Four regarding a well owner who closed off his well from other   166
users and later found a dog in the well is one form of resistance noted in 
the study. Besides this example, a case of conflict over water recorded 
during the study relates to the multiple use of the Barura dam. The multiple 
uses of Barura dam include livestock watering, garden irrigation, brick 
moulding and laundry. While there are multiple uses of Barura dam, under 
years of normal rainfall (ranging between 600 mm – 800 mm), the multiple 
uses are viewed in a complementary way. It is only when water levels 
become low, especially following a year during which low rainfall has 
been received where the multiple uses and users’ interests conflict. Below 
is a case that illustrates how perceptions of water scarcity following poor 
rains resulted in conflict between livestock owners and those participating 
in garden irrigation. Otherwise no other conflict situations relating to 
access to and control over water were observed or recorded during the 
study.  
 
The water conflict at Barura dam involved the chairman of the dam and 
members of the Barura garden project. Following a drought year, the water 
level in Barura dam sank low in early 2001 such that people believed that 
by the end of October the same year, when rains are expected to come, if it 
did not rain, there would be water shortage in the community. The villagers 
agreed that they should reduce the area under irrigation in the community 
garden so that water for watering livestock was assured until the following 
rainy season. The number of livestock that were getting water from the 
dam had increased because a number of surrounding villages, from the 
social catchment, were now watering their livestock at this dam after other 
water sources in their respective villages had dried up. Contrary to the 
plans of garden project members to reduce the area under irrigation, the 
dam chairman suggested that all gardening activities should stop to ensure 
that there was enough water for livestock in the dam. Garden project 
members protested indicating that such a move would disadvantage poor 
farmers who after all do not own livestock and depend on the irrigated 
plots for their livelihoods. The dam chairman proceeded to seal off (with 
the assistance of two other villagers) all outlet valves at the dam so that no 
water could flow to the garden. In response members of the garden project 
threatened to remove the plugs. Because he is used to people complying 
with his decisions, the dam chairman got angry at being challenged 
publicly by the garden members. One night he went to the dam and opened 
the outlet valve so that water could flow out and therefore there would be 
no water to quarrel about. The water flowed out until it was below the 
outlet valve. When garden project members discovered that this is what the 
dam chairman had done, they mobilised themselves and agreed that they 
had to fix him as they equated his behaviour with ‘bewitching one’s 
neighbour’. They secretly sent a delegation to the RDC and the NGO 
supporting the project and some officials from these organisations came to 
the village and convened a tribunal with the dam chairman and 
reprimanded him for his behaviour. The villagers called for him to resign 
from the dam committee, however he apologized to the project members 
and promised to co-operate with other farmers in conserving water   167
resources in the area. After the apology, he was able to retain his dam 
chairmanship. 
 
The conflicts over dam water further demonstrate how local community 
members strategically switch their allegiance from the informal to the 
formal institutional structures (or vice versa) depending on which decision 
benefits them the most. In this case the conflict was with a local traditional 
village leader who happened to be the chairman of the dam, project 
participants sought external assistance in resolving the case.  
 
5.4.7 Conflicts over spiritual issues 
Historically, sacred controls were used to protect certain areas or certain 
tree species (Fortmann and Nhira, 1992; Matowanyika, 1991). Sacred 
controls are here defined following Fortmann and Nhira (ibid: 3) as norms 
of natural resource use and protection that are based in folk or traditional 
religious beliefs and that are enforced by individual internalisation of the 
norms, community sanction and/or by religious and/or traditional leaders. 
There is a long history of traditional religions among the Shona, which 
Schoffeleers (1979) characterised as profoundly ecological as they issue 
and enforce directives with regard to a community’s use of its 
environment. These kinds of sacred controls are still found in most 
communal areas of Mashonaland and are part of the evolving natural 
resource management systems. Traditional religious beliefs with ecological 
functions are often communal institutions involving the entire population 
of a geographic area in a system of common obligations (ibid). Given the 
historical movement of populations in Romwe, resulting in people holding 
different religious beliefs residing in the same geographical locations, there 
has been a steady weakening of sacred controls. Matowanyika (1991) 
argues that because immigrants have less knowledge of sacred areas, they 
often violate rules relating to these sacred areas. In such situations the 
emergence of conflict is inevitable. Christianity has also been blamed for 
the violation of sacred controls in the communal areas of Zimbabwe (ibid).  
 
Different views exist among the Ndebele and Shona speaking villagers 
and between the old and young over cultural beliefs, in particular those 
relating to sacred areas. Claims by the groups endogenous to the area 
residing in the social catchment at the time of the study are that 
historically, every year in September old people responsible for the 
traditional rain making ceremonies would brew beer and go up the Romwe 
mountain (kunopira). Now it is no longer happening and the mountain is 
no longer viewed to be as sacred as it used to be because of the Ndebeles 
who came into the area who did not believe in the sacredness of the 
mountain. The Ndebele speaking groups do not deny this. One village 
leader indicated to the researcher that ‘amazilo lawa ayisiwo esiko lethu – 
this is not part of our culture’. Among the Shona, there is a belief that 
ancestral spirits mete out justice on their own if people flout rules 
regarding sacred areas. For instance in 1998, a leopard in the Mapande   168
mountain killed a number of goats in the area including one of the 
sabuku’s. This was believed by the Shona to be a ‘spirits leopard’ 
punishing people for violation of rules associated with sacred areas. The 
case was reported to the chief who suggested that something wrong had 
been done in the catchment area and sent his representative to appease the 
ancestral spirits pamarinda evadzimu – at an historical gravesite located in 
Dobhani village. After the chief’s messengers carried out their ceremony, 
cases of people losing goats to the leopard stopped. The older Shona 
people believed that the spirits had been appeased while young men 
believed that it was just a coincidence that this stopped and did not 
associate the whole leopard story with any mystical powers. Another 
contentious issue regarding traditional beliefs emerged following the death 
of Chief Madzivire under whose jurisdiction Dobhani village falls. 
Dobhani villagers were instructed not to go to the fields for a week as part 
of the tradition that should be respected, yet those in Sihambe and Tamwa 
continued working in their fields as they fall under a different chief. Chief 
Madzivire died on a Wednesday and by Saturday some women in Dobhani 
village were complaining that the weeds in their fields were affecting crops 
and that a week was too long to stay away from the fields. As one woman 
put it ‘we will end up ‘stealing time’ to go to the fields, what else can we 
do?’ It was observed that, even though the women complained about not 
going to the fields, they could not break such a rule for fear of being 
reprimanded by the sabuku and headman.  
 
5.4.8 Conflicts between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ 
Outsiders, however neutral they would like to be, are often involved in 
village conflicts. External facilitators find themselves in a position where 
they must not only learn from the local people, but must also negotiate 
consensual definitions and reappraisal of common goals and interests. The 
negotiation process itself is not power free. Views and objectives of the 
‘outsider’ may dominate the process despite the inclusion of local voices. 
The interaction of local actors (insiders) and external actors (outsiders) 
such as NGO, research and extension officers provides ground for a 
complex process of local actors, as individuals or groups fighting to 
position themselves strategically in relation to the external agents. A 
variety of strategies are used to gain advantage over other actors that 
include, frequent visits to research campsite, giving gifts such as vegetables 
to officers and being links for leaking village gossip to the external agents. 
In cases where conflicts emerge between the ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ 
these are often expressed in the manner described by Scott (1985), as the 
everyday forms of peasant resistance because open confrontation may deny 
the village future donor assistance. The strategies that could be interpreted 
as resistance by some sections of the community to external officers’ 
initiatives include vandalism and theft of project equipment with no 
response by community leadership, gossip about male officers having love 
affairs with some women in the village, especially widows or single 
women holding key positions in project committees, probably used as a   169
strategy to demoralise project participants. Table 5.6 illustrates some of the 
cases involving vandalism or theft of project equipment. 
 
The catchment traditional leaders’ views regarding the thefts fall into five 
categories. First, the traditional leaders suggested that considering that the 
people involved or the suspects are young men, it could be that young men 
are forced to steal because they are unemployed and therefore this is a 
survival strategy. Some of the local youths have completed four years of 
secondary education but have failed to secure formal employment, or 
places at colleges for tertiary education. Secondly, proximity to Ngundu 
growth point, which offers a diversity of services and forms of 
entertainment, could be a temptation for young men. Two highways, the 
Masvingo-Beitbridge and the Triangle-Masvingo meet at Ngundu growth 
point. There is high commercial sex activity partly because of the 
prevalence of long distance truck drivers. Local young men are said to 
participate in the commercial sex activities and also want to out-do the 
spendthrift long distance truck drivers. Youths may therefore be tempted to 
steal items for resale in order to raise money to spend at the growth point. 
Third, the traditional leaders claim that the said culprits are often from the 
neighbouring villages that may be jealous of the developments in Romwe 
and the support the villagers in Romwe are receiving from NGOs and other 
organisations. From assessing all the cases where the individuals involved 
in theft cases were identified, this view from the traditional leaders can be 
disputed because those individuals involved were from within the three 
study villages. A fourth view was that it is common to find mischievous 
people in any society and therefore the individuals involved could fall in 
that category of mischievous people. Last but not least, the traditional 
leaders’ explanation was that individuals involved could be disgruntled 
members of the community who may be feeling left out of projects and 
therefore as a way to register their anger to the larger community, they 
steal and vandalise project and research equipment.                  
 
While the cases presented in Table 5.6 could be interpreted as the 
‘weapons of the weak’ highlighting the problematic nature of the 
relationship between project officers and some actors in the community, 
especially young men (all the cases where the person committing the 
offence was identified involved young men), Mandondo (personal 
communication, December 2001) suggests that cases of theft occur in any 
community and there is always a group of nhire (deviants) found in any 
given society.  
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Table 5.6. Cases of vandalism and theft of project equipment       
 
Case and 
date 
Nature of case   Response by community 
members/leadership 
Victor 
Chitora 
(November 
2000) 
Disconnected 
solar panel from 
research 
equipment to 
charge a battery 
Sabukus expected to try the case but there 
was no action taken. Reason given by key 
informants is that Victor’s mother, a single 
woman was having an affair with one 
community leader, thus hesitancy to try the 
case.  
Researcher’s 
clothes 
(January 
2001) 
One of the 
researcher’s 
clothes and 
money stolen  
No action taken by community leadership 
but the researcher’s clothes were secretly 
brought back a few days later without the 
money.   
Mr. 
Chabiwa 
(April 2001) 
Stole one of the 
research 
equipment solar 
panels for resale 
Research team offer reward of Z$1500 for 
anyone with information on the panel 
without success. The thief was later caught 
but sabukus took no action despite the 
researchers suggesting that he be sent to the 
police. The sabukus said if they sent him to 
the police, it may negatively impact on 
social relations in the village. 
Chamanyoka 
solar panels 
(July 2001) 
Two solar panels 
stolen from 
Chamanyoka hill 
Suspected thief was one of the local young 
man hired to assist with mounting the solar 
panels. Police and community leaders not 
of any help. Research team offered reward 
of Z$5 000
48 for any information leading to 
the arrest of the culprit but even though 
reward money was much higher, no one 
provided any information.  
Chidiso 
garden wire 
(October 
2001) 
Wire for the new 
Chidiso garden 
extension stolen 
No action from both the Chidiso garden 
community and other community 
leadership. 
Mr Gudo 
(December 
2001) 
Stole another 
solar panel 
No action by community leadership despite 
the letter written by one of the research 
directors threatening that project would pull 
out if this continued. Also reward offer of 
Z$10 000
49 ignored by community despite 
being relatively high. 
 
 
Views of people from other social catchment villages, who are 
predominantly Shona speakers, including the headman suggested that 
                                                           
48 The research team increased the reward money assuming that the first reward offer might have been 
too low.   
49 The average net income in Romwe was reported to be Z$11 179 per household per annum 
(Campbell, et al., 2002:90).    171
Ndebele speaking people are always a problem and it is not surprising that 
varikuzvibira vega (they are stealing from themselves). While this may 
have some element of truth, stigmatising of other groups is also common. 
Scott (1986) suggests that it would be a grave mistake to romanticise these 
‘weapons of the weak’. In the first instance, it is not easy to differentiate 
what may be viewed as resistance or otherwise. For instance one may 
question why theft of a few solar panels or cases of witchcraft accusations 
be considered as some form of resistance. In this study, the non-reaction of 
project and community leaders to instances of project equipment theft 
suggests that these may be covert forms of resistance by ‘insiders’ towards 
some actions of the ‘outsiders’. Although community leaders gave the 
above reasons regarding vandalism or theft of project equipment, it appears 
that there is general unwillingness to identify and punish the offenders. 
This is intriguing as in a number of cases punishing the offenders would 
seem to be in the community’s interest as this would facilitate the smooth 
running of community projects. At one community meeting called to 
discuss vandalism of project equipment, a woman who was also the former 
secretary for the village micro-credit scheme suggested that if anyone had a 
suspect, they should let the whole community know. One member from the 
a Zvidza zvopo kinship group who was fired by IES from his position as 
local project manager responded indicating that people should be careful as 
to what they say because ‘you will be at loggerheads with your relatives if 
you do that. These project people are not going to be here forever, they will 
go and you will remain here with your relatives being hostile to you for 
trying to please project people’. Probably, as a result of such threats, no 
community member could say it out loud even if they had a suspect in 
mind.  
 
5.4.9 Conflict mediation mechanisms   
A variety of strategies and platforms are used for conflict mediation. To 
reduce organisational conflicts, community members may assign the same 
people to different leadership positions in the village as illustrated by the 
case of Mr Vakuru in Figure 5.1. While this may be a strategy for reducing 
organisational conflicts, power is centred on a few people, which may lead 
to undemocratic tendencies. Sometimes the few leaders may be overloaded 
and therefore not be able to fulfil their mandates in a satisfactory or 
efficient manner. Considering that the same people may be found in 
different institutional structures, both formal and informal, the relevance of 
the dichotomy between formal and informal institutions in community-
based projects is questionable.  
 
For conflict mediation in the context of woodland resource use, 
sometimes a dare (village court) is convened if the problem is deemed to 
be relatively complex. The village court is open to the public and 
attendance may be fairly large, ranging from forty to one hundred people. 
Each person who attends the dare is free to make his or her contribution as 
circumstances allow. The term dare has a wide application in Shona   172
society. It denotes both the place where the men of a village meet and the 
court where cases are judged (Gombe, 1995:5). The latter denotation also 
has two meanings attached to it, the court as the place where cases are tried 
and the people who take part in the deliberations. In this study, the term is 
used to refer to the people who take part in the village court deliberations. 
The dare is often convened for the purpose of settling cases or disputes 
between any two people or groups of people. The sabuku, headman or 
chief presides over the deliberations at the dare. The chief’s dare is the 
highest court of appeal under the traditional authority system. In trying 
cases brought before him, the leader presiding over the case is assisted by 
machinda or village elders. Other village men of no rank are also free to 
contribute to the deliberations (ibid).  
 
The traditional village courts are characterised by the use of token fees. 
There is no fixed amount for each particular token. The importance of the 
tokens does not lie in their face value at all, but in what they stand for. 
Before the hearing, the complainant and the defendant have to pay a 
hearing fee referred to as badza, (hoe), marime (the ploughing) or 
mahwandauswa (the sitting on the grass). The people who constitute the 
dare will have absented themselves, at least temporarily, from the day’s 
work in their fields and the hearing fee is to compensate them for this lost 
time. Both parties traditionally listed this fee in the form of a goat produced 
jointly or individually. The goat is slaughtered and eaten by the dare. 
Normally, people labelled as lacking wisdom were asked to skin the goat 
while others tried the case. Nowadays, the hearing fee is normally 
produced in the form of money and this money is shared among the sabuku 
(or the person presiding the case) and the machindas. The chief’s court 
demands a higher fee than the sabuku and the headman, thus people prefer 
to have their cases judged at a lower level court, if possible, than be 
referred to the chief’s court. The defendant is also asked to pay fees known 
as  mari yomupurisa (money for the court messenger who brought the 
summons). Thus even before the case has been tried, the defendant would 
have been made to pay something. Women are often not represented 
among the people that try the case, although they are allowed to attend the 
court and express their views where possible. The women are specifically 
allowed to speak where they come in as witnesses, the defendant or 
complainant.  
 
For cases that are easier to handle, rather than taking the case to the dare, 
the parties involved often discuss the problem and reach an agreement 
without consulting the community at large. Local conflict mediation arenas 
are presided over by the traditional authorities and if one traditional leader 
feels that he cannot handle the case by himself, he often enlists the services 
of other traditional leaders in the catchment area despite the fact that they 
fall under different administrative and chieftainship boundaries. Only in 
rare circumstances are cases forwarded to the headman or chief’s court. 
Where cases cannot be resolved locally, external assistance such as the   173
services of the RDC or NGOs is sought, as in the case of the water 
conflicts experienced at the Barura dam.  
 
For community projects, especially those initiated by external facilitators, 
constitutions are often established that are supposed to guide the 
interactions among the various resource users. These constitutions are 
formulated at a meeting convened by the project committee, often with an 
officer from the NGO that supports the project. Consensus has to be 
reached before the constitution can be passed. While the process of 
developing the constitution is open and involves all project members, 
power dynamics in the group may influence the outcome of the process. 
Similarly, the patron NGO officer may also influence the constitution 
formulation process. The Barura and Chidiso garden project constitutions 
are presented below to illustrate issues that are normally found in the 
constitutions that are important for reducing conflicts among the group 
involved. 
 
Barura garden constitution, January 1999: 
1.  All project members shall abide by the garden project constitution. 
2.  Project members can work from Monday to Friday if there is need 
to. 
3.  No payment will be received by members for doing some work at 
the dam if need arises. 
4.  Working time is 8 am to 11am. 
5.  Members who arrive for group work later than 9:30 am are 
considered late and therefore will be liable to pay a fine of Z$2.00. 
6.  Any member absent from group work without a satisfactory reason 
will pay a fine of Z$5.00. 
7.  Joining fee at the garden is Z$50 per person and this fee will be 
increased to Z$150 from the end of July 1999. Beginning January 
2000, the joining fee will be Z$1000.00 because new members 
would not have contributed their labour at the start of the project. 
8.  Every member shall pay a dam user fee of Z$5 per annum. 
9.  All garden tools are kept at the chairperson’s home. 
10. Dropouts get no refunds for the joining fee or any other payment 
they will have made.   
 
Chidiso garden constitution, enacted in 1991: 
1.  Fighting not allowed in the garden. 
2.  Plots should be watered on the designated day but members are 
free to come any time of the day. 
3.  Theft of other people’s vegetables is forbidden. 
4.  Gate to the garden should always be kept closed to prevent animals 
straying into the garden. 
5.  The garden committee tries offenders and chronic offenders will be 
taken to the sabuku. 
6.  Garden committee should work closely with the collector well 
committee.   174
7.  Agritex officer should pay frequent visits to the project to give 
advice on crop rotation, pest control and management and record 
keeping. 
8.  Members will pay an annual membership fee agreed upon by all 
project members. 
9.  A new committee will be elected every two years.  
Source: Garden projects records. 
 
While the content of constitutions may vary from project to project, they 
serve the same purpose, that is, ensuring order in the operations of the 
project. Project committee members monitor the enforcement of the 
constitutions. This may be problematic if committee members who are 
supposed to enforce the constitution are the ones who violate the 
constitutions. In such cases, where action is taken, external project 
facilitators are often consulted and their assistance sought in mediating or 
the attempt to resolve conflicts.   
 
5.5 Summary  
CBNRM remains an arena of conflict, expressed in either overt or covert 
forms. Conflicts that emerge are often group based although some cases 
that involve individuals in relation to other community members exist. 
Some of the conflicts involve both internal and external actors. Because 
local communities are dynamic and internally differentiated, various actors 
tend to shift alliances depending on the nature of the conflict and what 
resource is at stake. The environmental priorities and natural resource 
claims of social actors positioned differently in power relations may be 
highly contested (Leach et al., 1999:226). This points to the importance of 
having diverse institutions operating at multiple scale levels from micro to 
macro, which influence who has access to and control over what resources, 
and who arbitrates contested resource claims. To date poor understanding 
of the dynamism of institutional arrangements and the nature and patterns 
of local level organisational interactions appear to have impeded the 
implementation of CBNRM initiatives. Various actors shift their allegiance 
from one institution to another as part of the strategies of ensuring security 
of resource access. The institutions that provide positive response at a 
particular time are favoured at that time. While local government 
institutions may endure because of the legal backing by the state, they may 
also collapse in spite of this support or may function as a shell as discussed 
in Chapter Four. Yet local level informal institutions’ survival is dependent 
on the trust local people have in them as a result of how they cater for their 
needs and interests. Local level informal institutions are generally more 
accountable to local people as compared to the formal local government 
institutions and therefore the former tend to be more popular, although they 
are sometimes entangled in local level micro-politics.  
 
Historical processes, especially in immigrant communities as in Romwe, 
have a key role in shaping power relations regarding access to woodlands   175
and water resources. These also influence institutional development as well 
as laying the foundation to leadership claims. Local historical narratives 
show how historical processes such as longevity of residence in the area 
are used to justify power relations in the community. These historical 
narratives also influence people’s perception regarding the legitimacy of 
certain leaders such as the sabukus. While there may be diverging views on 
historical processes that have impacted upon institutional development in 
the community, these narratives still influence the form and nature of 
power relations in the community.   
 
At the local level, institutions are very much embedded in local history, 
culture and traditional beliefs as well as in patterns of social interactions. 
This influences the nature of control over access to natural resources and 
how rule flouting is handled at a particular time. For instance, judgement of 
cases of rule breaking is done on a case-by-case basis with no standard 
procedure to be followed. While the traditional institutions are viewed as 
being more powerful than modern institutions, they are increasingly losing 
their legitimacy partly as a result of external intervention and partly 
emanating from nepotistic tendencies regarding access to woodland 
resources and adjudication of cases. Traditional institutional authorities are 
also losing their legitimacy because the role they play in arbitrating cases 
or resolving conflict is no longer perceived as neutral. At times local 
community members feel that the traditional authorities are no longer 
operating according to their historical mandates and what the different 
community members expect of them. This has increased challenges to the 
legitimacy of some traditional leaders’ positions and sometimes to the 
breakdown of interpersonal relationships. Because of the embeddedness of 
institutions in local culture and traditions, they are entangled in broader 
community processes and social interactions and therefore influenced by a 
diversity of factors such as power relationships, and the agency of various 
actors differentiated by gender, age, wealth and other socio-economic 
criteria.  
 
Formal institutions appear to emphasise the management of the natural 
resource in question, for example woodlands, while the informal 
institutions appear to be there to manage actor-relationships that influence 
different actors’ access to the natural resource. Furthermore, traditional 
institutions straddle across many spheres of social life outside the sphere of 
woodlands and water use and management and this gives them a holistic 
approach to resource management, yet many formal institutions tend to be 
sectorial in their approach. The mandates of the formal institutions are 
defined by legal instruments that are very sectorial by design and therefore 
lack the holistic approach to resource management vis-à-vis the traditional 
institutions. Considering the complexity and dynamic nature of power 
relations in the community as well as conflicts that emerge in relation to 
how these power relations influence different actors’ access to woodlands 
and water resources, the following chapter explores strategies that are used 
by those actors considered to be weak such as women, to gain access to   176
natural resources. Strategies for influencing decision-making processes are 
also explored in relation to how decisions made influence who has access 
to and control over what natural resource as this has implications for the 
sustainable use of woodlands and water.   177
CHAPTER SIX: WOMEN’S ROLE IN 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES AND 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Patterns of interactions and conflicts that may emerge in the process of 
negotiating access to natural resources such as land, woodlands and water 
were discussed in Chapter Five. In analysing access to woodlands and 
water resources where there are competing interests and conflicts over 
resource use and control, gender and power emerge as important themes. 
Gender relations are viewed as socially constructed through meanings and 
practices, which invest them with particular significance in everyday social 
interaction. The institutional fabric of society cements these gender 
relations. Community institutions influence women’s and men’s access to 
and control over natural resources and their participation in decision-
making processes. In the communal land context in Zimbabwe, the role of 
institutions that determine who has access to and control over which 
natural resources is often influenced by formal and informal relations 
between women and men as well as numerous other factors, both internal 
and external. From the actor-oriented approach, gender relations and roles 
are perceived as being constructed in everyday interactions between and 
among women and men.  
 
A variety of approaches contribute to the exploration and interpretation 
of elements of gender and power relations in the CBNRM institutional 
framework. One approach that was found relevant for this study has its 
roots in the political ecology framework. This framework has two strands 
to it, the feminist environmentalists (Agarwal, 1992) and the feminist 
political ecologists (Rocheleau, 1995). Both strands stress that gender 
differentiation can be traced to a societal division of labour, property rights 
and power. On one hand the feminist environmentalists highlight women’s 
close relation with nature due to the gender division of labour, although 
they have little formal role and negligible decision-making authority over 
natural resources. The feminist environmentalists therefore argue for 
women to have a place in community resource management structures and 
committees and they see the presence of women in these structures, as 
important in bringing about change in their favour (Agarwal, 1997a). 
Participation of women in management structures is said to be vital in 
ensuring women have a voice in the management of natural resources. On 
the other hand, the feminist political ecologists emphasise property rights 
and power relations in the analysis of women’s and men’s roles in resource 
management. The feminist environmentalist approach is used to analyse 
the role of Romwe women in institutional structures, while the feminist 
political ecologist approach is used for the analysis of gendered access to   178
woodlands and water resources and the power dynamics that influence 
decision-making processes.  
 
Historically, women have generally been viewed as materially poor and 
excluded from decision-making processes and structures, though they are 
usually rich in local knowledge (Cleaver, 2000; Muchena, 1994; 
Rocheleau, 1995). Studies portraying women as disadvantaged groups in 
decision-making processes lack detailed analyses of daily lives, struggles 
and negotiations that characterise various social interactions of women and 
men in rural contexts. In order to go beyond the focus on structural 
oppression of women, this study identifies the spheres of the women’s 
influence, strategic networking and negotiations which women engage in to 
ensure access to woodlands and water resources as well as influencing 
decision-making processes. The negotiation processes are not always 
visible and public, and some negotiations are low visibility processes that 
may be difficult to identify (Fortmann, 1995). The low visibility 
negotiation processes do not occur in public and thus the challenge for the 
researcher is to use research methods that can get at these hidden 
negotiations (ibid). Little attention has been paid to private domains of 
decision-making, the main focus being on public forms of participation 
(Cleaver, 2000). As will be discussed in this chapter, informal arenas and 
networks often play an important role in the process of negotiating 
resource access and decision-making. While it is desirable to make 
women’s work, their rights to resources more formal, visible and less 
conditional on relations with men, there is also need to recognise that the 
invisibility and ambiguity may have strategic advantages for women as 
they may arouse less male resistance and yet deliver subtle forms of 
influence and power (Jackson, 1998:317).  
 
This chapter explores how power relations in Romwe influence the role 
of women within both formal and informal CBNRM institutions and 
related structures with the aim to contribute to the on-going debate on the 
role of women in natural resource governance. The chapter provides 
empirical material to highlight the fact that while women may not always 
be formally represented in formal institutional structures and their views 
not reflected in the formulation and enforcement of formal resource 
management institutions, they develop a variety of tactics and strategies 
that they use to influence the resource management structures. With the 
emergence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), where women 
cannot employ informal strategies, they seek assistance from such 
organisations.  
 
6.2. Gendered access to and control over resources and services 
in Romwe 
In Zimbabwe, more has been written on women and agriculture than on 
women and forestry and/or water. However, of late, the contribution of 
women and men as distinct social groups in the forestry and water sectors   179
                                                          
is increasingly being recognized (Goebel, 1998; Cleaver, 1998; Mvududu, 
1995). The role of women has received special attention because more 
women than men collect and use a variety of forest products (Fortmann & 
Bruce, 1993). Women are also more heavily involved and dependent on 
water resources than men (Sullivan, et al., 2001). Fortmann and Bruce 
(1993) observe that there is often a clear division of the use of trees and 
tree products according to gender. Women have the major responsibility 
for providing the household with tree products such as fuelwood, fodder 
and food. As a result, both they and their households suffer when they lose 
access to the trees that provide these products. Sullivan et al., (2001) 
highlight the important role that women play in ensuring the availability of 
water for domestic use in the household. Overlooking gender issues may 
produce a distorted picture in rural contexts where women and men in the 
same household may use the same natural resources for different purposes 
to fulfil their gender roles.  
 
Despite women’s role as primary natural resource users and managers, 
their entitlement to these resources is gained through marriage or some 
other male relation. Women’s lack of formal rights to natural resources 
such as land was historically underpinned by the definition of their legal 
status as minors during the colonial period. Although women now enjoy 
majority status at eighteen years through the provisions of the Legal Age of 
Majority Act (1982), they are still not customarily allocated land in their 
own right. Upon the death of a husband a widow does not gain entitlement 
to the land in customary law but only keeps it in trust for the male heir, 
usually the eldest son (Goebel, 1998; Moyo, 1995b). She may even be 
chased away by the relatives of the deceased. Thus, women’s access to 
resources tends to be dependent on their relationship with men.  
 
To determine who has access to and control over resources in Romwe, 
access and control profiles
50 were developed (Table 6.1). Often, access to 
and control over resources may influence who participates in decision-
making processes as well as in institutional structures that regulate access. 
 
50 Each item for each individual household member was scored out of ten. This was done with a focus 
group of eight women and six men and there were discussions around each particular item until the 
group reached some consensus.     180
Table 6.1: Access and control profiles in Romwe 
 
Resources Access  Control 
  M W B  G M W B  G 
Comments 
Dryland 
plots 
9 6 1 1 10  5 0  0  Mainly  elderly  men  control 
cropping fields. Women 
gain access to land mainly 
through marriage. This 
right is forfeited at divorce.  
Project 
garden 
plots 
3 10  1 1 4 10  2  2  Most  plots  are  registered  in 
women’s names. Women 
have control over the plots. 
Private 
gardens  
5 6 3 3 6 8 3  3  Accessible  to  both  women 
and men but women do 
most of the work. Children 
are often allocated small 
portions of the garden on 
which they grow crops of 
their own. 
Grazing 
areas 
10 10 10 10 9  5  2 2  For  all  non-sacred  areas, 
everyone has equal access. 
Mainly controlled by men 
and the sabukus. 
Firewood  10 10 10 10 9  9  1 1  Few  restrictions  for 
domestic use and more for 
sale. Children are also 
expected to police 
collection.  
Timber  10  5 5 0 10  1 1  0  Predominantly  used  and 
controlled by men.  
Thatch 
grass 
1 10  1 8 3 10  0  0  Women  control  thatch  grass 
and negotiations are mainly 
between various collectors, 
who are women.  
Mushrooms  1 10  0 8 1 10  0  0  Women  control  mushroom 
harvesting. Men were given 
a score because the sabuku, 
oversees, rule enforcement. 
Barura 
Dam 
10  9 9 9 10  7 1  0  Access  to  communal  water 
sources is open to both 
women and men. Control is 
by men and elected people. 
Borehole  10 10 10 10 10 10 1 1  Both  women  and  men 
control use of boreholes. 
Children ensure users abide 
by the rules. 
Private 
wells 
9  10 10 10 10 9  3 1  Women  have  slightly  better 
access to private wells for 
domestic uses. Well owners 
define users and uses.  
Extension 
services 
9 8 1 1 10  7 0  0  Extensionists  tend  to  target 
men while NGOs work 
closely with women. Men 
control access to services.   
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For dryland plots
51 women have access to these through their male 
relations. While this fact cannot be disputed, there is need for a critical 
examination of the power relations within households and clan structures, 
which may indicate how, gender differentiation influences culturally 
constructed land tenure processes. As Moyo argues, the call for land titles 
in both communal and resettlement areas to be registered in the names of 
both the husband and wife focuses on an atomisation of land tenure 
towards individuals within households, rather than challenging wider rural 
power relations and power bases as well as the institutional framework 
within which these power relations are operationalised (1995b: 26). 
Regarding garden plots, women have more control over plots in 
communally owned gardens as compared to privately owned gardens. The 
two community garden projects in Romwe were established through 
external support from the CEH and CARE International. On average plots 
allocated to members are approximately 36 m
2 per plot holder in Chidiso 
while in Barura the plot sizes average 42 m
2 per member. Types of crops 
grown in the community garden include a variety of leafy vegetables such 
as rape, covo, cabbage and tsunga, tomatoes, onions and maize that is 
consumed as green mealies. Produce from community gardens is for both 
household consumption and sale. Surplus produce is sold at Museva 
business centre (approximately 7 km away) and at Ngundu growth point 
(approximately 12 km away). The community garden plots are registered 
in the names of the project members, the majority of whom are women. For 
example, in Chidiso project, out of 50 original members, 42 are women, 
while in Barura project out of 109 members, 96 are women. The plots can 
be leased out or inherited but ‘officially’ cannot be sold.  
 
Given that the community garden plot holder has the right to lease or 
transfer ownership to children or relatives and the plot can be inherited by 
their children at the death of the plot holder, the plot holders have some 
autonomy over their plot. They can also make decisions regarding disposal 
of the plot, although decisions about what to grow are made by the group. 
Considering that women are the majority of plot holders, community 
garden projects are emerging as an important source of women’s power as 
women have more formal control and decision-making authority over those 
plots than the arable drylands and privately owned gardens. An analysis of 
community garden project management structures, as will be shown later in 
the chapter, also reveals that women are the majority in the garden 
committees. Observations made at community garden project meetings 
revealed that women are influential in decision-making related to these 
projects. Thus it is not a matter of having women as figure heads in these 
management structures, but they are actively involved in decision-making 
processes, not overlooking other power dynamics that may be at play in 
any group interaction processes.  
 
 
51 Dryland plot sizes range from 0.5 – 5 acres per household.   182
Regarding grazing areas, all household members are said to have equal 
access to grazing areas, but in reality, it is the livestock owning households 
that utilise the grazing areas the most. Considering that most livestock 
owners, especially for cattle, are men, this could explain why men have the 
most control over grazing areas. Women generally do not own cattle, but 
can own goats and chickens. In both the Shona and Ndebele cultures, 
women receive cattle from lobola paid for their daughters. This is a 
payment made to the mother by a son-in-law termed mombe 
yeumai/inkomo yohlanga (the cattle of motherhood). While women may 
keep these cattle, sometimes their husbands ask them to take them to their 
maternal homes, on the pretext that if they die, their relatives may claim the 
cattle. This could be seen as a way of limiting women’s economic power 
by men, as cattle are considered an important wealth indicator in both the 
Shona and Ndebele cultures.  
 
Women have better access to and control over woodland products such 
as firewood, thatch grass and mushrooms and this could be explained by 
their dominance in the collection of such products to fulfil their household 
responsibilities. Men mainly participate in firewood collection for 
commercial purposes, despite the illegality of such an activity as discussed 
in Chapter Five. Control over timber for construction is predominantly by 
men. Although commercialisation of timber for construction is said to be 
non-existent, in reality it happens in an indirect way because individuals 
are often hired to cut timber for other households. Thus in the process 
money changes hands.  
 
Both women and men appear to have fairly similar access to and control 
over water resources unlike in the case of arable drylands and grazing 
areas. Because women are the major collectors of water as shown in 
Chapter Four, they tend to have a better say regarding water related 
decision-making processes. While both women and men have similar 
access to extension services, men are said to have more control especially 
in cases where the extension workers are male. If the extension worker is a 
woman, men are said to exert less control over women’s interaction with 
the extension worker. This was confirmed by observations made while in 
the field when women would frequent the research campsite if female 
researchers were around and would rarely come to the campsite if only 
male researchers were around. During one field trip, some women were 
observed running to hide when they saw the researcher’s vehicle 
approaching. The researcher decided to stop and find out what was wrong. 
The women came out from behind the bush and said they ran to hide 
because they thought it was the male researchers. During the household 
interviews, female enumerators were often welcomed by women who 
commented that it was good that the team had sent female interviewers 
‘otherwise if it was those boys we would not talk to them freely’. This in a 
way points to the importance of the gender of the extension officers with 
regard to women’s participation in project activities and decision-making 
processes.    183
6.2.1 Gendered use of woodland products and resource areas in Romwe 
To begin thinking about how gender influences institutions and related 
structures for community-based natural resource management, it is 
important to visualise the natural resource spaces that women and men use. 
In this study, this was done through mapping of resource areas and 
products so as to capture the complexity of woodland resource landscape. 
Often, the conception of natural resources such as woodlands is that of 
discrete areas of trees located away from human settlement. In the 
Zimbabwean communal lands, including Chivi district, this is not the case. 
The miombo woodlands, which are characteristic of the savannah region 
are comprised of different tree areas in and around human settlement, 
grazing and arable land and in the hill areas. Resource areas highlighted by 
the community members in Romwe include the mountains, riverine areas, 
edges of arable land and grazing areas. People collect a wide variety of 
woodland products such as poles, firewood, thatch grass, wild fruits, 
mushrooms, herbal medicines, and fibre from these areas (Table 6.2). 
Access to these resource areas is gendered as women and men have distinct 
uses of these areas and differential control over their resources. These 
patterns of resource use have implications for women’s role in natural 
resource management institutions and related structures.  
 
Some of the information presented in table 6.2 has been discussed in a 
different context in Chapter Four in which a description of the Romwe 
landscape is provided. Based on their roles and responsibilities, women and 
men have different mobility patterns, which reflect gender differences in 
resource use and other division of labour such as in agriculture and cattle 
herding. The differential use of particular resource areas and products 
found in those areas leads to the association of certain spaces as 
predominantly women’s spaces and others as predominantly men’s spaces. 
Women’s spaces are not always clear-cut as is reflected in the gathering of 
non-timber forest products such as mushrooms, fruits and medicinal plants. 
These products are often collected in areas that are predominantly used by 
men such as Mapande mountain, which is used by men for grazing, poles 
and fibre. This has implications for woodland related management 
activities such as participation in the establishment and monitoring of 
resource management institutions. Despite this, women in the Romwe 
catchment are not actively represented in formal resource management 
institutional structures and are less likely to formally influence the 
establishment of institutions that regulate access to natural resources. 
Women therefore sometimes devise a variety of strategies that ensure their 
needs and interests are considered in resource management structures as 
well as contributing to the formulation and enforcement of resource use 
institutions.    
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Of the various resource areas, the hill areas emerge as the most important 
as more kinds of products in relatively large quantities are being gathered 
from these areas. People also depend on a variety of areas for the same 
products, indicating the interconnected nature of the resource areas. For 
instance women collect firewood from Mapande range, Barura, Romwe, 
Siyawarayira, Magegesa, and Chamanyoka hills. Similarly, both women 
and men use the same areas for different resources. For instance, Mapande 
range is used by women for collecting mushrooms and firewood while men 
use it for collecting fibre, poles and hunting of small game.
52 Institutions 
regulating access to these resource areas are either area or product specific 
or can be justified by sacredness or civil contracts (Fortmann & Nhira, 
1992). Fortmann and Nhira (ibid) suggest that utilization of woodlands in 
Zimbabwe’s communal areas illustrates overlapping tenurial niches. The 
concept of tenurial niches is used to describe property relationships and not 
the physical characteristics of the land or vegetation. For instance, while 
mushrooms found on Mapande hill have specific rules governing their 
harvesting, the whole mountain range also has rules that govern its use. In 
this case, rules governing access to mushrooms in Mapande specifically 
affect women while the other general rules such as not burning the area 
apply to both women and men. These findings point to the fact that women 
and men share natural resource spaces although they use different 
resources and may therefore be differentially affected by rules of access.  
 
Men are said to be more likely to break the rules regarding tree cutting 
because they prefer wet poles to dry poles for construction. As can be seen 
from Table 6.3, construction of structures was cited as the main reason why 
people break rules, followed by the need to generate income, activities that 
are predominantly men’s activities according to the gender division of roles 
in Romwe. The third reason for breaking rules was that some people are 
just defiant, with various other reasons as can be seen in Table 6.3. 
 
On the surface, men may appear to take a lead role in breaking rules as 
they are directly involved with tree felling for poles and wood for brick 
moulding and encroachment into grazing areas. Yet pressure to provide for 
their families and sometimes pressure from their wives may force them to 
break the rules. Women often collect dead wood for firewood. Often, 
women’s roles can be met without cutting live trees whereas men’s chores 
such as house construction can only be time consuming if wet wood is not 
used. Thus men are forced by the nature of their household responsibilities 
to cut wet wood. In some instances, men sell firewood while women 
predominantly collect wood for household use. Because men collect 
firewood for sale using scotchcarts, they need larger quantities of wood, 
which may not be easily found, if they concentrate on collecting dead 
wood. Thus men end up cutting wet wood to minimise the amount of time 
 
52 Officially people do not acknowledge that they hunt small game. They tell you ‘people steal small 
game but you should not write that down as it is like taking oneself to the police station after 
committing a crime’.     186
spent collecting firewood. Women collect head loads and thus find it easier 
to limit their harvesting to dead wood. 
 
Table 6.3. Reasons why people break woodland use rules 
 
Reason  Number of respondents 
citing reason (N = 42) 
Percentage of 
sample 
Need to construct structures  18  42.9 
Cannot afford alternatives (e.g. 
wire, bricks)  
2 4.8 
Scarcity of resources  1  2.4 
Commercial exploitation of 
resources 
3 7.1 
Brick firing encourages cutting of 
live trees  
2 4.8 
Christian influence   3  7.1 
Poverty/people need money  6  14.3 
Some people are just defiant  5  11.9 
Don’t know  2  4.8 
Total 42  100.0 
 
Men also play a larger role in sourcing land for the family. In the face of 
land shortage in the area, men have been found guilty of encroaching into 
some areas designated for grazing and woodland product collection. One 
example is that of a farmer whose use and privatisation of the common 
pool land resource in May 1999 resulted in conflict with the traditional 
leadership. In Tamwa village, the area above the Barura dam (which 
constitutes part of the dam catchment) was designated as a grazing area. 
Some local young men, however, claimed that the local sabuku had 
demarcated and reserved the area for his (the sabuku’s) sons to use as crop 
fields. One of these young men decided to clear that land for his crop field. 
He vowed to continue converting the grazing area as his own crop field 
even if the sabuku tried to stop him. This case is similar to other cases 
reported in Chapter Five involving a young man who established a well 
and a vegetable garden in a grazing area in Tamwa village in 1998. The 
sabuku is silent about the encroachment into the grazing areas and this has 
to a large extent weakened the position of local level institutions in 
resource management. The sabuku’s rules are sometimes broken because 
people feel they can afford to pay the fines, as they are often not very big 
fines, for instance for cutting a restricted tree individuals have often been 
fined Z$50 (US$0.90). The relatively low fines do not serve as a deterrent 
measure against potential offenders. In the majority of cases, interviewees 
first said rules are respected and adhered to but with further probing 
revealed that certain rules are broken as shown in Table 6.3.        187
6.2.2 Gender analysis of resource management institutional structures 
This section discusses natural resource management institutional structures 
found in the study area from a gender perspective. The study analyses the 
form and nature of membership in these structures as well as investigating 
who are the influential members of the structures in decision-making 
regarding access to natural resources and understanding why certain 
individuals are more influential than others. Three main categories of 
structures that were found to be prominent in Romwe are explored, namely, 
the traditional authority, local government administrative structures and 
project related structures such as the garden committees. The gender 
composition of membership was found to vary from one structure to the 
other as shown in Table 6.4.  
 
It is common to find women being elected into the position of treasurer 
in project related structures. This is because the position of treasurer is 
viewed as a ‘trying’ position that has to be given to a trustworthy person. 
Women are viewed as trustworthy with regard to management of money. 
The variation in the membership structures can be attributed to a number of 
factors that include the nature of the institutional structure’s role in 
resource management, composition of membership in the various contexts, 
personalities involved and the nature of kinship ties and other social 
networks that influence decision-making processes. 
 
Analysis of the composition of committees shows that most positions 
within these structures were obtained by local political elites at the expense 
of other social groupings. Because most project workshops are often run in 
English (although sometimes a mix of English and one of the local 
language is used) and project reports are written in English, community 
members may feel obliged to elect literate individuals, who may be able to 
represent the community at such meetings that are conducted in English. 
More often than not, individuals who are literate come from well-off 
families. Thus elected leadership may be skewed towards the more affluent 
members of the community. Committee members generally tend to be 
better placed as they have opportunities for more exposure than other 
community members. For example committee members often attend 
training workshops and other meetings, often held outside the village and 
may therefore be seen by other community members as assuming postures 
and behavioural patterns that project them as being superior to other 
villagers. T
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The following section analyses the gendered nature of the three broad 
institutional categories found in Romwe, namely the traditional authority, 
local government structures and NGO related project committees.  
 
Traditional authority 
Traditional authority positions are inherited and there is no history of 
women being for example, sabukus. Similarly, the majority of the rules are 
not formal rules but more ‘habits of the heart’, fitting within the broader 
moral economy of the community. Frameworks for understanding rule 
formulation processes tend to fragment rules e.g. rules for water, grazing, 
and trees, yet the traditional rules for resource access are viewed in a more 
holistic manner within the broader way of life in the community. The 
traditional regulatory mechanisms include explicit and implicit rules and 
taboos. 
 
There is some degree of social control over the traditional institutions 
and leadership. This occurs through reference to the power of the vadzimu 
(ancestral spirits) as well as other forms of social denunciation where 
decisions made by the traditional authority are not approved of. At the 
superficial level, traditional institutions may be seen as being oppressive to 
women due to lack of formal representation of women within their 
supporting structures, yet women often develop strategies for influencing 
the system or seek external intervention of NGOs, where they fail to exert 
their own influence. The Barura dam conflict discussed in Chapter Five 
illustrates some of the strategies used by women to ensure that they 
influence decision-making in relation to traditional institutions and natural 
resource management. In the Barura case, the garden project members, 
whose memberships are predominantly women, sought intervention of 
external agents when they felt disadvantaged by the traditional authority. 
Historically, traditional authority has been respected and rarely publicly 
challenged. With recent exposure to external NGO support, women now 
sometimes openly challenge certain decisions made by the traditional 
leaders. This case also illustrates that where women cannot employ internal 
strategies to influence decision-making processes, they rely on external 
development facilitators for support. In the Barura dam case referred to 
above, the women felt the traditional authority had treated them unfairly, 
thus they sought and received support from an external agent. An 
alternative would have been for the women to seek assistance from the 
dare (traditional village court), but there was no immediate assurance that 
their case would be treated positively as the dare is made up of elderly men 
only, who are unlikely to pass judgement in favour of women against a 
traditional leader. Women only participate as witnesses in the cases tried 
by the dare.  
 
Local government/modern institutions   
As discussed in Chapter One, the term ‘modern’ institutions in this thesis is 
used to refer to natural resource management institutions of the state such   190
as those instituted by the village development committees (VIDCOs) and 
ward development committees (WADCOs). In theory, VIDCOs and 
WADCOs are applauded as being truly democratic and allowing broad 
participation as individuals are elected into their positions. Yet in practice, 
these structures are upwardly accountable to the state and not downwardly 
accountable to the local community (Mandondo, 2001; Matondi, 2001; 
Ribot, 1999). A VIDCO consists of 7 elected committee members and 
represents about 100 households. Two of these 7 positions are reserved for 
the ruling party’s women and youth leagues. The reservation of seats for 
women is often referred to as the quota system and this refers to the 
predetermination of women’s representation in institutional structures. 
Because the majority of VIDCO chairpersons are men, and WADCOs 
consist of chairpersons of VIDCOs, male representatives dominate the 
WADCO membership.  
 
Councillors are the chairpersons of the WADCOs and these represent the 
ward at RDC level. At the time of the study, the whole of Chivi RDC had 
only one female councillor (out of a total of thirty councillors) who 
represents a ward that is classified under the Small Scale Commercial 
Farming Areas (SSCFAs), that have a different set-up from the communal 
areas, under which the Romwe catchment falls. SSCFAs were designated 
during the colonial period as commercial farming areas for the upcoming 
elite of African origin (equated to blacks). Thus composition of settlers in 
these SSCFAs was mixed, with people originating from different rural 
areas where they had been identified as qualifying for small-scale 
commercial farming, the majority of whom had Master Farmer certificates. 
Master Farmer certificates are certificates that were given to farmers of 
African origin who would have taken some course on agricultural 
production and had the potential of producing crops at a small-scale 
commercial level and not just for subsistence as is the case in the 
communal areas. Thus traditional values and cultural beliefs in such 
farming communities tend to be less influential as compared to the 
communal areas. This may explain why a woman could be elected as 
councillor in this area, yet none of the communal area wards in the district 
have a female councillor.  
 
The fact that one position in the VIDCO is reserved for women and 
another for the youth representative emanated from the numerous attempts 
by the government to make legal and institutional moves to promote 
gender equality (Jacobs, 1991). This was influenced by the socialist 
ideology of the revolutionary struggle and the role women played in the 
war of liberation. This early commitment to gender equality affected the 
formation of new local level institutions, thus often ruling party women’s 
league and youth wing representatives were voted in or co-opted into the 
VIDCO. While women have a specified seat in the VIDCO and WADCO, 
it is important to note that numbers do not always mean effective 
representation. The process of voting for members of the VIDCO is done 
by show of hands and thus lacks any privacy. People may therefore be   191
influenced by show of hands to vote for someone, not because they want to 
but because of peer pressure.  
 
In the Romwe catchment, the VIDCO was found to be inactive. For 
instance, the VIDCO held only two meetings during the research period 
where the process of decision-making could be observed. The first meeting 
was held to replace the VIDCO chairman who had died but this meeting 
was poorly attended. The second meeting was to compile a list of 
beneficiaries of the food-for-work programme. The food-for-work 
programme engages community members in projects such as road 
construction or rehabilitation in exchange for food. Such programmes have 
been found to be successful as long as there are material benefits. When 
such benefits run out, people stop participating. Thus, while we have 
women representatives in these committees, the committees do not do 
much, making it difficult to assess the women’s level of contribution to 
decision-making. Setting a quota for women to be represented in resource 
management structures also does not translate into participation of women 
in decision-making. While this is the case, the quota system may be used as 
an entry point to involve women in formal decision-making processes in 
the modern resource management structures. The quota system needs to be 
complemented by capacity building among women through e.g. leadership 
training. Quota setting to facilitate women’s representation in local 
structures may negatively influence people’s perceptions about women’s 
role in resource management institutional structures as community 
members seem to respect their own initiative in electing leaders more than 
external driven processes.  
 
The rural district council expects the VIDCO to enforce woodland use 
rules at the local level. This was found not to be the case on the ground and 
the current VIDCO chairman says there is no incentive to enforce rules 
because they are not paid, yet the members sacrifice time they could spend 
in fields and other household chores attending RDC workshops outside the 
area. The current VIDCO chairman threatened the councillor with 
resignation if their need for allowances was not addressed. In talking to his 
wife during his absence, the researcher observed that the wife might have 
pushed him to resign. For instance, she pointed out that she did not support 
the idea of her husband continuing as chairman of the VIDCO because all 
the meetings that he has to attend at the RDC hold up their household 
work, yet there is no pay. Their main house was blown away by heavy 
winds in November 2000, but up to September 2001 at the time of the 
interview, the house had not been repaired. Furthermore, before her 
husband became chairman of the VIDCO, she used to go to Museva 
business centre, about 5 km away, to sell vegetables and tomatoes. Now 
that she has to do more work at home, she can no longer go to Museva and 
thus has very little income of her own.  
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NGO related project institutional structures  
A number of structures set up by NGOs or other government departments 
were found in the study site. These include catchment management 
committees, dam management and garden committees. The process of 
establishing these structures theoretically involves democratic elections 
such as is the case with VIDCOs. Participants are free to choose people 
they want to be in committees and there are no pre-set conditions. NGO 
facilitators set the timeframe for the operation of these structures, which is 
often 2-3 years, but usually with the hope that they will be sustainable. In 
the majority of cases, election of members is done at community meetings. 
Similar to the VIDCO elections, voting during the project committee 
elections is done by show of hands. While this is considered a transparent 
process, the downside of this is that other people may vote in fear of being 
accused of voting for the wrong candidate and this may influence how 
some community members vote.  
 
Committee members often attend training workshops and other meetings 
at hotels or other venues outside the village – they thus have more 
exposure and are sometimes seen as viewing themselves as superior to 
other people in the community. Innovators in the community are often 
elected into NGO facilitated institutional structures. An innovator is 
defined as someone who takes a lead in initiating activities either at 
household level or at community level, for example in the case of the 
community mobiliser she developed water harvesting techniques that no 
one in the community had done before and she also does some 
experimentation with different varieties of seeds in her crop field. 
Innovators are sometimes seen as being “too forward” especially if they are 
women and do not have husbands and it is believed this is a result of lack 
of control over them by a man, e.g. the community mobiliser who is a 
widow. A community mobiliser is an individual who is chosen to facilitate 
project activities at community level and operates as an assistant to the 
CARE International programme officer. CARE International appointed the 
community mobiliser, based on her innovativeness in her own household 
and fields. Some of the local perceptions of female innovators are 
illustrated in the case presented below:  
 
Women leaders and innovators – the Romwe community mobiliser: One 
of the female leaders and innovators in Romwe is the community mobiliser 
for CARE International. She is a widow and her late husband was a soldier 
in the Zimbabwe national army. She is also a daughter-in-law of an 
influential kraal head Tamwa, is in her mid-40s and her household falls in 
wealth category one for the rich (see Annex 2 for the criteria of wealth 
ranking based on community perceptions of wealth). She owns a car, has 
positions in a number of committees and has attended many training 
workshops. She has primary school education and can therefore read and 
write. Her views are respected in community decision-making arenas but 
other community members do not copy all of her innovations. She often   193
                                                          
stands up in village meetings and speaks out in a polite way. Being polite is 
a strategy that has worked in ensuring she is listened to as people respect 
her for being cool and to the point. She is a former committee member of 
Simudzirayi loan scheme as well as a former committee member of Chidiso 
garden project. Currently she spends much of her time at Barura garden. As 
a result of being innovative, she has diverted water from Barura dam 
spillway for her own use and has a flourishing 2-acre plot of vegetables, 
sugarcane, citrus fruits, and maize, which she crops all year round (outside 
the Barura garden). Other farmers once raised concerns that she was using 
community water from the dam for her own private use and she argued that 
she was only using water spilling on its own from the dam. She uses her 
open truck to ferry her produce to the nearby markets. At times she is 
thought to be selfish e.g. she attended a leadership course organised by 
IES, yet she had attended a similar course before organised by CARE 
International. The IES field based research assistant had suggested that she 
give other community members a chance, but she refused and attended the 
course herself.  Overall, she is an innovative farmer who works with a 
variety of organisations on trials, e.g. maize seed trials with Seedco, drip 
irrigation with the Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG), 
wheat trials and indigenous tree planting with IES. Because of being a 
progressive farmer, she interacts with many external agents that have 
predominantly male officers and thus has been accused of being a 
prostitute, especially by men in the community. This was confirmed by one 
sabuku who called the field based male IES research assistant and said to 
him ‘My son, you have to be careful with some women that you work with. 
We know them they are not good. They have had love affairs with many 
people and they may disturb your work’. In checking with other women for 
their perspective on this, one married woman noted that “Amai ava 
vanoshanda nesimba tese takatarisa. Hama dzavo nevanhu vane jealous 
vavakuti ifambi’ (This woman is such a hard working person. It is her 
jealous relatives who accuse her of being a prostitute
55). Besides gaining 
power through her assets and other resources she owns, the community 
mobiliser also has alliances and networks that help her establish authority 
within formal decision-making arenas. She also projects the image of a 
subordinated woman and accommodates social expectations of her (self-
image) in a non-threatening way for local men through her soft-
spokenness. This allows her to ensure that her interests and those of other 
women are defended. Being soft-spoken is a strategy that helps her wield 
power without openly threatening the status quo. 
 
Women in the NGO facilitated committees are proving to be very 
assertive. This may be partly due to the fact that membership in externally 
facilitated projects tends to be predominantly women and committee 
members receive formal training on leadership skills and also attend 
 
55 Quoting Kabeer (1988), Agarwal (1994, p292) highlights a similar case where a widow in 
Bangladesh was accused of having an affair with her brother-in-law as a way of forcing her to 
move from the land she had inherited from her late husband.   194
confidence-building courses. To a large extent, intervention by NGOs has 
changed the institutional outlook in the Romwe area. Historically, women 
have been less assertive in formal decision-making arenas and less 
represented in local resource management structures. NGOs have created 
space for women’s participation in resource management structures in 
Romwe through encouraging women’s election into project committees. 
Although women have started off as leaders in projects with predominantly 
female membership, such as gardens, this may be a starting point for 
empowering women to be more active even in arenas that have a mix of 
women and men. Decision-making processes and participation in resource 
management in general may also be influenced by self-images that women 
and men have of each other and of themselves. The study therefore 
investigated the self-images of women and men in Romwe. 
 
6.3 Self-images of women and men  
The study investigated the perceptions that women and men have of each 
other as well as of themselves referred to here as self-images. The self-
images of women and men influence the institutional framework and 
decision-making processes as they define who should make what decisions. 
These self-images often influence the establishment of management 
structures that are often put in place through the so-called democratic 
processes where people are voted into leadership positions. The majority of 
management structures in CBNRM, such as the catchment management 
committees, dam, borehole, garden and grazing committees as well as other 
externally facilitated structures such as the village and ward development 
committees use the system of elections to put in place the leadership of 
these structures. The self-images of women and men in a given community 
may influence which individuals are elected into leadership positions. Thus 
it was found important to assess the self-images of women and men in 
Romwe. 
 
The groups that were involved in generating self-images comprised a mix 
of people with differing marital status including the married, single, 
widowed and divorced. The author is aware that if a similar exercise is 
done with groups divided according to marital status, a different picture 
may emerge. Given that the process of establishing institutional structures 
involves people with differing marital status e.g. in the election process, for 
the purposes of this study, the self-images were generated through these 
mixed groups. Ages of participants ranged from 25 years to 60 years. Two 
groups of fifteen women and twelve men separately generated the self-
images. The question that was put forward to separate groups of women 
and men was ‘If you hear the word woman/man what comes to your mind 
first?’ The self-images generated appear to have been based on the 
household level, even though the question put forward to the groups was 
general and not specific to the household level. What happens at the 
household level often influences activities and decision-making processes   195
at the community level. Results from the group exercises are presented in 
Table 6.5. 
 
Table 6.5. Self-images of women and men 
 
When you hear the word “woman” what comes to mind first? 
Women’s group:  
- Heavy workload  
- A home is a woman (Musha 
mukadzi)  
- Many problems that women face 
- Is paid lobola
56 (bride wealth) for 
- Responsible for the upkeep of the 
whole family 
- The beauty of a woman  
- Responsible for planning  
- Child bearing 
- Training & socialising children 
- Brings unity in the family 
- A married man is more respected  
- Hard life 
- Feeding children 
- Raising children 
- Family healthcare 
Men’s group: 
- Helper (Mubatsiri) 
- Responsible for cooking and healthcare 
- Responsible for laundry 
- Respected person (mudzimai anoremekedzwa) 
- Temptations (mhosva) 
- Looks after the home 
- Offering love (kunyenga) 
- I will be looked after 
- Child bearing 
- An associate 
- Feel happy (kunzwa mufaro) 
- Lobola  
- Parent 
- A home is a woman (Musha mukadzi). 
When you hear the word “man” what comes to mind first? 
Women’s group: 
- Breadwinner 
- Decision-maker (Mutongi)  
- Oppressor (Mudzvanyiriri)  
- Cares for the family  
- Planner 
- Leader (Mutungamiri) 
- Owner of everything 
- A harsh person (hasha)  
- Someone who controls 
- Head of the household (musoro 
wemba) 
- A home without a man is not 
respected 
Men’s group: 
- Problem solver 
- Breadwinner (muriritiri) 
- King -ndiMambo 
- Controller 
- Leader 
- The clan bearer (Musikarudzi)  
- Full of ideas 
- Fighter 
- Household head (musimboti wemusha) 
- A lot of power 
- Hunter 
- Friend (sahwira) 
-Dishonest – cannot be trusted 
- Hero (Gamba) 
- God’s important creation (Chisikwa chikuru) 
 
From the women’s perspectives, emphasis is on the multiple roles that 
women play and the problems they encounter, while men are seen as 
leaders, decision-makers, and controllers. The women highlight their 
commitment to the survival of the family through their reproductive roles, 
that is, both the social and biological roles. In both women’s and men’s 
groups, the Shona expression ‘musha mukadzi’ (a home is a woman) came 
                                                           
56    Lobola has been perceived as an instrument of ‘buying women’s rights and obligations’ into clans 
and along with this perception goes the view that women do not ‘naturally’ hold land rights in their 
husbands’ territories. Yet even in their maternal home areas women tend to be denied individual 
land rights. Thus women gain access to key productive resources such as land on the basis of 
patronage and the largesse of their husbands, fathers and other patriarchs (Moyo, 1995b).    196
                                                          
out, which may be interpreted as some form of encouragement for women 
to accept their status and position in the society, as well as the nature of 
their workload. Sometimes the use of the concept of musha mukadzi is a 
social control mechanism to keep women happy in their position in relation 
to men in the household. The women’s group seemed to realise the cultural 
necessity of a woman to a man (that a woman is paid lobola for). The 
women see a man as a person who controls household resources as well as 
its members. A man is the household head who has the interest of the 
family in mind when he is planning. The men’s self-images also highlight 
the imbalance of power between women and men, with men having the 
upper hand. Women view men as oppressors and this may be related to the 
tendency by men to suppress women’s views in formal decision-making 
arenas.   
 
The self-images appear to be influenced by traditional values and cultural 
beliefs that influence practices and the patterns of interaction between 
women and men. Self-images of women from the men’s group that portray 
a woman as a ‘helper’ substantiates men’s views that women should abide 
by what their husbands or male relatives tell them to do. There is a general 
perception that a man who lets a woman make decisions is weak or has 
been given some love potion to tame him
57. This was sometimes reflected 
in public gatherings such as village or project meetings where women’s 
contributions to debates were not taken seriously except for a few 
prominent ones like the community mobiliser. Because the mobiliser (a 
widow) is one of the few exceptional women leaders in the community and 
also hard working in terms of agricultural production, when other 
community members refer to her they say ‘that woman is a man in herself’. 
Sitting positions at community meetings are also influenced by the self-
images of women and men and these were also observed during the study. 
The sitting arrangements tell a story about social relations in a given 
community. In Romwe, women sat on the ground while men sat on chairs, 
or other elevated positions at village meetings. This is perceived as the 
traditional or cultural way of doing things but it also signifies women’s and 
men’s different positions in community social and political interactions, 
with men often viewed as the dominant group.   
 
Quotations from the bible were sometimes used to justify why women 
should not be in the forefront in decision-making processes. For instance, 
the men’s group argued that a woman is supposed to be a helper to her 
husband because the bible in Genesis 2 verse 18 says when God created 
man, he said ‘I will make him a helper fit for him
58’ and not what we see 
today where women go off trading to such far off places as Beitbridge 
(about 300 km from Romwe). Because most women in the village go to 
 
57 Goebel (2002) documents perceptions on the use of husband taming herbs in a resettlement area in 
Zimbabwe. The husband taming herbs are designed to control husbands’ behaviour and promote 
love and harmony in marriage (ibid: 463). 
58 This quotation came from the man’s group, which was raised during the plenary session.   197
                                                          
one church or another, the belief that God created a woman to be a man’s 
helper appears to be entrenched in the community although there are a few 
exceptional cases. The men’s group noted that church is good because it 
teaches women to respect their husbands. While there was a general 
perception that men are supposed to be the leaders, the women’s group also 
highlighted that this does not apply to all men because vamwe varume 
mazita chete (some men are just men by name). Such men cannot even 
fend for their families. Observations at community meetings revealed that 
some men are despised and sometimes when they stand up to speak, even 
women who are culturally expected to sit and listen when a man speaks, 
will grumble and make noises that will force that man to sit down.  
 
The illustration of women going out of the village for trading purposes as 
something negative from the men’s viewpoint may also influence who 
participates in community projects’ leadership positions. This is because 
often people elected into leadership positions have to represent the village 
at project meetings and attend training workshops, the majority of which 
are held outside the village. Often training workshops e.g. on leadership 
and project management are held outside the village at venues deemed 
convenient for participants from different project sites in the district. This 
may restrict participation of married women, as their spouses may not be 
willing to let them attend such meetings. Besides, their household 
responsibilities of child caring may also be restrictive. Often the budgets 
for NGOs do not cater for women with small children who may need baby-
sitting arrangements. Thus participation of potential female leaders with 
small children may be restricted if meetings and training workshops are 
held outside the village
59. Because of such constraints, women elected into 
leadership structures tend to be single, widowed or divorced or those that 
have grown up children.  
 
Further discussions around the women’s and men’s self-images helped 
explain the nature and patterns of interaction between women and men 
especially in public arenas. It was noted that at community meetings, 
women have a tendency to go with the wind – accepting ideas that often 
come from men. After community meetings, women often share their 
opinions on decisions taken and if they are not happy, they may just decide 
to ignore those decisions. It was common to see women congregating at 
some homestead before or after a meeting for tea. During the tea time, a 
diversity of issues are discussed and often some opinions may be formed 
even prior to a large community meeting. In some of the meetings 
attended, the researcher observed the proceedings in terms of who did most 
of the talking and whose views were taken on board and often it would be a 
few individuals from powerful kinship groups in the community. The 
majority of women would not be speaking out loudly although they 
 
59 It is worth noting that restricted participation in workshops for women with small children does not 
apply to rural women only. This also applies to professional women as the author herself went 
through similar experiences.    198
                                                          
sometimes grumbled where they did not agree with some point, but would 
rarely stand up and express their view. In asking some women after one 
community meeting why they did not express their views during the 
deliberations, some women gave the following responses.
60  
 
“I wanted to speak. I was going to tell them the truth, they 
know me, I am not afraid. I raised my hand many times but no 
one gave me a chance to speak.” Mbuya Simba
61, about 60 
years old.  
 
“You don’t dare to speak when they are speaking (referring to 
the members from a powerful kinship group – referred to as 
Zvidza zvopo). Today was nothing; often they are worse at 
other meetings. Once I tried to speak and I was threatened by 
one of them and I just sat down embarrassed. Now I just keep 
my mouth shut.” MaiPeter, about 45 years old.  
 
“This family is really a problem (referring to a family that fall 
under the Zvidza zvopo group). I looked at you people from 
IES and I felt pity for you because you do not understand the 
politics here. You should not get angry at what they do – it is 
just politics.” MaiLisa in her mid-thirties.  
 
Source: follow-up informal discussions after a meeting 
held on 16 February 2001 to discuss the community loan 
scheme. 
 
Decisions made in public arenas are sometimes difficult to implement 
because women agree but when they get to their homes they convince their 
husbands to change their minds. The men’s group discussion revealed that 
the problem with discussions at community meetings is that women 
sometimes behave according to the self-images i.e. perceptions of what 
women should or should not do in public and the gathering reaches some 
consensus and passes resolutions. But ‘when each one of us goes home (in 
the bedroom), your wife will say to you, whatever you agreed on does not 
make sense and if you want to be part of those resolutions passed you may 
as well go and stay with the sabuku (or who ever was facilitating the 
meeting). That is why some things do not work in the village’. This 
comment was made in relation to discussions and resolutions that had been 
passed regarding strict enforcement of rules relating to use of woodland 
products following a spate of commercialisation of some products such as 
firewood by especially young married men who have limited livelihood 
options. While the men may want to stop the sale of wood, the need for 
 
60 Quoted in Sithole’s (2002) manual on making sense of micro-politics in multiple stakeholder groups. 
61 Mbuya Simba is also referred to in Chapter Five in relation to her field expansion into a common 
pool woodland area.    199
                                                          
survival and pressure from their wives to fend for their families may force 
them to continue.  
 
Where men are culturally or traditionally considered ‘leaders’ (as 
portrayed in the self-images) in both public and private arenas, it becomes 
increasingly problematic for women to challenge the status quo in public or 
seek to achieve goals higher than those set for them predominantly by the 
male discourse. When women do challenge the existing order, for example, 
being innovators or ‘good’ leaders like the female community mobiliser, 
there is often some resistance from those who benefit from the status quo. 
Sometimes the women who challenge the existing order such as the 
community mobiliser through her leadership qualities and innovativeness, 
are accused of succeeding through illicit means. An implicit factor in the 
nature of relations between women and men is that cultural definitions of 
gender, as reflected in the self-images, are not only creations of one group 
and a manipulative aspect of social relations, but they are also useful 
mechanisms to keep checks and controls on some actors, either as 
individuals or groups.  
 
The overall impact of the self-images discussed above regarding 
decision-making processes is that they restrict women’s participation in 
formal decision-making arenas. Lack of participation in formal and public 
arenas does not necessarily imply women do not influence decision-
making processes. Because women are often viewed as ‘helpers’, 
especially the married ones, they prefer to be quiet in formal arenas rather 
than being outspoken and risk being rebuked in public, yet they may 
influence their husbands in private arenas. This may explain why the 
majority of the outspoken women in public arenas are widows or single 
women
62 as the public arenas are the main opportunity for them to 
influence decision-making processes as they may have fewer opportunities 
to arm-twist men in the private arenas. Sometimes single women (either 
divorcees or those who have never been married) can be rebuked if they 
are too outspoken and told that is the reason why they are not married. This 
may restrict how much single women can say in public arenas. For 
example a former treasurer of a community loan scheme indicated at one 
meeting that she had records of who had repaid and who had not repaid the 
loans and wanted to read out the names. One member of a powerful kinship 
group in the area, who had not repaid stood up and told her to sit down and 
stop acting the wise one, adding that, that is why she does not have a 
husband. The woman cried and threw the books into the air indicating that 
she no longer wanted the treasurer position. None of the community 
leaders present challenged the man. Widows may therefore sometimes be 
better positioned in public arena decision-making than the single women.  
 
 
62 About 25% of the household heads in Romwe are widows (Romwe Household Livelihood Survey, 
1999-2000).    200
Besides influencing decision-making processes, the self-images also 
influence who does what in the household. For instance, married women 
are generally expected to contribute to the household requirements in small 
ways that do not threaten the male dominance. Usually men do not allow 
their wives to invest in big items such as buying cattle because if the 
woman dies, her relatives would want to inherit the cattle. Thus men prefer 
to have women spend their income on perishables such as the household 
food and kitchen utensils.   
 
6.4 Social networks influencing resource management decisions 
Social networks have recently emerged as an intriguing institutional 
arrangement whose influence on what goes on in the village with regard to 
access to woodland and water resources has often been overlooked. 
Cleaver (1998:350) argues that within the institutional literature, there is a 
tendency to concentrate on formal structures, committees, constitutions and 
property rights as mechanisms for reducing transaction costs and 
institutionalising cooperative interactions. Such a focus is viewed as being 
prescriptive, formalised institutional arrangements being considered more 
likely to be robust and enduring than informal ones. Yet in practice, there 
are a plethora of rural social networks with different forms, structures, and 
histories of existence. Social networks that were identified in Romwe are 
presented in Table 6.6. 
 
The social networks identified during the study are not necessarily 
structured or tailored to suit natural resource management, but often have 
indirect influence on CBNRM institutions and could also be adapted for 
the purposes of woodland and water resource management. The majority of 
these social networks depend on uncodified rules and norms, some of 
which are based on regular practice in the everyday existence of villagers. 
Many of the villagers, especially women and other disadvantaged groups 
participate in a variety of social networks for livelihood sustenance within 
the rural landscape. In the case of Romwe, social networks and interactions 
were found to be relatively strong and are based on kinship ties, ethnicity, 
period of residence in the area, totem sharing and other various forms of 
social classification such as those described in Chapter Three. Matondi 
(2001) finds that in Shamva district in the Mashonaland province in north-
eastern Zimbabwe, social networks and interactions are much stronger 
between people who share the same totem. It is worth noting that social 
networks and relationships are far from being deterministic as they are 
often influenced by micro-politics and availability of natural resources at a 
given time. 
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Table 6.6. Examples of networks identified in Romwe  
 
Type Participants  Function  Problem/Comment 
Burial society  Older men 
and women 
Help families during 
and after funeral with 
both material and 
moral support 
These were originally 
informal but with the increase 
in deaths due to HIV/AIDS
63, 
now some have constitutions 
to ensure good management.  
Work parties 
(nhimbe) 
Women, 
men and 
youth 
Assist in activities 
such as ploughing, 
weeding, harvesting, 
and spreading manure 
Suffer from privatisation of 
labour by the rural elite. 
Beer parties 
(ndari) 
Older men 
and older 
women 
Meetings during beer 
drinking parties 
Evolve from one 
household to another 
Entertainment sources 
These are often a source of 
mobilisation for traditional 
leadership. Discussions from 
here may influence formal 
decision-making processes.  
Well 
(matsime) 
meetings  
Women and 
girls 
Fetching water 
meetings 
Gossiping about 
diverse village issues 
Not taken seriously by men, 
may influence formal arenas. 
May result in village 
conflicts. 
Livestock 
herding 
(madzoro) 
Men and 
boys 
Labour mobilisation to 
assist each other with 
herding cattle 
Confused by the elite who 
have capacity to hire paid 
labour. 
Traditional 
rituals 
(huruva) 
Older men 
and older 
women past 
menopause 
Rain making 
ceremonies 
Where necessary, 
appeasing spirits 
Do not have respect of the 
youth. Are sometimes viewed 
as beer drinking sessions. 
Family friend 
(sahwira) 
Men and 
women 
Unrelated to family 
that help in various 
household errands 
Fizzling out due to 
commercialisation. 
Totem 
sharing 
Both women 
and men 
Unrelated people who 
share the same totem. 
Assist each other e.g. 
with draught power, 
food or labour 
These are not very strong in 
Romwe and this can be 
attributed to mixed ethnicity 
of the catchment residents. 
Religious 
networks e.g. 
church goers 
Majority are 
women 
Moral support during 
bereavement.  
Assist each other to 
meet household needs 
These are quite important 
these days as a result of many 
deaths assumed to be 
HIV/AIDS related. 
Tea groups  Women  Arenas for gossiping 
Provide moral support 
Often held prior to or 
after community 
meetings to reflect on 
deliberations 
Discussions from these 
networks may influence 
formal decision-making 
processes. 
Often occur randomly – not 
planned in advance. 
Kinship based 
cliques e.g. 
zvidzazvopo
64 
Both women 
and men 
May be used to defend 
or consolidate kin-
based interests 
May be retrogressive to 
development or collective 
action initiatives. 
 
 
                                                           
63   58 of the 127 (46%) catchment households have lost one or more members of the family between 
1997 and 2001. 
64  See Chapters Three and Five for the discussion of social classification of households in Romwe.   202
 
While burial societies have a long history in Zimbabwe, an increase has 
been seen in recent years due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. People pay a 
joining fee and thereafter make monthly contributions. For example, in 
Romwe, the Dobhani village burial society had a monthly contribution of 
Z$2 (US$0.36) per member as of April 2002. The money contributed is 
used to cover most of the burial costs of the members or their immediate 
family. Often the money is used to buy food to feed people during the 
mourning days or buy a coffin, in cases where the bereaved family cannot 
afford to buy a coffin. By providing emergency financial and non-financial 
support, burial societies find practical ways to minimise social tensions and 
strengthen family and kinship relations. In the burial society community, 
the social process of providing emergency financial and non-financial 
relief is therefore more than an instrumental task; it is a nuanced cultural 
process that redefines kin and family social relations. Burial societies have 
traditionally been informal with members ranging from ten families and 
above. With the emergence of HIV/AIDS and increase in the occurrence of 
death, burial societies are becoming more formal with some establishing 
constitutions that guide their operations. The burial societies are said to be 
important especially by women who often have to carry the burden of 
taking care of people during funerals as members of these societies often 
come together and assist one another with work such as cooking, fetching 
water or firewood for the funeral. Relationships developed in these burial 
societies may influence decision-making processes at community level as 
views maybe based on cliques formed during interation in these informal 
arenas.  
 
Another form of social networks found important for women are the 
work parties (nhimbe). These social networks are referred to as work 
parties because while people work hard, they also have a good time 
socialising during the process. These work parties are often organised 
around household activities such as agricultural production, ploughing, 
weeding, harvesting and so forth. This is a way of addressing labour 
shortages. Often an individual or household who organises a work party 
brews beer or prepares some food and invites other community members to 
participate in a particular activity. The composition of participants is based 
on other criteria that influence interaction in the village such as residence 
in the same geographical areas, being biologically related, or other forms 
of friendship. In Romwe, these work parties have of late been impacted 
upon by the privatisation of labour by the rural elite, who can afford to pay 
for labour. Thus the poor and those who cannot afford to hire labour tend 
to be impacted upon in a more negative way.  
 
Beer parties are still important social networks where a diversity of issues 
are discussed. These are more widespread during the dry season (off peak 
agricultural season), especially during years of good harvest. It is believed 
that even the most shy person, after one or two beers, will open up and 
express their views. Often discussions from the beer parties may influence   203
decision-making processes that take place at formal community gatherings. 
It is mostly the older women and men who participate in these beer parties 
as younger women prefer to go to church instead. Beer parties were found 
to be more a source of mobilisation for traditional leaders’ views and ideas 
as well as legitimation of leadership positions.   
 
Water source meetings, e.g. at wells, boreholes and other water sources, 
are mostly networking arenas for women and girls because they collect 
water on a daily basis for domestic use. It is common to see women 
walking to water sources in small groups of twos or threes and during this 
time, there are many issues that are discussed and opinions may be formed 
around certain issues. Often women go to fetch water at similar times of 
the day, e.g. early in the morning or late afternoon. Thus there are often 
groups of women gathering at water sources during certain times of the day 
and a lot of gossip goes on at these informal meetings. Sithole (1997) 
documents in greater depth the role and importance of these informal 
meetings that take place at the wells. Sithole (ibid)’s study showed that 
during discussions at wells, if there is an issue at stake in the community at 
a particular time, women may strategise as to how they should respond to 
the issue and even suggest who should present the women’s views in 
formal arenas. Thus in a way, the informal meetings at wells may influence 
what happens in the community at large. While these well meetings may be 
a source of power for women, often discussions from such arenas are 
viewed by men as ‘women’s gossip’ and may therefore not be taken 
seriously by men. But these are important forums for women’s networking. 
Scott (1985:282) notes that gossip may be some form of symbolic 
resistance. Gossip is said to be never disinterested, but rather it is a partisan 
effort by a group or faction to advance its claims and interests against those 
of others (ibid). For the weak, gossip may be a way of expressing their 
opinion, of contempt and disapproval while minimising the risks of 
identification and reprisal. This is because the source of gossip is often not 
known or cannot be identified. 
 
Similar to work parties, group livestock herding arrangements (madzoro) 
serve the purpose of labour mobilisation. These are more common among 
the men during school term when adults have to herd cattle while children 
are at school. The village elites, who have the capacity to hire labour for 
livestock herding, have weakened these networks.  
 
Traditional rituals include rainmaking ceremonies, appeasing the 
ancestral spirits, masukafosholo (literally translated, this means cleansing 
the tools used during a burial ceremony) or observing rest days following 
burial of a deceased relative. Christianity and modernisation have impacted 
upon and weakened traditional ritual networks. Rituals such as rain making 
ceremonies are no longer common. Other ceremonies like masukafosholo 
that are held after the death of a household member where beer has to be 
brewed and a beast slaughtered have also been impacted upon negatively 
by the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Because households are losing members on a   204
more frequent basis (sometimes 3 members in a year), many households 
can no longer afford to host such functions, as it would mean slaughtering 
a beast on each occasion. Similarly, observing rest days after burial is no 
longer done because of the increase in the number of funerals. For instance, 
during the two weeks spent in the village for fieldwork, the researcher 
would attend about four to five funerals especially during 2000 and 2001. 
If the rest days were observed, this means farmers would not be able to 
engage in farming operations.  
 
Family friendship (sahwira) and totem sharing often involve unrelated 
individuals. Family friendship involves long standing friends that help each 
other with household errands. In recent years, these have succumbed to 
commercialisation of e.g. labour. Totem sharing involves unrelated 
individuals who share the same totem and these often assist each other with 
draught power, food and other forms of material and moral support. The 
totem sharing networks were found to be not very strong in Romwe and 
this could be due to the mixed ethnicity and the history of in-migration into 
the area by people from different parts of the country, with different 
cultural backgrounds and beliefs. Religious networks are predominantly for 
women and these serve a variety of purposes such as moral and material 
support during bereavement. These have become even more important due 
to HIV/AIDS.  
 
Tea groups are ad hoc gatherings often with no prior planning or 
arrangements. Sometimes women may be going somewhere and stop at one 
household to greet a friend or neighbour and end up having tea and some 
socialising. These are mainly women’s networks and were found to be 
powerful in Romwe and they are arenas for strategising by women. For 
instance, some women were often seen drinking tea at the home of the 
Chidiso garden vice chairwoman and further investigations revealed that 
those women advise the vice chairwoman on what actions to take at 
community meetings. For example, in one instance, some women were 
seen drinking tea at the vice chairwoman’s house prior to a meeting 
organised to discuss change in the leadership of Chidiso project. It is 
believed (by other project members) that those women advised the vice 
chairwoman to reject the proposition to change the leadership and they 
promised to support her views. This gave the chairwoman more courage to 
reject the idea at the meeting and the garden committee was retained. These 
tea groups also formed unplanned at the campsite when female researchers 
were around and these became a source of information and village gossip 
for the female researchers. 
 
Kinship based cliques is a concept used to refer to the networks that form 
around kinship ties. These were more evident for kinship groups that are 
considered powerful in the village. These kinship cliques may be used to 
defend or consolidate kin-based interests and resource claims. Such 
networks could be retrogressive to development or collective action as was 
seen in the case of the Simudzirayi micro-credit scheme discussed by   205
Mutamba  et al., (2000) and Sithole (2002). These kinship based 
associations, friendships and other networks presented in table 6.6 
contribute to the formation of webs of interaction, which commit the actors 
involved to certain social groupings, and clusters where information is 
jointly processed and this may have some important influence on what 
happens in formal decision-making arenas. Specific scripts often produced 
and reproduced within these social networks contain informal regulations, 
social codes and the legitimation of discursive strategies. Women’s 
commitments to specific networks shape their practices and influence their 
views of CBNRM initiatives and the related institutional framework within 
which CBNRM is implemented. The women draw upon these networks 
and rework them in response to their immediate needs and use them 
whenever possible to achieve certain levels of control.  
 
6.5. Identifying women’s niches in institutional processes 
Recent perspectives on CBNRM initiatives question the representativeness 
of resource management institutional structures, especially at the local 
level (Narayan, 2000; Mukamuri, 2000). This literature argues that the 
more powerful members of a society may create institutions in order to 
regularise and entrench mutually beneficial relationships. Thus institutions 
do not necessarily serve the needs and interests of all, but only enough 
influential persons to ensure their preservation. Women and other poor 
groups are often excluded from formal natural resource management 
institutions, which may be influenced by the self-images of women and 
men. As a result, women have restricted access to key natural resources 
such as land. In such situations, women sometimes devise strategies (both 
intentionally and unintentionally) to ensure they gain access to key 
resources such as land. Some of these strategies identified in Romwe 
involved women participating in community projects such as gardens, 
where they are allocated plots in their own right and the plots are registered 
in their names. Thus through these projects, women ‘own’ land, a right that 
they are often denied when it comes to arable land for rainfed agriculture. 
There has been widespread investment in community garden projects by a 
number of NGOs throughout the country over the last decade (Drescher, 
1998).  
 
An important role of the community garden projects that has often been 
overlooked is their contribution to the social welfare and independence 
especially of women and children (Drescher, 1998). Examples of garden 
projects implemented elsewhere in Zimbabwe include, those facilitated in 
Mutoko district (in Mashonaland East province) by Coopibo a Belgian 
funded organisation, the Buhera district (Masvingo province) projects 
funded by Canadian Hunger Foundation and Zimbabwe Freedom from 
Hunger Campaign, United Methodist projects in Mutare district 
(Manicaland province), Oxfam Canada (country-wide), Christian Care in 
Manicaland, Mashonaland, Masvingo, Midlands and Matebeleland North 
provinces. These are just a few examples and it is worth noting that during   206
                                                          
the course of the research, the author did not come across documentation 
providing a comprehensive list of garden projects in Zimbabwe. In Chivi 
district, CARE International also has a number of other garden projects 
besides those found in Romwe. At the time of the study, CARE 
International had assisted with the establishment of a total of thirty garden 
projects (linked to the rehabilitation of small dams for servicing the 
gardens) in the whole of Chivi district. Examples of garden projects found 
in Romwe are the Chidiso and Barura garden projects described below.  
 
The Chidiso garden project: Membership in Chidiso is predominantly 
female and the members’ own plots in their own right. Project members 
point out that they have benefited from the garden and collector well since 
they now have a perennial and reliable source of water. They also get cash 
income from the sale of vegetables as well as supplementing their dietary 
needs. Farmers participating in the garden are from the three biophysical 
catchment villages. While membership is predominantly women (42 
women out of 50 plot holders), formal decision-making in this committee 
is dominated by the most influential sabuku in the catchment, who is the 
garden chairman, and the vice-chairwoman. It is rumoured that the 
chairman and vice chairwoman of the project have a strong personal 
relationship, thus decision-making is not transparent. The vice-chairwoman 
also belongs to a powerful kinship group
65 in the catchment. No one in the 
community wants to challenge members of this kinship group and the 
reasons given for this reluctance are that the family is well connected 
politically and they are also close kin to two of the three catchment 
sabukus. As discussed in Chapter Five, one of the four brothers from this 
family has usurped the position of one of the sabukus. Another of the four 
brothers, a teacher and former councillor in the district also had political 
connections gained while he was councillor. In addition, the vice-
chairwoman also has her own cliques of women (such as the tea groups 
that often congregate at her home) that she associates with and sometimes 
gets advice from them. For instance, one informant commented that, ‘the 
vice chairperson has some people who discuss with her Chidiso project 
management and give her ideas on what decisions to make. When you see 
them drinking tea in her kitchen, you know that they are giving her advice’ 
(informal discussion with the vice chairperson’s daughter-in-law, 
03/09/2001). All these different individuals involved create strong 
networks that influence decision-making processes in the catchment. The 
majority of the decisions relating to Chidiso garden are therefore often 
made outside the formal arenas and this has, for instance, given the two 
leaders for Chidiso garden the opportunity to push their ideas and interests 
forward. Reacting to this set up, some original members who are not happy 
with decision-making processes are now subletting their beds to ‘tenants’ 
because they do not want to give up their claims to the land in the garden, 
yet they refuse to be part of the garden decision-making process. At the 
 
65 Members of this kinship groups are referred to as Zvidzazvopo (the powerful ones) and members 
from this group claim that no substantive decisions can be made without their involvement.   207
time of the study, approximately seventy percent of the plot users were 
tenants, but they do not have the right to vote. Therefore, they cannot 
influence decision-making processes. This may partly explain the 
persistence of bad leadership in Chidiso. The majority of the original 
members have moved to Barura garden where decision-making processes 
are said to be more transparent. In addition, the method of watering in 
Barura garden is a lot easier as they use a flood irrigation system, while in 
Chidiso they have to pump water from the borehole and carry it for a 
distance of about 500 metres. Similar to Chidiso garden, membership in 
Barura garden project is predominantly women.  
 
The Barura garden project: The Barura garden project was established in 
1998 with support from CARE International. Membership of the project is 
drawn from beyond the three Romwe catchment villages to include other 
social catchment villages. This is due to that fact that water used in the 
garden is from Barura dam, which caters for other villages outside the 
Romwe catchment area. At the time of the study, Barura garden project 
was more vibrant than Chidiso. Because the women are fairly represented 
in the Barura garden committee, they influence formal decision-making in 
the project. Female influential personalities in the area such as the 
community mobiliser, one of the wives of the late councillor, and a widow 
from Tamwa village are members of the Barura garden committee. There 
was less micro.politics recorded for Barura and this could be due to the 
infancy of the project. 
 
Decision-making processes are complex and cannot be easily traced, 
especially where decisions are made outside formal arenas. For instance 
while the chairman of the Chidiso garden is a well-respected man in the 
area, it is believed that he is manipulated by the vice chairwoman. Despite 
such micro-politics, the author observed that garden projects are a niche for 
women to gain access to land that they can claim to be theirs. Although all 
communal lands in Zimbabwe officially belong to the state, at the local 
level, men ‘own’ land. Women gain access to land through their husbands 
or other male relation. Membership in the Chidiso and Barura garden 
projects accords women the opportunity to ‘own’ some piece of land as 
such land is registered in their own names. Thus women have become 
“official” owners of land portions, yet traditionally it is the men who own 
land such as fields and homesteads and also claim ownership of “bush 
land” near their homestead area. On divorce, if the woman remains in the 
village, she retains her ownership of the community garden project plot 
established through NGO support, yet the same does not apply to privately 
owned gardens and crop fields. This demonstrates the gradual erosion of 
total male land holding privileges during a time when women’s gardening 
projects are on the increase. These findings concur with Schroeder’s 
findings in the Gambia where women became landowners through the 
introduction of market gardening (1997:489). In the case of Romwe, 
women’s economic status may be restricted by lack of access to vegetable 
markets and this may explain why men are less active in the gardening   208
projects. But for women, the gardens serve more than just an economic 
purpose, as the women become “official” landowners. Because 
membership in community gardening projects is predominantly women, 
this has also created an opportunity for women to gain access to leadership 
positions that they are highly unlikely to get in joint women/men projects. 
This can also be used as an entry point for building women’s leadership 
capabilities that may later be broadened to other community arenas. 
 
A recent strategy that has been used by women in Romwe to gain access 
to traditionally male decision-making domains is to penetrate spheres that 
are often viewed as male domains. This has been through planting of 
indigenous tree species traditionally used to meet male needs by 
participating in action research on trees. Tree planting in homestead areas, 
especially of exotic fruit trees used for family consumption and income 
generation is widespread in the Romwe catchment, yet there has been very 
little experimentation with planting indigenous tree species. The action 
research project involves experimentation with planting indigenous tree 
species and is facilitated by researchers from IES and the Department of 
Plant Ecology at Uppsala University in Sweden. The project started off 
with 48 participants (12 men and 36 women) in December 2000. Tree 
species planted were mukamba ( Afzelia Quanzensis),  muuzhe 
(Brachystegia spiciformis) and mupfura (Sclerocaryia birrea). These are 
tree species predominantly used by men in the area for poles and carving. It 
is interesting to note that women are enthusiastically planting these tree 
species traditionally believed to be needed for male chores such as carving 
and construction. The original species selection was project driven and not 
community initiated but participants have developed a lot of interest in the 
project. This group has no formal representative structure – but there is a 
high degree of information sharing among the group members. 
Participatory monitoring and evaluation sessions are done every six months  
 
Women appear to have considered security and access to the trees in 
selecting sites for tree planting. Table 6.7 presents data on the reasons 
given by participants on site selection. Each responded, could give more 
than one answer, thus the total responses do not correspond with the total 
number of respondents. 
 
From the results presented in Table 6.7, site selection appears to have 
been influenced by a variety of reasons that include security and control of 
resource access, replacement and conservation purposes, ecological 
similarity with observed natural conditions where the tree species normally 
grows, near water source, good soils and for shade and to serve as a 
windbreak. Among the women interviewees, security and control of 
resource access emerged as the top two reasons for site selection. This 
shows women are using the project to lay the foundation for claims to 
resource areas that they can later control. 
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 Table  6.7.  Reasons for site selection for tree planting 
 
Number of respondents (27 females and 8 
males) 
Reason for location 
Female Male 
Security, control of resource 
access 
10 2 
Replacement, conservation, 
prevent soil erosion 
9 1 
Ecological similarity with natural 
conditions  
8 2 
Near water source  2  0 
Good soils  7  4 
Shade/windbreak 12  4 
Total responses  48  13 
 
One of the major reasons given by women for participating in the tree 
research group besides gaining knowledge on the planting of indigenous 
trees is to be able to claim ownership of the land where they have planted 
their trees. Secondly, there is restricted access to use of the three tree 
species that the group is planting and the participants, especially women, 
indicated that once their trees are big, they would be able to use them 
without restrictions from anyone. The common response when asked about 
their visions for the trees they have planted was ‘If my trees grow, I will 
have my own trees that I can use the way I want without anyone refusing 
me access to the trees’. Asked what they would do if their husbands 
divorced them considering that they may have to move to settle elsewhere 
and leave their trees, one woman said ‘I will never leave this homestead, if 
my husband wants me to leave, he had better kill me here. If it were exotic 
fruit trees I would leave because those trees grow much faster and I could 
go and plant other trees whereever I go. But now, these indigenous trees 
are a lot of work and you have to be a very patient person to nurture them.’ 
This in a way shows the determination the women in the action research 
have regarding ownership of the trees they have planted.  
 
6.6 Summary 
Power relations in local level institutions and related structures are 
gendered and also interwoven with other kinds of social relations such as 
kinship and interest group networks presented in Table 6.6. Other examples 
include the case of the vice chairwoman of Chidiso garden project who 
draws her power from social networks and kinship ties. For one to be able 
to understand the final decisions made, one needs an understanding of the 
broader community context and the micro-politics within the community. 
There is a need to adopt some research methodology that would allow one 
to make extensive observations as well as gather information relating to 
informal arenas. This calls for longitudinal studies that involve an extended 
stay in the community and participation in community activities such as 
church services, funerals and other social events. Similarly women’s role in 
natural resource management decision-making processes cannot be easily   210
explored separate from other social interaction processes. For instance, 
marital status seems to be important, because most women in key decision-
making positions, who are assertive, are predominantly widows or elderly 
single parents (de jure household heads, e.g. the community mobiliser, the 
Chidiso garden committee vice-chairwoman). Such a set up (where what 
happens in one arena affects other arenas) highlights the embeddedness of 
resource management institutions in the communal areas of Zimbabwe. 
There is therefore need to understand broader social relationships, 
interactions and power dynamics to be able to assess gendered decision-
making processes. 
 
The findings from this study also show that women and men share the 
same resource areas but use different resources as in the case of woodlands. 
These findings concur with Goebel’s findings from a study carried out in 
the resettlement areas in Zimbabwe. The sharing of resource spaces is 
relevant to the use of woodlands where a variety of products are found in 
the same spaces. The relations between women and men in institutions 
involved in management of natural resources such as woodlands and water 
are not static. The power relations between women and men are constantly 
shifting as they are often negotiated and renegotiated in response to 
changing natural resource availability, needs and interests of the actors 
involved. For instance, the emergence of NGO facilitated projects has 
changed the nature of relations between women and men regarding access 
to land and sources of income. Whereas men have dominated land 
ownership, women are becoming land ‘owners’ in their own right through 
garden projects. As these relations are ever changing, the challenge facing 
researchers, is how to capture such continuous changes and their influence 
on decision-making processes that influence who has access to what 
natural resources. Women’s bargaining power appears to be lower for 
woodland resources where access is more individualised and there is so 
much overlap in the areas and products used by women and men. For 
instance, in the hills, men predominantly collect poles while women collect 
firewood and mushrooms from the same areas. The women’s bargaining 
power is much higher in the garden projects where they operate in groups 
and also the resource use areas are more discrete.  
 
Decision-making arenas are not always public or formal. Informal arenas 
for decision-making also exist and they are very influential. For instance, 
when meetings are called, the agenda is not always formally announced but 
through the informal social and information networks in the village, by the 
date of the meeting almost everyone will know what will be discussed in 
the meeting and some decisions are even made prior to the formal meeting. 
The majority of women in Romwe do not seem to stand out at public 
meetings, thus they largely use informal means to control powerful male 
figures in the community. An example is the alleged strong personal 
relationship that a powerful and most respected village head in the area is 
entangled in, and this sometimes constrains his power to make certain 
decisions. Impromptu conclusions should not be drawn on the role of   211
women outside the public arena without in-depth analysis of informal 
processes and social interactions. In other parts of Zimbabwe (i.e. in the 
Zambezi Valley), the author found that there was minimal communication 
on the agenda of meetings prior to the meeting date, highlighting the need 
in those circumstances for women’s participation in public forum decision-
making processes, if they are to have any influence (Nabane, 1997).   
 
While we have more women in garden project committees, analysis 
shows that the membership of these projects is predominantly women. This 
partly explains the number of women in these project committees. Despite 
the fact that gardens are traditionally viewed as women’s domain, the 
problem of marketing and that there is little profit may have made men less 
interested in the projects. A similar conclusion may be drawn for the action 
research on trees project, where the benefits are long term and not assured. 
This study finds that participating in projects with membership that is 
predominantly female gives women access to natural resources that they 
would otherwise not have. For instance, membership in garden projects has 
given rise to new forms of property ownership by women such as being 
landowners in their own right. These findings contradict what Meinzen-
Dick and Zwarteveen (2001) found in South Asia, where with the 
exception of female-headed farms, women often continued to be perceived 
as helpers of their husbands with limited sources of income of their own.  
 
The cases presented in this chapter are examples of how informal and 
less recognised ways of participation in institutional structures for natural 
resource management may be a niche for increasing women’s participation 
in decision-making regarding resource use and management. The dynamics 
of natural resource management cannot be understood if attention is 
restricted to the analysis of formal institutions and related structures. 
Evidence presented in this chapter suggests that lack of formal 
representation of women in resource management institutions does not 
imply that women do not influence what happens within the organisation. 
These findings concur with Jackson (1998) and Zwarteveen & Neupane 
(1996) who document that women have other informal ways of influencing 
what happens in formal decision-making arenas. But this is not to suggest 
that women’s participation in formal structures and institutions is not 
important. Women’s participation in formal resource management 
institutions is important because access to natural resources through 
informal means may not be secure. While a study undertaken by May 
(1979) found that women use hidden strategies such as withholding sex 
from men to make themselves heard, this study finds that women’s 
strategies for influencing decision-making are becoming more visible with 
the emergence of non-governmental organisations. Where women feel they 
are unable to influence local level formal decision-making processes and 
institutional structures, they often seek external intervention by NGO 
officers.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION AND 
CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter synthesises the findings of this study in a thematic manner 
that allows for reflection on the key issues relating to institutional 
processes in access to woodlands and water in Romwe catchment, southern 
Zimbabwe. Woodlands and water are important sources for rural livelihood 
systems in Zimbabwe as well as other southern African countries. The 
thesis examined the role of local level formal and informal institutions and 
related structures in the context of donor-funded CBNRM initiatives and 
how they influence access to and use of woodlands and water resources by 
various actors. In addition, the study explored the role of women in 
resource management institutional structures and decision-making 
processes. This study contributes to the growing number of studies 
focusing on institutional arrangements in common pool resource 
management and also on the role of women in these institutional processes. 
Some central themes run through the findings of the study and these are 
linked to the study objectives presented in Chapter One. These themes 
include, complexity of the natural resource landscape where there are 
multiple resource users and use boundaries, the existence of a multiplicity 
of resource management institutions and related structures with unclear 
mandates and jurisdictions, the micro-politics of participatory resource 
management approaches within the decentralisation discourse, the 
gendered nature of decision-making processes and institutional structures 
for resource management as well as conflicts that may emerge in the 
process of negotiating resource access and control by various actors. The 
chapter also makes some reflections on the methodological and theoretical 
frameworks adopted for the study. 
 
Sources of livelihood in Romwe range from livestock and crop 
production, collection of woodland products such as timber for 
construction, poles, firewood, thatch grass, medicines, fibre and leaf litter 
as well as engaging in gold panning activities during drought years. This 
study shows how access to and control over these resources is mediated by 
a set of interacting and overlapping institutions, both formal and informal, 
which are embedded in the political and social life of the area. Certain 
natural resource use practices result in outcomes that may be detrimental to 
others’ livelihood, such as encroachment by young couples into woodland 
areas for settlement and crop production, reducing the size and quality of 
the grazing areas. Other woodland resource uses such as the collection of 
fibre, medicines, leaf litter and mushrooms and domestic use of water are 
more mutually compatible. An understanding of social difference relating 
to resource access is essential if CBNRM interventions are to support the 
claims of those otherwise excluded, often by a dominant minority referred 
to in Romwe as the Zvidzazvopo.    214
 
A fundamental assumption in CBNRM and the decentralisation discourse 
is that a distinct community exists. This view has now been largely 
challenged (e.g. Campbell, et al., 2001; Guijt & Shah, 1998; James, 1999; 
Leach et al., 1999; Madzudzo, 2002; Mosse, 1994, Sithole, 1999). This 
thesis therefore does not belabour this point. It is worthwhile though to 
note that while other studies have questioned the notion of ‘community’ in 
CBNRM as relatively homogenous, with members’ characteristics 
distinguishing them from ‘outsiders’, there has been very little shift in the 
way CBNRM is implemented. Similarly, while sometimes CBNRM 
facilitators have acknowledged social difference within communities, and 
explicit efforts are made, e.g. using participatory approaches to examine 
implications for project interventions on different actors disaggregated by 
age, gender and ethnicity, all too often there is an implicit assumption that 
the public airing of views is sufficient and that social consensus and 
solidarity will result (Goebel, 1998; Mosse, 1994).  
 
From an actor-oriented perspective, which emphasises actors, action, 
agency and power relations, communities cannot be treated as static, rule-
bound wholes, since they are composed of people who actively monitor, 
interpret and shape the world around them (Long & van der Ploeg, 1989; 
Long & Long, 1992). Such a perspective conceives of social change very 
differently from the CBNRM narrative of external intervention into a 
‘static’ society or community. The actor-oriented approach does not reject 
the notion of community altogether, but rather contextualises it by 
describing a more or less temporary unity of situation, interest or purpose. 
For instance, in Romwe, at one time community is defined only as the three 
biophysical catchment villages, e.g. for timber harvesting and at other 
times community is defined in terms of the social catchment, comprising 
ten villages, such as for livestock watering at Barura dam or fibre and 
mushroom harvesting on Mapande mountain. Such shifts in the definition 
of community may be seen as actively created and recreated by various 
actors for particular (not necessarily shared) purposes and are also 
outcomes of dynamic interaction and negotiation between the different 
actors. This may have important implications for institutions regulating 
access to natural resources as they may constantly change in response to 
the negotiation processes. 
 
While literature on institutional issues in CBNRM often refers to formal 
and informal institutions, the findings of this study show that the 
dichotomy between formal and informal institutions and structures is 
overemphasised in theoretical debates. In practice there are inter-linkages 
and overlaps that make the boundaries between the formal and informal 
institutions very fluid. The relations between these resource management 
institutions are influenced by a diversity of social, political, economic and 
power dynamics in a given community. Contemporary social theoretical 
accounts of power suggest that the questions of resource control as limited 
to an interrogation of formal versus informal authority systems may not be   215
the central axis of concern in institutional analysis. Rather, power is seen as 
capillary, acting in the daily enforcement of social and political practice, 
independent of the legal power of the formal institutions (Robbins, 
1998:429). This approach therefore shifts analysis away from the 
dichotomy of formal and informal resource management institutions to a 
more fundamental inquiry into the nature and effectiveness of social power 
deployed through both the formal and informal authority systems of 
hegemony, domination and control (ibid). The distribution of power within 
and between various levels of society is central to the debate about 
decentralisation of natural resource management authority.  
 
Although the merit of decentralisation in the context of CBNRM is now 
readily acknowledged and appreciated among environmentalists, 
researchers and development practitioners, there is still need to critically 
consider the effect of the so-called enabling or decentralised resource 
management legislation that seeks to empower local level resource users, 
managers and institutional structures. More often than not, such laws 
reinforce recentralisation of power in lower level state organs such as the 
Rural District Council (RDC), contrary to espoused notions of citizen 
participation and empowerment. In other cases, decentralisation processes 
impact negatively on power relations within the local community as most 
often village elites may influence the management processes for their own 
benefit. This may result in conflicts over resource access by the various 
actors. This study finds that legal resource management authority has not 
been devolved to levels below the RDC and this could be explained by the 
multiplicity of structures below the RDC with the potential of being 
empowered.  
 
Conflicts over access to woodlands and water resources are expressed in 
various forms, which vary in space, time and level. The intensity of 
conflicts depends on the nature of the resource in question, the relationship 
of the actors involved and the history of natural resource access. The 
emerging conflicts in Romwe are about various actors negotiating access to 
and control over key natural resources that are important for survival in 
semi-arid regions. In some cases, the conflicts are rooted in historical 
narratives and other resource claims such as those based on length of 
residency in the area and other forms of social classification. Thus conflicts 
are not only fuelled by resource scarcity as often suggested in the CBNRM 
literature, but are influenced by historical claims, patterns of interaction 
and the power dynamics at play. Conflicts over woodlands and water are 
also about survival, leadership and institutional arrangements governing 
access to these resources and diversity of actors who may have differing 
interests in a particular resource. In the case of Romwe, more conflicts 
exist over woodlands and very few were reported for water resources.    216
7.2 CBNRM and the decentralisation discourse 
In Zimbabwe, as in other southern African countries, decentralisation is 
now high on the agenda of the state, inspired in part by an international 
drive towards participatory natural resource management. This is an option 
that is seen as a potentially more ethical and effective alternative to 
centrally directed management of natural resources (Sayer & Campbell, 
2002). Despite the envisaged merits of decentralised natural resource 
management, findings of this study and other experiences in Zimbabwe, 
suggest that the state is reluctant to fully relinquish power and control over 
natural resources. The state view of the appropriate management of 
resources appears to extend to local communities through a centrally 
directed structure and process. In the case of Romwe, there has been partial 
devolution of natural resource management to the local authority, the RDC 
and not to communities below the RDC. Effective control therefore is still 
largely vested in the state or bureaucracies under its direction such as the 
RDCs. A major challenge for the process of decentralisation is the 
identification and empowerment of institutional structures to fit more 
closely with local forms of resource management and control. A relevant 
question in Romwe where there is multiplicity of institutional structures, as 
in other sites where decentralisation processes are being facilitated is, what 
could be the appropriate resource management authority to which bundles 
of entrustments should be devolved?  
 
Though advocates of decentralisation justify it on grounds of increased 
participation, efficiency and equity, quite often most efforts end up without 
increasing powers to some of the actors, particularly local communities 
(Agrawal & Ribot, 1999). Interactive participation described by Agarwal 
(2001) as empowering is also difficult to foster where there is a history of 
actor conflict and confrontation. What is therefore apparent in current 
decentralisation of resource management initiatives appears to be a 
framework for management that reduces government spending and 
transfers responsibility to local resource users, yet the state maintains 
control (through the RDC) over key resources and/or decisions deemed 
important to natural resource management. The overall support for the 
policy on devolution, may improve the power relations among different 
actors in favour of the less privileged actors to make the playing field more 
level. 
 
Theorists believe that downwardly accountable or representative 
authorities with meaningful discretionary powers are the basic institutional 
elements of decentralisation (Ribot, 2003 & 1996; Agrawal & Ribot, 
1999). However, when examined in detail, community-based and 
decentralised forms of local natural resource management often lack 
representation, downward accountability and/or sufficient powers 
(Mandondo, 2000b; Matondi, 2001). In the case of Chivi district and 
Zimbabwe in general, decentralisation initiatives are transferring decision-
making powers and management authority to various unaccountable local   217
bodies such as the RDC. For instance, contrary to establishing the 
institutional infrastructure for decentralised participatory natural resource 
management in Zimbabwe, most legislation re-centralises power at the 
RDC level, doing so at the expense of meaningful participation of local 
actors in natural resource management. Only the privilege of proposing 
development plans appears to have trickled down to the local level through 
institutional structures like the VIDCOs and WADCOs. Yet the approval 
of these plans is beyond the control of the local actors. The state and its 
closest actors such as the RDC and government extension departments 
retain the complementary roles of approval of the development plans 
proposed by local level actors, implementation and fiscal control. It is 
important to understand the impact of this contradiction between 
decentralisation, which the state aims to foster, and the re-centralisation of 
power at the RDC level which is actually taking place, on local level 
institutional structures for woodlands and water management as well as 
power relations determining access to these resources. Similar findings on 
recentralisation of management authority in bodies that are not locally 
accountable have been documented for other African countries such as 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon and the Gambia (Ribot, 1999; Schroeder, 1997). 
Many governments are devolving insufficient powers and benefits to 
motivate local actors and their institutional structures to carry out new 
environmental management responsibilities. In addition, the appropriate 
mix of powers and functions of different local actors is poorly defined. 
There is little empirical evidence or experience from which to derive the 
best local institutional arrangements or show which factors link 
decentralised resource management to improved social and ecological 
outcomes (Conyers, 2001; Ribot, 2003). 
 
The re-centralisation of resource management power and authority at the 
RDC level is mainly through the RDC Act (1988), although other Acts 
such as the Communal Lands Act (1982), Parks and Wildlife Act (1975) 
and the Communal Areas Forest Produce Act (1987) discussed in Chapter 
Four also empower the RDC to be the overseer of natural resource use in 
the communal areas. The RDC Act (1988) was enacted based on the 
philosophy of decentralisation and provides structural and operational 
arrangements for rural local governance. The Act provides the legal basis 
for, among other things, the demarcation and establishment of the spatial 
units for rural administrative purposes. It also prescribes the structure of 
the RDC and the processes for constituting their membership, specifies the 
roles and responsibilities of the councils, which include the planning and 
implementation of development programmes and related taxing and fiscal 
authority and bestows on them minor legislative powers that enable them 
to enact by-laws that govern access to natural resources. Building on the 
views of Murombedzi (1992) and Mapedza & Mandondo (2001) it is here 
argued that the RDCs Act does not establish institutional infrastructure for 
decentralised natural resource management in Zimbabwe, but rather re-
centralises power at the RDC level, thereby restricting meaningful 
participation by local level actors and their institutional structures. The Act   218
therefore to a large extent precludes decentralisation initiatives that entail 
devolution of management authority and power to the ‘lowest accountable 
units’ so that as Murphree (1991) suggests, ‘authority gets linked to 
responsibility and cost gets linked to benefit’.  
 
A variety of reasons have been given in the literature in an attempt to 
explain the tendency for re-centralisation of management authority at the 
RDC level. Murphree (1993:8) argues that RDCs have tended to retain 
authority, management and benefit, relegating to local communities the 
function of production because of the bureaucratic impulse by RDCs to 
retain authority, the necessity of councils to raise revenues following the 
enactment and implementation of the RDCs Act (1988) and the fact that 
councils do not trust local communities to make appropriate or ‘right’ 
decisions. Other authors (e.g. Mandondo, 2001; Ribot, 1999) argue that 
resource management authority has been re-centralised at RDC level 
because the process of decentralisation has been supply-led rather than 
demand driven.  
 
Findings of this study suggest that the lack of further devolvement of 
management authority beyond RDCs to local communities could be a 
result of the multiplicity of institutional structures and jurisdictional 
fuzziness amongst various structures at the local level with the potential of 
being empowered to take full responsibility of resource management. For 
instance, between the two major institutional structures found in Romwe, 
the modern and the traditional structures, it is not clear to which structure 
management authority should be decentralised. This may also explain why 
NGOs tend to establish new structures that are project specific rather than 
working through existing structures. Given the multiplicity of institutions 
regulating access to woodlands and water resources at the local level, the 
question that needs to be addressed is not which institution is more suitable 
but rather how can the various institutions be operationalised in a more 
complimentary way. This may facilitate devolution of resource 
management to levels below the RDC and thus enable local communities to 
begin to trust state efforts at empowering them to manage their resources. 
Devolution of effective powers to levels below the RDC may facilitate 
participatory resource management processes. Current initiatives to foster 
participation have been complex as will be discussed below. 
 
7.2.1. Participatory processes in decentralised natural resource 
management  
The process of devolution entails placing resource management authority 
closer to local level actors, a complex process of empowerment in which 
individuals and their interests and aspirations are the building blocks on 
which democratic resource management is crafted. In the CBNRM 
literature, this process is assumed to foster interactive participation of local 
actors in resource management. It is easier to talk about the concept of 
participation than to achieve it. For example, there are as many interests   219
and aspirations as there are actors (as individuals or groups) and it is 
impractical to have each and every one of them participate in daily 
resource management decision-making processes. Electoral participation 
then becomes a proxy for democracy, since it is cumbersome to secure 
direct individual participation in daily decisions (Ribot, 1999). Political 
representation is therefore the primary justification for democratic 
decentralisation (devolution), since theoretically the elected representatives 
can then be held downwardly accountable to electoral majorities (Ribot, 
1999). In practice however, electoral processes may not result in downward 
accountability.  
 
In the case of VIDCOs in Romwe, as discussed in Chapter Six, electoral 
processes sometimes lack any regularity and more often elections are 
conducted in an unrepresentative manner, as few community members are 
involved in the election process. Furthermore, the elections are a public 
and open process whereby voters use a show of hands to choose their 
representatives and may therefore be influenced by peer pressure to vote 
for someone they would otherwise not vote for, if voting was done in a 
private way. In view of this, many recent analyses emphasise the need to 
pay careful attention to what lies beneath the surface of visible public 
behaviour. In public arenas, the less powerful groups or actors may seem to 
accept their own domination, but they always question it behind the scenes. 
According to Scott (1985), ‘public transcripts’ describe the open, public 
interactions between dominators and the oppressed i.e. the outer shell of 
power relations. Scott (ibid) uses the term ‘hidden transcripts’ to describe 
the critique of power that takes place backstage. The western notions of 
participation as open and public dialogue and action have often blinded 
development practitioners and researchers to the real dynamics of 
participation (Cleaver, 1998; Goebel, 1998; Jackson, 1998). This is 
because there has been emphasis on the visible and not the hidden spaces 
for participation.  
 
The participatory resource management discourse assumes that: there is 
equitable power sharing among the various actors, all actors are aware of 
and want to exercise this power and that all actors consistently feel the 
need to participate in decision-making arenas (Sithole, 2001). Despite the 
stated intentions of participatory resource management, it is becoming 
clear that multiple actor initiatives do not deal well with the complexity of 
actor difference (Guijt & Shah, 1998; Campbell et al., 2001). Actors are 
neither homogenous in composition and concerns, nor are they necessarily 
harmonious in their relations.  
 
Historically, local actors participated in the research and development 
process mainly as information givers. However, there has been a shift in 
the development paradigm to involve villagers in the development process 
as key stakeholders who play pivotal roles in shaping the way and manner 
in which change should be effected. But at the local level, actors are still 
sceptical and uncertain or unaware of the change in their role in modern   220
research and development. For instance, villagers in Romwe still view 
researchers as information gatherers who are often egoistic and use the  
‘valuable’ information they get from local actors for the enrichment of 
their own intellectual desires. This perception was found to apply both at 
village and the RDC levels. As referred to in Chapter Three, people in 
Romwe expressed their hope that results of this study would inform them 
and help them in planning for the management of their resources. 
Similarly, at the RDC, the Chief Executive Officer expressed his concern 
that many research projects have been undertaken in Chivi district, but 
there is not a single research output at the RDC offices to show for all that 
research. This may be due to the fact that there are no systematic or formal 
feedback mechanisms between researchers, villagers and the RDC. While 
participation by villagers is important, on its own, it is not an adequate 
condition for genuine ownership of the research and development process 
by local actors as it may often turn out to mean the cooption of local elites 
purported to represent the interests of the community at large, yet they may 
be representing interests of a few particular groups. 
 
As seen in the case of Romwe, during election processes, community 
members tend to elect almost the same individuals to different leadership 
positions as discussed in Chapter Five. Though necessary, regular elections 
and local decisions alone are not sufficient conditions for genuine 
empowerment and fostering participation in natural resource management 
by various actors. Sometimes, elections may entrench despotism (Mutamba 
et al., 2000). The work by Mutamba et al., (ibid) on committees and 
leadership in a community-based micro-credit scheme in Romwe, also 
depicts electoral cycles that always bring back traditional leadership, which 
arguably is not always democratic. The illustration of a variety of positions 
held by one sabuku presented in Chapter Five supports Mutamba et al.,’s 
findings. In order to be considered transparent in such contexts where one 
individual may hold several leadership positions, there is need for third 
party monitoring.  
 
In Zimbabwe, funding from donor agencies is essential to cover the costs 
of facilitating participatory processes in CBNRM, as the government does 
not have resources for this. Financial and material assistance from NGOs 
and international donor agencies therefore complement government efforts 
at devolution. The danger with this set up is that an unhealthy dependency 
on these external funds is sometimes created, often resulting in the collapse 
of the initiatives when the funders withdraw (Shackleton & Campbell, 
2001). Reliance on donor funding is also risky in the current political 
environment in Zimbabwe. This is because of donor scepticism in funding 
programmes in Zimbabwe and reduced allocations to especially forest 
sector portfolios, and increased competition for soft money among many 
natural resource oriented organisations over the years. In response to this, 
most NGOs involved in facilitating CBNRM programmes have realised 
that a single donor strategy is not sustainable. There is often need for a 
multi-donor strategy that provides fallbacks in funding support. The   221
challenge with a multi-donor strategy is that the various donors may have 
diverging interests and agendas and therefore it may be difficult for the 
CBNRM facilitators to meet the divergent donor expectations. Further, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are often hard pressed to 
demonstrate impact to the donor community whose expectations include a 
value for money and strict adherence to funding conditions. Given their 
reliance on donor funding, NGOs therefore tend to be upwardly 
accountable to the donors and not downwardly accountable to local 
communities. 
 
NGOs and research institutes also have a key role in institutional 
strengthening and capacity building. Associated activities with the capacity 
building processes include training of local communities in natural 
resource management options, facilitation of exchange visits and field 
demonstrations to foster experience sharing at the local level, staff training 
and resource mobilisation. Despite these efforts at capacity building, 
environmental NGOs have been criticised for spending significant amounts 
of money and other resources on advocacy and awareness raising at the 
expense of implementation (Mandondo, 2002). Awareness raising is often 
aimed at influencing attitudinal changes and therefore usually precedes 
more active strategies like capacity building, and lobbying. Because of the 
invisible nature of its impacts, awareness raising is quite difficult to justify 
to donors especially in time-bound and goal oriented projects in which the 
emphasis is on delivery, which is partly why some people may see it as 
‘frustrating and taking time and resources away from implementation 
(ibid).  
 
7.3 Institutional arrangements in woodlands and water 
management in Romwe 
The institutional development for woodlands and water resource 
management in Romwe is marked by confusion. There are multiple 
structures operating at the same level, but guided by different policies and 
legislation, a major challenge for CBNRM initiatives at community level. 
These multiple structures have unclear mandates and overlapping 
jurisdictions and responsibilities in resource management. This applies 
particularly to the parallel hierarchy formed by local government and the 
traditional authority systems. The result of this institutional ambiguity is a 
great deal of confusion on the ground, contestation and power struggles 
between structures and weakening of authority all round that often creates 
an institutional vacuum that can be exploited by those with vested interests. 
Policies that explicitly devolve power to communities and not RDCs may 
help avoid some of these complexities and associated conflicts. The 
challenge for decentralisation initiatives as discussed earlier in the chapter, 
is this multiplicity of structures at community level, which makes it unclear 
to which structure management authority should be decentralised. This 
institutional fuzziness has in many ways led to struggles for power and 
control over especially, woodlands resources, with certain sections of the   222
community aligning themselves with particular institutions that suit their 
needs at a particular time. The result is lack of legitimacy of any one 
institution as legitimacy shifts in different circumstances.  
 
The post colonial era resulted in parallel or dual local authority systems 
consisting of the traditional authorities on one hand and the government 
established structures on the other. The dual structures compete with each 
other for power and influence, often resulting in a power vacuum that may 
be exploited by powerful vested interests. In some instances, potential 
conflict between modern and traditional structures has been avoided by 
incorporating traditional leaders into the new structures as discussed in 
Chapter Four. In other situations, traditional authorities have been 
deliberately excluded as being undemocratic, corrupt and agents of the 
previous regimes. The relationship between the traditional and modern 
structures is highly dynamic. The recent enactment of the Traditional 
Leaders Act (1998) may see the resurgence of power of traditional 
structures, but the new legislation has still not clarified the overlapping 
nature of traditional and modern structures.  
 
Local resource management structures in general tend to be ineffectual. 
On the one hand, the legal local authority, the RDC is cash-strapped and 
the elected VIDCOs and WADCOs often lack legitimacy and motivation. 
On the other hand, the traditional leadership is weak from a history of 
being empowered and disempowered by government, modernisation and 
economic forces that undermine traditional values. There has also been 
rapid decrease in sacredness of landscape patches over the last few decades 
due to a variety of reasons including migration, Christianity etc. Sacredness 
is based on non-use rather than sustainable use and there is some evidence 
that protection of their sacredness may relate to their importance to local 
elites as sources of resources and power for social control (Mukamuri, 
1995). Given the existence of RDCs, WADCOs and VIDCOs, the 
traditional authorities and the NGO engineered institutional structures, the 
question is, which management structure would be able to support 
community based management of woodland and water resources at the 
local level? 
 
The complex institutional arrangements with many stakeholders and 
overlapping roles and mandates in Romwe may have negative effects on 
effective resource management. Institutional tensions and power struggles 
may be experienced both at local and national government levels due to a 
lack of clarity on the mandate guiding the different institutions and their 
relationship to one another. Ostrom (1992) stresses that institutional 
ambiguity, such as is currently the case in Romwe, regarding the roles of 
traditional and modern authorities, can be an important factor in disrupting 
local level management and can prevent revitalisation of common property 
systems.  
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7.3.1. The institutional engineering approach 
The majority of CBNRM initiatives often establish new institutions and 
institutional structures for coordinating activities at the local level and 
monitoring use and management of resources at the local level. Emphasis 
is placed on what new institutions have to be created or put in place in 
order for assistance to become effective and sustainable (Havnevik, 
2000b). The justification for this approach, e.g. drawing from the 
CAMPFIRE programme and the Resource Sharing Scheme in Zimbabwe 
has been that it is important to establish ‘new’ institutions that are neutral 
and not entrenched in current and historical micro-politics. This approach 
implicitly assumes that these ‘new’ institutions will be value free, consider 
views of diverse stakeholders, yet the fact that these structures are made up 
of local community members already makes their election or appointment 
in a way political. The use of a blueprint approach to institutional design 
and development has ignored the fact that because a particular set of rules 
work well in one setting, this does not guarantee that it will work 
elsewhere. As shown in the thesis, the interactions of various actors that 
have a stake in the natural resources, as they shape and/or are shaped by 
institutions are most often contextual. Adoption of blueprint approaches 
from one project to another is the framework that is used in the 
establishment of the majority of the management structures. For instance, 
in most cases, the committees that are established are identical and made 
up of seven members with similar positions defined including the chair and 
vice chairpersons, secretary and vice secretary, treasurer and two 
committee members. This is done without considering the relevance of 
each of those positions for a particular project. The institutional 
engineering approach may not be wrong if it is based on a deep 
understanding of the traditional or other institutional frameworks already in 
place on the ground. Depending on their character and density, social 
relations and networks may strengthen or weaken the newly established 
institutions. 
 
The most common problems with the institutional engineering approach 
are that the committees that are established often are not accountable to the 
local population. Yet, it has often been argued that the committees that are 
established are representative of community interests as they are often put 
in place through election processes. Even where elected committees exist, 
they are rarely entrusted to represent local communities in significant 
matters of resource management. More often, these structures tend to 
represent a few interested actors under the control of the local elite. 
Furthermore, their powers remain highly limited or are circumscribed by 
central agencies. More often than not, these NGO facilitated committees 
are accountable to the NGO bodies rather than to their local constituency.  
 
While there has often been institutional engineering in donor funded and 
state driven CBNRM initiatives, as is the case in Romwe, traditional 
institutions have remained influential. They are based on trust and   224
reciprocity, agreed norms and rules. This may explain why they have 
remained resilient despite the history of empowerment and 
disempowerment by both the colonial and postcolonial state. Trust is key to 
sustaining relationships because it lubricates cooperation and reduces 
transaction costs between people (Pretty & Ward, 2001:211). For instance, 
instead of investing in monitoring others, individuals are able to trust them 
to act as expected. Furthermore, traditional authorities are believed to be 
downwardly accountable to their constituency, unlike the externally 
facilitated institutional structures.  
 
7.3.2. Institutional accountability 
The need for downward accountability of resource management 
institutional structures has been emphasised in recent literature (Ribot, 
2003 & 1999; Mapedza & Mandondo, 2001; Matondi, 2001). Insights 
drawn from this literature suggest that it does not matter whether an 
institution is formal or informal, has evolved internally or has been 
externally engineered. What matters is whether it is downwardly 
accountable or not. A major weakness of this literature is that it is not 
explicit on the mechanisms for achieving that downward accountability. 
There is need to take a closer look at the mechanisms for enhancing 
downward accountability. In establishing local institutions for 
decentralised and participatory woodland and water resources 
management, the objective is often to empower the most broadly 
representative and downwardly accountable local institutions (Ribot, 2003 
& 1999).  
 
Local institutional structures can be held downwardly accountable to local 
constituencies in a number of ways. The most commonly cited means of 
accountability are elections, yet in Romwe as discussed earlier, elections 
do not appear to be democratic. Thus elections alone are not sufficient 
since many elected officials are not accountable to their constituencies 
even when the electoral system is well crafted. Other means of ensuring 
downward accountability may include legal backing, third party 
monitoring by for instance, NGOs, media, participatory monitoring and 
evaluation, provision of information on roles and obligations of various 
actors including central government, local government reporting 
requirements and civic dedication. While not subject to elections (e.g. the 
RDC chief executive officer position), authorities appointed by central 
government can also be made more downwardly accountable, more 
democratic and therefore more apt to be socially and environmentally 
responsible through some of these mechanisms. The progressive and 
systematic application of these mechanisms could be a good alternative 
strategy for democratic reform where electoral mechanisms are threatening 
to the central state (Mandondo, 2000a). Ribot (2003) makes 
recommendations aimed at pushing the decentralisation experiment beyond 
the RDC level towards empowering institutional structures below the 
district level.    225
 
7.3.3. The role of women in decision-making and effect on institutional 
processes  
In most societies, gender relations profoundly influence women’s and 
men’s decision-making ability and participation in leadership structures. 
Variations in levels of women’s and men’s participation in institutional 
processes from one community to another demonstrate that such activities 
are socially defined and not biologically determined. As a social construct, 
gender roles are malleable and potentially responsive to changes in natural 
resource management activities. Decision-making in CBNRM in southern 
Africa is often male dominated as a result of the patriarchal nature of most 
communities (Hunter, et al., 1990). If not facilitated carefully, development 
interventions may perpetuate and strengthen traditional relations of 
patriarchy to the disadvantage of women (Peluso, 1991). In Romwe, 
women were found to be more actively involved in decision-making 
processes and institutional structures that are established by NGOs and 
much less in traditional and other local resource management structures.  
 
Analysing gender relations in decision-making processes within CBNRM 
institutions is a complex process and sometimes outcomes are resource 
specific (e.g. woodland use versus water use in garden projects). Decision-
making is also influenced by many other factors, both related and not 
related to natural resource use such as kinship ties, age, the issue being 
discussed and the natural resource in question. In the case of women in 
Romwe, marital status seems to play a key role in determining their 
chances of being elected to committees as well as being listened to. For 
instance, widows and elderly single women tend to be given more positions 
in management structures as compared to married women or younger 
single women. Widows and elderly single women tend to stand up and 
speak out in public meetings. These findings concur with what Bradley 
(1991) found among the Luhya tribe in Kenya where older widows had 
greater decision-making power with regard to tree planting and disposal of 
woodlots than younger females.  
 
In Romwe, women appear to have more bargaining power regarding 
access to natural resources if they operate as groups than as individuals. 
Regarding access to woodland resources, women were found to have less 
bargaining power because of lack of organisation, yet their bargaining 
power with regard to water use in relation to garden plots was much higher 
partly because they operate as groups. NGO facilitation in relation to 
garden projects has also led women into opportunities that were formerly 
not available such as holding key leadership positions and participation in 
income generation activities. Confidence building and leadership skills 
training provided by NGOs have facilitated women’s active participation 
and not just numerical representation. Thus, while women have historically 
been less assertive in formal decision-making arenas and lowly represented 
in local woodland and water management structures, NGOs have changed   226
the institutional map in Romwe. Although women have started off as being 
more actively involved in leadership in structures for predominantly 
women’s projects such as gardens, this may be a starting point for 
empowering women to be more active even in mixed male/female arenas. 
Although the process of change points to greater inclusion of women, men 
still have substantially greater control over resources through traditional 
institutions and their related structures. This also applies to VIDCOs and 
WADCOs where women’s representation is based on a quota system and 
not being voted into positions based on their leadership qualities. Women’s 
participation in decision-making processes also appears to be influenced by 
the self-images that women and men have for each other and for 
themselves as discussed in Chapter Six.  
 
7.4. Negotiating access to natural resources 
Whilst different resource users engage in negotiation processes to gain 
access to woodlands and water resources, negotiation platforms are not 
level (Steins, 1999). There are power differentials among the various actors 
and resource users. Negotiation arenas are therefore sites for struggle to 
gain control by various actors. The negotiation platforms are also very 
dynamic and contextual and as Berry (1993) puts it, no condition is 
permanent. Actors are constantly evaluating their positions and seeking 
maximum advantage in the process of negotiation. In the process of 
negotiation, conflict may inevitably emerge. 
 
In recognition of the on-going struggles and conflicts that pervade 
natural resource access and control, development facilitators and 
researchers need to consider ways of facilitating processes of negotiation 
among various actors. The assumption here is that through negotiation, 
conflicts between different users’ perspectives may be analysed and 
resolved in a collaborative way. It would be naive however, to assume that 
negotiation processes take place on a level playing field (Leach et al., 
1999). The very idea of negotiation conjures up an image of parties equally 
able to voice their positions and argue for them, which is far from the 
reality in most situations confronted by CBNRM. Just as power relations 
pervade the institutional dynamics of everyday resource use, so would they 
pervade any negotiation process. Different social actors have very different 
capacities to voice and stake their claims. There is therefore need to 
consider power relations in any participatory resource management project 
and how this influences both formal and informal resource management 
institutions. These power relations may fuel conflicts over access to 
woodlands and water resources discussed in the following section.   227
7.4.1 Conflicts over access to woodlands and water resources 
Conflicts over access to and control over natural resources have a long 
history in sub-Saharan Africa (Berry, 1992) and have sometimes been 
influenced by resource scarcity. Social differentiation is strongly expressed 
during times of scarcity as seen in the context of land shortage in Romwe. 
The reclassification of rights of access also emerges during times of 
conflict, e.g. Ndebeles and other immigrants in Romwe are regarded as 
‘outsiders’ during times of conflict over resource access, yet they have 
resided in the area for more than 50 years. Historical narratives and social 
classification are tools used to justify claims over resource access and 
control. Different groups of people use a variety of narratives to justify 
their own interest regardless of the formal governance structures in place.  
 
Tension between national and local objectives concerning conservation 
and local livelihoods sometimes interferes with the decentralisation of 
management authority over natural resources. Within the state-local 
tensions, there is a common ‘tension between technocratic practices of 
development managers and the newly pluralistic political practices created 
by processes of democratisation (Shivaramakrishnan, 2000; Wollenberg et 
al., 2001). National technical objectives may prescribe how woodland and 
water resources can be used, while democratic objectives may call for local 
populations to set their own priorities for environmental quality and use. In 
both cases, there is a problem of articulation between national conservation 
objectives and local autonomy and this may lead to some tension.  
 
While water is an important commodity in semi-arid regions, there were 
fewer conflicts identified in relation to water use and management. This 
could be related to people’s perceptions of security of tenure over water 
and general adherence to rules of access. There is also a clear definition of 
who uses which water sources and for what purpose. One major conflict 
over water reported during the study concerned the Barura dam. When 
people’s perceptions of water availability shifted as water levels were 
going down following poor rains during the previous year, this led to 
increased competition over use of water from the dam. Overall, there was 
more compliance with rules governing access to water resources at the time 
of the study, which could be the reason why fewer conflicts were 
experienced over water resources as compared to woodlands. 
 
7.5. Methodological reflections 
This thesis has explored interactions and relations between various 
institutions and actors in woodland and water use in the Romwe CBNRM 
initiatives. The study reveals that social interactions and relations are 
highly dynamic, often difficult to predict and embedded in culture and 
belief systems of the local community. Institutional interactions and 
relationships are sometimes subtle and ambiguous, presenting some 
methodological challenges. The processes through which these relations   228
are formed are of low visibility and their everyday nature means methods 
that are employed to investigate such processes should be sensitive to the 
continuous shifts. Recognition of these challenges should influence or have 
a bearing on the choice of methods by the researcher. Important variables 
that need to be considered in choosing methods to be employed include: 
 
a)  The recognition of various arenas where decision-making takes place. 
b)  Understanding the actors’ identity and social context. 
c)  Familiarity with the study area and actors (i.e. the need to understand 
cultural norms, practices and values). 
d)  Adoption of locally meaningful disaggregation e.g. for wealth related 
variables. 
e)  Qualitative data of high ‘quality’ that will capture dynamism. 
    
Given that natural resource landscapes are arenas for competition and 
negotiation, among different actors, social groups and categories, CBNRM 
initiatives have to deal analytically not with a monolithic entity, but with a 
set of institutions that are subject to being continuously redefined. The 
methodological challenge is to devise analytical means that capture such 
processes and allow us to unravel the dynamic contradictions rather than to 
merely note their pervasive character (Peters, 1984:29). Political ecologists 
have attempted to develop analytical tools that capture the dynamic nature 
of institutions and reveal how institutions are made and remade through 
resistance and interpretation by individual actors and are lodged in a large 
political economy where the disempowered are often deprived of crucial 
resources in the daily struggles over property rights.     
 
A participatory research methodology was adopted for this study for two 
main reasons. First, the research methodology engages the respondent 
actively in the research process through the use of open-ended participatory 
methods such as focus group discussions, semi-structured interviews and 
group discussions. Secondly, participatory research assumes that the 
research process will empower participants and lead to follow-up action. 
This places ethical demands on researchers who use participatory methods 
for academic and policy research. The participatory approach was useful in 
this study because the methods used generated valuable insights into the 
multiple meanings, dimensions and experiences of access to natural 
resources. The findings of this study show that participation of different 
groups is often an outcome of social processes that are constantly changing 
depending on the socio-cultural, political and economic context. It is worth 
noting that the process of relationship mapping in the analysis of resource 
management institutional dynamics is quite complex and time consuming.  
 
This research was conducted within a broader development project. The 
development aspects within the broader project therefore took care of 
developmental related expectations that may have emerged from the 
participatory research process. Most CBNRM initiatives operate through 
project-based approaches. Restricted project time frames constrain tracking   229
of processes across temporal scales, whilst conditionalities associated with 
donor support inevitably erode autonomy. Another methodological 
challenge relates to the geographical coverage of CBNRM initiatives. The 
majority of the CBNRM programmes are implemented at localised sites, 
which often constrains the generalisation of lessons learned across spatial 
dimensions.  
 
7.6. Theoretical reflections 
There are a number of factors that limit the implementation of CBNRM in 
Zimbabwe’s communal areas and these factors are not addressed 
adequately in the common property resource theory that informs CBNRM 
implementation. These factors are related to policy, local institutional 
dynamics, natural resource characteristics and dynamic household 
strategies for accessing resources. There is need for a more nuanced 
understanding of the characteristics of common pool resources and the 
nature of users, if the paradox between theory and practice is to be 
understood. There is also need for a more nuanced description of property 
rights, denoting a shift from simplistic classifications into four broad 
categories, namely, common property, private property, open access and 
state property, to a detailed understanding of each landscape unit or 
resource in terms of such characteristics as excludability use designation, 
duration of use, transferability of user rights and/or ownership, operational 
requirements, control and security (Kundhlande and Luckert, 1998). The 
CPR research needs to pay more attention to spatial contexts and temporal 
contexts including history, micro-politics of resource use and transaction 
costs. Almost all natural resources are constantly rotating from one phase 
to another in terms of ownership, e.g. at one point, a resource is common 
property and then open access or private property and then common 
property as in the case of ownership of crop fields. Classification of natural 
resources under the four broad common property regimes is therefore a 
theoretical ideal as real life cases like the Romwe catchment show that 
there are common-property-like and open-access-like scenarios.  
 
Considering that CBNRM is informed by debates around use and 
management of common property and common pool resources, prospects 
for the existence of robust institutions for woodlands and water resources 
are examined against the design principles for robust institutions described 
by Ostrom (1990). As discussed in Chapter Two, a design principle is an 
element or condition that helps to account for the successes of institutions 
in sustaining the common pool resources and gaining compliance of 
generation after generation of appropriators of the resource (Ostrom, 
1990). Ostrom (ibid) states that robust and long-term institutions are 
characterised by most of the design principles, while fragile institutions are 
characterised by only some of these principles. Failed institutions are 
characterised by very few of these design principles. Robust institutions 
may help to regularise irrational or unpredictable behaviour on the part of 
resource users. The analysis of the institutional set up for the management   230
of common pool woodlands and water resources in Romwe was to a large 
extent informed by these design principles. Thus the relevance and/or non-
relevance of the design principles in Romwe is discussed in the following 
section.  
 
7.6.1. Applicability of the design principles for robust institutions  
Ostrom (1990) proposes eight design principles that have influenced 
institutional reform towards CBNRM. These design principles suggest that 
for common pool resource management institutions to be robust, there is 
need to have in place, clearly defined boundaries, congruence between 
benefits and costs of resource management, collective choice arrangements, 
monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict resolution mechanisms, 
autonomy and nested enterprises. Each of these design principles is 
discussed below in relation to the findings of this study.  
 
Clearly defined boundaries 
This principle suggests that the resource must have clearly defined 
boundaries and these should be sufficiently distinct that users can 
determine the limits and exclude non-members. Findings of this study 
discussed in Chapter Four show that there is a lack of fit between resource 
use, traditional villages and administrative boundaries. While this applies 
to both woodlands and water resources, user groups were more clearly 
defined for water resources than for woodlands. In relation to use of water 
sources, both private and communal, there are shifting use boundaries 
based on the type of use, season of the year and whether it is a drought 
year, yet despite these shifts, water source users appear to be clear 
regarding who uses what water source during which season and for what 
purpose. Unlike Sithole (1999) who finds that in north eastern Zimbabwe, 
local people regard water as a resource ‘available to everyone and 
belonging to God’ this was not the case in Romwe. In Romwe, water is 
regarded as ‘life’ and access should not be denied to anyone, but there are 
rules and regulations that regulate access to both private and communally 
owned water sources. These rules of use depend on availability, location 
and the type of ownership of the water source. While some water sources 
are held privately, there are many institutional arrangements, 
predominantly informal, that are entered into through which resources are 
shared (e.g. water sources) and/or leased (e.g. garden plots). In some 
instances, private water sources may be shared by kin and in others sharing 
extends to other non-kin households. There is reciprocity of these sharing 
arrangements as private water source owners may also be accorded access 
and/or use of other resources that they may not own such as land or 
draught power.  
 
The findings for water sources regarding boundaries for resource use 
were somewhat different from those for woodland resource areas and 
specific products. In the case of woodlands, while a village that falls in the 
social catchment may be accorded access to a grazing area within the   231
Romwe biophysical area, these members may also collect resources such as 
mushrooms, honey or fibre during the process of grazing their livestock, 
although they may not have specifically been granted access to those 
resources or products. Monitoring collection of products in the woodlands 
was said to be difficult due to, for example, location of some woodland 
areas far from settlement areas. Water sources are located within settlement 
areas where there is often movement of people, making it easier to identify 
transgressors. For water, there was more adherence to rules regulating 
access and use, yet for woodlands, there was less adherence and very little 
enforcement of the rules regulating access. These findings on the definition 
of resource use boundaries relating to woodland use concur with what 
Mandondo (1997) reports for Nyamaropa communal lands in Nyanga 
district, eastern Zimbabwe, where he finds that woodland resource use 
boundaries are fuzzy and overlapping. As discussed in Chapter Four, 
woodland resource areas, have boundaries that are constantly shifting and 
negotiated, influencing who has access to what woodland products or 
areas, yet institutional jurisdictions for the management of these resources 
are fuzzy. This fluidity of woodland resource use boundaries suggest that, 
rather than defining resources as physical spaces, these resources should be 
defined as landscapes that are negotiated and renegotiated by different 
actors over time and in varied social contexts. This dynamism of resource 
and boundary definition challenges conventional attempts at land use 
planning for rural contexts where the tendency has been to demarcate areas 
as specifically for settlement, arable, grazing and woodland areas.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, resource use boundaries in Romwe are not 
conducive to CPR management of woodlands. Modern administration and 
traditional village boundaries do not match the biophysical boundaries and 
for each woodland resource, there is a different spatial pattern of use. 
Boundaries are generally porous, open to individual interpretation and to 
contestation and are changeable. It is difficult to see how boundaries can be 
clearly defined as suggested in the design principles (Ostrom, 1990). Any 
attempts to harden the boundaries, are likely to be frustrated by local 
people or user groups or may fuel local conflicts. With the emergence of 
CBNRM, researchers and NGOs have also unconsciously created 
‘communities within communities’ by defining communities or user groups 
that they want to work with versus the larger community. A major 
challenge faced by CBNRM facilitators therefore is facilitating woodland 
and water management under CPR conditions when there is lack of clearly 
defined resource use boundaries. This is further complicated by the lack of 
congruence between the biophysical and social boundaries. The call for 
clearly defined boundaries also appears to contradict the nature of common 
pool resources whose access is determined by the institutional framework 
in place. Common pool resources are said to be characterised by two 
attributes, ‘the difficulty of excluding non-members from benefiting from a 
good and the subtractability of the benefits consumed by one individual 
from those available to others (Ostrom, et al., 1996). Yet the design 
principles on boundaries call for clearly defined boundaries.    232
 
Because there is multiple layering of user rights over a resource, which 
changes over time depending on the prevailing pressure and condition of 
the resource, it is difficult to establish use boundaries for a resource like 
woodlands that comprise a myriad of products that can be harvested. 
Boundaries are soft and porous allowing use of resources by people living 
in other villages that are far from the resource. In the case of water, it was 
found that proximity to a privately owned water source was no guarantee 
of access to rights for a full range of services from the water source. Other 
criteria for determining access such as social networks were applied.  
 
Congruence between benefits and costs 
This principle concerns congruence between rules that assign rights and 
those that assign costs. In this case, appropriation rules restricting time, 
place, technology or quantity of resource units are related to local 
conditions and to provision of rules requiring labour, materials and/or 
money (Ostrom et al., 1994). Unless the number of individuals authorised 
to use a common pool resource is so small that their harvesting patterns do 
not adversely affect one another, at least some rules related to how much, 
when and how a product can be harvested are usually designed by those 
using the resource. Findings of the study do not reveal much congruence 
between the benefits and costs of management due to the overlapping 
nature of resource use and fuzzy institutional jurisdictions. It is not clear 
how, for instance, people from social catchment villages can contribute to 
the management of resources in the biophysical catchment that they are 
accorded access to, by the three biophysical catchment villages. It would 
have been worthwhile to investigate what local people think about the 
management of resources that they might use but which are located outside 
their village boundaries. This would provide some insights as to the effects 
of resource sharing across villages on the management of those resources.  
 
Collective-choice arrangements 
This principle states that most people who can be affected by harvesting 
and protection rules should be included in the group of actors who can 
modify these rules. Common pool resource institutions that comply with 
this principle are better able to tailor rules to local circumstances, since the 
individuals who directly interact with one another and with the physical 
world can modify the rules over time to fit them to specific characteristics 
of their setting. Chapter Six, which discusses decision-making processes 
and actor participation in institutional structures, shows that not all users 
have a say in what rules are made. There is varied involvement of actors 
such as women and men in different kinds of rule formulation processes. 
Chapter Four also shows that sometimes, local people are not involved in 
the formulation of rules that affect them, if these rules are formulated by 
higher-level authorities. For example, local actors were not involved in the 
formulation of the Chivi RDC by-laws, even though there could be avenues 
for them to be. In traditional authority systems, rules, norms and sacred   233
control, the public also has very little say in the ways rules are formulated. 
However, through consultation with traditional leaders, some of these rules 
are relaxed or reinterpreted. Another broad category of rules is that 
formulated by project related structures, which are often in the form of 
constitutions. There was evidence that these rules are developed with wide 
participation of project members, although there are committees who work 
closely with patron NGOs. These patron NGOs often play an advisory role 
in the formulation of these rules and may influence what rules are adopted.  
 
Institutions for water that were in use and adhered to at the time of the 
study appear to have emerged locally, with little external interference and 
were working satisfactorily. On the contrary, institutions for water 
emanating from the institutional engineering approach such as the borehole 
committees were found to be less effective. Their existence is 
acknowledged but people do not see them as being effective because in 
most cases there is little that they do. For instance the Chidiso borehole 
committee has failed to repair one of the two pumps that broke down in 
1998 and even by June 2002 at the conclusion of the fieldwork for this 
study, the pump was still not functional.   
 
Monitoring 
The fourth design principle states that there should be monitors who 
actively audit physical conditions and use behaviour and are at least 
partially accountable to the users and/or are the users themselves. Findings 
from Romwe presented in Chapters Four and Five show that there is 
ineffectual monitoring by the two broad institutional structures responsible 
for especially woodland management, namely the state related agencies 
(formal) and traditional structures (informal). State related structures such 
as VIDCOs and WADCOs are not accountable to the users and therefore 
even where these structures attempt to monitor resource use, they tend to 
be accountable to the state organs such as the RDC and not to the local 
resource user or actors. This may alienate them from the resource users 
with whom they reside and therefore they may prefer not to monitor 
adherence to rules and regulations. Designated monitors within the 
traditional system, e.g. the sabuku’s police, were found to be relatively 
more effective than the formal ones that fall under the local authority, the 
RDC. But their position has been weakened over the years by competition 
from monitors who are supported by the state system such as DNR, 
VIDCOs and the WADCOs or other structures that have been established 
through NGO support such as the catchment management and dam 
committees. Thus, this design principle was applicable to a large extent 
within the framework of the traditional authority system, as the sabuku’s 
police (the monitor) is often also a user and is accountable to other users 
and the traditional leaders based locally rather than being accountable to an 
external agency.  
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Graduated sanctions 
This principle suggests that users who violate rules are likely to receive 
graduated sanctions depending on the seriousness and context of the 
offence. Graduated sanctions in state systems were enforced by the RDC 
through fines, with VIDCOs and WADCOs responsible for reporting 
offenders to the RDC. Because the fines are paid to the RDC and are not 
ploughed back to the community from which the fine was paid, there was 
no incentive for the VIDCOs and WADCOs to forward names of offenders 
to the RDC. Penalties for breaking rules are also very low, thus 
encouraging people to break rules as most of them can afford to pay the 
fines as well as make a profit. Traditional graduated sanctions were found 
to be applied, but not in a consistent manner. For instance, environmental 
conditions such as drought or annual seasonal variations often resulted in 
the relaxation or reinterpretation of some rules. The context surrounding 
the offence was found to be important too and determined the variability of 
fines imposed.  
 
Conflict resolution mechanisms 
This design principle states that users and their officials have rapid access 
to low cost, local arenas to resolve conflicts among users and/or between 
users and officials or leaders. Because of the existence of a multiplicity of 
institutions and institutional structures that influence access to especially 
woodland resources, users may act strategically and find low cost conflict 
resolution options. Some of the resolutions effected, especially by 
traditional leaders who sometimes pass inconsistent resolutions as 
discussed in Chapter Five, may fuel conflicts or may legitimise actions or 
practices prohibited by other institutional structures. In other cases, 
conflicts tend to be protracted as users switch from one structure to another 
to seek arbitration. As illustrated by the Mafeha case in Chapter Five, 
people may oscillate between institutional structures, favouring those that 
they feel may make a better judgement over their case. 
 
Minimal recognition of rights to organise (autonomy) 
This principle states that the rights of the users to devise their own 
institutions are not challenged by external governmental bodies and users 
have long-term tenure to the resource. As discussed in the thesis, there is a 
multiplicity of institutions involved in woodlands and water use, both 
formal and informal. The importance of informal, non-codified institutions 
has sometimes been ignored, yet these are the most used by local actors. 
Within project committees, there is more autonomy, as the right to organise 
is often not challenged by either the traditional leaders or state authorities. 
But the committees’ autonomy exists in relation to the patron NGO. The 
eighth design principle, nested enterprises, is said to apply to resources that 
are parts of larger systems. In this case, appropriation, provision, 
enforcement, conflict resolution and governance activities are organised in 
multiple layers of nested enterprises. This design principle was not tested   235
in Romwe because the resources analysed were not considered as parts of 
larger systems.  
 
The design principles were found to be generally more relevant to water 
resource management and less applicable to woodland resources. For water 
resources, resource users and the nature of their use are clearly defined, for 
instance there were specifications that village X uses water for livestock 
watering only during the dry season or during a drought year and village Y 
uses water for irrigation and other specified uses. Water is a more discrete 
resource even though its uses are diverse and this may explain why user 
groups and boundaries are more clearly defined and rules are adhered to. 
Patterns of water use and groups of users are relatively fixed although there 
is room for flexibility. Unlike in the case of woodlands, use boundaries 
were not contested for water resources. This could also be related to the 
fact that the majority of water sources except for Mawunga stream and 
natural springs were established through some investment such as labour, 
time or other material resources. Thus potential users, who did not 
contribute towards the establishment of the water sources, have less room 
to challenge or claim ownership over water sources such as the dam, 
boreholes and deep wells. Yet for woodlands, contestations could be on the 
basis of the resources being natural, God given and no one having invested 
any material resources in their development (Gerhardt & Nemarundwe, 
forthcoming). There is general adherence to rules for accessing various 
water sources even though the rules are not written down, and there 
appears to be a high level of awareness of the rules among community 
members. 
 
Design principles are less applicable for woodlands because resource use 
and users’ boundaries are fuzzy, fluid and often contested and institutional 
jurisdictions are also unclear. There are diverse woodland product uses by 
different groups and villages but these uses are not clear and are very 
dynamic. Thus unlike for water resources, it cannot be categorically said 
this village uses poles only or grazing only. An individual can come into 
the area to harvest poles but in the process get fibre, fruit or pick 
mushrooms. Rule enforcement is therefore more complex for woodlands 
than for water resources. Ownership and/or user rights in woodlands are 
highly contested. Social classification and historical narratives were used to 
justify claims over woodland resources. In times of social stress, social 
classification such as the notions of Voho (the ruling clan), Zvidza zvopo 
(those closely related to the ruling clan but not direct descendants), Vawuyi 
(new comers) and Vechirudzi (aliens of foreign origin, e.g. Malawians) 
discussed in Chapters Three and Five becomes much stronger. When there 
is less tension, other kinds of classifications such as those related to gender, 
age or wealth are more at play. Historical narratives are also used to justify 
claims over both resource ownership and leadership positions. The highly 
contested nature of woodland resources could be due to the fact that 
woodlands are linked to land. As a result of land shortage in Romwe, both 
in terms of quantity and quality, there has been an increase in cases of   236
encroachment into woodland areas for purposes of settlement and 
agriculture. This has reduced the size of grazing land, affecting mostly 
cattle owners. The majority of those who are affected by the land shortage 
are the newly married young men. The government fast track resettlement 
programme had raised the hopes of these young men to ‘own’ land, but 
from experiences of those who have been to the newly acquired 
commercial farms (e.g. the cases presented in Chapter Four), their hopes 
are still to be fulfilled.  
 
Drawing from the foregoing discussion, it would appear as if the 
relevance of the design principles for woodlands in contexts like Romwe is 
limited. Ostrom (1990) states that systems that are characterised by some 
of these principles are fragile, while failed systems are characterised by 
very few of these principles. In this characterisation, woodland 
management systems in Romwe, would be described as failed systems, yet 
as has been demonstrated in this thesis, these resources are not truly open 
access systems as the various management regimes in place have some 
elements of common property regimes. There is clearly a lack of 
congruence between theory and empirical evidence. Much more attention 
therefore needs to be paid to realities on the ground and the characteristics 
of a particular natural resource to inform theory. The comparative analysis 
of woodland and water management systems in Romwe seems to point to 
the fact that the characteristics of a resource are important in the analysis of 
the applicability of design principles for robust institutions for common 
pool resource management. The development of the design principles was 
in the context of water resources and this may partly explain their 
relevance for water institutions in Romwe and not for woodlands. 
Woodland management is riddled with more complexity when compared to 
water resources.  
 
Other questions that remain unexplored in the CPR literature include the 
question whether all commoners are equal and whether they have similar 
interests in the implementation and protection of community property 
rights. How is the local flow of power regulated or disrupted through 
CPRM? How are local institutions situated within the larger political 
economy? The discourse on common property also needs to recognise that 
rural people use both private and communal resources. The categorisation 
of property rights regimes into four broad categories i.e. state property, 
private property, common property and open access may lead to a 
misconception that there are clear cut divisions between the property 
regimes, yet there is often overlap across the regimes. Different tenure 
systems can apply in one locale simultaneously or at different times.   237
7.6.2 The actor-oriented and actor-network approaches 
The study also used the actor-oriented approach to examine the diversity of 
actors and institutional structures involved in community-based resource 
management. The actor-oriented approach to institutional analysis was 
found useful in seeking to elucidate how social dynamics influence 
woodland and water resource management activities of diverse groups of 
people, and how these activities in turn help to produce and shape 
particular kinds of environment. For instance, rather than framing 
woodland resource management problems simply in terms of aggregate 
population pressure on a limited natural resource base, an actor-oriented 
framework was useful in that it considers the role of diverse institutions in 
mediating the relationships between different social actors and different 
components of the local natural resource landscape. The insights derived 
from such an analysis could help target external interventions more 
effectively, whether the objectives are to protect and to promote access 
rights or security of tenure of particular social groups or foster particular 
CBNRM outcomes. Such forms of intervention may involve a much more 
diverse range of institutions than the CBNRM institutional engineering 
process has acknowledged. An understanding of this complex set of 
institutional relationships, by making conflicts and synergies more explicit, 
is a vital precursor to the exploration of options for the management of 
woodland and water resources at the local community level. 
 
The actor-oriented perspective begins with the idea that different social 
interactions develop and change depending on the context and natural 
resource at stake. This approach places emphasis on the role of human 
agency and thus it is important in the analysis of how individual actors and 
or resource users strategise or position themselves strategically in relation 
to other actors as a way of ensuring that their interests and needs are 
catered for. The actor-oriented approach was therefore also useful in 
unravelling the processes of negotiating resource access for different 
members of the community. Given that its main emphasis is on human 
agency, which is often equated to the agency of the individual, this 
approach was less useful in the examination of social networks for resource 
access that were found to be important in determining who could access 
what natural resource at a given time. Thus, for exploring such 
relationships, the actor-network approach was adopted. Using an actor-
network perspective, the study further examined the role of social networks 
within the institutional framework for woodlands and water.  
 
To understand how different actors’ practices are embedded in and help 
to shape the range of formal and informal institutions necessitates an actor-
oriented approach to the analysis of institutions (Long & Long, 1992; Long 
& van der Ploeg, 1989; Villarreal, 1994). This view is augmented by Leach 
et al., (1999) based on findings from three case studies undertaken in the 
Eastern Cape’s Wild Coast area in South Africa, Wenchi district in Ghana 
and Udipur district, Rajasthan in India. Leach et al., (1999: 238) found the   238
actor-oriented approach useful in the analysis of the embedded nature of 
formal and informal institutions and in exploring institutional change in an 
historical perspective. This study found the actor-oriented approach useful 
in the analysis of the roles of various actors in governing access to 
woodlands and water resources at the local level.  
 
An actor-oriented approach to institutional analysis adopted for this study 
highlights relations of power among various resource users. This approach 
sees institutions as outcomes of negotiations among social actors, involving 
power relationships and debates over meaning (Leach, et al., 1999; Peters, 
1984). Rather than existing as a fixed framework, institutions are 
constantly made and remade through people’s practices and interactions. 
Just as power shifts between various institutional structures, so too do the 
allegiances of various actors as groups or individuals, suggesting that at 
any given time, there is a complex network of alliances and relationships 
between institutional structures and local people. Social networks and other 
relationships are very contextual and dynamic and therefore difficult to 
predict, making the definition of appropriate management structures 
problematic. The dynamism challenges prescriptive institutional 
engineering approaches facilitated by NGOs and state agencies. Social 
networks, which fall under informal institutions, are also embedded in the 
local context and culture. Owing to the embeddedness of informal 
institutions, institutional change in a given community may be a slow 
process, even if formal institutions such as legal frameworks, macro-
economic policies and political regimes change much quicker.    
 
The actor-oriented approach adopted in this study was also useful in 
unravelling various actors’ perceptions regarding the issue of boundaries. If 
such an approach is adopted by technocrats and policy makers, it may help 
them see beyond the physical boundaries when drafting crucial policies and 
regulations guiding natural resource use so they take cognisance of the 
multiple interests of different people claiming access to the natural 
resources. This observation runs contrary to the recommendation of the 
LTC (1994) suggesting that physical boundaries should be drawn between 
villages. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
Many challenges for the implementation of decentralisation policies 
through CBNRM still exist and there are also many lessons still to learn. 
Each situation is unique and influenced strongly by a variety of contextual 
factors such as the power dynamics, micro-politics at play or characteristics 
of the natural resource being managed. It is therefore important that 
facilitators of CBNRM initiatives are not too prescriptive in determining 
what works and what does not work. Possibly, one of the most important 
lessons for policy makers, practitioners and researchers is the need to be 
flexible and recognise CBNRM as a dynamic process in which different 
issues, concerns and power-plays emerge as the process unfolds and the   239
system evolves and adapts to accommodate new institutions and the related 
power shifts.  
 
The institutional framework governing access to and control over 
resources, the motivational dynamics and power relations, which operate 
create different dynamics that must be considered when analysing 
institutions for woodland and water resources management in semi-arid 
conditions. Traditional institutions, as represented by traditional leaders, 
were found to be more influential and considered more legitimate at the 
local level. This study therefore advocates for building on the legitimacy of 
the traditional institutions, but infusing some democratic orientation into 
these institutions. While the traditional authorities were more favourable to 
the community members at the time of the study, the traditional leadership 
needs some capacity for facilitating collaborative resource management, 
and participatory processes in natural resource management to ensure that 
not only dominant groups such as the elite villagers dominate decision 
making processes.  
 
Characteristics of the natural resource in question may influence the 
effectiveness of resource management institutions. Ostrom’s design 
principles highlight the need for clearly defined resource boundaries, 
congruence between benefits and costs, collective choice arrangements, 
monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict resolution mechanisms and 
autonomy of the resource users and their institutional structures, if 
collective action for resource management is to be sustainable. This study 
however finds that investment in the development of a resource in terms of 
time, labour or other material resources also influence whether institutions 
are adhered to or not. For instance, for water resources where there has 
been some investment, there was more compliance with rules, yet this was 
not the case for woodlands that are considered as a God given resource. 
Furthermore, perceptions about resource availability or scarcity are also an 
important determinant influencing whether institutions are adhered to or 
not. It is important to note that availability of a resource is not only 
measured in terms of quantity of the resource but the quality of the 
resource is equally important. If a resource is perceived to be available and 
there are secure rights of access to the resource, there is generally less 
competition and fewer contestations over the resource, often resulting in 
fewer challenges over institutions for resource management. This study 
finds that in cases where there are multiple and competing claims and 
contestation over resource access and control, as in the case of woodlands, 
management institutions tend to be much weaker.  
 
Through the actor-oriented and actor-network approaches, this study has 
attempted to provide a dynamic perspective on the role of local level 
institutions in people-environment relations within the context of 
decentralisation of natural resource management to the local level through 
CBNRM initiatives. Diverse institutions, both formal and informal and 
often acting in combination (given their overlapping jurisdictions), shape   240
the ways in which actors, differentiated according to gender, age and 
wealth access, derive livelihoods from woodlands and water resources, and 
in doing so, influence the changes in the landscape. As people interact with 
each other in relation to natural resource use within a given institutional 
framework, their actions and interactions may over time serve to reproduce 
particular institutions or they may serve to alter them. By seeing the 
people-environment relations from the actor-oriented and actor-network 
frameworks, this study offers some fundamental challenges to the ways in 
which ‘community’ institutions are often viewed in the literature 
surrounding CBNRM and this has some implications for development 
planning and practice including: 
 
1.  Institutional engineering within CBNRM based on the implicit 
assumption that democratically elected and empowered community 
institutional structures are the main vehicle for CBNRM activities 
is challenged. In reality, institutional engineering may be a 
reflection of the institutional complexity within which woodland 
and water resources are accessed. 
2. Multiple institutions are involved in woodland and water 
management and most of these are not dedicated to the purposes of 
managing these resources only. They regulate access to many other 
resources and govern many other arenas of social interactions e.g. 
kinship and other social networks. 
3. Amidst this multiplicity of institutions for natural resource 
management, different people rely on different institutions to 
support their claims to woodland and water resources. In most 
cases, a combination of a set of claims supported by different 
institutions is used.  
4.  Many of the institutions operating at community level, especially 
in the context of water use, are informal and consist more in the 
regularised practices of particular actors and are not in any fixed 
form. Yet local community members perceive these informal 
institutions as being more effective compared to the formal ones. 
Many of the informal institutions are highly dynamic, changing 
over time as actors alter their behaviour to suit new social, 
political, economic and ecological circumstances. Externally 
facilitated institutional structures may miss or reduce the flexibility 
that is inherent in informal institutions.  
5.  Understanding social difference and diversity of natural resources 
management institutions, which define different actors’ (such as 
women’s and men’s) access to resources, points towards 
possibilities for more strategic specificity in CBNRM initiatives. 
For instance, if certain institutions are identified as supporting the 
interest of certain actors, or as contributing to the desired goal of 
CBNRM, then they may be targeted by policy in strategies of 
institutional capacity building.  
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In traditional resource management institutions and decision-making 
processes, women have often been sidelined. This has also been the case in 
formal institutions and decision-making processes that are backed by the 
state or state agencies such as the RDC. The facilitation of CBNRM by 
NGOs appears to have empowered women to be more actively involved in 
resource management decisions as well as improving women’s access to 
land and water. This in a way is changing the institutional map at the local 
level, with women playing a much bigger role than has historically been 
the case. Provision of training in leadership skills and confidence building 
workshops by NGOs, have facilitated this process of empowering women.  
 
While efforts are being made to decentralise management of woodlands 
and water resources, this study concludes that there is in general 
insufficient local control over the management of natural resources, 
influence over policy and policy-making processes, administration and 
legislation pertaining to natural resource management. A number of 
contradictions exist in the initiatives that aim to foster decentralised 
participatory resource management at the local level and these include, 
state (central) control versus decentralised control, statutory rights versus 
customary rights, few uses and resource users versus many and diverse 
uses and users without clearly defined mandates and jurisdictions, modern 
resource management knowledge systems versus traditional knowledge 
systems and formal versus informal institutions.  
 
There are four emerging themes from this study that need more attention. 
These are, the perception of traditional authorities as being more legitimate 
in the eyes of the local people despite their history of empowerment and 
disempowerment; accountability of resource management structures; the 
relevance of the dichotomy between formal and informal institutions and 
related structures; and the recentralisation of legal management authority 
for natural resources at the RDC rather than devolution to levels below the 
RDC.  
 
The traditional institutions and related structures appear to enjoy 
legitimacy in the eyes of the local people, yet from the colonial period, the 
liberation war and the post independence periods, they have undergone 
phases of empowerment and disempowerment by the various governments 
of the time or forces at play during a particular phase. During the colonial 
period, the structure of the traditional authority system was altered by the 
introduction of the position of sabuku for efficiency in tax collection. 
During the liberation war, the traditional authorities were weakened as the 
liberation war fighters stripped them of their powers and also built up a 
view against the traditional leaders as being sellouts and supporters of the 
colonial government. Following independence in 1980, traditional 
authorities were further weakened by the introduction of the VIDCO and 
WADCO structures. Yet at the local level, people appear to still consider 
traditional leaders more legitimate. There is need to further investigate why 
the traditional institutions and related structures have remained powerful in   242
the face of the different processes of empowerment and disempowerment 
during the various time periods.  
 
Accountability has also emerged as an important issue in the process of 
decentralising resource management. There appears to be general 
agreement in the literature on decentralisation that there is need for 
downward accountability of resource management structures (Mapedza & 
Mandondo, 2001; Matondi, 2001; Ribot, 2003 & 1999). The assumption in 
this literature advocating for downward accountability of natural resource 
management institutional structures is that this would foster active 
participation of local actors in the management of their natural resources. A 
major challenge is that, this literature does not discuss the mechanisms to 
achieve downward accountability. This study was not able to pursue issues 
relating to accountability and therefore recommends that research be 
undertaken to investigate what mechanisms can be put in place to ensure 
that there is downward accountability of resource management structures.  
 
More often, CBNRM literature refers to formal and informal resource 
management institutions and related structures discussed in the thesis. 
Given the overlapping mandates and membership in the institutional 
structures often classified as formal or informal, a key question that 
emerges relates to the relevance of the dichotomy between the formal and 
informal institutions. Recent literature argues that it does not matter 
whether an institution is formal or informal, what matters is whether the 
institutional structure is better able to manage resources and also whether it 
is downwardly or upwardly accountable. This study began by using the 
dichotomy between the formal and informal, but with the results pointing 
to the fluid nature of boundaries between these structures, further studies 
would generate insights on whether this dichotomy is useful or not.  
 
Last but not least, this study, similar to other studies that have been done 
in Zimbabwe (e.g. Murombedzi, 1992; Mandondo, 2001), finds that the 
legal authority for the management of woodlands and water resources has 
not been devolved to levels below the RDC. Rather the legal mandate for 
the management of these natural resources has been recentralised at RDC 
level through various legal instruments such as the Rural District Councils 
Act (1988) and the Communal Lands Forest Produce Act (1982 revised in 
1987). There are a number of explanations given in the CBNRM literature 
and these include, the bureaucratic impulse by organisations such as the 
RDC to retain management authority (Murphree, 1993) and that the 
decentralisation process has been supply-led rather than demand driven 
(Mandondo, 2001; Ribot, 1999). Findings of this study suggest that 
recentralisation of resource management authority at the RDC level could 
partly be a result of the existence of a multiplicity of structures involved in 
resource management below the RDC. It is therefore not clear to which 
structure management authority should be devolved. Further studies need 
to be undertaken to identify mechanisms for ensuring that management 
authority is further devolved beyond the RDC.   243
REFERENCES 
 
Abercrombie, N. 1988. The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology. Penguin. London. 
Abrahams, R. (ed). 1985. Witchcraft in Contemporary Tanzania. African Studies 
Centre. Cambridge. 
Acheson, J.M. 1989. ‘Management of Common Property Resources’. In S. Platter 
(ed). Economic Anthropology. Stanford University Press. Stanford. 
Admassie, Y. 1995. Twenty Years to Nowhere: Property Rights, Land 
Management and Conservation in Ethiopia. Department of Sociology, Uppsala 
University. Uppsala. 
Agarwal, B. 2001. ‘Participatory Exclusions, Community Forestry and Gender 
Analysis for South Asia and a Conceptual Framework’. World Development. 
Vol. 29, No. 10, pp 1623-1648. 
Agarwal, B. 1997a. ‘Environmental Action, Gender Equity and Women’s 
Participation.’ Development and Change, Vol. 28, pp 1-44. 
Agarwal, B. 1997b. ‘Gender, Poverty Interlinks: Regional Variations and 
Temporal Shifts in Rural India’. World Development, Vol. 25, No.1, pp 23-25.    
Agarwal, Bina. 1994a. A Field of One’s Own: Gender and Land Rights in South 
Asia. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 
Agarwal, B. 1994b. ‘Gender, Resistance and Land: Interlinked Struggles over 
Resources and Meanings in South Asia’. The Journal of Peasant Studies. Vol. 
22, No. 1, pp 81-125. 
Agarwal, B. 1992. ‘The Gender and Environment Debate: Lessons from India’. 
Feminist Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp 119-158. 
Agrawal, A. and C.C. Gibson. 1999. ‘Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role 
of Community in Natural Resource Conservation’. World Development. Vol. 27, 
No. 4, pp 629-649.  
Agrawal, A. and J.C. Ribot. 1999. ‘Accountability in Decentralisation: A 
Framework with South Asian and African Cases’. Journal of Developing Areas, 
Vol. 33, (Summer) pp 473-502. 
Apthorpe, R. and D. Gasper. 1996. Arguing Development Policy: Frames and 
Discourses. Frank CASS & EADI. London. 
Arnold, J.E.M. 1998. Managing Forests as Common Property. FAO Forestry 
Paper, no. 136. Rome. 
Arnstein, S.R. 1969. ‘A Ladder of Participation’. Journal of American Institute of 
Planners’. July 1969, pp 216-223. 
Bachrach, P. and M.S. Baratz. 1970. Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice. 
Oxford University Press. New York. 
Balland, J-M. and J-P. Platteau. 1996. Population Pressure and Management of 
Natural Resources. FAO Economic and Social Development Paper No. 139. 
FAO. Rome. 
Barnes, C., E. Keogh, N. Nemarundwe, and L. Nyikahadzoi. 2002. Micro-Finance 
and Mitigation of the Impacts of HIV/AIDS: An Exploratory Study from 
Zimbabwe. MSI. Washington D.C. 
Bassett, T. 1993. ‘Introduction: The Land Question and Agricultural 
Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa’. In T. Bassett and D. Crummey (eds). 
Land in African Agrarian Systems, University of Wisconsin Press. Madison, pp 
3-34.  
Bassett, T.J. 1988. ‘The Political Ecology of Peasant-Herder Conflicts in Northern 
Ivory Coast’. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 78, pp 
453-472.  
Bassett T. and D. Crummey (eds). 1993. Land in African Agrarian Systems, 
University of Wisconsin. Madison. 
Bates, R.H. 1995. ‘Social Dilemmas and Rational Individuals: An Assessment of 
the new Institutionalism’. In J. Harris, J. Hunter and C.M. Lewis (eds). The New   244
Institutional Economics and Third World Development. Routledge. London, pp 
27-48.  
Beach, D.N. 1973. ‘The Shona and the Ndebele Power’. Henderson Seminar No. 
26. Department of History, University of Rhodesia. Mimeo. 
Beach, D.N. 1971. ‘The Adendorf Trek in Shona History’. South African 
Historical Journal, No. 3, pp 30-48. 
Bebbington, A. 1994. ‘Theory and Relevance in Indigenous Agriculture: 
Knowledge, Agency and Organisation’. In D. Booth (ed). Rethinking Social 
Development: Theory, Research and Practice. Longman. Harlow, pp 202-225.  
Berger, P.L. and T. Luckman. 1968. The Social Construction of Reality: A 
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Anchor Books. New york.  
Berkes, F. and T. Farvar. 1989. ‘Introduction and Overview’. In (ed) F. Berkes. 
Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable 
Development. Belhaven Press. London, pp 1-17.  
Berry, S. 1997. ‘Tomatoes, Land and Hearsay: Property and History in Asante in 
the Time of Structural Adjustment’. World Development, Vol. 25, No. 8, pp 
1225-1241. 
Berry, S. 1993. No Condition is Permanent: The Social and Agrarian Change in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. University of Wisconsin Press. Madison.  
Berry, S. 1992. ‘Hegemony on a Shoestring: Indirect Rule and Access to 
Agricultural Land’. Africa, Vol. 62, No. 3, pp 327-355. 
Berry, S. 1989. ‘Social Institutions and Access to Resources’. Africa, Vol. 59, No. 
1, pp 41-55. 
Biggs, S. and H. Matsaert. 1998. ‘An Actor-oriented Approach for Strengthening 
Research and Development Capabilities in Natural Resource Systems’. Paper 
presented at the Monitoring and Evaluation mini-conference, 25-26 August 
1998. Overseas Development Group, University of East Anglia. Norwich. 
Bourdillon, M. 1987. The Shona Peoples: An Ethnography of the Contemporary 
Shona, with Special Reference to Religion. Third Revised Edition. Mambo 
Press. Gweru.  
Bradley, P. 1991. Woodfuel, Women and Woodlots. Vol.1. Macmillan. London.  
Braedt, O. and W. Standa-Gunda. 2000. ´Woodcraft markets in Zimbabwe´. 
International Tree Crop Journal, No. 10, pp 367-384. 
Bratton, M. 1994. ‘Peasant and State Relations in Post-Colonial Africa: Patterns of 
Engagement and Disengagement’. In J.S. Midgal, A. Kohli and V. Shue (eds). 
State Power and Social Force: Domination and Transformation in the Third 
World. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, pp 231-255. 
Bromley, D.W. (ed). 1992. Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and 
Policy. ICS Press. San Francisco.  
Bromley, D. W. 1991. Environment and Economy: Property rights and public 
policy. Blackwell Publishers. Cambridge. 
Bromley, D.W. and M. M: Cernea. 1989.  The Management of Common Property 
Natural Resources: Some Conceptual and Operations Fallacies. World Bank 
Discussion Paper 57, World Bank. Washington, D.C.  
Bruce, J.W. 1986. Land Tenure Issues in Project Design and Strategies for 
Agricultural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. LTC Paper, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. Madison.  
Bryant, R.L. 1997. The Political Ecology of Forestry in Burma 1824-1994. 
C.Hurst. London. 
Bryant, R.L. 1992. ‘Political Ecology: An Emerging Research Agenda in Third 
World Studies’. Political Geography, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp 12-36. 
Bryant, R.L. and S. Bailey. 1997. Third World Political Ecology. Routledge. 
London. 
Burns, T.R., T. Baumgartner and P. Deville. 1985. Man, Decisions and Society: 
Theory of Actor-System Dynamics for Social Scientists. Studies in Cybernetics 
No. 10, Gordon Breach. New York.    245
Butterworth, J.A. 1997. The Hydrology of a Dryland Catchment in Southern 
Zimbbabwe and the Effects of Climatic and Land Use Change on Shallow 
Groundwater Resources. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Department of Soil Science, 
Univeristy of Reading. UK.  
Byron, N. 1997. ‘International Development Assistance in Forestry and Land 
Management: The Process and the Players’. Commonwealth Forestry Review. 
Vol. 76, pp 61-67. 
Callon, M. and J. Law. 1997. ‘After the Individual in Society: Lesson on 
Collectivity from Science, Technology and Society’. Canadian Journal of 
Sociology. Vol. 22, No. 2, pp 165-182. 
Campbell, B. M., W. de Jong, M. Luckert, A. Mandondo, F. Matose, N. 
Nemarundwe and B. Sithole. 2001. Challenges to proponents of common 
property resource systems: Despairing voices from the social forests of 
Zimbabwe. World Development, Vol. 29, No.4, pp 589-600. 
Campbell, B.M., S. Jeffrey, W. Kozanayi , M. Luckert, M. Mutamba and C. Zindi. 
2002. Household Livelihoods in Semi-Arid Regions: Options and Constraints. 
Center for International Forestry Research. Bogor.  
Campbell, B., N. Byron, P. Hobane, E. Madzudzo, F. Matose and L. Wily. 1999. 
‘Moving to Local Control of Woodland Resources: Can CAMPFIRE go beyond 
the mega-fauna’. Society and Natural Resources, Vol. 12, pp 501-509. 
Campbell, B.M., I. Grundy and F. Matose. 1993. ‘Tree and Woodland Resources: 
The Technical Practice of Small-scale Farmers’. In P.N. Bradley and K. 
McNamara (eds). Living with Trees: Policies for Forestry Management in 
Zimbabwe. World Bank Technical Paper No. 210, pp 29-62.  
Carney, J. and M. Watts. 1991. ‘Manufacturing Dissent: Work, Gender and the 
Politics of Meaning in a Peasant Society’. Africa, Vol. 60, No. 2, pp 207-241. 
Carr, D. 1986. Time, Narrative and History. Indiana University Press. 
Bloomington, Indianapolis. 
Cavendish, W. 2000. ‘Empirical Regularities in the Poverty Environment 
Relationship of Rural Households: Evidence from Zimbabwe’. Centre for the 
Study of African Economies, University of Oxford. Oxford. 
Cernea, M.M (ed). 1985. Putting People First: Sociological Variables in Rural 
Development. Oxford University Press. New York.  
Chambers, R. 1995. Poverty and Livelihoods: Whose Reality Counts? UNDP. 
New York.  
Chambers, R. 1993. Challenging the Professions: Frontiers for Rural 
Development. Intermediate Technology Group. London. 
Chambers, R. 1992. Rural Appraisal: Rapid, Relaxed and Participatory. IDS 
Publications. Brighton.  
Chambliss, W. J. 1999. Power, politics and crime. Westview Press. Boulder, 
Colorado.  
Cheater, A. P. 1986. Social Anthropology: An Alternative Introduction. Mambo 
Press. Gweru.  
Cheneaux-Repond, M. 1992. The economic and social situation of widows and 
divorced women on a resettlement scheme in Zimbabwe’. In J. Stewart (ed). 
Working papers of Inheritance. Women and Law in Southern Africa research 
project working paper number 5, pp 22-52. Harare. 
Clarke, J. 1997. Building on Indigenous Natural Resource Management: Forestry 
Practices in Zimbabwe’s Communal Lands. Forestry Commission. Harare.   
Cleaver, F. 2000. ‘Moral Ecological Rationality, Institutions and Management of 
Common Property Resources’. Development and Change, Vol. 31, pp 361-383.  
Cleaver, F. 1998. ‘Incentives and Informal Institutions: Gender and the 
Management of Water.’ Agriculture and Human Values, Vol. 15, pp 347-360.   
Cleaver, F. 1994. ‘Water as a Weapon: The history of water supply development 
in Nkayi district, Zimbabwe’. Environmental History, Vol. XVII, pp 313-333.   246
Cleaver, F. and D. Elson. 1995. Women and Water Resources: Continued 
Marginalisation and New Policies. Gatekeeper series no. 49. International 
Institute for Environment and Development. London. 
Clegg, S.R. 1989. ‘Circuits of Power: A Framework for Analysis’. In Frameworks 
of Power. Sage Publications. London, pp 187-240. 
Clyde, Kluckman. 1962. Navaho Witchcraft. Beacon Press. London. 
Cohen, S..S., J.W. Dyckman, E. Schoenberger and C.R. Downs. 1981. 
Decentralisation: A Framework for Policy Analysis. University of California 
Press. Berkeley. 
Coleman, J.S. 1994. Foundations of Social Theory. The Belknap Press. 
Cambridge. 
Conyers, D. 2001. ‘Whose Elephants are they? Decentralisation of Control Over 
Wildlife Management through the CAMPFIRE Programme in Binga District, 
Zimbabwe’. Working Paper No. 31, World Resources Institute. Washington 
D.C.  
Corell, E. 1996. ‘Water as a Source of Conflict: A Case Study of India’. IRD 
Currents, No. 12, pp 21-24. 
Cornwall, A. 2001. Beneficiary, Consumer, Citizen: Perspectives on Participation 
for Poverty Reduction. SIDA Studies No. 2. SIDA. Stockholm. 
Cousins, B. 1997. ‘How do Rights Become Real? Formal and Informal Institutions 
in South Africa’s Land Reform’. IDS Bulletin, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp 59-68. 
Cousins, B. 1992. ‘A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Communal 
Grazing Regimes’. In B. Cousins (ed). Institutional Dynamics in Communal 
Grazing Regimes in Southern Africa. CASS, University of Zimbabwe. Harare, 
pp 13-38. 
Cousins, B. 1989. ‘Community, Class and Grazing Management in Zimbabwe’s 
Communal Lands’. In B. Cousins (ed). People, Land and Livestock. GTZ and 
CASS, Univeristy of Zimbabwe. Harare.  
Cox, R. 1987. Production, Power and the Third World Order. Columbia Press. 
New York. 
Daniels, S. and G. Walker. 2001. Working through Environmental Conflicts: The 
Collaborative Learning Approach. Praeger. Westport, CT.  
Denzin, N.K. and Y.S. Lincoln (eds). 2000. ‘Introduction: The Discipline and 
Practice of Qualitative Research’. In N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds). 
Handbook of Qualitative Research. Second Edition. Thousand Oaks. London, 
pp 1-28. 
Derman, B. 1999. Democratising Environmental Use? Land and Water in 
Southern Africa at the end of the Century. Department of Anthropology and the 
African Studies Centre, Michigan State University. Michigan. 
Derman, B. and C. Nhira. 1998. Preliminary Reflections on a Comparative Study 
of the Mazoe and Mupfure Pilot Catchments in the context of Zimbabwe’s new 
Water Act. CASS, University of Zimbabwe. Harare. 
Dore, D. 2001. ‘Transforming Traditional Institutions for Sustainable Natural 
Resource Management: History, Narratives and Evidence from Zimbabwe’s 
Communal Areas’. African Studies Quarterly 
 http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i3a1.html. Accessed in November 2002. 
Drescher, A.W. 1998. African Home Gardens: Self-Management of Sustainable 
Production Systems and Strategies of Food Security in Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
www.geoagraphie.unifreiburg.de/ipj/forschung/ap1/publications/summarydresch
er.html. 
Dudley, E. 1993. The Critical Villager: Beyond Community Participation. 
Routledge. London & New York. 
du Toit, R.F., B.M. Campbell, R.A. Haney and D. Dore. 1984. Wood Usage and 
Tree Planting in Zimbabwe’s Communal Lands: A Baseline Survey of 
Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices. Report for the Forestry Commission of 
Zimbabwe and the World Bank Resource Studies. Harare.   247
Dzingirai, V. 1998. Human Migration and Natural Resources Management in 
Zimbabwe’s Communal Lands: The Case of Binga. DPhil Thesis. CASS, 
University of Zimbabwe. Harare.  
Dzingirai, V. 1994. ‘Politics and Ideology in Human Settlement: Getting Settled in 
the Sikomena Area of Chief Dobola’. Zambezia XXI (ii), pp 167-175. 
Escobar, A. 1988. ‘Power and Visibility: Development and Invention of 
Management of the Third World’. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 3, pp 428-443. 
Etzioni, A. 1992. ‘Normative-affective Factors: Towards a New Decision-making 
Model’. In M. Zey (ed.) Decision-making: Alternatives to Rational Choice 
Models. Sage Publications. Newbury Park. 
Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 1937. Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande. 
Clarendon Press. Oxford. 
Fairhead, J. and M. Leach. 1995. ‘False History, Complicit Social Analysis: 
Rethinking Some West African Environmental Narratives’. World Development. 
Vol 23, No. 6, pp 1023-1035.   
Fairhead, J. and M. Leach. 1996. Misreading the African Landscape: Society and 
Ecology in a Forest-Savanna Mosaic. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 
Field, B.C. 1991. ‘The Economics of Common Property: A review of two recent 
books’. Natural Resources Journal, Vol. 30, pp 239-252. 
Fisher, R. 1992. ‘Local Organisations in Community Forestry’. In C. Veer and J. 
Chamberlain (eds). Local Organisations in Community Forestry Extension in 
Asia. FAO. Rome, pp 48-61. 
Flick, U. 1998. An Introduction to Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and 
Applications. Sage Publications Inc. London. 
Folke, C. and J. Colding. 2001. ‘Traditional Conservation Practices’. 
Encyclopaedia of Biodiversity. Vol. 5, pp 681-693.  
Folke, C., L. Pritchard Jr., F. Berkes, J. Colding and U. Svedin. 1998. The 
Problem of Fit between Ecosystems and Institutions. International Human 
Dimensions Programme (IHDP). Working Paper No. 2. Bonn.   
Fortmann, L. 1995. ‘Talking Claims: Discursive Strategies in Contesting 
Property’. World Development, Vol. 23, pp 1053-1064. 
Fortmann, L. and C. Nhira. 1992. Local Management of Trees and Woodland 
Resources in Zimbabwe: A Tenurial Niche Approach. CASS, University of 
Zimbabwe. Harare. 
Fortmann, L. and J. Bruce. 1993. ‘Tenure and Gender Issues in Forest Policy’ in 
P.N. Bradley and K. McNamara (eds.) Living with Trees: Policies for Forestry 
Management in Zimbabwe. World Technical Paper No. 210, pp 199-210. 
Washington D.C.     
Foucault, M. 1982. ‘The subject and power’. In D. Hubert and R. Paul (eds). 
Michael Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. University of 
Chicago Press. Chicago, pp 208-226. 
Foucault, M. 1979. Discipline and punish: The birth of prison. Penguin. London.   
Frost, P. and A. Mandondo. 1999. Improving Rural Livelihoods in Semi-Arid 
Regions through Management of Catchments. IES, University of Zimbabwe. 
Harare. 
Gaidzanwa, R. B. 1988. Women’s land rights in Zimbabwe: An overview. Rural 
and Urban Planning Occasional paper no. 13. University of Zimbabwe. Harare.  
Gaidzanwa, R.B. 1995. ‘Land and the Economic Empowerment of Women: A 
Gendered Analysis’. Southern African Feminist Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp 1-12. 
Gerhardt, K. and N. Nemarundwe. Forthcoming. ‘Local Knowledge of Indigenous 
Tree Planting and Management in Miombo Woodlands in Zimbabwe’. 
Department of Plant Ecology. Uppsala University. Uppsala. 
Giddens, A. 1984. The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of 
Structuration. Polity Press. Cambridge. 
Gilles, J. L. and D. Jamtgaard. 1981. ‘Overgrazing in Pastoral Areas’. Sociologia 
Ruralis, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp 129-141.   248
Goebel, A. 2002. ‘Men These Days, They are a Problem. Husband Taming Herbs 
and Gender Wars in Rural Zimbabwe’. Canadian Journal of African Studies 
IRCEA 36, No. 3, pp 460-489. 
Goebel, A. 1999. ‘Then it’s Clear who Owns the Trees: Common Property and 
Private Control in Social Forest in a Zimbabwean Resettlement Area’. Rural 
Sociology. Vol. 64, no.4, pp 625-641. 
Goebel, A. 1998. ‘Process, Perception and Power: Notes from ‘Participatory’ 
Research in a Zimbabwean Resettlement Area’. Development and Change, Vol 
29, pp 277-305. 
Goetz, A. M. 1996. Understanding Gendered Institutional Structures and 
Practices at the Macro,Meso and Micro Levels. Mimeo. Institute of 
Development Studies, Brighton. 
Gombe, J.M. 1995. The Shona Idiom. Mercury Press. Harare.  
Gordon, H.S. 1954. ‘The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The 
Fishery’. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 62, pp 124-142. 
Gore, C. 1993. ‘Entitlement Relations and Unruly Social Practices: A Comment 
on the Work of Amartya Sen’. Journal of Development Studies. Vol. 29, No. 3, 
pp 429-460. 
Grimble, R. and K. Wellard. 1997. ‘Stakeholders’ Methodologies in Natural 
Resource Management: A Review of Principles, Contents, Experiences and 
Opportunities’. Agricultural Systems, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp 173-193. 
Guha, R. 1990. ‘Towards a Cross-Cultural Environmental Ethic’. Alternatives, 
Vol. 15, pp 431-447. 
Guijt, I. 1994. ‘Making a Difference: Integrating Gender Analysis into PRA 
Training’. RRA Notes, No. 8, Special Issue on Training. IIED. London. 
Guijt, I. and M.K. Shah (eds). 1998. The Myth of Community: Gender Issues in 
Participatory Development. Intermediate Technology Publications. London. 
Hahn, T. 2000. Property Rights, Ethics and Conflict Resolution: Foundations of 
the Sami economy in Sweden. Department of Economics. Swedish University of 
Agricultural Sciences. Uppsala. 
Hammersley, M. and P. Atkinson. 1983. Ethnography: Principles in Practice. 
Tavistock Publications. London. 
Hanna, S., C. Folke, and K-G Maler (eds). 1996. Rights to Nature: Ecological, 
Economic, Cultural and Political Principles of Institutions for the Environment. 
Island Press. Washington D.C. 
Hapgood, D. (ed). 1969. The Role of Popular Participation in Development: 
Report of a Conference on the Implementation of Title IX of the Foreign 
Assistance Act, June 24 to August 2, 1968. The MIT Press. Cambridge.  
Hardin, G. 1968. ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’. Science, Vol. 162, pp 1243-
1248.  
Hasler, R. 1993. Political Ecologies of Scale and the Multi-Tiered Co-
Management of Zimbabwean Wildlife Resources under CAMPFIRE. CASS, 
University of Zimbabwe. Harare. 
Havnevik, K. 2000a. ‘Introduction’. In K. Havnevik (ed). The Institutional 
Context of Poverty Eradication in Rural Africa. Nordic Africa Institute. 
Uppsala. 
Havnevik, K. 2000b. ´The Institutional Heart of Rural Africa: An Issue 
Overlooked’. In K. Havnevik and E. Sandstrom (eds). The Institutional Context 
of Poverty Eradication in Rural Africa. Nordic Africa Institute. Uppsala.  
Havnevik, K. 1997. Research Programme on the Land Question in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences. Uppsala. 
Havnevik, K.J. and M. Hårsmar. 1999. The diversified future: An institutional 
approach to rural development in Tanzania. Expert Group on Development 
Issues (EGDI). Stockholm.  
Helmsing, A.H.J. 1991. ‘Transforming Rural Local Government: Zimbabwe’s 
Post-Independence Experience’. In N.D. Mutizwa-Mangiza and A.H.J.   249
Helmsing (eds). Rural Development and Planning in Zimbabwe. Gower 
Publishing Company. Aldershot.   
Herbst, J. 1990. State Politics in Zimbabwe. University of Zimbabwe Publications. 
Harare. 
Hill, K. 1996. ‘Zimbabwe’s Wildlife Utilisation Programmes: Grassroots 
Democracy or an Extension of State Power’. African Studies Review, Vol. 39, 
pp 103-123. 
Hulme, D. and M. Murphree. 2001. ‘Community Conservation in Africa: An 
Introduction’. In D. Hulme and M. Murphree (eds). African Wildlife and 
Livelihoods: The Promise and Performance of Community. James Currey. 
Oxford, pp 1-8.   
Hunter, M., R. Hitchcock, and B. Wyckoff-Baird. 1990. ‘Women and Wildlife in 
Southern Africa’. Conservation Biology. Vol. 4, No. 4, pp 448-451. 
ILO. 1992. Towards Action Against Child Labour in Zimbabwe. Jongwe Press. 
Harare. 
Jacobs, S. 1991. ‘Changing Gender Relations in Zimbabwe: The Case of 
Individual Family Resettlement Areas’, in D. Elson (ed). Male Bias in the 
Development Process. Manchester University Press. Manchester, pp 51-82. 
Jackson, C. 1998. ‘Gender, Irrigation and Environment: Arguing for Agency’. 
Agriculture and Human Values, Vol. 15, pp 313-324. 
Jackson, C. 1996. ‘Rescuing Gender from the Poverty Trap’. World Development. 
Vol 24, No. 3 pp 489-504. 
James, W. 1999. ‘Empowering Ambiguities’. In A. Cheater (ed). The 
Anthropology of Power: Empowerment and Disempowerment in Changing 
Structures. Routledge. London. 
Jewitt, S. 2000. ‘Unequal Knowledge in Jharkhand, India: De-Romanticising 
Women’s Agro-ecological Expertise’. Development and Change, Vol. 31, pp 
961-985. 
Jiggins, J. 1997. ‘Women and the Re-Making of Civil Society’. In J. Burbidge 
(ed). From the Bottom Up: Participation in the Rise of Civil Society. PACT, for 
the Institute of Cultural Affairs International. New York.   
Jiggins, J. 1994. Changing boundaries: Women centered perspectives on 
population and the environment. Island Press. Washington D.C. 
Kabeer, N. 1988. Reversed Realities: Gender Hierarchies in Development 
Thought. Verso. London. 
Keely, J. and I. Scoones. 2000. Environmental Policy Making in Zimbabwe: 
Discourses, Science and Politics. Institute of Development Studies Working 
Paper No. 116. Sussex.  
King, L. 1994. Inter-Organisational Dynamics in the CAMPFIRE Programme. 
CASS, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.  
Klooster, D. 2000. ‘Institutional choice, community and struggle: A case study of 
forest co-management in Mexico’. World Development, Vol 28, No. 1, pp 1-20. 
Kohnert, D. 1996. ‘Magic and Witchcraft: Implications for Democratisation and 
Poverty-Alleviation Aid in Africa’. World Development, Vol. 24, No. 8, pp 
1347-1355. 
Krige, J.D. 1947. ‘The social function of witchcraft’. Theoria, Vol. 1, pp 8-21. 
Kriger, N. 1992. Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices. Cambridge 
University Press. Cambridge. 
Kundhlande, S. 2000. ‘Implementing natural resource management by-laws and 
legislation/policies: Opportunities and Constraints’. In J. Siamachira (ed). 
Natural Resource Management and Sustainable Livelihoods: Compatibility or 
Conflict? Intermediate Technology Development Group Southern Africa. 
Harare.  
Kundhlande, G. and M.K. Luckert. 1998. Towards an Analytical Framework for 
Assessing Property Rights to Natural Resources: A Case Study in the Communal 
Areas of Zimbabwe. Department of Rural Economy, University of Alberta, CA, 
Staff paper no. 98-05.    250
Lan, D. 1985. Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe. James 
Currey. London. 
Land Tenure Commission. 1994. Report for the Inquiry into Appropriate Land 
Tenure Systems. Zimbabwe Government Printers. Harare. 
Latour, B. 1986. ‘The Powers of Association’. In J. Law (ed). Power, Action and 
Belief. Routledge. London, pp 264-280. 
Law, J. 1997. ‘Topology and the Naming of Complexity’. Centre for Social 
Theory and Technology home page 
http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/stt/staff/jl/pubs-JL2.htm. Accessed in November 
2002. 
Law, J. 1992. ‘Notes on the Ordering of the Actor-Network: Ordering Strategy 
and Heterogeneity’. Systems Practice, Vol. 5, pp 379-393. 
Lawry, S. 1989. Tenure Policy Toward Common Property Natural Resources. 
Land Tenure Centre Paper No. 134. University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
Madison. 
Leach, M. 1994. Rainforest relations: Gender and resource use among the Mende 
of Gola, Sierra Leone. Edinburgh  University Press for the International African 
Institute, Edinburgh.  
Leach, M. and R. Mearns. (eds). 1996. The Lie of the Land: Challenging Received 
Wisdom on the African Environment. The International African Institute in 
Association with James Currey. Oxford. 
Leach, M., R. Mearns and I. Scoones. 1999. ‘Environmental Entitlements: 
Dynamics and Institutions in Community-Based Natural Resource 
Management’. World Development, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp 225-247. 
Leach, M., R. Mearns and I. Scoones. 1997. ‘Challenges to community-based 
sustainable development: Dynamics, entitlements and institutions’. IDS Bulletin, 
Vol. 28, No. 4, pp 4-14. 
Lele, Uma. 1975. The Designing of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa. The 
John Hopkins University Press. London/Baltimore. 
Li, T.M. 1999. ‘Images of Community: Discourse and Strategy in Property 
Relations’. Development and Change. Vol. 27, pp 501-527. 
Lindgren, B. 2002. The Politics of Ndebele Ethnicity: Origins, Nationality and 
Gender in Southern Zimbabwe. PhD Thesis, Department of Cultural 
Anthropology and Ethnology. Uppsala University. Uppsala.  
Little, P. D. 1994. ‘The Link Between Local Participation and Improved 
Conservation: A Review of Issues and Experiences’, in D. Western and R. M. 
Wright (eds). Natural Connections: Perspectives in Community-based 
Conservation. Island Press. Washington D.C., pp 347-372. 
Ljung, M. 2001. Collaborative Learning for Sustainable Development of Agri-
Food Systems. SLU Agraria No.308. Uppsala. 
Long, N. 1992. ‘From Paradigm Lost to Paradigm Regained? The Case from an 
Actor-oriented Sociology of Development’. In N. Long and A. Long (eds). 
Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social 
Research and Development. Routledge. London. 
Long, N. 1984. Creating Space for Change: A Perspective on the Sociology of 
Development. Wageningen University of Agriculture. The Netherlands. 
Long, N. 1977. Introduction to the Sociology of Rural Development. Tavistock. 
London. 
Long, N. and A. Long. 1992. Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of 
Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development. Routledge. London. 
Long, N. and J.D. van der Ploeg. 1989. ‘Demythologising Planned Intervention: 
An Actor-oriented Perspective’. Sociologia Ruralis, Vol. XXIX, (3/4) pp 226-
249.  
Lovell, C., C.H. Batchelor and P.J. Chilton. 1999. Community Gardens: Using 
Limited Ground Water Resources. Centre for Ecology and Hydrology. London. 
Luckert, M. 2000. Personal Communication. University of Zimbabwe. Harare.  
Luke, S. 1977. Power: A Radical View. Macmillan. London.   251
Mackenzie, F. 1991. ‘Without a Woman There is No Land: Marriage and Land 
Rights in Smallholder Agriculture’. Resources for Feminist Research. Vol. 3/4, 
No. 19, pp 68-74.  
MacPherson, C. B. 1978. Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions. University 
of Toronto Press. Toronto.  
Madriz, E. 2000. ‘Focus Groups in Feminist Research’. In N.K. Denzin and Y.S. 
Lincoln (eds.) Handbook of Qualitative Research. Second Edition. Thousand 
Oaks. London, pp 835-850.  
Madzudzo, E. 2002. Outcomes of CBNRM Programmes: A Case Study of the 
CAMPFIRE in Bulilimamangwe District of Zimbabwe. PhD dissertation. 
Roskilde University. Denmark. 
Magadlela, D. 2000. Irrigating Lives: Development Intervention and Dynamics of 
Social Relationships in an Irrigation Project. Unpublished PhD Thesis, 
Wageningen University. The Netherlands. 
Makumbe, J. Mw. 1998. Democracy and Development in Zimbabwe: Constraints 
of Decentralisation. SAPES Trust. Harare. 
Makumbe, J. Mw. 1996. Participatory Development: The Case of Zimbabwe. 
University of Zimbabwe Publications. Harare. 
Mamdani, M. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of 
the Late Colonialism. Princeton University Press. Princeton.  
Mandondo, A. 2002. ‘Analysing the Role of Forestry Networks in Africa.’ 
Unpublished report. Center for International Forestry Research. Bogor.  
Mandondo, A. 2001. ‘Allocation of Governmental Authority and Responsibility in 
Tiered Governance Regimes: The Case of Chivi Rural District Council Landuse 
Planning and Conservation By-laws’. African Studies Quarterly. 
http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i3a3.htm.  
Mandondo, A. 2000a. Situating Zimbabwe’s Natural Resource Governance 
Systems in History. Center for International Forestry Research Occasional Paper 
No. 32. CIFOR. Bogor. 
Mandondo, A. 2000b. Management and Ecology of Indigenous Woodlands in 
Nyamaropa Communal Lands, Nyanga District in Zimbabwe. PhD Thesis, 
Department of Biological Sciences, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.   
Mandondo, A. 1998. The Concept of Territoriality in Local Natural Resources 
Management and its Implication on Livelihood in Nyamaraopa Communal 
Land. IES, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.  
Mandondo, A. 1997. ‘Trees and Spaces as Emotion and Norm Laden Components 
of Local Ecosystems in Nyamaropa Communal Lands, Nyanga District, 
Zimbabwe’. Agriculture and Human Values. Vol. 14, pp 352-372.  
Mandondo, A., B. M. Campbell, M. Luckert, N. Nemarundwe, W. de Jong and W. 
Kozanayi. 2001. Transacting Institutional Change in Contexts of Complexity: 
Experiences from Chivi District in Zimbabwe. IES/CIFOR. Harare. 
Mapaure, I., A. Mapaura and J.A. Butterworth. 1995. Romwe Catchment Study, 
Zimbabwe: Effect of Land Management on Groundwater Recharge and 
Implications for Small Scale Irrigation Using Ground Water. Baseline 
Vegetation Survey. Institute of Hydrology. Oxfordshire.  
Mapedza, E. and A. Mandondo. 2001. Co-Management in the Mafungautsi State 
Forest Area of Zimbabwe: What Stake for Local Communities? CASS, 
University of Zimbabwe, Harare.  
Massey, D. 1991. ‘A global sense of place’. Marxism Today, June, 1991, pp 24-
29. 
Matondi, P. B. 2001. The Struggle for Access to Land and Water Resources in 
Zimbabwe: The Case of Shamva District. Ph.D. Thesis, Swedish University of 
Agricultural Sciences. Uppsala. 
Matose, F. 2002. Local People and Reserved Forests in Zimbabwe: What 
Prospects for Co-management? DPhil Thesis. University of Sussex. Brighton.   252
Matowanyika, J.Z.Z. 1991. Indigenous Resource Management and Sustainability 
in Rural Zimbabwe: An Exploration of Practices and Concepts in 
Commonlands. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Waterloo. Waterloo. 
May, J. 1979. Social Aspects of the Legal Position of Women in Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia. MPhil Thesis submitted to the Centre for Inter-Racial Studies. 
University of Rhodesia. Salisbury. 
Mayer, P. 1954. Witches: Inaugural Lecture. Rhodes University. Grahamsatown. 
Mazarire, G.C. 1999. ‘Women, Politics and the Environment in Pre-Colonial 
Chivi 1840 to 1900’. Paper presented to the Women and the Environment 
Conference, Monomotapa Crown Plaza, 5 August. Harare.  
Mbizvo, C.L. and J.C. Mohammed. 1993. The Institutional and Legal Framework 
of Natural Resource Management: Local Level Natural Resource Management 
Project, Makoni District. Stockholm Environment Institute. Working Paper No. 
3. Stockholm.   
McCay, B.J. 1996. ‘Commons and Private Concerns’ in S. Hanna, C. Folke, and 
K-G Maler (eds). Rights to Nature: Ecological, Economic, Cultural and 
Political Principles of Institutions for the Environment. Island Press. 
Washington D.C., pp 111-126. 
McCay, B.J. and J. M. Acheson. (eds). 1987. The Question of the Commons: The 
Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources. University of Arizona Press. 
Tucson. 
McGregor, J. 1995. ‘Gathered Produce in Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas: 
Changing Resource Availability and Use’. Ecology of Food and Nutrition. Vol. 
33, pp 163-193. 
McGregor, J. 1991. Woodland Resources: Ecology, Policy and Ideology: An 
Historical Case Study of Woodland Use in Shurugwi Communal Area, 
Zimbabwe. PhD Thesis. Loughborough University of Technology. 
Loughborough.   
Meinzen-Dick, R.S. and M. Zwarteveen. 2001. ‘Gender Dimensions of 
Community Resource Management: A Case of Water Users’ Associations in 
South Asia’. In Arun Agrawal and Clark. C. Gibson (eds). Communities and the 
Environment: Ethnicity, Gender, and the State in Community-Based 
Conservation, pp 63-88. 
Meinzen-Dick, R. and M. Zwarteveen. 1998. ‘Gendered Participation in Water 
Management: Issues and Illustrations from Water Users’ Associations in South 
Asia’. Agriculture and Human Values, Vol. 15, pp 337-345. 
Meinzen-Dick, R.S., L.R. Brown, H.S. Feldstein and A.R. Quiusumbing. 1997. 
‘Gender, Property Rights and Natural Resources’. World Development, Vol. 25, 
No. 8, pp 1303 -1315. 
Mies, M. and V. Shiva. 1993. Ecofeminism. ZED Books. London. 
Mohamed-Katerere, J. 2001. ‘Participatory natural resource management in the 
communal lands of Zimbabwe: What role for customary law?’ African Studies 
Quarterly, http://web.Africa.efl.edu/asq/v5/v5i3a7.htm. Accessed in Nov. 2002. 
Moore, D. S. 1996. A River Runs Through It: Environmental History and the 
Politics of Community in Zimbabwe’s Eastern Highlands. CASS Occasional 
paper & Institute of International Studies. Harare.  
Moore, D.S. 1993. ‘Contesting Terrain in Zimbabwe’s Eastern Highlands: 
Political Ecology, Ethnography and Peasant Resource Struggles’. Economic 
Geography, Vol. 69, No. 4, pp 380-401. 
Morawski, J. 1997. ‘The Science Behind Feminist Research Methods’. Journal of 
Social Issues, Vol. 53, pp 667-681. 
Morgan, D.L. 1988. Focus Groups as Qualitative Research. Sage Publications. 
Newbury Park, CA. 
Moriarty, P. 2000. Integrated Catchment Management and Sustainable Water 
Resource Development in Semi-arid Zimbabwe. D.Phil. Thesis, University of 
Reading. Reading, UK.   253
Moriarty, P. and C. Lovell. 1998. Groundwater Resource Development in the 
context of Farming Systems Intensification and Changing Rainfall Regimes: A 
Case Study from Southeast Zimbabwe. AgREN Network Paper No. 81, pp 15-
21. ODI, London. 
Moser, C.O.N. 1993. Gender Planning and Development: Theory, Practice and 
Training. Routledge. New York.   
Mosse, D. 1997. ‘The Symbolic Making of a Common Property Resource: 
History, Ecology and Locality in Tank-Irrigated Landscape in South India’. 
Development and Change, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp 467-504. 
Mosse, D. 1994. ‘Authority, Gender and Knowledge: Theoretical Reflections on 
the Practice of Participatory Rural Appraisal’. Development and Change, Vol. 
25, No. 3, pp 497-526. 
Mosse, J.C. 1993. Half the World, Half a Chance: An Introduction to Gender and 
Development. Oxfam. Oxford. 
Moyo, S. 1995a. The Land Question in Zimbabwe. SAPES Trust. Harare. 
Moyo, S. 1995b. ‘A gendered perspective of the land question’. Southern African 
Feminist Review, Vol 1, No. 1, pp 13-31. 
Moyo, S., P. Robinson, Y. Katerere, S. Stevenson and D. Gumbo. 1991. 
Zimbabwe’s Environmental Dilemma: Balancing Resource Inequities. ZERO. 
Harare. 
Muchena, O. 1994. ‘The Changing Perceptions of Women in Agriculture’. In M. 
Rukuni and C.K. Eicher (eds). Zimbabwe’s Agricultural Revolution. University 
of Zimbabwe Publications. Harare.  
Mukamuri, B.B. 2000. ‘Local Institutions and Management of Indigenous 
Woodland Resources in Zimbabwe’, in P. Virtanen and M. Nummelin (eds). 
Forests, Chiefs and Peasants in Africa: Local management of natural resources 
in Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Silva Carelica 34. University of 
Joensuu. Joensuu, pp 15-33.  
Mukamuri, B.B. 1995. ‘Local Environmental Conservation Strategies: Karanga 
Religion, Politics and Environmental Protection’. Environmental History. Vol. 
1, pp 297-311. 
Mukamuri, B.B. and W. Kozanayi. 1999. Institutions Surrounding the Use of 
Marketed Forest Products: The Case of Berchemia Discolor, Warburgia 
Salutaris and Adansonia Digitata. IES Working paper. IES, University of 
Zimbabwe. Harare.   
Mukamuri, B.B., F. Matose, and B.M. Campbell. 2000. Rural Institutions: 
Contextualising Community-Based Management of Natural Resources in 
Zimbabwe. IES, University of Zimbabwe. Harare. 
Mukonyora, I. 1999. ‘Women and Ecology in Shona Religion’. Word and World, 
Vol. XIX, No.3, pp 276-284. 
Murdoch, J. 1998. ‘The Spaces of Actor-Network Theory’. Geoforum. Vol. 29, 
No. 4, pp 357-374. 
Murombedzi, J. C.1994. The Dynamics of Conflict in Environmental Management 
Policy in the Context of CAMPFIRE. PhD Thesis. CASS, University of 
Zimbabwe. Harare. 
Murombedzi, J.C. 1992. ‘The Need for Appropriate Level Common Property 
Resource Management Institutions in Communal Tenure Regimes’. In B. 
Cousins (ed). Institutional Dynamics in Communal Grazing Regimes in 
Southern Africa. CASS, University of Zimbabwe. Harare, pp 39-58.  
Murombedzi, J.C. 1991. Decentralising Common Property Resources 
Management: A Case Study of the Nyaminyami District Council of Zimbabwe’s 
Wildlife Management Programme. IIED Paper No. 30. London. 
Murphree, M.W. 2000. Boundaries and Borders: The Questions of Scale in the 
Theory and Practice of Common Property Management. Paper presented at the 
Eighth Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of 
Common Property (IASCP). Bloomington, Indiana.   254
Murphree, M.W. 1994. The Role of Institutions in Community-based 
Conservation. Theme review paper presented at a workshop on Community-
based Conservation held between 18-22 October 1993. Washington D.C. pp 
423-427.  
Murphree, M.W. 1993. Communities as Resource Management Institutions. IIED 
Gatekeeper Series No. 36. IIED. London. 
Murphree, M. W. 1991. Communities as Institutions for Resource 
Management.Institutions.  Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of 
Zimbabwe. Harare. 
Murphree, M.W. and D. H. M. Cumming. 1990. Savana Land Use: Policies and 
Practice in Zimbabwe. Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of 
Zimbabwe. Harare. 
Mutamba, M., W. Kozanayi, and B.M. Campbell. 2000. Report on the Simudzirayi 
Micro-credit Scheme. Institute of Environmental Studies Report, University of 
Zimbabwe. Harare.   
Mvududu, S.C. 1995. “Gender Concerns in Indigenous Woodland Management”. 
In C. Nhira (ed). Proceedings of the Conference on Indigenous Woodland 
Management. CASS Occasional Paper Series NRM. University of Zimbabwe. 
Harare. 
Nabane, N. 1997. A Gender Sensitive Analysis of a Community-based Wildlife 
Utilisation Initiative in Zimbabwe’s Zambezi Valley. Unpublished MPhil. thesis. 
Centre for Applied Social Sciences, University of Zimbabwe. Harare.   
Narayan, D. 2000. Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us? Oxford University 
Press (for The World Bank). Oxford. 
Narayan, D. 1997. Voices of the Poor: Poverty and Social Capital in Tanzania. 
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Studies and 
Monographs Series No. 20. The World  Bank. Washington DC.  
Narayan, D. 1996. The Contribution of People’s Participation: Evidence from 121 
Rural Water Supply Projects. ESD Occasional Paper Series No. 1. The World 
Bank. Washington D.C. 
Nemarundwe, N. Forthcoming. Social Charters and Organisation for Access to 
Woodland Resources in Chivi District, Southern Zimbabwe. Society and 
Natural Resources Journal. 
Nemarundwe, N. 2001. ‘Institutional Collaboration and Shared Learning for 
Forest Management in Chivi District, Zimbabwe’. In E. Wollenberg, D. 
Edmunds, L. Buck, J. Fox, and S Brodt. (eds). Social Learning in Community 
Forest Management: Linking Concepts and Practice. Center for International 
Forestry Research. Bogor.  
Nemarundwe, N. and W. Kozanayi. 2003. Institutional Arrangements for Water 
Resource Use: A Case Study from Southern Zimbabwe. Journal of Southern 
African Studies, Vol, 29, No. 1, March 2003, pp 193-206.  
Nemarundwe, N., M. Mutamba and W. Kozanayi. 1998. An Overview of 
Woodland Utilisation and Management in three Communal Areas in Zimbabwe: 
Results of Participatory Rural Appraisal Research in Chivi, Mangwende and 
Gokwe South Districts. IES Special Report, No. 16. IES, University of 
Zimbabwe. Harare.  
Nhira, C. 1994. Indigenous Woodlands Usage and Management in Kanyati 
Communal Area, Zimbabwe. With Special Reference to Common Property 
Issues. Unpublished DPhil Thesis. CASS, University of Zimbabwe. Harare. 
Nhira, C. and L. Fortmann. 1993. ‘Local Woodland Management: Realities at the 
Grassroots’. In P.N. Bradley and K. McNamara (eds). Living with Trees: 
Policies for Forestry Management in Zimbabwe. World Bank Technical Paper 
No. 210, pp 139-155.  
North, D. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.    255
Olesen, V.L. 2000. ‘Feminisms and Qualitative Research into the Millennium’. In 
N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds.) Handbook of Qualitative Research. Second 
Edition. Thousand Oaks. London, pp 215-255. 
Olson, M. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge University Press. 
Cambridge. 
Ostrom, E. 1999. Reformulating the Commons. Centre for the Study of 
Institutions, Population and Environmental Change. Indiana University. Indiana. 
Ostrom, E. 1997. What Makes for Successful Institutions to Govern Common-pool 
Resources. Centre for the Study of Institutions, Population and Environmental 
Change. Indiana University. Indiana.   
Ostrom, E. 1992. The Rudiments of a Theory of the Origins, Survival and 
Performance of Common Property Institutions’. In D.W. Bromley (ed). Making 
the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and Policy. Institute of Contemporary 
Studies Press. San Francisco, pp 293-318.  
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 
Ostrom, E. and E. Schlager. 1996. ‘The Formation of Property Rights’ in S. 
Hanna, C. Folke, and K-G Maler (eds). Rights to Nature: Ecological, Economic, 
Cultural and Political Principles of Institutions for the Environment. Island 
Press. Washington D.C., pp 127-156. 
Ostrom, E., R. Gardener and J.M. Walker. 1994. Rules, Games and Common Pool 
Resources. Ann Arbor. Michigan. 
Ostrom, E., L Schroeder and S. Wynne. 1993. Institutional Incentives and 
Sustainable Development: Infrastructure, Policies in Perspective. Westview 
Press. Boulder. 
Peluso, N. 1994. The Impact of Social and Environmental Change on Forestry 
Management: A Case Study from West Kalimantan, Indonesia. FAO. Rome.  
Peluso, N. 1992. Rich forests, poor people: Resource control and resistance in 
Java. University of California Press. Berkeley. 
Peluso, N. 1991. ‘Women and Natural Resources in Developing Countries’. 
Society and Natural Resources. Vol. 4, No. 1, pp 1-3. 
Peters, P. 1992. ‘Manoeuvres and Debates in the interpretations of land rights in 
Botswana’. Africa, Vol. 62, No. 3, pp 413-434. 
Peters, P. 1984. ‘Struggles over water, struggles over meaning: Cattle, water and 
the State’. Africa, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp 29-49. 
Pierre, J. and B.G. Peters. 2000. Governance, Politics and the State. Macmillan. 
London. 
Plant, G. and J. Plant (eds). 1992. Putting Power in Its Place: Creating 
Community Control. New Society Publishers. Philadelphia.  
Platteau, J-P. 1996. ‘The Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights as Applied to sub-
Saharan Africa: A Critical Assessment’. Development and Change, Vol. 27, No. 
1, pp 29-86.  
Platteau, J-P. 1995. Reforming Lands Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: Issues of 
Efficiency and Equity. Discussion Paper No. 60. United Nations Research 
Institute for Social Development (UNRISD). Geneva.  
Poats, S.V. 1991. The Role of Gender in Agricultural Development. Issues in 
Agriculture No. 3, Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. 
Washington D.C. 
Police Outpost. 1999. A Police Magazine, January 1999 Edition. 
Pretty, J.N. 1995. ‘Participatory Learning for Sustainable Agriculture’. World 
Development, Vol. 23, No. 8, pp1247-1263. 
Pretty, J. and H. Ward. 2001. ‘Social capital and the environment’. World 
Development, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp 209-227. 
Pretty, J.N., I. Guijt, J. Thomson, I. Scoones. 1995. Participatory Learning and 
Action: A Trainer’s Guide. IIED. London.   256
Ranger, T. 1999. ‘Women and Environment in African Religion: The Case of 
Zimbabwe’. Paper presented to the Women and The Environment Conference, 
Monomotapa Crowne Plaza, 5 August. Harare. 
Ranger, T. 1993. ‘The Invention of Tradition Revisited: The Case of Colonial 
Africa’, in T. Ranger and O. Vaughan (eds). Legitimacy and the State in 
Twentieth Century Africa: Essays in Honour of A.H.M. Kirk-Greene. Macmillan 
Press. Oxford, pp 62-111. 
Ranger, T. 1985. Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe. James 
Currey. London. 
Reynolds, P. 1991. Dance Civet Cat: Politics of Child Labour in the Zambezi 
Valley. ZED Books. London.  
Ribot, J.C. 2003. ‘Democratic Decentralisation of Natural Resources: Institutional 
Choice and Discretionary Power Transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa’. Public 
Administration and Development, Vol. 23, No. 1.   
Ribot, J.C. 1999. ‘Decentralisation, Participation and Accountability in Sahelian 
Forestry: Legal Instruments of Political-Administrative Control’. Africa, Vol. 
69, No. 1, pp 23-65. 
Ribot, J.C. 1998. Integral Rural Development: Authority and Accountability in 
Decentralised Natural Resource Management. Africa Technical Division 
Working Paper. The World Bank. Washington D.C.  
Ribot, J.C. 1995. ‘From Exclusion to Participation: Turning Senegal’s Forestry 
Policy Around?’ World Development, Vol. 23, No. 9, pp 1587-1599. 
Ribot, J.C. and N. Peluso. 2001. A Theory of Access: Taking Property Out of 
Place. World Resources Institute. Washington D.C. 
Richards, P. 1983. ‘Ecological Change and the Politics of African Landuse’. 
African Studies Review, Vol, 26, No. 2, pp 1-72. 
Roark, P. 1984. ‘Women and Water’. In P. Bourne (ed). Water and Sanitation: 
Economic and Sociological Perspectives. Florida Academic Press. Orlando, pp 
49-67. 
Robbins, P. 1998. ‘Authority and Environment: Institutional Landscapes in 
Rajasthan, India’. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 88, 
No. 3, pp 410-435. 
Rocheleau, D. 1995. ‘Gender and Biodiversity: A Female Political Ecology 
Perspective’. IDS Bulletin, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp 9-16. 
Rocheleau, D. 1991. ‘Gender, Ecology and the Science of Survival: Stories and 
Lessons from Kenya’. Agriculture and Human Values. Vol. 8, pp 156-165.   
Rocheleau, D. 1987. ‘Women, Trees and Tenure: Implications for Agroforestry 
Research and Development’. In J.B. Raintree (ed). Land, Trees and Tenure. 
Proceedings of an International Workshop on Tenure Issues in Agroforestry. 
LTC. Wisconsin, Madison.  
Rocheleau, D. and D. Edmunds. 1997. ‘Women, Men and Trees: Gender, Power 
and Property in Forest and Agrarian Landscape’. World Development, Vol 25, 
No. 8, pp 1351-1371.  
Rondinelli, D.A. 1983. Development Projects as Policy Experiments. Routledge. 
London. 
Roe, E. 1995. ‘More Than the Politics of Decentralisation: Local Government 
Reform, District Development and Public Administration in Zimbabwe’. World 
Development, Vol. 23, No. 5, pp 833-843. 
Roe, E. 1991. ‘Development Narratives or Making the Best of Blueprint’. World 
Development. Vol. 19, pp 287-300. 
Rubin, J.Z., D.G. Pruitt and S.H. Kim. 1994. Social Conflict: Escalation, 
Statement and Settlement. McGraw-Hill, Inc. New York.  
Runge, C.F. 1981. ‘Common Property Externalities: Isolation, Assurance and 
Resource Depletion in a Traditional Grazing Context’. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics. November issue, pp 595-606.   257
Ryan, G.W. and H.R. Bernard. 2000. ‘Data Management and Analysis Methods’. 
In N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds.) Handbook of Qualitative Research. 
Second Edition. Thousand Oaks. London, pp 769-802. 
Sayer, J.A. and B.M. Campbell. 2002. Future Harvests: Local Livelihoods and the 
Global Environment. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.  
Schmidt, E. 1992. Peasants, Traders and Wives: Shona Women in the History of 
Zimbabwe – 1870 to 1939. Baobab Books. Harare. 
Schoffeleers, J.M. 1979. ‘Introduction’. In J.M. Schoffeleers (ed). Guardians of 
the Land: Essays on Central African Territorial Cults. Mambo Press. Gwelo, pp 
1-46.   
Schroeder, R. 1997. “Reclaiming Land in The Gambia: Gendered Property Rights 
and Environmental Intervention”. Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers Vol. 87, No. 3, pp 487-508. 
Schroeder, R. 1993. ‘Shady practices: Gender and the political ecology of resource  
stabilisation in Gambian garden/orchards’. Economic Geography. Vol. 69, No. 4, 
pp 349-365. 
Scoones, I., C. Chibudu, S. Chukura, P. Jeranyama, W. Machaka, B. Machanja, B. 
Mavedzenge, M. Mombeshora, M. Mudhara, C. Mudziwo, F. Murimbarimba 
and B. Zirereza. 1996. Hazards and Opportunities: Farming Livelihoods in 
Dryland Africa: Lessons from Zimbabwe. ZED Books. London.  
Scoones, I. 1996. ‘Politics, Polemics and Pasture in Southern Africa’. In M. Leach 
and R. Mearns (eds). The Lie of the Land: Challenging Received Wisdom on the 
African Environment. James Currey. New Hampshire, pp 34-53.  
Scoones, I. and F. Matose. 1993. ‘Local Woodland Management: Constraints and 
Opportunities for Sustainable Resource Use’. In P. N. Bradley and K. 
McNamara (eds). Living with Trees: Policies for Forestry Management in 
Zimbabwe. World Bank Technical Paper No. 210, pp 157-193.  
Scoones, I. and K. Wilson. 1989. ‘Households, Lineage Groups and Ecological 
Dynamics: Issues for Livestock Development in Zimbabwe’s Communal 
Lands’. In B. Cousins (ed). People, Land and Livestock. CASS, University of 
Zimbabwe. Harare, pp 17-22.  
Scott, J.C. 1990. Domination and the Art of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. Yale 
University Press. New Haven. 
Scott, J.C. 1986. ‘Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance’. In J.C. Scott and B.J.T. 
Kerkvliet (eds). Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance in South East Asia. 
Frank CASS & Comp. Ltd. London. 
Scott, J.C. 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. 
Yale University Press. New Haven. 
Scott, J. 1976. The Moral Economy of the Peasant. Yale University Press. New 
Haven.  
Scott, W.R. 1995. Institutions and Organisations. Sage Publications. London. 
Shackleton, S. and B. Campbell. 2001. Devolution in Natural Resource 
Management: Institutional Arrangements and Power Shifts. A Synthesis of Case 
Studies from Southern Africa. USAID SADC NRM Project no 690-0251. 
Harare. 
Shackleton, C.M., S. E. Shackleton and B. Cousins. 2001. ‘The Role of Land-
based Strategies in Rural Livelihoods: The Contribution of Arable Production, 
Animal Husbandry and Natural Resource Harvesting in Communal Areas in 
South Africa’. Development Southern Africa. Vol. 18, No. 5, pp 581-604. 
Sharp, R. 1992. ‘Organising for Change: People, Power and the Role of 
Institutions’ in Johan Holmberg (ed). Policies for a Small Planet from the 
International Institute for Environment and Development. Earthscan. London. 
Shepsle, K.A. 1989. ‘Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational 
Choice Approach’. Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 1, pp 131-147. 
Shipton, P. and M. Goheen. 1992. ‘Understanding African Land Holding: Power, 
Wealth and Meaning’. Africa, Vol 62, pp 307-326.   258
Shiva, V. 1988. Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Survival in India. Zed Books. 
London. 
Shiva, V. 1987. ‘The Violence of Reductionist Science’. Alternatives, Vol. 12, pp 
243-261.  
Shivaramakrishnan, K. 2000. ‘Crafting the Public Sphere in the Forests of West 
Bengal: Democracy, Development and Political Action’. American Ethnologist, 
Vol. 27, No. 2, pp 431-461. 
Simbolon, I.J. 1998. Peasant Women and Access to Land: Customary Law, State 
Law and Gender-Based Ideology, the Case of Toba-Batak (North Sumatra). 
PhD Thesis. University of Wageningen. The Netherlands. 
Sihlonyane, M.F. 2001. ‘The Rhetoric of the Community in Project Management: 
The Case of Mohlakeng Township’. Development in Practice, Vol. 11, No. 1, 
pp 34-44. 
Sithole, B. Forthcoming. ‘Becoming Men in Our Dresses!’ Women’s Involvement 
in a Joint Forestry Management Project in Mafungautsi, Zimbabwe. In C.J. 
Colfer (ed). No Fair! Enhancing Equity in Forest Management. Chapter 13. 
CIFOR. Bogor.  
Sithole, B. 2002. Where the Power Lies: Multiple Stakeholder Politics over 
Natural Resources – A Participatory Methods Guide. CIFOR. Bogor.  
Sithole, B. 2001. ‘Devolution and Stakeholder Participation in the Water Reform 
Process in Zimbabwe’. African Studies Quarterly www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5.htm 
Accessed in November 2002. 
Sithole, B. 1999. Access to and Use of Dambos in Communal Areas of Zimbabwe: 
Institutional Considerations. Unpublished PhD Thesis. CASS, University of 
Zimbabwe. Harare. 
Sithole, B. 1997. Contested Domains: The Study of Water and Settlements in 
Dande. CIRAD Guruve Biodiversity Project Report. Guruve Rural District 
Council & CIRAD. Guruve and Montpellier. 
Sithole, B. and B. Edziwa. 1999. ‘Ignorant Farmers or Ignorant Extension? 
Zimbabwe Science News, Vol. 32, No. 2/3, pp 35-42. 
Spradley, J.P. 1979. The Ethnographic Interview. Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
New York. 
Stake, R.E. 2000. ‘Case Studies’. In N.K. Denzin and Y.S. Lincoln (eds). 
Handbook of Qualitative Research. Second Edition. Thousand Oaks. London, 
pp 435-454. 
Steins, N. 2002. ‘Understanding Platform Processes Through ANT’. In C. 
Leeuwis and R. Pyburn. Wheelbarrows Full of Frogs. Koninklijke Van Gorcum 
BV. The Netherlands, pp 407-420.  
Steins, N. 1999. All Hands on Deck: An Interactive Perspective on Complex 
Common-Pool Resource Management Based on Case Studies in the Coastal 
Waters of the Isle of Wight (UK), Connemara (Ireland) and the Dutch Wadden 
Sea. Wageningen Agricultural University. The Netherlands.   
Steins, N., V. M. Edwards and N. Röling. 2000. ‘Re-Designed Principles for CPR 
Theory’. The Common Property Resource Digest, No. 53, pp 1-4. 
Stockholm Group for Studies on Natural Resource Management. 1988. 
Perspectives on Sustainable Development: Some Critical Issues Related to the 
Bruntland Report. Stockholm studies in NRM, No. 1. Stockholm.   
Stocking, M. 1996. ‘Soil Erosion: Breaking New Ground’, in M. Leach and R. 
Mearns. (eds). The Lie of the Land: Challenging Received Wisdom on the 
African Environment. The International African Institute in association with 
James Currey. Oxford, pp 140-154. 
Sullivan, C., M. Mutamba, and W. Kozanayi. 2001. Water Use and Livelihood 
Security: A Study of Rural Households in Southern Zimbabwe. Centre for 
Ecology and Hydrology. Wallingford. 
Swallow, B.M. 1990. Strategies and Tenure in African Livestock Development. 
Land Tenure Center, paper 140. Land Tenure Center. University of Wisconsin. 
Madison.   259
Thomas-Slayter, B. and D. Rocheleau. 1995. Gender, Environment and 
Development in Kenya: A Grassroots Perspective. Lynne Rienner. Boulder, CO.  
Toure, O. 1988. ‘The Pastoral Environment of Northern Senegal’. Review of 
African Political Economy, Vol. 42, pp 32-39. 
Turner, M.D. 1999. ‘Conflict, Environmental Change and Social Institutions in 
Dryland Africa: Limitations of the Common Property Resource Management 
Approach’. Society and Natural Resources, Vol. 12, pp 643-657.  
Uphoff, N. 1991. ‘Fitting projects to people’ in M.M. Cernea (ed). Putting People 
First: Sociological Variables in Rural Development. Oxford University Press. 
New York.  
Uphoff, N. 1986. Local Institutional Development: An Analytical Source Book 
with Cases. Kumarian Press. West Hartford, Connecticut.  
Uphoff, N.T., J.M. Cohen and A.N. Goldsmith. 1979. Feasibility and Application 
of Rural Development Participation: A State of the Art Paper. Cornell 
University Rural Development Committee, Monograph Series No. 3. Cornell. 
Varughese, G. and E. Ostrom. 2001. ‘The Contested Role of Heterogeneity in 
Collective Action: Some Eevidence from Community Forestry in Nepal’. World 
Development, Vol 29, No. 5, pp 747-765. 
Villarreal, M. 1994. Wielding and Yielding: Power, Subordination and Gender 
Identity in the Context of a Mexican Development Project. PhD Thesis. 
Wageningen University of Agriculture. The Netherlands. 
Villarreal, M. 1992. ‘The Poverty of Practice: Power, Gender and Intervention 
from an Actor-oriented Perspective’. In N. Long and A. Long (eds). Battlefields 
of Knowledge: The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and 
Development. Routledge. London, pp 247-267. 
Warner, M. and P. Jones. 1998. Assessing the Need to Manage Conflict in 
Community-based Natural Resources Projects. ODI, Natural Resources 
Perspectives, No. 35. 
Weber, M. 1962. Basic Concepts in Sociology Free Press. Illinois.  
Weber, M. 1957. The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation. Free Press. 
Illinois.   
Wekwete, K. H. 1990. ‘Constraints to Planning for Socialism in Zimbabwe’. In P. 
de Valk and K.H. Wekwete (eds). Decentralisation for Participatory Planning? 
Gower Publishing Company. Aldershot. 
Whatmore, S., M. Terry and P. Lowe. 1994. Gender and Rurality: Critical 
Perspectives on Rural Change Series. David Fulton Publishers. London. 
White, S. 1996. ‘Depoliticising Development: The Uses and Abuses of 
Participation”. Development in Parctice, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp 6-15. 
Whitlow, R. 1988. Deforestation in Zimbabwe: Some Problems and Prospects. 
Natural Resources Board. Harare. 
Wollenberg, E., J. Anderson and D. Edmunds. 2001. ‘Pluralism and the Less 
Powerful: Accommodating Multiple Interests in Local Forest Management’. 
International Journal of Agricultural Resources, Governance and Ecology, Vol. 
1, No. 3-4, pp 199-223.  
World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987. Our Common 
Future. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 
Wunsch, J.S. 2001. ‘Decentralisation, Local Governance and the Democratic 
Transition in Southern Africa: A Comparative Analysis’. African Studies 
Quarterly, http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v2/v2ila2.htm. Accessed in Nov. 2002.  
Wyckoff-Baird, B. 1994. Women and Water Lilies. World Wide Fund for Nature. 
Windhoek. 
Yin, R.K. 1994. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Sage Publications. 
London. 
ZERO. 2001. 2000 Annual Report. ZERO. Harare. 
Zwarteveen, M. 1995. Linking Woman to the Main Canal: Gender and Irrigation 
Management. IIED. London.   260
Zwarteveen, M. and N. Neupane. 1996. Free Riders or Victims: Women’s Non-
Participation in Irrigation Management in Nepal’s Chhattis Mauja Irrigation 
Scheme. Research report no. 7. IIMI, Colombo. Sri Lanka.   261
Annex 1: Woodland Resources Tenure Survey
66 
 
1. Comprehensiveness: Rights of Harvest
67: What can be harvested? 
 
Resources/Products Designated  Areas 
 Household 
Plots
68 
Community 
Woodlands
69 
Riverin
e Areas  
Sacred 
Areas
70 
Plants (all plants in each 
category except)
71.  
(for sacred areas, all species 
allowed)  
Exotics 
      
Indigenous Fruits         
Indigenous Other         
Animals (livestock for 
households plots, wildlife for 
woodlands) 
(sacred areas, species allowed) 
      
Water        
 
2. Exclusiveness: Rights of harvest: Who is allowed to harvest? 
Only household members (HH); Only kraal members (KM); Adjoining kraals 
(AK); Open access (OA); Other (O): explain. 
Resources/Products Designated  Areas 
 Household 
Plots 
Community 
Woodlands 
Riverin
e Areas  
Sacred 
Areas 
Plants  
Exotics 
 
Indigenous Fruits         
Indigenous Other         
Animals        
Water        
 
3. Use Restrictions: Are Landuse changes allowed? Under what circumstances? 
Current Use:  Changeable to: 
 Household 
Plots 
Community 
Woodlands 
Riverine 
Areas  
Sacred 
Areas 
Household Plots  --------------       
Community Woodlands    -----------------     
Riverine Areas      ----------   
Sacred Areas        ----------- 
                                                           
66  The concept behind the structure of this survey was that rules governing use may vary according to 
designated area, or by resource. Accordingly, for most of the characteristics, the information was 
gathered within a table that captured both of these sources of variation.    
67  Comprehensiveness could include management rights as well as harvesting rights. However, 
management rights arise out of incentives to capture benefits from investments, influenced by a 
number of factors including other property right characteristics.  
68  Household plots include gardens, fields and homestead areas. 
69  Community woodlands include open, flat areas as well as wooded hilly areas. 
70  Sacred areas may lie within household plots or woodlands, but are delineated as distinct areas with 
distinct rules within these other designations. 
71  The study identified what is harvested from the PRA exercises and thus in the tenure survey focus 
was on what cannot be harvested.   262
4. Duration: Are there designated time endings on rights held in: (If so, indicate 
how long) 
Household Plots  Community 
Woodlands 
Riverine Areas  Sacred Areas 
 
 
May rights be leased for a specific period of time in: (If so, indicate typical lease 
period) 
Household Plots  Community 
Woodlands 
Riverine Areas  Sacred Areas 
 
 
5. Allotment Type: Are rights area based (AB), volume based (VB) or both (B)? 
Resource/Products  Designated Areas 
 Household 
Plots 
Community 
Woodlands 
Riverine 
Areas 
Sacred 
Areas 
Plants 
Exotic 
      
Indigenous Fruits         
Indigenous Other         
Animals (livestock for 
household plots, wildlife for 
woodlands) 
(for sacred areas, all species 
allowed) 
      
Water        
 
6. Size: (Volume or Area): Is there a size limit? What are the range and average 
of sizes? 
Resource/Products  Designated Areas 
 Household 
Plots 
Community 
Woodlands 
Riverine 
Areas 
Sacred 
Areas 
Plants 
Exotic 
      
Indigenous Fruits         
Indigenous Other         
Animals (livestock for 
household plots, wildlife for 
woodlands) 
(for sacred areas, all species 
allowed) 
      
Water        
 
7.1. Transferability: Of Rights: Can the rights be sold (S) or leased (L)? 
Household Plots  Community 
Woodlands 
Riverine Areas  Sacred Areas 
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7.2 Transferability: Of Products: Can the products be sold? 
Resource/Products  Designated Areas 
 Household 
Plots 
Community 
Woodlands 
Riverine 
Areas 
Sacre
d 
Areas 
Plants 
Exotic 
      
Indigenous Fruits         
Indigenous Other         
Animals (livestock for 
household plots, wildlife 
for woodlands) 
(for sacred areas, all 
species allowed) 
      
Water        
 
7.3 Transferability: Of Rights in the event of death: Who inherits the rights…. 
If the husband dies? 
Household Plots  Community 
Woodlands 
Riverine Areas  Sacred Areas 
 
 
If the wife dies? 
Household Plots  Community 
Woodlands 
Riverine Areas  Sacred Areas 
 
 
7.4 Transferability: Of Rights in the event of divorce: Who receives the rights in 
the event of divorce? 
Household Plots  Community 
Woodlands 
Riverine Areas  Sacred Areas 
 
 
8. Payments: Are there required payments for rights to harvest and/or manage 
property? 
Produc
ts 
Designated Areas 
  Household Plots  Community Woodlands  Riverine and 
Sacred Areas 
 Who 
Pays 
Who 
Collect 
How 
much 
Who 
Pays 
Who 
Collect 
How 
much 
Who 
Pays 
Who 
Collect 
How 
much 
Plants 
Exotic 
            
Indig. 
Fruits 
            
Indig. 
Other 
            
Animal              
W a t e r               
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9.1 Operational Requirements: Harvesting: What rules govern the harvesting of 
crops or products? 
Resource/Products  Designated Areas 
 Household 
Plots 
Community 
Woodlands 
Riverine 
Areas 
Sacred 
Areas 
Plants 
Exotic 
      
Indigenous Fruits         
Indigenous Other         
Animals (livestock for 
household plots, wildlife for 
woodlands) 
(for sacred areas, all species 
allowed) 
      
Water        
 
9.2 Operational Requirements: Management: What rules govern the 
management of crops or products? 
Resource/Products  Designated Areas 
 Household 
Plots 
Community 
Woodlands 
Riverine 
Areas 
Sacred 
Areas 
Plants 
Exotic 
     
Indigenous  Fruits       
Indigenous  Other       
Animals (livestock for 
household plots, 
wildlife for woodlands) 
(for sacred areas, all 
species allowed) 
     
Water       
 
10. Operational Control: How are the rules governing the harvesting, 
management and protection of crops and products enforced? 
Resource/Products  Designated Areas 
 Household 
Plots 
Community 
Woodlands 
Riverine 
Areas 
Sacred 
Areas 
Plants 
Exotic 
     
Indigenous  Fruits       
Indigenous  Other       
Animals (livestock for 
household plots, 
wildlife for woodlands) 
(for sacred areas, all 
species allowed) 
     
Water       
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Annex 2: Local Perceptions of wealth criteria 
and wealth groups in Romwe 
 
Wealth class  Criteria/wealth indicators  Number of 
households 
1 – Rich 
(Vanowanisisa) 
Type of main house – brick and tin roof/asbestors 
Dryland farm size – 3-5 ha 
Have access to remittances 
Number of cattle – 8 and above 
Number of goats – 15 and above 
Agricultural implements – ox-drawn plough, some 
have cultivators, hoes 
Other assets – scotch cart, wheelbarrow, some have 
cars, radio. 
Vanodya vachiguta (they eat well) 
Children go to boarding schools 
20 
2 – Average 
(Vanowana) 
Type of main house – pole and dagga (few with tin 
roof) 
Dryland farm size – 2-3 ha 
Have access to remittances 
Number of cattle –4 - 7   
Number of goats – 6 and above 
Agricultural implements – ox-drawn plough, hoes 
Other assets – scotchcart, wheelbarrow, radio but 
some have problems buying batteries 
Vanechikafu chakakwana (they have enough food). 
Children complete primary school and go to day 
secondary schools as they cannot afford boarding 
schools 
40 
3 – Poor 
(Vanoshaya) 
Type of main house – pole and dagga and thatch grass 
Dryland field – 1-2 ha except for sabukus with 3-5 ha 
Very few have access to irregular remittances 
Cattle – 1-2 
Goats – 1-5 
Agricultural implements – hoes and no ox-drawn 
plough 
Other assets - some have wheelbarrows 
Vanotamburira chikafu (They struggle to get food) 
Children finish primary school and become herd boys 
or maids. Cannot afford secondary school fees 
54 
4- Very poor 
(Vanoshayisisa) 
Type of main house – pole and dagga, and thatch 
grass. Some have no main house and use kitchen as 
bedroom. 
Dryland – average of 0.5. ha  
No remittances 
Depend on maricho (piece jobs) 
No cattle 
Agricultural implements – hoes only 
No big household assets 
Vonorarama nekupema (often have to beg for food) 
Children drop out of primary school and become herd 
boys or house girls or engage in maricho 
13 
 